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ABSTRACT 
Malaysia is generally described as a prime example of a society severely divided along 
ethnic lines and most observers agree that ethnic conflict has been, and still is, one of 
the most distinctive sources of political conflict. Malaysia, nonetheless, is one of the 
few plural societies that has achieved some measure of success in managing ethnic 
conflict and enjoyed relative political stability since independence in 1957. In this 
regard, much of the existing tradition in the study of politics in Malaysia concerns the 
development of political structures and processes which regulate conflict situations and 
the achievement of political stability. Previous studies have usefully analyzed how 
ethnic -conflict management strategies have been applied in different situations but they 
have not given adequate attention to how such strategies have changed to meet changing 
circumstances in the deeply divided Malaysian society. 
This thesis is concerned with the nexus between a dynamic conflict structure in 
Malaysia and regime maintenance strategies in that country. The central question is how 
the ruling political elite, especially UMNO leaders and Mahathir, has been able to 
maintain its own political hegemony while at the same time maintaining a fairly high 
degree of regime stability. The study assumes that the conflict structure challenging or 
undermining the maintenance of the regime in Malaysia has been continuously 
changing since independence in 1957. In addition, the changing configuration of 
conflict during transitions provides opportunities for a fresh look at the nature of the 
ruling elite's regime maintenance strategies in accommodating new social and political 
challenges. An assumption throughout this thesis is that those who enjoy positions of 
power in the apparatus of the state are unlikely to give up their power willingly. 
Although, to meet new social and political conflict circumstances, the LM NO -led ruling 
elite has adapted to changing expectations of Malaysian society, the single most 
important motive for regime change and regime maintenance is to sustain its own 
political power. 
The study examines in detail what made the UMNO -led ruling elite transform its 
regime maintenance approaches (from consociational bargaining to authoritarian 
UMNO dominance to Mahathir's personal dominance). It also considers at what were 
the essential elements of these changing regime maintenance strategies. The findings of 
the study offer an alternative viewpoint to the existing theoretical perspective, which 
stresses questions of power in explaining the political behavior of a hegemonic political 
elite in its dealing with the changing conflict configurations and regime maintenance. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
Malaysia is generally described as a prime example of a society severely divided along 
ethnic lines and most observers agree that ethnic conflict has been, and still is, one of 
the most distinctive sources of political conflict. Malaysia, nonetheless, is one of the 
few plural societies that has achieved some measure of success in managing ethnic 
conflict and has enjoyed relative political stability since independence in 1957.1 After 
independence, Malaysian society and economy have changed drastically but the UMNO 
(United Malays National Organization) -led ruling elite has successfully adapted to these 
changes and continued to play a dominant role in the post -colonial Malaysian state. This 
thesis examines how the ruling elite of rival communal groups, especially the dominant 
Malays, have been able to maintain their own political hegemony while achieving 
relative political stability in the last few decades in a severely fragmented Malaysian 
society. 
This thesis has two main purposes. The primary task is to examine the 
transforming and essential elements of the various regime maintenance approaches by 
the UMNO -led ruling elite, especially during the prime ministership of Mahathir 
Mohamad since 1981.2 A secondary, but rather substantial, objective is to interpret the 
Political stability is an ambiguous term defined differently by scholars. For the purposes of this study, 
political stability follows the meaning used by Ian Lustick. He notes that stability or political stability 
refers to the continued operation of specific patterns of political behavior, apart from the illegal use of 
violence, accompanied by a general expectation among the attentive public that such patterns are likely to 
remain intact in the foreseeable future. See Ian Lustick, "Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: 
Consociationalism versus Control ", World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 3, 1979, p. 325. For more elaborations 
on the definition of political stability, see Leon Hurwitz, "Review Essay: Contemporary Approaches to 
Political Stability', Comparative Politics, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1973, pp. 449 -463; Claude Ake, "A Definition of 
Political Stability ", Comparative Politics, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1975, pp. 271 -283. 
2 The notion of regime is situated in a different context of relationships in the international and the 
domestic arena. In everyday language, however, the term 'regime' normally refers to 'the formal and 
informal organization of the center of political power, and its relations with the broader society (Fishman, 
1990:428). A regime may be used to refer to the particular personnel in charge of a state (as in 'the 
Marcos regime' or 'the Suharto regime') or the form of ruling that occurs in the state (i.e., 'an authoritarian 
regime' or 'democratic regimé ). Lawson concludes that 'regimes embody the norms and principles of the 
political organization of the state which are expressed in the rules and procedures set out for government 
to operate within' (Lawson, 1991:6). Regime maintenance or regime continuity, in this study, implies the 
persistence of the modes and practices of ruling by the particular personnel or social group who has 
access to political power in a state. As Fishman notes, 'regimes are more permanent forms of political 
organization than specific governments, but they are typically less permanent than the state' (Fishman, 
1990:428). A change of government, therefore, does not necessarily involve a change in regime. For more 
detail on the definition and account of the state /regime /government distinction, see Stephanie Lawson, 
2 
nature or characteristics of political stability and regime maintenance in Malaysian 
politics. 
1 -1. Ethnic Politics and Malaysian Politics 
For many post -colonial plural societies, nation- building was regarded as the most 
important task since the Second World War.3 Despite their eager wishes, however, it 
has been a sobering experience to see ethnic hostilities and political instability in 
societies that are marked by major cultural cleavage 4 The evidence of ethnic conflict 
and political instability is abundant. For example, in recent decades there have been 
frequent and almost constant communal, religious and regional disputes in Asía, as in 
the cases of Sri Lanka, Burma, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, the Philippines and 
Indonesia. Furthermore, the politics of contemporary Africa, as seen in such countries 
as the Sudan, Nigeria, Ghana, Burundi and Uganda, provides the most vivid examples 
of communal hostilities and political instability in the newly independent countries of 
the post -colonial world. Ethnic conflicts have also occurred frequently in the Caribbean 
and South America. 
In addition, this widespread phenomenon of cultural cleavage, with its 
unfortunate implications for political stability and political democracy, is by no means 
found only in the underdeveloped or developing countries in the Third World. Rather, 
the phenomenon of ethnic conflict can be found in almost every modern state in the 
"Some Conceptual and Empirical Issues in the Study of Regime Change ", Regime Change and Regime 
Maintenance in Asia and the Pacific, Discussion Paper Series Number 3 (Canberra: The Australian 
National University, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, 1991); Robert M. Fishman, 
"Rethinking State and Regime: Southern Europe's Transition to Democracy ", World Politics, Vol. 42, No. 
3, 1990, pp. 422 -440; and Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University, 
1983). 
3 The plural society can be defined in terms of various perspectives. In terms of socio- cultural 
perspective, the plural society presents two or more different cultural traditions in a given population. 
From an economic viewpoint, there is a division of labor along racial lines in the plural society. The 
plural society is, also, a political concept. Rabushka and Shepsle stress that the feature that distinguishes 
the plural society from its pluralistic counterpart is the practice of politics almost exclusively along ethnic 
lines. Each ethnic group holds by its own political organization in the plural society. The plural society, in 
this study, can be characterized by a highly salient ethnic dimension, intense preferences, communal 
incompatibility, and a set of ambitious political entrepreneurs, as Rabushka and Shepsle noted in their 
study. See Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic 
Instability (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1972), p. 88. For the socio- cultural 
perspective of plural society, see M. G. Smith, The Plural Society in the British West Indies (Berkeley and 
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965). An economic viewpoint of plural society can be 
found in J. S. Furnivall, Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy (London: Cambridge University 
Press, 1939). 
Ethnic refers to those basic cultural characteristics of language, custom and heritage that distinguish one 
social group from another; sometimes used synonymously with race. Strictly speaking, ethnic groups are 
not races, since ethnicity can be more precisely defined than race or even logically independent: Serbs 
and Croats are also Slays, and a Jew might be black or white. Nevertheless, 'ethnic conflict' can be the 
same thing as conflict between nations or races as it can also be conflict between religious groups. See 
Iain McLean, Concise Dictionary of Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 163. 
3 
world. If ethnic conflict and political instability were limited only to underdeveloped or 
developing countries, we could assume that economic development would eliminate 
ethnic tensions and facilitate stable democracy in general. However, this assumption is 
questionable, as seen in examples from several industrialized countries. The growing 
expression of ethnic sentiment in the political processes of several industrialized 
nations, such as Canada, Northern Ireland, Switzerland, Belgium and Spain, clearly 
reveals this.5 
Along with the ubiquity of ethnic conflict in the world, the intensifying of racial 
assertiveness has been widespread and has even accelerated recently. In brief, the 
problem of ethnic conflict has become increasingly prominent in Eastern Europe since 
1989 and the collapse of communist regimes in the early 1990s. The slaughters inside 
the former Yugoslavia and other ex- members of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) are the most dramatic manifestations of this contemporary 
development. In this sense, Rabushka and Shepsle mention that 'ethnic conflict is 
constrained neither by time nor space; the history of plural societies is replete with 
tragedies of civil strife dating over centuries and located in nearly every region of the 
globe..6 
Viewed in this light, for political scientists, one of the most distinctive, broadest 
and long -lived phenomena to have developed since the Second World War is the 
persistent, even rising, communal assertiveness in scores of national political arenas. It 
appears to be a general assumption among political scientists that rising tensions and 
conflicts will inevitably occur in ethnically divided societies. 
This view, however, is not necessarily shared by all analysts of countries with 
plural societies. Malaysia is only one of many nations in which ethnic conflict 
conditions daily life as well as politics. Like other plural societies, Malaysia has deep 
vertical cleavages, reflecting differences in race, religion, culture, language and even 
ideology. The pluralistic character of Malaysia's population has come into being over 
the course of the last 150 years. Various culturally and ethnically differentiated groups 
can be found in Malaysia's population of just under 20 million. Religious groupings 
also tend to be along ethnic lines. In terms of culture, Malaysia is also particularly rich, 
being the home of the representatives of four of the world's major cultures - Islamic, 
Chinese, Indian, and Western - as well as possessing a vigorous indigenous culture of 
5 For more detail on ethnic conflict in industrialized countries as well as in the developing and 
underdeveloped countries, see Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972, pp. 2 -8; John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary 
(eds.), The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation (London: Routledge, 1993); and Abdul Said and Luiz R. 
Simmons (eds.), Ethnicity in an International Context (New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1976). 
4 
its own. Though Bahasa Melayu (Malay Language) is the national language under 
Article 152 of the Constitution and must be used for official purposes, various ethnic 
groups use their own languages in their daily life. This ethnic mixture makes Malaysia 
a prime example of a plural society. 
What makes Malaysia more unusual, however, is not only its highly variegated 
ethnic mix but also the large size of its ethnic minorities. In Malaysia, despite various 
differentiated groups, the most basic population division is that between Bumiputera 
(son of the soil) and non -Bumiputera people. Broadly speaking, Malaysias ethnic 
groups fall into two main categories: those with cultural affinities indigenous to the 
region and to one another, classified as Bumiputera; and those whose cultural affinities 
lie outside, classified as non- Bumiputera. Malays constitute the principal Bumiputera 
group and account for around 55 per cent of Malaysia's population. Together with 
other indigenous peoples they make up about 61.7 per cent of the population. Chinese 
constitute about 27.3 per cent of Malaysia's population and Indians about 7.7 per cent 
in Peninsular Malaysia.? 
Malaysia, nonetheless, is one of the few plural societies that has achieved some 
measure of success in managing ethnic relations. The main measure of such success is 
the relative absence of violent racial conflict. Since independence in 1957, Malaysia 
has enjoyed political stability and relative racial harmony. Apart from an almost two - 
year period following racial riots after the 1969 general election, the parliamentary 
system of Malaysia has functioned continuously and general elections have been held 
regularly. Though not as a result of elections, there have been three consecutive 
changes of heads of government without violence and there have been ten 
uninterrupted general elections. In this sense, the political process of Malaysia has been 
regular and predictable for the last few decades. Its military, moreover, is clearly 
subordinate to the civil power and there has never been any threat of a military 
intervention in the political process.8 This experience of political stability makes 
Malaysia a distinctive case among the newly independent countries of the post -colonial 
world. 
The distinctiveness, however, does not only arise from the consistent 
experience of political stability in Malaysian society. Of further distinction is the 
UMNO -led ruling elite's successful overcoming of inter /infra- ethnic conflicts 
6 Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972, p. 7. 
7 See Seventh Malaysia Plan 1996 -2000, p. 106. 
$ See Harold Crouch, "The Military in Malaysia" in Viberto Selochan (ed.), The Military, the State, and 
Development in Asia and the Pacific (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 121 -137. 
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throughout a series of different conflict situations over the Iast few decades. Malaysian 
politics has gone through four different phases since independence in 1957 and the 
patterns of conflict configurations which challenge or undermine regime continuity 
have also shifted at least three times during that period. Throughout the whole political 
process, however, the UMNO -led ruling elite has successfully adapted to these changes 
and has continued to maintain its own political hegemony with relative political 
stability. This makes Malaysia's experience of conflict management and regime 
maintenance more remarkable, providing a special incentive and rationale for the study 
of ethnic politics in a plural society. 
The first stage of Malaysian politics (1957 -1969) was a period of Malay 
dominance, but with strong recognition of the non -Malay political role. This was 
mainly because inter -ethnic conflict was perceived as the main threat to regime 
stability in the process of nation -building after independence. The terms 'inter- ethnic 
bargaining' and 'compromise', therefore, were most frequently used among the ruling 
elite of rival communal groups during the first twelve years of independence. The 
accommodation also served the UMNO -led ruling elite's interest more generally and 
allowed them to stay in power. 
The conflict configuration, however, changed drastically as the Malaysian 
society moved into its second decade of independence. Especially after the racial riots 
in 1969, the tradition of inter -ethnic elite accommodation was less important as a 
contributing factor to the preservation of political legitimacy of the UMNO -led ruling 
elite. The previous acquiescent attitudes of the segmental masses, especially the 
dominant Malays, towards their communal leaders were also replaced by open 
criticism. Given the changed political environment, one of the most obvious features of 
the second stage of Malaysian politics (1969 -1987) was the shift in UMNO leaders' 
attitude from moderate consociational bargaining to one of more hegemonic control. 
During that period, the modes and practices of ruling by the UMNO -led government 
became closer to the control end on a consensus -control continuum, but in relative 
terms, political stability remained intact. 
The year 1987 marked another significant change in the political environment 
as intra -UMNO factional conflict became more and more intense. For the dominant 
Malay ruling elite fed by Mahathir, the main sources of conflict undermining its 
hegemonic position came increasingly from within UMNO circles. This time the split 
within the ruling bloc seemed to provide the prospect of the transition from an 
authoritarian or semi -authoritarian regime towards a more competitive and 
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accommodative political system. However, what actually happened in the post -1987 
phase was the consolidation of Mahathir's authoritarian rule. The deepening UMNO 
factionalism and subsequent leadership crisis encouraged the Mahathir -led ruling elite 
to adopt a more assertive approach in order to curtail the political and civil liberties of 
its political opponents. Consequently, a new ruling party, UMNO (Baru) was formed 
around Mahathir. Especially in the years after 1990, Mahathir has successfully 
maintained a political order and re- emerged as strong as ever. In the 1990s, two distinct 
phenomena occurred: on the one hand, Mahathir appeared much less tolerant toward 
potential challengers to his political dominance; on the other, there was greater 
tolerance for the traditionally sensitive non -Malay concerns, pertaining to their 
language, education, religion and cultural heritage. These ambivalent 'repressive - 
responsive' features, however, were not contradictory but 'mutually supportive' for 
Mahathir's dominance in the processes of power throughout the third period of 
Malaysian politics (1987 -1998).9 
The period from 1998 onwards can be regarded as the fourth phase and this is 
closely related to another shifting pattern of conflict configurations in the Malaysian 
society. After several years of rumors of a leadership tussle between Mahathir and his 
deputy Anwar Ibrahim, Anwar was abruptly dismissed from office, expelled from the 
ruling party, beaten while in police custody, and eventually charged in court on several 
counts of sodomy and corruption in September 1998. Anwar's abrupt dismissal and its 
drastic aftermath shocked the nation and Malaysian civil society became increasingly 
politicized. Mahathir's national image was tarnished to a great extent and anti -Mahathir 
sentiment became widespread, especially among the Malay community. What was 
more significant was that the Anwar episode promoted the emergence of multi- ethnic 
consciousness in Malaysian civil society, and anti -Mahathir sentiment translated into 
serious disenchantment with the UMNO -led ruling elite as a whole. This time the most 
crucial elements threatening the Mahathir regime's political hegemony arose from the 
resurrection of multi- ethnic civil society and enhanced prospects for political 
liberalization. Until recently, the Mahathir regime appeared to have effectively 
managed the ongoing crisis situation and Mahathir's personal grip on power seemed to 
remain almost intact. Malaysian politics beyond Anwar, nonetheless, provides another 
opportunity to return to the nexus between factional conflict in the ruling bloc and the 
breakdown or erosion of authoritarian rule. The future prospects of `regime change' or 
9 See Harold Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
1996). 
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`regime maintenance' are still uncertain. 
1 -2. Research Questions 
The primary questions posed in this study are: 
(1) How does a country like Malaysia with deep cleavages, reflecting differences in 
race, religion, culture, language and even ideology, successfully maintain 
regime continuity with relative political stability? 
(2) How are we to interpret the nature or characteristics of political stability and 
regime maintenance in Malaysian ethnic politics? 
In analyzing these general questions, the following substantial research questions will 
be investigated: 
(1) Under which conditions and by which processes do ethnic identities become 
activated and converted to political conflict in the multi- ethnic Malaysian 
society? 
(2) For adaptation to changing conflict configurations, what regime maintenance 
approaches are used by the dominant Malay ruling elite? 
(3) What were the main motives and essential elements of the different regime 
maintenance strategies (from moderate consociational arrangements prior to 
1969 and then authoritarian Malay dominance during 1969 -1987 to Mahathir's 
personal dominance but with greater tolerance for the traditional non -Malay 
concerns in the years after 1987) in responding to the changing conflict 
configurations in Malaysian politics? 
(4) To what extent do factional rivalries within the ruling bloc affect the 
transformation of Malaysia's political landscape? In particular, what are the 
main differences and similarities in the circumstances that surround the two 
distinct UMNO factional conflicts in 1987 and 1998, especially in relation to 
the transition from authoritarian or semi -authoritarian rule? 
1 -3. The Study of Conflict Resolution and Regime Maintenance in a Plural Society 
and Its Relevance to Malaysia 
There is general consensus in the study of politics in plural societies that communalism 
is the most significant feature of the political system and that the motif of ethnic politics 
is tension between segmented ethnic communities. Much of this Iiterature is concerned 
with the breakdown of communal relations but it also examines the development of 
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political structures and processes to regulate conflict situations and achieve political 
stability. Most studies influenced by this perspective assume that plural societies are 
inherently prone to conflict and everything of political and economic significance is 
closely associated with communal interests. Political parties are organized communally 
and the ethnic -based parties themselves tend to represent communal interests. In 
ethnically divided societies, rising tensions and conflict are rarely resolved by orthodox 
democratic measures and, therefore, require special strategies to accommodate the 
nation's differing communal interests.to 
In particular, an intriguing solution to the puzzle of political stability in deeply 
divided societies has been proposed by scholars who have adopted ' consociational 
analysis'. Consociational analysts, such as Lijphart (1969; 1977) and Lehmbruch (1975), 
derive an empirical and normative model called consociational democracy from the 
study of stable Western European democratic regimes with severely fragmented 
societies, for example, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium and Austria. The 
empirical application of this approach has also covered the post -colonial plural societies 
of the Third World, for example, Malaysia (1955 -1969), Lebanon (1943 -1975) and Fiji 
(1970- 1987).0 
An excellent definition of consociational democracy is provided by Lijphart. 
Consociational democracy is defined in terms of four characteristics: (1) government by 
a grand coalition of the political leaders of all significant segments of the plural society; 
0 See Eric A. Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies (Cambridge: Harvard University, 
Center for International Affairs, 1972); Rabuska and Shepsle, 1972; McGarry and O'Leary (ed.), 1993. 
Leo Kuper uses the term 'equilibrium as a contrast to 'conflict' regarding the nature of societies 
characterized by pluralism. According to the equilibrium perspective, the permanent condition in plural 
societies of existing societal cleavages along ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious lines should not 
necessarily imply a negative assessment. Rather, such fragmented divisions in plural societies themselves 
provide positive opportunities, largely lacking in homogeneous societies. This equilibrium perspective 
has been applied in contexts so varied that the term acquires separate meanings, such as those implied in 
the melting -pot model, the pluralist model, mass society theory and modernization theory. Though these 
approaches are not directly focused on the methods of ethnic conflict management, they seem to give 
meaningful insight into possible political stability and system endurance in the long -term. For relevant 
studies on the equilibrium approach to pluralism and the critical research on this perspective, see Leo 
Kuper and M. G. Smith (eds.), Pluralism in Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1971), pp. 7 -22; William Komhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (New York: The Free Press, 
1959); Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (eds.), The Integration of Political Communities 
(Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964); L. Diamond, Juan Linz and S. M. Lipset (eds.), Politics in Developing 
Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 
1990); Saul Newman, "Does Modernization Breed Ethnic Political Conflict ", World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 
3, 199I, pp. 451 -478; Walker Connor, "Nation -building or Nation -destroying ? ", World Politics, Vol. 24, 
No. 3, 1972, pp. 319 -355; and R. Melson and H. Wolpe, "Modernization and the Politics of 
Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective ", American Political Science Review, Vol. 64, No. 4, 1970, pp. 
1112 -1130. 
u Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," World Politics, Vol. 21, No. 2, 1969, pp. 207 -225; Arend 
Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); and Gerhard 
Lehmbruch, "Consociational Democracy in the International System ", European Journal of Political 
Research, Vol. 3, 1975, pp. 377 -391. 
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(2) the mutual veto or concurrent majority rule, which serves as an additional protection 
of vital minority interests; (3) proportionality as the principal standard of political 
representation, civil service appointments, and allocation of public funds; and (4) a high 
degree of autonomy for each segment to run its own internal affairs.12 The essential 
conceptual tools for the explanation of stability in fragmented societies are compromise, 
bargaining, accommodation, coalition and alliance. In short, stability in a segmented 
society is said to be the result of the 'co- operative efforts' of subcultural elites 'to 
counteract the centrifugal tendencies of cultural fragmentation.i13 
Since Lijphart introduced the concept of consociational democracy, the literature 
dealing with consociational techniques for achieving and maintaining political stability 
in deeply divided societies has expanded rapidly, though not always conforming to 
Líjphart's approach. Some of the important works in this perspective include: Rothchild 
(1970), Daalder (1974), Nordlinger (1972), Lehmbruch (1974), Steiner (1974), Lorwin 
(1974), Noel (1974), Ormsby (1974), and Milne (1981).14 The consociational approach 
has also been widely applied to the case study of conflict management in ethnically 
divided Malaysian society.15 The political science literature on consociational analysis 
in Malaysian studies is therefore not lacking. The essential studies that clearly outline 
this perspective include: Gullick (1964), Ratnam (1965), Milne (1967), Ratnam and 
Milne (1967), von Vorys (1975), Mauzy (1983), Ongkili (1985), Means (1991) and 
Case (1996).16 
í2 See Lijphart, 1977, pp. 25 -52. 
13 Arend Lijphart, "Cultural Diversity and Theories of Political Integration, Canadian Journal of 
Political Science 4 (March 1971), p. 9. Similarly, Eric Nordlinger tries to elaborate a theory of stability in 
segmented political systems by identifying conditions conducive to successful operation of one or more 
of six effective conflict -regulatory practices: (1) the stable governing coalition between political parties, 
(2) the principle of proportionality, (3) the mutual veto, (4) purposive depoliticization, (5) compromises 
on the issues which divide conflict groups, and (6) the granting of concessions by one of the conflict 
groups, as opposed to compromise, which entails mutual concessions or adjustments. He assumes that in 
the absence of at least one of six conflict -regulating practices, deeply divided societies will experience 
intense and destabilizing conflicts. See Nordlinger, 1972, especially pp. 20 -41. 
14 See Donald Rothchild, "Review Article: Ethnicity and Conflict Resolution, World Politics, Vol. 22, 
No. 4, 1970, pp. 597 -616; Nordlinger, 1972; and R. S. Milne, Politics in Ethnically Bipolar States: 
Guyana, Malaysia, Fiji (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1981). Articles by Daalder, 
Lehmbruch, Steniner, Lorwin, Noel, Ormsby and other scholars on the consociational approach published 
in a volume by Kenneth McRae (ed.), Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in 
Segmented Societies (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Limited, 1974). 
15 For research trends in post -colonial Malaysian ethnic politics, see Than Seong Chee, Social Science 
Research in Malaysia (Singapore: Graham Brash, 1981), pp. 61 -80; Felix Gagliano, "Political Science" in 
John A. Lent (ed.), Malaysian Studies: Present Knowledge and Research Trends (Northern Illinois 
University, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1979), pp. 135 -170; and Tan Chee Beng, Bibliography on 
Ethnic Relations with Special Reference to Malaysia and Singapore (Kuala Lumpur: University of 
Malaya, Institute of Advanced Studies, 1992). 
16 J. M. Gullick, Malaya (London: Longmans, 1964); K. J. Ramam, Communalism and the Political 
Process in Malaya (Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1965); R. S. Milne, Government and Politics 
in Malaysia (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967); K. J. Ratnam and R. S. Milne, The Malaysian 
Parliamentary Elections of 1964 (Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1967); Karl von Vorys, 
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Studies informed by consociational analysis in Malaysia basically suggest that 
what is required is greater attention to inter -ethnic accommodation, bargaining and 
negotiation between ethnic elites in order to solve complex socio- political conflict and 
to maintain system. To them, even under unpromising circumstances, consociational 
politics is still operative to a great extent in pluralistic Malaysian politics. Ethnic 
balancing in elite recruitment and the allocation of resources are essential indications of 
consociational politics. Since the 1970s, the notion of consociationalism as the primary 
source in analyzing the nature of the Malaysian polity, however, has been challenged as 
the new generation of Malay leaders appeared to increasingly move away from 
compromise and the accommodative tradition. This was also because elite competition 
and division became more infra- ethnic during the 1980s. The consociational approach, 
nonetheless, has continued to be the dominant framework for the analysis of Malaysian 
political structures and processes. 
Meanwhile, the consociational approach has been challenged by a theoretical 
discourse presented in 'control' terms to provide an alternative mode of conflict 
management and regime maintenance in deeply divided societies. Whereas the 
consociational approach focuses on the emergence and functioning of elite consensus as 
a key factor explaining stability in plural societies, the control approach primarily 
focuses on how a superordinate ethnic group can effectively manipulate /control 
subordinate or rival ethnic groups. In this theory, the terms domination, repression and 
hegemonic control are the most common elements of managing ethnic conflict in multi- 
ethnic societies. The control approach as an alternative discourse to the consociational 
model was elaborated by Ian Lustick.17 However, even before Lustick, the notion of 
control had long been illustrated by many other scholars as a means of explaining 
stability and conflict management in deeply divided societies, as shown in the studies of 
Furnivall (1939), Smith (1965), Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) and Esman (1973).18 
Although Furnivall is not regarded as a scholar who insists on a control 
approach in his study of 1939, two implications in his work on the plural society have 
Democracy without Consensus: Communalism and Political Stability in Malaysia (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1975); Diane K. Mauzy, Barisan Nasional: Coalition Government in Malaysia (Kuala 
Lumpur: Mancan & Sons Sdn Bhd, 1983); James P. Ongkili, Nation -building in Malaysia, 1946 -1974 
(Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985); Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics: The Second 
Generation (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1991); and William Case, Elites and Regimes in 
Malaysia: Revisiting a Consociational Democracy (Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, 1996). 
Lustick, 1979. For critical reviews of the consociational model, see Brian Barry, "Political 
Accommodation and Consociational Democracy ", British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 5, 1975, pp. 
477 -505; Brian Barry, "Consociational Model and its Dangers ", European Journal of Political Research, 
Vol. 3, 1975, pp. 393 -412; and McGarry and O'Leary, 1993, pp. 30 -37. 
s Furnivall, 1939; Smith, 1965; Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972; and Milton J. Esman, The Management of 
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been explored by other scholars examing the matter. One is that separate communities 
inherently incline toward conflict behavior. The other is that the unity of plural 
societies is maintained through non -democratic means by an external force. The second 
notion of an 'external force' to hold divided groups together is pertinent to the `control' 
approach. With the same perspective, Smith stresses the need for authoritative 
regulation to keep order in societies with rival communal groups. According to him, 
'given the fundamental differences of belief, value and organization that connote 
pluralism, the monopoly of power by one cultural section is the essential precondition 
for the maintenance of the total society in its current form.'19 
In the case of Africa, it is believed that, to a certain extent, the relative stability 
of the colonial phase may be attributed precisely to the political domination of 
external/colonial forces. With political independence, however, the Africans were 
invited to rule themselves and, inevitably, political power was not distributed equally 
to all cultural/ethnic groups. Rather, political power in the newly independent African 
states quickly fell into the hands of one cultural or ethnic group, usually the one 
previously favored by colonial administrators. In consequence, it is no coincidence that 
civil war, or the launching of an endless sequence of military coups, followed soon 
after the winning of political independence in the history of modem Africa. 
Esman thus suggests 'institutionalized dominance' as one of four paths to the 
effective management of communal conflict.20 He asserts that regimes committed to 
the dominance of one communal group at the expense of another will always use three 
methods of conflict management. The three methods are: proscription or control of the 
political expression of collective interest among dominated groups; limitation of 
membership in the dominant community; and monopoly or preferential access for the 
dominant group to political participation, advanced education, economic opportunities 
and symbols of status which reinforce the political, economic and psychic control of 
the dominant group.21 
The general argument made by Rabushka and Shepsle is that plural societies 
cannot develop as stable democracies. What they show is that one way of resolving the 
tension between the plural character of a society and a democratic political ethos is 
through the dominant- majority configuration. And, the dominant majority 
configuration is characterized by infrequent ethnic co- operation, immoderate ethnic 
Communal Conflict ", Public Policy, Vol. 21, 1973, pp. 49 -78. 
19 Smith, 1965, p. 86. 
20 The other three are induced assimilation, syncretic integration and balanced pluralism. See Esman, 
1973, pp. 57 -63. 
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politics at the expense of minority groups at the constitutional as well as the policy 
level, and eventual repression of minority political activity.'22 According to them, the 
minority communities' democratic role is 'politically significant only in the event of 
major splits in the dominant group.'23 
The most systematic introduction to the control approach as an alternative 
theoretical discourse for achieving stability in a vertically segmented society is 
Lustick's study. He argues that the emergence and maintenance of stable conflict 
resolution in societies where political culture is sharply divided can be better explained 
by the sustained manipulation of subordinate segments by a superordinate segment 
than the mutual cooperation and bargaining of subnational elites. He underlines that 
consociational modes can only be applied effectively when an alternative means of 
control or domination is available for the dominant segment.24 Empirically, 'there are at 
least as many deeply divided societies whose stability is accounted for by the effective 
exertion of the superior power of one sub -unit as by the "cooperative efforts" of rival 
sub -unit elites'.25 Furthermore, Lustick claims that there was a general slackening of 
interest in consociationalism as increasingly previously exemplary consociational 
countries collapsed or became destabilized, especially since the mid- 1980s.26 
The control model seems a rather consistent and rational theoretical tool for the 
analysis of conflict management in Malaysia. The experience of Malaysian politics 
since the 1970s, especially, conforms more to the control model than to the 
consociational one. A series of studies on classification of regimes also illustrates that 
Malaysia has moved closer to the authoritarian end on the liberal- authoritarian 
continuum over the last few decades.27 The number of studies informed by the control 
21 Esman, 1973, pp. 56 -57. 
n Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972, p. 90. 
Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972, p. 89. 
Lustick, 1979, p. 326. 
25 Lustick, 1979, p. 330. 
26 For the most critical review of the consociational model, see Ian Lustick, "Lijphart, Lakatos, and 
Consociationalism ", World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1, 1997, pp. 88 -117. For other effective critiques, see 
Barry, "Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy ", 1975, pp. 477 -505; Barry, 
"Consociational Model and its Dangers ", 1975, pp. 393 -412; M. P. C. M. van Schendelen, The Views of 
Arend Lijphart and Collected Criticisms ", Acta Política 19 (January 1984); Adriano Pappalardo, "The 
Conditions for Consociational Democracy: A Logical and Empirical Critique ", European Journal of 
Political Research 9 (December 1981); and Sue M. Halpern, "The Disorderly Universe of Consociational 
Democracy ", West European Politics, Vol. 9, No. 4, 1986, pp. 181 -197. 
27 In 1965, Malaysia was evaluated as 'near free' by an annual survey scoring political and civil liberties. 
It, however, moved towards a 'partly free' status in the same survey conducted in 1985. The classification 
of regimes at the end of 1997 shows that Malaysia had 'non -liberal' status or had moved closer to the 
authoritarian end. For more detail on the classification of regimes by country, see Larry Diamond, Juan J. 
Linz and Seymour Martin Upset (eds.), Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia (Colorado: Lynne 
Rienner Publisher, 1989), pp. 36 -37; Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation 
(Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), pp. 279 -280. 
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perspective, nonetheless, is unimpressive compared with the amount of research 
devoted to consociational analysis. The best comprehensive introduction to the 
Malaysian political process using the control approach is found in Barraclough's study. 
He argues that the regime has adopted coercion as the essential means of managing its 
political legitimacy and the use of coercion has not been confined to non -Malays but to 
all communal groups ` s Though not directly related to the control approach, Mauzy's 
notion of 'coercive consociationalism' connotes an increase of non -consociational 
elements - centralized federalism, political dominance of one -party in cabinet and 
government, no constitutional establishment of mutual veto on the sensitive issues, a 
highly disproportionate electoral system, and authoritarian rule by a powerful prime 
minister rather than by a cartel of elites - in Malaysia's political structures and 
processes, especially under the Mahathir regime.29 
Despite diverse interpretations in the study of stability in ethnic politics, some 
critical limitations are found in applying these approaches to the Malaysian case. 
Malaysia fits reasonably well one or other of these two major theoretical approaches, 
but the theories cannot be applied to the whole political process in Malaysia. This is 
mainly because the existing theoretical traditions have not given adequate attention to 
the changing conflict configurations and the dominant political elites' subsequent 
modification of conflict resolution approaches. These limitations cause empirical over - 
extension when they are applied and generalized into the whole political structures and 
processes to interpret the character of political stability and regime maintenance in 
deeply divided societies. 
The consociational model, for example, would appear to suit the Malaysian 
political system in some respects. As I describe in chapter three, there are some 
characteristics of consociationalism in the Malaysian political system, especially in the 
first phase. Nevertheless, the consociational power -sharing arrangements do not always 
seem to suit Malaysian ethnic politics. In fact, the Malaysian political system is backed 
by considerable authoritarian power and it demonstrates repeatedly characteristics of 
hegemonic control. From this perspective, the relatively strong consociational 
bargaining that occurred in the first stage is 'aberrant'. When it comes to interpreting 
the second phase of Malaysian ethnic politics, especially, the limitations of 
consociationalism are obvious. Because of increasing political and economic 
28 Simon Barraclough, "The Dynamics of Coercion in the Malaysian Political Process ", Modern Asian 
Studies, Vol. 19, No. 4, 1985, pp. 197 -822. 
29 Diane K. Maury, "Malaysia: Malay Political Hegemony and 'Coercive Consociationalism "' in John 
McGarry and Brendan O'Leary (eds.), 1993, pp. 106 -127. 
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discrimination in favor of the Malays in the 1970s, Lijphart himself notes that 'it is 
doubtful that Malaysia after 1971 can be regarded as either fully democratic or fully 
consociatíonaL'30 Furthermore, the authoritarian trend that began in the early 1980s 
after Mahathir Mohamad took political control cannot be sufficiently explained in 
terms of the concept of bargaining and consociationalism. 
The control approach reveals the same limitation as the consociational approach 
to the issue of change in Malaysia. As an alternative approach to consociationalism, the 
control model seems more capable of analyzing the second period after the 1969 racial 
riots. The experience of the period 1987 -1990 also illustrates that the necessary 
conditions for the practice of consociational democracy can be allowed only if the 
hegemonic political elite's power is not seriously undermined. However, in the years 
prior to 1969 and after 1990, there are clear limitations of the control approach. 
Especially when applied to the third phase after 1990, the control model has difficulties 
explaining how multi- ethnic Malaysian society with strong state intervention during 
the second period did not move in a more repressive and dictatorial direction, as most 
Third World states have done where strong state intervention exists. The control model 
has also been criticized for ignoring mutual understanding of cultural values, growing 
factionalism within communal groups and the development of multi -racial 
consciousness which would enable the convergence between segmented ethnic 
communities in a plural society. Ethnic identities in fact have by no means 
disappeared. As society modernizes, however, ethnic identities become less important 
and conflict tends to be reduced; in the case of Malaysia this is seen especially in the 
restoration of consociational or accommodative characteristics in the 1990s. 
The weaknesses of the existing theoretical traditions are largely due to their 
orientation towards the study of ethnic politics. The existing academic literature 
focuses on order and stability and the methods of achieving/preserving them. Of 
course, this orientation strongly reflects the concern about widespread and intensifying 
bloodshed resulting from ethnic conflict in the modern world. Nevertheless, the over- 
emphasis on order /stability and the techniques of conflict management underlines 
critical problems both in the arena of academic and political reality. In the academic 
arena, as mentioned above, the existing approaches have usefully analyzed how ethnic - 
conflict management strategies have been applied in different situations but they have 
not given adequate attention to how such strategies have changed to meet new 
circumstances in deeply divided societies. More importantly, the preoccupation with 
so Lijphart, 1977, p. 153. 
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order /stability and the techniques of regulating conflict could possibly lead to 
justification of conservative and authoritarian political control by the government in 
political reality. In fact, for the last few decades, the various methods of ethnic conflict 
management themselves have been frequently utilized by many political leaders of 
newly independent countries to legitimize their authoritarian and totalitarian political 
rules. 
In Malaysia, the UMNO -led ruling elite has frequently changed its approach to 
society. Despite a relatively democratic political process since independence in 1957, 
the Malay -dominated government often turned to authoritarian means to control its 
imminent and/or potential political opponent groups. The authoritarian behavior of the 
Malaysian government has been seen in various ways since the 1970s. After the 1969 
racial rioting in particular, the Malaysian political system shifted in an authoritarian 
direction. Authoritarian powers were thought necessary to deal with ethnic tension and 
for the purpose of maintaining a stable socio- political order. It was also believed that 
political stability might be strengthened after the immediate aftermath of a bloody 
ethnic riot in 1969 and the outbreak of further racial conflict would be avoided. During 
the 1980s, however, it was more difficult to believe that the authoritarian trend 
reflected imminent ethnic conflict of Malaysian society. The explanation of the 
authoritarian trend in the 1980s must be different to that of the 1970s. The other 
transition after the mid -1980s is more challenging and gives us an opportunity to 
provide new insight into the nature of conflict resolution and regime maintenance in 
Malaysian politics. 
In addition to the mid- 1980s' authoritarian trend, there was another significant 
change led by Mahathir's government in the 1990s_ After the economic recession of 
the mid -1980s and the split of UIVLNNO in 1988, various gestures by the Mahathir 
government were made to the non -Malay communities. During this period, the control 
mode was not completely abandoned. The political dominance of the ruling elite was 
indeed further consolidated, especially around Mahathir's personality. It was, however, 
during this period that political sensitivity towards the non -Malays was reduced 
remarkably. Among the important changes were: liberalization of language and 
education policies; promotion of nation -building in the society, such as Bangsa 
Malaysia and Wawasan 2020; and re- definition of the Malay community's traditional 
concerns, such as the position of the Malay rulers, the Malay language and Islam. 
These changes have been initiated by UMNO Ieaders and Mahathir in particular. Why 
have these changes taken place? To what extent can the theoretical discourses of 
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control and consociationalism explain the judicious mix of continuing political 
dominance and accommodative ethnic policies especially in the 1990s2 
1 -4. An Alternative Approach 
Viable long -term political stability in a severely divided society requires some degree of 
consensus and accommodation among the leaders of rival communities and within the 
factions of their own group. It must, however, also be noted that the political stability 
and persistence of the ruling pattern exist to the extent that the various sources of 
conflict are effectively restricted by centralized decision -making and state control. That 
is, hegemonic control is likely to serve as the basis for the continued operation of 
specific patterns of political behavior in societies that are marked by major cultural 
cleavage. 
In this context, Rothchild suggests that the various elite power -sharing regimes 
represent 'amalgams of authoritarian control and consociational democracy'. He argues 
that 'elite power -sharing regimes can be either moderately authoritarian or moderately 
democratic systems... Either way, such regimes unite the competing thrusts of political 
control and bargaining among the state and various societal notables.'31 In the study of 
politics in Malaysia, Case also notes that Malaysia has displayed both Lijphart's 
consociationalism and Lustick's control in elite relations and ethnic alignments. These 
characteristics made the Malaysian polity 'semi- democracy' in nature.32 Likewise, 
Crouch characterizes the ambiguous Malaysian political system as a 'repressive - 
responsive regime'.33 Studies informed by this perspective help us to understand the 
Malaysian political structures which combine some key elements of liberal political 
processes with considerable levels of state control. 
This study also begins by locating the admixture of consociational and control 
features of the Malaysian political structures at the center of the analysis. Nonetheless, 
in response to the weaknesses of the existing theoretical approaches, a series of 
questions arises: under what circumstances are consociational modes of ruling exercised 
by the super -ordinate sub -units over sub -ordinate sub -units? What motivates the 
political ruling elite to transform, or modify, its regime maintenance strategies into ones 
31 Donald Rothchild, Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation 
(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), pp. 13 -14. 
32 William Case, "Semi- Democracy in Malaysia: Withstanding the Pressures for Regime Change ", Pacific 
Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 2, 1993, pp. 183 -205. A similar conceptualization of Malaysian polity can be found 
in Zakaria Haji Ahmad, "Malaysia: Quasi Democracy in a Divided Society" in Larry Diamond, Juan J. 
Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds.), 1989, pp. 347 -381. 
33 See Crouch, 1996, especially pp. 236 -247. 
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which are more hegemonic? Or, under which conditions is the political ruling elite 
likely to incorporate consociational and control features in managing conflict situations? 
Why does this admixture take place? These are key points in interpreting the nature of 
the UMNO -led ruling elite's political behavior in containing conflict and maintaining 
regime stability. 
This study assumes that the conflict structure challenging or undermining the 
maintenance of the regime in Malaysia has been continuously changing since 
independence in 1957. And, the transition period of changing conflict configurations 
provides opportunities for a fresh look at the nature of the ruling elite's regime 
maintenance strategies in accommodating new social and political challenges. The main 
interest of this study lies in how the political behavior of the ruling elite has adapted to 
changing socio- political configurations to maintain regime stability. 
Nordlinger emphasizes the critical role of conflict group leaders in the process of 
conflict regulation in a deeply divided society.i4 However, in circumstances of uneven 
power distribution, the various conflict group elites or conflict organizations, namely 
political parties, are not always treated equally. Rather, we need to highlight the critical 
role of a hegemonic political party and its dominant leaders. In this study, the UMNO- 
led ruling elite, therefore, will be considered a primary political actor, though the role of 
the ruling coalition and the opposition will be considered also. The rationale behind this 
is that UMNO, as the dominant group in the government, has played a crucial role in 
post -colonial Malaysian society by substituting for colonial rule as a force ensuring a 
stable political order. Especially since the -mid 1980s, the capacity of the UMNO -led 
ruling elite for adaptability and responsiveness to the changed conflict circumstances 
has been prominent. 
In analyzing the nature of the political behavior of the UMNO -led ruling elite in 
containing conflict and maintaining regime stability, this study will be considering the 
motives, incentives and timing of the changing regime maintenance strategies by the 
UMNO -led ruling elite as major analytical concepts. The presence of strong conflict - 
regulating motives, according to Nordlinger, is a necessary condition if the political 
ruling elites are to engage in conflict -regulating behavior.35 In a similar vein, Horowitz 
notes that: 
34 See Nordlinger, 1972, pp. 39 -41. 
35 Nordlinger argues that one or more of four motivations must be present if the political leaders are to 
make regulatory efforts: the strong desire to fend off external pressure; to maintain or increase the level of 
economic well -being of the leaders' segment; to acquire or retain political power; or to avoid bloodshed or 
strife within their own segments. For more detail on these conflict -regulating motives, see Nordlinger, 
1972, pp. 42 -53. 
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...since elite competition is one of the sources of ethnic conflict, it is a mistake to impute good 
intentions to leaders without good political reasons for thinking they in fact entertain such 
intentions. What is needed is a theory of timing and incentives for elite cooperation [and elite 
competition1.36 
Neither Nordlinger's motivations nor Horowitz's incentives are directly related to 
conceptual and empirical issues in the study of regime change and regime maintenance 
in an ethnically divided society. Such analytical concepts of motives or incentives, 
nonetheless, provide a meaningful insight into the nature of the LTMNO -led ruling elite's 
initiating role in modifying its regime maintenance strategies over the Iast few decades: 
from moderate consociational arrangements (1957 -1969) and then authoritarian Malay 
dominance (1969 -1987) to Mahathir's personal dominance but with an ambivalent 
repressive- responsive admixture (1987- 1998). 
From the perspective of the hegemonic political party and its critical role in 
initiating change in specific ruling patterns, this study will draw special attention to the 
notion of relative leadership autonomy. The capacity of the political elite is always 
limited. Especially in ethnically segmented societies, the limitations are mostly imposed 
by cultural cleavages and other communal factors. The notion of relative autonomy, 
nonetheless, suggests that the hegemonic political party and its dominant leaders may 
pursue their own interests without needing to take account the interests of the classes or 
certain segmented groups in the society at large. Among conflict- regulating 
motivations, this study gives primary emphasis to a question of power in determining 
the political behavior of the hegemonic political elite in accordance with the changing 
conflict configurations. Although the UMNO -led ruling elite has adapted to changing 
expectations of Malaysian society to meet new social and political conflict 
circumstances, the single most important motive for the adaptability and responsiveness 
is to acquire or retain its own interests defined in terms of power. In some situations, 
this motivation may lead the ruling elite to act or establish more moderate cooperative 
behavior. It is also not surprising that the ruling elite seeks the possibility of political 
alternatives which combine moderate levels of public participation with moderate levels 
of state domination. A concern throughout, however, will be the nature of power 
politics, that those who enjoy positions of power in the apparatus of the state are 
36 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 
573 -574. Italics added. According to Horowitz, not all leaders in ethnically divided states are committed 
to cooperative behavior. They may have a view of inter -group relations that sees ethnic conflict as 
necessary to the advancement of the interests of their group. Taking the presence of such limitations as 
given, leadership intentions and incentives are important in determining the effectiveness of measures to 
regulate conflict situations. For more detail, see Horowitz, 1985, pp. 577 -588. 
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unlikely to give up their power willingly. 
The notion of power politics, or political realism, has been closely linked to 
traditional theories of the state and international relations. Studies influenced by the 
realist tradition basically assume that states are the most important actors in world 
politics and most states are indeed strongly inclined to seek power.37 The power 
assumption in political realism, however, provides further insight in the domestic 
domain. Locating the aspiration for power principally in human nature, Morgenthau, 
one of the leading realists, also argues that 'domestic and international politics are but 
two different manifestations of the same phenomenon: the struggle for power... The 
difference between domestic and international politics... is one of degree and not kind'.38 
Accordingly, the question of power as a general trend in politics may offer an 
alternative to the understanding of the hegemonic political elite' s political behavior in 
containing conflict and maintaining regime stability in Malaysia. 
Malaysia alone has been chosen as a case study because it is a prime example of 
successful conflict resolution in a society that continues to be characterized by deep 
vertical cleavages. This research uses an in -depth historical, descriptive -analytical 
approach. It also compares some of the empirical aspects of transitions from 
authoritarian regimes, especially under Mahathir's rule. The primary sources of 
empirical data are newspapers, news magazines, government documents and other 
academic publications. Another important source of information is interviews with main 
political actors, journalists, academics and other knowledgeable persons. Approximately 
60 interviews were held in three different time periods between December 1997 and 
May 2000. Further e -mail correspondence with some of the interviewees was also 
conducted. 
1 -5. Outline of Chapters 
This study is composed of eight chapters. Chapters are organized in chronological and 
thematic order. Chapter one is introductory. It contains research background, research 
questions, reviews of theoretical traditions and an alternative perspective on the study of 
politics in Malaysia. 
37 The most comprehensive introduction to political realism can be found in Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of 
International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979); Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: 
The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985); Michael J. Smith, Realist 
Thought from Weber to Kissinger (London: Louisiana State University Press, 1986); and John A. 
Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
sa Morgenthau, 1985, p. 52. 
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Chapter two presents a historical and political overview of the roots of ethnic 
conflict in Malaysian society. The main purpose of this chapter is to provide the 
background analysis of which conditions and by which processes different ethnic 
identities become activated and transformed into political opponents prior to 
independence in 1957. 
Chapter three deals with the first twelve years of post -colonial Malaysian 
politics (1957 -1969) as a trial period of regime maintenance through consociational 
power -sharing arrangements. In analyzing the relevance of consociationalism in this 
period, the chapter will trace the kinds of factors which have motivated the UMNO -led 
ruling elite to choose consociational strategies to maintain its power. The chapter will 
detail the main consociational elements of elite bargaining and analyze the outcomes of 
consensual elite bargaining. 
Chapter four focuses on the period of authoritarian Malay dominance during the 
second phase of Malaysian politics (1969 -1987). The first part of the chapter discusses 
UMNO and its dominant leaders' motives for changing the regime maintenance 
approach from one of consociational bargaining to one characterized by hegemonic 
control. The second and third sections of the chapter focus on the key elements of 
hegemonic control in the 1970s and 1980s and the growing infra -elite conflict within 
UMNO as a consequence of the power struggle. 
Chapter five deals with the relations between UMNO's leadership split and the 
transition from authoritarian rule, especially during the period 1987 -1990. The main 
question of this chapter is how rivalries within the hegemonic ruling elite affect political 
behavior and what is the extent of consensual unity in a multi -racial Malaysian society. 
This chapter provides an analysis of Mahathir's regime maintenance strategies in 
circumstances where the threats came increasingly from within the hegemonic ruling 
bloc. 
Chapter six explores the consolidation of Mahathir's supremacy within and 
outside the ruling party and the repressive- responsive Malaysian political structures and 
processes in the 1990s. Since 1990, the Mahathir -led ruling elite has shown greater 
tolerance in ethnic politics while at the same time further restricting `limited 
democracy' through hegemonic state control. What are the motives behind such 
ambivalent levels of tolerance for political and cultural expression? This chapter traces 
the background, context and outcomes of Mahathir's dominance and the repressive - 
responsive Malaysian political system in the period 1990 -1998. 
Chapter seven deals with the lead -up to, and the consequences of, Anwar 
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Ibrahim's downfall in the years after 1998. It examines the context in which the 
Ieadership conflict took place and how Mahathir responded to a second crisis within the 
ruling bloc. The Mahathir -Anwar leadership tussle offered another opportunity to 
transform the political Iandscape of Malaysia. Consequently, this chapter focuses on a 
comparative analysis of the 1987 and 1998 UMNO factional split and its consequences 
for the changing nature of authoritarian rule in Malaysia. 
Chapter eight concludes the thesis with a summary of the major findings of the 
study. In concluding the thesis, this chapter also deals with the prospects for Malaysian 
politics in terms of regime change and regime maintenance. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Origins of Ethnic Conflict and the Consolidation of Conflict Configurations 
... ethnicity is a product of modem politics. Although people have had identities -- deriving from 
religion, birthplace, language, and so on -- for as long as humans have had culture, they have 
begun to see themselves as members of vast ethnic groups, opposed to other such groups, only 
during the modern period of colonization and state -building.' 
2 -1. Introduction 
Since independence in 1957, ethnicity has been one of the prime sources of conflict in 
multi- ethnic Malaysian society and this conflict and its resolution has been a primary 
concern in the study of politics in Malaysia.' This chapter tries to provide a historical 
and political overview of the roots of ethnic relations in Malaysian society. To 
understand why 'ethnic differences' became 'ethnic contrast' which in turn became 
'ethnic antagonism', it is necessary to trace the colonial origins of communal -group 
contrast in Malaya. In doing so, this chapter examines the conditions under which, and 
the processes by which, ethnic identities and differences become activated and 
converted to political conflict. 
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first summarizes the creation of 
a pluralist society in Malaysia. The second focuses on the specific question of the non- 
assimilation of the main ethnic communities in Malaysia and considers factors which 
have made the assimilation of the Malayan peoples difficult, despite their proximity 
within the same political unit. The third part is about the deepening of inter -ethnic 
conflict and why inter -ethnic relations deteriorated. In other words, what kinds of 
factors have catalyzed the deepening of inter -ethnic conflict in Malaysia? The final 
section deals with the institutionalization of an ethnic -conflict configuration in 
Malaysia's modern political system. 
John R. Bowen, "The Myth of Global Ethnic Conflict ", Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 4, 1996, p. 4. 
2 In this study, Malaya refers to the period before the formation of the Federation of Malaysia in 
September 1963. In 1941, for example, 'Malaya' was a term comprising three political units: (1) the 
Straits Settlements of Singapore, Malacca and Penang; (2) the Federated Malay States (FMS) of Selangor, 
Perak, Pahang and Negeri Sembilan; and (3) the Unfederated Malay States (UMS) of Johor, Perlis, 
Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu. In 1948 the Federation of Malaya was formed out of the states in the 
Malayan Union, comprising Penang, Malacca, and the nine Malay States (FMS and UMS). At that time, 
Singapore remained a British Crown Colony. Sabah and Sarawak were also excluded. Independence was 
granted to the Federation of Malaya in 1957, and the Federation of Malaysia was formed in September 
1963, comprising the states of the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak. In August 1965, 
Singapore was expelled from the Federation. 
23 
2 -2. The Origins of a Multi- ethnic Malaysian Society 
Numerous ethnic groups exist in Malaysia. Ethnic relations in Malaysia, however, 
generally revolve around the relations between the Malays and the non -Malays 
(including the Indians) in Peninsular Malaysia, or more specifically the complex Malay - 
Chinese relationship. 
Since the early Christian era there has been continuous contact between various 
ethnic and nationality groups on the Malay Peninsula. The interplay of these main 
ethnic groups, especially the Malays and the Chinese, on the Malay Peninsula goes back 
to the time of the earliest Chinese settlement in Malaya in the fifth century. Most of the 
early contact arose from trade relationships. During the Malacca Sultanate, a number of 
small Chinese communities was established in Malacca as the result of this contact.' 
However, it was only after the tremendous influx of Chinese immigrants under British 
colonial rule, in the period from the 1870s to the outbreak of the Second World War, 
that serious friction between the Malays and the Chinese began to develop in Malaya. In 
this context, the origins of ethnic conflict in this country was a by- product of British 
colonialism. 
Table 2 -1 illustrates how, after the beginning of British colonial rule in 1874, 
the pattern of population distribution changed due to the influx of migrants from China 
and India. After the beginning of British colonial rule, in other words, the trend was 
towards a complex type of pluralism, which manifested itself in the multi- ethnic 
composition of the Malayan population. The Malay proportion declined from 85.9 per 
cent in 1835 to 49.5 per cent in 1947. On the other hand, the Chinese proportion grew 
from 7.7 per cent in 1835 to 38.4 per cent in 1947. The Indian population grew more 
than 100 per cent during this period. Not until the 1930s when the colonial government 
put restrictions on migration and the demand for labor began to decrease as a result of 
the depression, did the flow of migration slow down. 
3 On the early history of Malaya, see B. W. Andaya and L. Y. Andaya, A History of Malaysia (London: 
The Macmillan Press, 1982); D. J. Steinberg (ed.), In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History 
(Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1987); D. G. E. Hall, A History of South -East Asia (Fourth Edition) (London: 
The Macmillan Press, 1981); V. Purcell, The Chinese in Malaya (London: Oxford University Press, 
1948); and K. G. Tregonning, A History of Modern Malaya (London: Eastern University Press, 1964). 
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Table 2 -1. Racial Composition of Malaya from 1835 to 1947 by Percentages([) 
1835 1884 ' 1921 1931 1947 
Malays(2) 85.9 63.9 54.0 49.2 49.5 
Chinese 7.7 29.4 29.4 33.9 38.4 
Indianso) -- - -- 15.1 15.1 10.8 
Othersc4) 6.3 6.7 1.5 1.8 I.3 
Total 376,000 1,401,000 2,906,000 3,787,000 4,908,000 
Source: Compiled from Alvin Rabushka, Race and Politics in Urban Malaya (California: Hoover 
Institution Press, 1973), p.21 and Syed Husin Ali, Malay Peasant Society and Leadership 
(Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975), p.23. 
Notes: (1) The figures for 1921, 1931 and 1947 refer to the Peninsula Malaysia only. 
(2) 'Malays' includes Malays, Indonesians and aborigines. 
(3) Pakistanis and Ceylonese are counted with 'Indians'. 
(4) 'Others' in 1835 and 1884 are made up mainly of Indians and Pakistanis. 
The Malays were not the earliest inhabitants of the Malay Peninsula. However, 
the migration of the Malays to this area occurred far enough back in history for them to 
be generally considered the indigenous people of this country. Their initial arrival on the 
peninsula was probably between 2,500 and 1,500 B.C.' These peoples were known as 
the proto- Malays. It was believed that the descendants of these proto- Malays, together 
with the later immigrants who entered from Indonesia, constituted the ancestors of the 
modern Malays. They displaced the various aboriginal peoples to the jungle interior and 
gradually settled in the coastal areas and plains. However, many of the Malays now 
living in Malaysia migrated relatively recently from various parts of insular Southeast 
Asia, especially from Indonesia. Despite the diversity of their geographical origins and 
their length of residence, nowadays the Malays have a strong sense of common 
communal and cultural identity. 
The Chinese from the south -eastern provinces of China - Kwangtung, Fukien 
and Kwangsi - had been coming to the Malay Peninsula to trade since as early as the 
fifth century. The Chinese immigration took place in two phases.' The first significant 
Chinese immigration to Malaya began after the Portuguese captured Malacca in the 
sixteenth century. During this period, however, the Manchu government in China 
actively discouraged emigration and this meant that emigrants could not return but had 
4 B. W. Hodder, Man in Malaya (London: University of London Press, 1968), p. 22. About the origins of 
the Malays in the Malay Peninsula, also see M. W. F. Tweedie, "The Stone Age in Malaya', Journal of 
the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. 26, Part 2, 1953, pp. 1 -100. 
5 The causes of migration from China and India as well as the conditions the early migrants to Malaysia 
faced have been the subject of considerable historical research. See V. Purcell, 1948; N. J. Ryan, A 
History of Malaysia and Singapore (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976); R. N. Jackson, 
Immigrant Labor and the Development of Malaya: 1786 -1920 (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1961); 
W. L. Blythe, "Historical Sketch of Chinese Labor in Malaya ", Journal of the Malay Branch of the Royal 
Asiatic Society, Vol. 20, 1947, pp. 64 -125; J. N. Farmer, Colonial Labor Policy and Administration (New 
York: Monograph of the Association for Asian Studies, 1960); and Kernial Singh Sandhu, Indians in 
Malaya: Some Aspects of Their Immigration and Settlement: 1786 -1957 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1969). 
25 
effectively cut themselves off completely from China.' At the time, few Chinese women 
undertook these dangerous journeys, and so male immigrants tended to marry into local 
Malay families. Today their descendants are known as the Babas and they are found 
mainly in Penang and Malacca. Although in general they have retained the old Chinese 
traditions in dress, religion and customs, they speak a language which is a Chinese 
version of Malay and have assimilated many Malay customs and habits.' For centuries 
they have looked on Malaysia as their home.' 
The second and more substantial phase of Chinese emigration began in the 
second half of the nineteenth century.' During this period, China abolished her laws 
forbidding emigration and so not only men but an increasing number of women came to 
the Malay Peninsula. At the same time, the huge influx of immigration to Malaya was 
stimulated by the growing demand for labor which was encouraged by the British 
colonial government. Both the Chinese and the British began to exploit Iocal resources, 
especially tin, as well as engage in trade relationships. Among other economic ventures 
were the planting of various cash crops such as pepper, spices, sugar cane and coffee on 
a commercial basis. 
Most Chinese came as indentured laborers, working to pay off their debt to 
whoever paid their passage to Malaya. Having paid off this debt, they worked the tin 
mines or opened up shops and business ventures. The tin mines had attracted the 
Chinese for centuries and until the nineteenth century tin- mining was predominantly a 
Chinese enterprise. The Malay rulers were willing to let the Chinese work the tin mines 
for a fee, but it was only when the British took control of the Malay States that Chinese 
participation in commerce expanded rapidly. 
The Indians, too, first came as traders - even before the Chinese. However, the 
major wave of Indian emigration came after the British had established bases in Malaya. 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, rubber, which was to become the 
largest single source of income for the British in Malaya, was introduced. The major 
flow of Indian migration began in the 1880s and increased sharply in the second decade 
of the twentieth century when the rubber plantation sector began to expand very 
rapidly. ° The British systematically recruited labor from India to work on the rubber 
'Ryan, 1976, p. 138. 
' Ryan, 1976, p. 137. 
$ For more detailed analysis of Baba Chinese, see Tan Chee Beng, 'Baba and I'lyonya: A Study of the 
Ethnic Identity of the Chinese Peranakan in Malacca., unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University, 
1979. 
' Blythe, 1947, p. 66. 
0 Kemial Singh Sandhu, 1969. pp. 312 -313. 
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plantations in the Malay Peninsula, and the number of Indians increased considerably. 
They were mainly indentured laborers, like the Chinese, bonded by contract to work for 
a specific period. Many of their descendants are still rural- based, mainly on rubber 
estates. 
The introduction of these immigrants on such a large scale greatly upset the 
ethnic balance in the country. As a result of this immigration, before the Second World 
War Malaya was the only country in Southeast Asia where the immigrant races 
outnumbered the indigenous people." When the 1931 Census revealed for the first time 
that the Malays were outnumbered in their own country by the non -Malays, it came as 
something of a shock to both the Malays and the British colonial authorities. The 
Malays, 'who had now become a numerical minority within their own country', were 
concerned about preserving their birthright as the indigenous people of the country.12 
Therefore, restrictions were imposed on further immigration, especially from China, not 
only 'to prevent unemployment or economic distress' but also 'to control the political 
unrest." 
The problem of out -numbered Malays was not too apparent at first because 
both Chinese and Indian workers came on contract and had every intention of leaving. 
The great majority of Chinese initially had no desire to settle in Malaya but only of 
seeking their fortune there and returning to their villages in China. Wilson, the 
Permanent Under -Secretary of State for the Colonies, describes the situation in Malaya, 
based on the 1931 Census, in his report: 
... the number of the Chinese population which has been for a long time in the country is relatively 
very small and the number of those who were born there and expect to end their days there is 
smaller still... the same is true of the Indian immigrant, so that the number of non- Malays who 
have adopted Malaya as their home is only a very small proportion of the whole population of the 
territory?' 
Over time, however, many of the immigrants became permanent settlers in the 
" The I93I Census shows that the number of Malays was 1,644,173 (37.5 %), if the indigenous peoples 
are included 1,962,021 (44.7 %), Chinese 1,709,392 (39.0 %) and Indians 624,009 (14.2 %). These figures 
includes the Straits Settlements (Singapore, Malacca and Penang), the Federated Malay States (Selangor, 
Perak, Pahang and Negeri Sembilan) and the Unfederated Malay States (Johor, Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan 
and Trengganu). For more detailed data, see British Malaya, A Report on the 1931 Census and on Certain 
Problems of Vital Statistics (Westminster: The Crown Agents for the Colonies, 1932), pp. 120 -126. 
12 Collin E. R. Abraham, Divided and Rule: The Roots of Race Relations in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: 
INSAN, 1997), p. 201, italics in original. 
13 Abraham, 1997, p. 200. For more detailed contexts of The Immigration Restriction Ordinance of 1928 
and The Aliens Ordinance of 1933, see Abraham, 1997, pp. 199 -20I. 
'4 Samuel Herbert Wilson, Report of Brigadier- General Sir Samuel Wilson, Permanent Under -Secretary 
of State for the Colonies on His Visit to Malaya 1932 (London: His Majesty's Office, 1933), pp. 26 -27. 
According to Partner, the average length of stay of immigrants was two to three years. See Partner, 1960, 
p. 17. 
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country. They married within their ethnic groups, and a new generation of Chinese was 
born in Malaysia. As the twentieth century progressed there was a growing number of 
local -born Chinese and Indians who began to think of Malaya as their home, still 
keeping their cultural heritage but having no intention of returning to their original 
countries. 
Table 2 -2. Percentage of Locally Born Population by Race in the Federation of Malaya and Singapore 
1921 1931 1947 1957 
Malays - - 96.0 97.4 
Chinese 20.9 29.9 63.5 75.5 
Indians 12.1 21.4 51.6 65.0 
Total 56.4 58.9 78.3 84.8 
Source: Federation of Malaya, 1957 Population Census of the Federation of Malaya, Report No. 14 
(Kuala Lumpur: Department of Statistics, 1960), p. 15. 
As shown in Table 2 -2, the proportion of locally born among the non -Malay 
communities sharply increased from 1921 to 1957. The major increase in the number of 
locally born occurred between 1931 and 1947. By 1957, over three -quarters of the 
Chinese and two -thirds of the Indians had been born locally. It was this section of the 
immigrant communities that began to demand citizenship rights in Malaya, and 
according to Parkinson 'the inter- racial problem began, not when people arrived, but 
from the date when they began to settle.15 The problem of claims to citizenship from 
immigrants became apparent in the early twentieth century in Malaya, as shown in the 
report by Wilson: 
Those who have been born in Malaya themselves, or whose children have been born there... state 
that in a great many cases those concerned have never seen the land of their origin and they claim 
that their children and their children's children should have fair treatment.16 
2 -3. The Non -Assimilation of the Main Ethnic Communities 
Compared with many other multi -ethnic countries, one of the most unusual features of 
Malaysian society is the non -assimilation of the main ethnic communities, in terms of 
intermarriage or amalgamation. While intermarriage is certainly not unknown in the 
Malay Peninsula, as shown most obviously in the case of the Babas, it is not common, 
especially between the Malays and the Chinese. What were the key factors contributing 
to the non -assimilation of the main ethnic communities in Malaya? 
First of all, the attitude of immigrant peoples should be considered one of the 
key internal factors resulting in the non -assimilation of the main ethnic groups. Unlike 
the earlier immigrants who had assimilated into the local Malay community, the later 
5 C. N. Parkinson, A Short History of Malaya (Singapore: D. Moore, 1954), p. 18. 
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Chinese and Indian immigrants rarely considered Malaya their homeland. Rather they 
identified themselves as 'transients' or birds of passage'. While the Malays, along with 
some aborigines and the natives of Sabah and Sarawak, are regarded as indigenous 
people, the Chinese and the Indians were brought to the country as 'aliens' or 'guest 
workers'. Their primary objective in coming to Malaya was to amass sufficient wealth 
and return to their home countries. Therefore, as Tregonning notes, they felt little 
necessity to adapt themselves in any way to their temporary environment, and conscious 
of their difference they kept apart from their fellow inhabitants of the peninsula.'11 The 
attitude of most migrants would not have mattered had they left the Malay Peninsula but 
an increasing number stayed on and by settling they contributed to the inter -racial 
problem. 
As the second internal factor, and more seriously, there were a number of 
fundamental socio- cultural differences that made assimilation more difficult between 
the major ethnic communities. In brief, the main ethnic communities, especially the 
Malays and the Chinese, were, and still are, extraordinarily different in almost every 
aspect of their lives, such as religion, language, foods, customs and world- views. These 
fundamental differences hindered their assimilation into a common cultural society. 
Most of all, language has been the major barrier to the assimilation of the main 
ethnic communities. The different ethnic communities have kept their own languages as 
their mother tongue. In addition, there have been also various sub -communities of 
Chinese and Indians who continue to speak the dialects or Ianguages of their original 
provinces in China and India.' To make matters worse, these ethnic communities have 
different dietary habits. A Chinese eats and rather likes port, beef and other general 
foods that are forbidden among the Malays and the Indians for religious reasons. 
Furthermore, the Chinese often keep dogs at home, while Malays regards contact with 
dogs as unclean requiring ritual ablution. 
Along with these differences, the world -views of the two communities are 
poles apart. Practically all Malays are Muslims and, as such, cannot marry non -Malays 
who do not convert to Islam. Thus, the social and religious structure of the Malay 
community makes it extremely difficult for other religious or ethnic groups, with the 
exception of Arabs or Indian Muslims, to integrate with them. On the other hand, 
16 Wilson, 1933, p. 27. 
17 Tregonning, 1964, p. 182. 
is According to the census of 1957, only 3 per cent of Chinese aged ten and over, and only 5 per cent of 
Indians in the same age group were literate in the Malay language, while 46 per cent of Malays, in the 
same age group, were literate in Malay. See Federation of Malaya, The 1957 Population Census of the 
Federation of Malaya, Report No. 14 (Kuala Lumpur: Department of Statistics, 1960), pp. 94 -95. 
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Chinese follow a variety of religious traditions, including Buddhism and Taoism, and 
are generally xenophobic and sinocentric. In addition, the majority of Indians are Hindu. 
For ethnic communities with strong national, cultural and religious traditions, 
conversion to another religion is not a common event. In this respect, intermarriage 
between the three communities, which may have helped to break down racial barriers, 
was difficult, though not all that unusual. 
Thirdly, it may be useful to point out the role of 'secret societies' inhibiting 
immigrant Chinese from assimilation into the existing Malay society. Traditionally, 
Malay rulers dealt with the Chinese as a whole through the Kapitan China System in 
which the leader of the Chinese was appointed by the Malay Sultan to adjudicate 
community affairs.19 However, as the Chinese population expanded during the British 
administration of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the Kapitan China 
System became ineffective. Furthermore, the increasing diversity within the Chinese 
community required more than one individual to protect and represent their interests ?° 
Therefore, when the Chinese migrants came to the Malay Peninsula, societies based on 
clan or dialect associations appeared to be indispensable organizations affording 
protection and assistance in an alien and often hostile environment. The secret societies 
came to play an increasingly important role as the Chinese population expanded in the 
early twentieth century. The strength and importance of secret societies are well 
explained by the fact that the British government believed that 'the best way of 
governing the Chinese was through the Chinese themselves'?' Indeed, it had been 
estimated that 'sixty per cent of the Chinese in the Straits were sworn members and most 
of the remaining forty per cent were under their influence' in the early twentieth 
century.2° In this context, the secret societies were of fundamental importance in 
maintaining links with China and in preserving Chinese values and culture. Thus, the 
absorption of the Chinese into the existing Malay political and social system was 
hindered by the secret societies. 
With these internal factors inhibiting assimilation of the main ethnic 
communities, the British government policy towards the Malay Peninsula, as a key 
external factor, also helped keep them separate. In particular, 'a policy of active 
19. See C. S. Wong, A Gallery of Chinese Kapitans (Singapore: Dewan Bahasa dan Kebudayaan 
Kebangsaan, 1963) and R. N. Jackson, Pickering, Protector of Chinese (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford 
University Press, 1965). 
20 In fact, the Kapitan China System worked when the Chinese were very small in numbers compared to 
Malays, and where the Chinese were largely confined to the economic sphere and played no overt 
political role. 
' Jackson, 1965, p. 50. 
22 Jackson, 1965, p. 5I. 
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intervention and indirect rule' from 1867 until the Japanese occupation of Malaya had 
its roots in the division of Malayan society on a communal basis between the main 
ethnic communities. Joginder Singh Jessy mentions the effects of British policy on 
Malay society as follows: 
The primary result of the British policy... was to keep Malay society and institutions intact. But 
this was achieved at the expense of excluding the Malays from participating in the modern 
economy in any effective manner. The political position of the Malays which was preserved, put 
them in a good position when the politics of independence drew near. But economically, Malay 
society was generally impoverished. The educational policy helped to make for a placid peasantry 
but denied opportunities for the Malays in other fields.23 
Since 1867 when the administration of the Straits Settlements was transferred 
to London, the British government extended its influence to the Malay Sultanates, 
motivated especially by economic interests.24 British rule in the nine Malay States had 
been extended gradually and indirectly by means of what came to be known as 'the 
Resident System'. Each of the Sultans of Perak, Selangor, Pahang and Negeri Sembilan 
agreed to accept the British Resident as 'adviser' in the administration of the states 
except in matters of Islamic religion and Malay customs. These states eventually formed 
the Federated Malay States (FMS). Though the remaining five Malay States, which 
formed the Unfederated Malay States (UMS), retained greater autonomy, they had also 
gradually come under British protection by 1930. 
In fact, the Resident System became the precursor of direct British rule in 
Malaya. Although the legal position of the Sultans was safeguarded under the Resident 
System, the 'advice' given to the Sultans by the British Residents had to be 'acted on' so 
that the British in practice exercised nearly complete control of the decision- making 
powers of the Malay states. This reduced the position of the Sultans to the level of 
dependents on British protection, encouraged an uncontrolled flow of immigrant labor 
from China and India, and isolated Malays from the economic mainstream. It was 
during this period that the British had encouraged Chinese and Indian migration to the 
Straits Settlements to fulfiII their own economic needs. 
Of the many differences - such as occupation, income, education and 
23 Joginder Singh Jessy, History of South -East Asia (1824 -1965) (Kedah: Penerbitan Darulaman, 1983), p. 
380. 
24 Though there has been a multitude of other factors leading to the change of the British government's 
colonial policy from non -intervention to direct intervention, it was mainly motivated by economic reasons 
to protect trade and commerce in the Straits Settlements. For more detailed analysis of the British colonial 
policy, see Archana Sharma, British Policy Towards Malaysia, 1957 -1967 (London: Sangam Books 
Limited, 1993); Nicholas Tarling, "Intervention and Non- Intervention in Malaya ", Journal of Asian 
Studies, Vol. 21, No. 4, 1962, pp. 523 -527; and Rupert Emerson, Malaysia: A Study in Direct and 
Indirect Rule (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1964). 
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ownership of share capital - between the ethnic communities, perhaps none was more 
significant than patterns of residence in rural and urban areas. In terms of demographic 
distribution, in 1957 four -fifths of the Malays were in the rural areas, while over half of 
the Chinese population lived in the towns, and a majority of the Indians was 
concentrated in the estates. Thus, as shown in Table 2 -3, in 1957 almost three -quarters 
of the Chinese population lived in towns of 1,000 and more, while only one -fifth of 
Malays did." 
Table 2 -3. Indices of Urban Concentration of Each Ethnic Group, West Malaysia 1931 -1957 
(Urban Areas of 1,000 Population and Over) ( %) 
1931 1947 1957 
Malay 8.6 11.3 19.3 
Chinese 38.8 43.1 710 
Indian 25.9 33.8 41.1 
Source: Federation of Malaya, 1957 Population Census of the Federation of Malaya, Report No. 14 
(Kuala Lumpur: Department of Statistics, 1960), p. 11. 
The sudden influx of immigrants to tin mining and rubber factories and the 
pro -Malay policies of the British government also created a serious ethnic imbalance in 
the economic distribution of wealth. Tin mining and trading, for example, brought in the 
most wealth and these were also urban pursuits. On the other hand, the pro -Malay 
policies of the British government 'helped to preserve the traditional patterns of Malay 
society and its peasant -based economy.'26 Though these policies seemed appropriate, 
especially in terms of avoiding political controversy between different racial groups, 
they 'did not help the Malays to come to terms with the modern world or adapt 
themselves to a competitive economic system.'27 Since the Malays were encouraged to 
remain in rural. areas, many were therefore denied access to urban amenities and to the 
wealth available to non -Malays. According to the 1947 Population Census, nearly three - 
quarters of the total male Malay working population was engaged in agriculture and 
fishing. On the contrary, although one -third of the male Chinese working population 
was engaged in agriculture, over 50 per cent of the population were mainly shop 
assistants, tin mining laborers, construction workers, traders, businessman or were 
engaged in the various professions.28 As for the Indians, the majority of them were 
" The dramatic rise of the proportion of Chinese in urban areas from 1947 to 1957 is usually attributed to 
the forced relocation of rural Chinese squatters into 'new villages' by the British colonial government 
during the 'Emergency' during the early 1950's. Over a half million rural settlers, mostly Chinese, were 
resettled into 'new villages', many of which became small towns. The 'Emergency' was the popular name 
of a period of warfare between guerrilla forces and the government which officially lasted from 1948 to 
1960, although most of the active fighting had ended by the mid 1950's. 
26 Gorden P. Means, Malaysian Politics (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1976), p. 43. 
27 Means, 1976, p. 43. 
28 See British Malaya, A Report on the 1947 Census of Population (London: The Crown Agents for the 
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estate workers. This meant that the majority of the Malays was generally found in the 
lower income economic activities while the non -Malays were found in the higher level 
of economic activities. 
Moreover, certain specific policies of British colonialism made it more difficult 
for the various ethnic groups to integrate. One of the key policies maintaining 
communalism was the colonial education policy. In brief, prior to 1952, there was no 
national system of education in Malaya. Rather, the British policy on education for the 
three main ethnic communities 'ranged from token paternalism (toward the Malay 
peasantry) to complete neglect (of the Chinese); the Tamil laborers were presumed not 
to require any education at all'.29 
While the traditional Malay rulers' children were educated in public school - 
type English- medium schools, most of the Malay masses were given only minimal 
vernacular education suitable for the rural way of life. Although Malay education after 
1920 was free and compulsory, it did not go beyond primary level. As for the Chinese, 
they were Iargely left to their own devices as far as Chinese -medium education was 
concerned. It was the local Chinese community which provided the necessary impetus 
to education by setting up Chinese schools for their own children. The Indians were also 
left to their own devices. As a result of this policy and the attitude of the British colonial 
government, there was a clear 'educational division of each community' during this 
period.' More seriously, the educational division of the main ethnic communities 
further intensified the division of labor between the different sectors in the society. 
In sum, along with some internal inhibiting factors resulting from fundamental 
differences in almost every part of the life styles of the Chinese, Indian and Malay 
communities, the limited social contact between and amongst the various ethnic groups, 
mostly induced by the British colonial policy, made assimilation of the separate 
Malayan peoples extremely difficult during the colonial period and helped shape 
intercommunal relations after independence. 
2 -4. The Deepening of Inter -Ethnic Conflict 
Although British colonial policies before the Second World War resulted in the 
Colonies, 1949), p. 106. 
29 Hua Wu Yin, Class and Communalism in Malaysia: Politics in a Dependent Capitalist State (London: 
Zed Books Ltd., 1983), p. 59. 
30 Tregonning, 1964, p. 183. According to Husin Ali, 89 per cent of Malays attended Malay medium 
schools; 85 per cent of Chinese attended Chinese medium schools; 67 per cent of Indians attended Tamil 
schools. Among the Malays only 8 per cent attended English schools while 14 per cent of Chinese 
attended English schools. See Syed Husin Ali, Malay Peasant Society and Leadership (Kuala Lumpur: 
Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 23. 
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segregation and non -assimilation of the main ethnic communities in Malaya, the 
relations between the Chinese and the Malays were relatively peaceful. However, 
serious inter -racial animosities broke out after the Japanese came to the Malay 
Peninsula. As Clutterbuck notes the relations between Chinese and Malays, which had 
been good before the war, were ruined' during the Second World War.31 Indeed, it was 
the colonial policies of the Japanese Military Administration towards Malayan peoples, 
along with the post -war British policies, that played a substantial role in deepening and 
reinforcing inter -ethnic cleavages, particularly between the Malays and the Chinese, in 
Malaya. 
With the aim of establishing 'the Greater East Asia Co- prosperity Sphere' 
encompassing East and Southeast Asia, the Japanese invaded several towns on the 
northern coast of Malaya on 8 December, 1941. Through rapid military conquest, the 
Japanese completely replaced the pre -war British colonial administration after the 
capitulation of Singapore (renamed Shonan, the Light of the South) on 15 February 
1942. After that, the Japanese Military Administration ruled Malaya until 15 August 
1945. 
In contrast to the British practice of having a dual form of government in 
Malaya, the Japanese governed Malaya as a single integrated colony under one supreme 
government headed by the Japanese Military Administration. Like the British, however, 
the Japanese Military Administration treated the three main ethnic groups of Malaya 
'separately', or to use the more exact term 'differentially'. As a result, as discussed later, 
this differential approach by the Japanese encouraged and catalyzed inter -ethnic 
hostility among Malayan peoples. 
Towards the Malays, the Japanese Military Administration adopted a moderate 
policy, encouraging Malay nationalism, to gain Malay mass cooperation. For their own 
purposes, the Japanese generated various intensive political activities at all levels of 
31 Richard Clutterbuck, Conflict and Violence in Singapore and Malaysia 1945 -1983 (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1985), p. 38. Also, Funston stresses the distinct impacts of the British rule and subsequent Japanese 
occupation on Malayan ethnic relations: 
Social dislocation, though widespread, was not so severe that it forced the masses into the political 
arena; [the] British ostensibly pursued a pro -Malay policy and had some success in convincing 
Malays that it was acting as their protector vis -a -vis the non -Malays; and when Malay political 
activity nonetheless surfaced repressive action was quickly taken. The Japanese occupation upset 
this fine balance and brought into being a politicized mass that could link up with the existing 
political elite. It was not to be long before the accumulated tensions of two colonial regimes gave 
rise to the first direct participation of the Malay masses in the political field. 
See N. J. Funston, Malay Politics in Malaysia: A Study of the United Malays National Organisation and 
Party Islam (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Educational Books, 1980), p. 36. 
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Malay society.32 In this context, 'mass demonstrations, slogan competitions and 
lecturing contests were frequently held; pan -Malayan conferences and training 
programmes were arranged,'33 Administratively, the Japanese retained the Sultans, but 
reduced their powers considerably. In this context, Andaya mentions that 'the weakened 
status of the traditional rulers in the Occupation, combined with Japanese 
encouragement of Malay nationalism, contributed to the growing importance of a new 
Malay elite who had arisen in the 1920s and 1930s.'34 In addition, distrusting the 
political reliability of the Chinese, the Japanese deliberately recruited Malays into the 
police and armed forces to maintain security against the Malayan Peoples' Anti - 
Japanese Army (MPAJA), which was dominated by the Malayan Communist Party 
(MCP). Some Malays were also promoted to higher posts in the administration. 
With regard to the Indians, the Japanese did not treat Indians as well as the 
Malays but the Indians were never brutalized as were the Chinese. Rather, the Japanese 
used the appeal of nationalism to win over the support of the Indians, many of whom 
were extremely anti -British because of the struggle for independence that was in 
progress in India at this period. In this context, the Japanese Military Administration 
allowed the existence of Indian Independence League Movements which called for the 
liberation of India from British rule. Though Indians focused on their homeland, the 
very fact of the existence of the Indian Independence Leagues and their activities 
generated political consciousness amongst them in Malaya.35 
However, cooperation from the Chinese was almost impossible to obtain. The 
Chinese in Malaya were more inclined to aid their countrymen fighting the Japanese in 
China. Even prior to the Japanese invasion in 1942, anti- Japanese activities among the 
Chinese community in Malaya had already begun, as shown in the anti -Japanese 
activity of the MCP.36 Thus, the Japanese attitude towards the Chinese was generally 
one of ruthless repression.37 Of all the main ethnic groups in Malaya, the Chinese 
32 See A. J. Stockwell, British Policy and Malay Politics During the Malayan Union Experiment, 1942- 
/948 (Kuala Lumpur: Art Printing Works, 1979), pp. 1 -16. 
33 Stockwell, 1979, p. 9. 
34 Andaya, 1982, p. 248. For detailed analysis on the rise of nationalism in Malaya before the 1941, see 
Joginder Singh Jessy, 1985, pp. 377 -388; William Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1967); and Radin Soenarno, "Malay Nationalism, 1896- 1941 ", Journal of 
Southeast Asian History, Vol. I, No. I, 1960, pp. 1 -28. 
35 See Zainal Abidin bin Abdul Wahid, "The Japanese Occupation and Nationalism" in Zainal Abidin bin 
Abdul Wahid (ed.), Glimpses of Malaysian History (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1970). 
36 The MCP, formally organized in April 1930, had led anti -Japanese activities with the Japanese invasion 
of China in 1937. 
37 Despite the overall ruthless treatment of the Chinese, according to Yoji Akashi's study, Japanese policy 
had been changed from moderation to repression and repression to moderation. In detail, Japanese policy, 
prepared before the war, was moderate, allowing some flexibility in its operation. However, the Japanese 
Military Administration's view of the Chinese hardened because the Chinese were loyal to China; friendly 
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received the harshest treatment from the Japanese, mainly because of the Sino- Japanese 
War and their continuing cooperation with China. 
One of the first and cruelest acts of retaliation committed by the Japanese 
Military Administration after the fall of Singapore was the infamous sook ching (purge 
through purification) aimed at the suppression of hostile Chinese. This was the biggest 
massacre of the Chinese during the Japanese occupation in Malaya, with a death toll 
estimated to be between 6,000 and 40,000.38 Although such a large -scale massacre 
against the Chinese was not repeated, 'smaller but equally brutal atrocities were 
committed against the Chinese throughout the Occupation.'" 
In response to the hostile policies of the Japanese, the main anti -Japanese 
activities came from the ranks of the Chinese. An underground anti -Japanese movement 
called the Malayan Peoples' Anti -Japanese Army ( MPAJA) was largely Chinese in 
composition, although its members also included a few Malays. Its leaders were from 
the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). With British aid in the form of supplies, 
intelligence and training, the MPAJA provided the backbone of the resistance 
movement against the Japanese in Malaya. Although the Japanese Military 
Administration changed its policies towards the Chinese from repression to moderation 
from late 1943 onwards, by integrating them with other races in advisory councils, 
business, education and government, the Chinese were never forgiven for their support 
of the anti- Japanese struggle until the war was over. 
Although the Japanese did not deliberately promote racial animosity between 
the Malays and the Chinese, the differential policies followed by the Japanese Military 
Administration for their own reasons had different repercussions on different ethnic 
communities in Malaya. In other words, the divisive and differential Japanese policy 
created pervasive social tensions in Malayan society and local interpretations of these 
policies by Malay and Chinese communities naturally led to bitter inter -racial conflicts. 
Such sensitive racial responses are well described in two different studies by Andaya 
and Zainal Abidin as follows: 
with Britain; and hostile to Japan. Again, mainly because of the necessity for an economically self - 
sufficient Malaya, Japanese policy was moderated half way through the occupation. For more detailed 
analysis on the Japanese policy towards the Malayan Chinese, see Youi Akashi, "Japanese Policy Towards 
the Malayan Chinese 1941 -1945 ", Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1970, pp. 61 -89. 
38 The figures for the total number of Chinese massacred differ between Japanese and Chinese sources. 
See Cheah Boon Kheng, "The Social Impact of the Japanese Occupation of Malaya (1942 -1945)" in 
Alfred W. McCoy (ed.), Southeast Asia Under Japanese Occupation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1980), p. 119, note 16. Andaya, however, estimated the number of deaths between 5,000 and 25,000. See 
Andaya, 1982, p. 251. 
39 Andaya, 1982, p. 251. 
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During the Occupation the anti- Chinese feeling among Malays was further encouraged by the 
Japanese who used paramilitary units composed mainly of Malays to fight Chinese resistance 
groups. The communal violence of the post -war years can thus be regarded as a logical outcome of 
divisive ethnic policies and attitudes...° 
The Japanese hostile acts against the Chinese and their apparently more favourable treatment of 
the Malays helped to make the Chinese community feel its separate identity more acutely... it was 
also the beginning of racial tension between the Malays and the Chinese.41 
Indeed, though the Japanese Military Administration reigned over Malaya for 
only a relatively short period of three and a half years, the effects of Japanese rule on 
Malaya were much more harmful than the British rule as far as ethnic relations were 
concerned. Most particularly, the Japanese occupation brought about profound changes 
among peoples in Malaya. It awakened a keen political awareness among Malayan 
peoples by intensifying communalism and racial hatred. Especially, it acted as a catalyst 
for the emergence and development of Malay nationalism in Malaya. As Hall states, 
political consciousness among the Malays was weak prior to the Japanese invasion. 
And, Malay nationalism was only in an incipient stage and was confined to a small 
group of intellectual radicals. 
Before the war the Malays had been the least politically minded of all the peoples of South -East 
Asia... During the occupation period, however, Malay national sentiment had become a reality; it 
was strongly anti -Chinese, and its rallying cry, Malaya for the Malays'...42 
What was more significant about Malay national sentiment was the unity 
among Malays, who had been politicized during the war, to resist an expected Chinese 
bid for power which would threaten Malay sovereignty. This meant that political 
awareness among Malays was no longer limited to a small group of educated 
intellectuals or in the urban areas, but became a real concern even for uneducated 
kampung (village) Malays as well. In this context, the Japanese occupation 'politicised 
the Malay peasantry to the extent that they were available for mass mobilisation 
immediately after the war.'43 The activities of the Chinese -dominated MPAJA in Malay 
villages during the Japanese occupation especially heightened Malays' political 
consciousness and accounted for the rapid rise in Sino -Malay racial strife after the war.44 
Substantial changes also occurred in non -Malay communities as a whole, 
especially in the Chinese communities. As mentioned earlier, like the Indians, the 
4° Andaya, 1982, p. 253. 
ai Zainal Abidin, 1970, p. 97. 
42 Hall, 198I, p. 871. 
43 Funston, 1980, p. 35. 
44 See Cheah Boon Kheng, 1980, pp. 110 -111. 
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nationalism of the Chinese, as 'aliens', was not directed towards Malaya but towards 
China. In fact, the politically active Chinese were in a minority, although their vitality 
made them seem dominant. Indeed, the majority of Chinese remained uninterested in 
the political situation both at home and abroad. However, the hostile and discriminatory 
policies of the Japanese against the Chinese aroused resentment among most Chinese 
towards Malays, and the political interests of the Chinese eventually turned towards 
Malaya instead of China. 
Furthermore, the political influence of the Chinese increased throughout the 
war. The MCP, in particular, increased its influence through its propaganda and the 
MPAJA's guerrilla activities against the Japanese. When the Japanese occupation 
finished in 1945, the MPAJA was the only armed, and the best organized, force within 
Malaya. In the chaos of the post -war years, the MCP -MPAJA immediately took over 
local governments and used this opportunity to deal harshly with the Chinese 'traitors' 
and Malay 'collaborators' of the Japanese occupation.45 They took bloody revenge 
against these traitors and collaborators. However, their main targets after the war were, 
in fact, Malay officials who were thought to have cooperated treacherously with the 
Japanese. This had serious effects on ethnic relations in Malayan society as a whole, as 
Andaya notes: 
... the violence initiated by ideology,.. quickly became interpreted as an inter -ethnic conflict. The 
Malays organized themselves under their village secular and religious leaders to fight what they 
saw as the "Chines& MPAJA/MCP.46 
2 -5. The Institutionalization of the Inter -Ethnic Conflict Configuration 
The wartime Japanese policies towards Malaya, as mentioned in the previous section, 
awakened a keen political consciousness of the Malayan peoples, which resulted in the 
politicization of Malayan society. However, the post -war British approach towards 
Malaya stimulated and accelerated the institutionalization of political consciousness 
among Malayan peoples. During this period, the Malay masses collectivized their 
political demands into an organized political front against the non -Malay communities 
as well as the British government. 
When the British reoccupied Malaya in September 1945, it was placed under 
the British Military Administration (BMA) and the BMA, with central authority, 
45 According to Report on the Military Government 12 -30 September 1945 by the Deputy Chief Civil 
Affairs Officer (Malaya), 'there is no doubt that in all the villages throughout the Malay States the 
Chinese Resistance Forces are in command and it must be admitted that without their assistance in those 
places law and order could not be maintained'. Quoted in Stockwell, 1979, p. 39. 
46 Andaya, 1982, p. 252. 
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continued to use the Japanese -type integrated government for Malaya. Despite 
traditional pro -Malay policies, the British, however, felt obliged to the Chinese for their 
wartime effort and introduced the concept of the Malayan Union which greatly 
improved the status of non- Malays.47 The Union was designed to effect constitutional 
changes to unite all the FMS, UMS and the Straits Settlements of Penang and Malacca 
into one entity.4$ 
The proposed Malayan Union would not only force the nine Sultans to 
surrender their sovereignty to the British government but also to change the conditions 
of citizenship. The BMA introduced the principle of jus soli which conferred citizenship 
on any persons born in Malaya and Singapore after the establishment of the Malayan 
Union. It also devised liberal citizenship provisions for other domiciled immigrants. 
Furthermore, all citizens of the new Malayan Union were to have equal rights, including 
admission to the administrative civil service. Thus, Malayan citizenship was to be 
extended to all without racial discrimination under the Malayan Union.49 
With the concept of the Malayan Union, in short, the British had rejected their 
pre -war policy of recognizing the sovereignty of the Malay Sultans, the autonomy of the 
Malay states, and Malay special privileges.' One of the distinguishing features of the 
Malayan Union proposal was the absence of any distinction between Malays and non - 
Malays. According to the conditions of Malayan Union Citizenship, it was estimated 
that 83 per cent of Chinese and 75 per cent of Indians in Malaya would qualify for 
citizenship.' The effect of these new citizenship qualifications on Malayan peoples, 
especially on Malays, was quite significant, considering the expected growing numbers 
47 Despite the fact that two Malay battalions had fought with the British at Singapore in 1942, the BMA 
generally did not favor the Malay community because of the activities of the Malays in Japanese - 
sponsored organizations. In contrast, many British officials believed that the Chinese and Indian 
communities had remained generally loyal to British colonial power. 
48 In fact, the idea of the Malayan Union was adopted before the reoccupation of Malaya by the British 
Military Administration. In addition, due to various reasons Singapore and the Borneo territories were 
omitted and the final proposal for Malayan Union was confined to the Malay peninsula. For more detail 
on the Malaya Union, see J. D. V. Allen, The Malayan Union (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967); 
Mohamed Noordin Sopiee, From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation: Political Unification in the 
Malaysia Region 1945 -1967 (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Universiti Malaya, 1974); and A. J. Stockwell, 
1979. 
49 See Great Britain, Malayan Union and Singapore: Summary of Proposed Constitutional Arrangement 
(London: HMSO, 1946). 
5Q In this context, Wong Lin Ken describes ' {tlhe origins and demise of the Malayan Union were 
transitory in the occurrence, but reverberatory in the consequence. The Union's distinctive feature was 
that it was a radical departure from traditional British policy, which... maintained de jure rather than de 
facto that Malaya was primarily a Malay country.' See Wong Lin Ken's review article of A. J. Stockwell 
(1979) in Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1982, p. 184. For more details, see A. J. 
Stockwell, British Policy and Malay Politics during the Malayan Union Experiment, 1942 -1948, Malayan 
Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society Monograph No. 8, Kuala Lumpur, 1979. 
sr K. J. Ratnam, Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya (Kuala Lumpur. University of 
Malaya Press, 1967), p. 75. 
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of non -Malay citizens in Malaya under the Malayan Union scheme. 
When the Malayan Union proposal was formally outlined by the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies in Parliament on 10 October 1945, the Malays reaction was 
unexpectedly serious and widespread.52 The Malay press carried a considerable number 
of letters and reports criticizing and opposing the Malayan Union proposal. There was 
also great resistance among the ordinary Malay people to this new proposal. There were 
demonstrations running to thousands of people in almost every town. For example, in 
Kedah, 50,000 people took part in a demonstration and in Kelantan 36,000 people 
participated. 
Furthermore, throughout the country, many organizations voiced their protest 
in local newspapers, accusing the British government of using - methods of 
intimidation" to obtain the Malay Sultans' agreement to the new treaties.'S3 On 20 
November 1945, eight Malay associations in Johor joined to form the Malay League of 
Johor and on 3 January 1946, the Peninsula Malay Movement of Johor was organized 
under the leadership of Dato' Onn bin Jaafar, a Malay district officer in the state of 
Johor and a Ieading figure of the protest group. Finally, on 1 March 1946, about 200 
Malay delegates representing forty -one Malay associations met in Kuala Lumpur for a 
Pan -Malayan Malay Congress to discuss the idea of forming a centralized organization. 
The main objective of this congress was to unite the Malays into a strong association so 
as to obtain a repeal of the constitution of the proposed Malayan Union. 
The gathering of these various associations was particularly significant in terms 
of the institutionalization of political consciousness among Malays because the Pan - 
Malayan Malay Congress was the forerunner of the Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu 
Bersatu, or the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). With the formation of 
UNLNO to oppose the Malayan Union, the Malays finally had their own united political 
force, whereas, before this, they were having difficulty organizing themselves into a 
united political front. In fact, they were politically fragmented between socialist, 
conservative, radical, religious, and royalist elements. 
At the next Pan -Malayan Malay Congress held in Johor Baru later on 11 May 
1946, UMNO was inaugurated. Dato' Onn bin Jaafar was elected as its first president. 
UMNO defended the traditional power of the sovereignty of the Sultans and rejected the 
Malayan Union. Though the British government initially refused to withdraw the 
proposal for the Malayan Union, UMNO kept protesting and, together with the nine 
52 About the reaction to the Malayan Union and political activity of the Malays, see Stockwell, 1979, 
especially pp. 42 -94. 
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Sultans, boycotted all activities organized by the British government. The political 
situation in Malaya during this period was clearly described in a secret telegram to Hall, 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, from Gent, an original proponent of the Malayan 
Union, on 11 May 1946: 
... almost universal Malay political opinion here gives no basis for expecting effective operation of 
constitution on Union... Strength and organisation of Malay opinion and their free criticism of their 
own Rulers has surprised all who have experience of Malaya, including especially the Rulers 
themselves.S4 
In contrast to the Malays' widespread response, curiously, non -Malays initially 
showed little enthusiasm for the Malayan Union proposal even though it had the 
potential to improve their position and give them political rights which they had been 
previously denied.ss 
In circumstances of mounting agitation from the Malays and lack of support 
from the non -Malays, the constitution of the Malayan Union was reviewed at a 
conference between the Sultans, representatives of UMNO, and representatives of the 
British government. Finally, a new constitution based on the concept of federalism was 
agreed upon by the British government. As a result, on 1 February 1948, the Federation 
of Malaya Agreement was signed by the Sultans and the British High Commissioner. 
The Federation of Malaya Agreement stated that the high commissioner would 
be responsible for safeguarding the 'special position' of the Malays and the 'legitimate 
interests' of the non -Malays. Meanwhile, under the Federation scheme, sensitive issues 
that had dominated Malaysian politics to the present, such as the special rights and 
privileges of the Malays, the position of the Sultans, and the place of the Chinese in 
Malaya, were brought out into the open and upheld. The conditions of citizenship were 
made more restrictive than in the earlier Malayan Union scheme, requiring residence of 
at least fifteen years over the previous twenty years, a declaration of permanent 
settlement, and a certain competence in Malay and English." 
In contrast to their earlier indifferent response to the Malayan Union proposal, 
the non -Malays were aggrieved at the restoration of Malay constitutional privileges 
53 Andaya, 1982, p. 256. 
64 See A. .1. Stockwell (ed.), Malaya, Part I: The Malayan Union Experiment 1942 -1948 (London: 
HMSO, 1995), p. 229. 
ss The Chinese were more interested in the restoration of their businesses damaged by the war, than in 
politics. See Richard Hugh Sedley Allen, Malaysia, Prospect and Retrospect: The Impact and Aftermath 
of Colonial Rule (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 84. 
56 For more detailed citizenship regulations, see Federation of Malaya, The Federation of Malaya 
Agreement, 1948 As Amended (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1956), pp. 40-43. Also see Federation 
of Malaya, The Federation of Malaya Agreement (Amendment) Ordinance (Kuala Lumpur: Government 
Press, 1952). 
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when the Federation scheme proposed to replace the Malayan Union proposal. The non - 
Malays, especially the Chinese, protested and threatened to walk out of the various 
councils. Again, the new constitutional proposal accelerated the institutionalization of 
political movements among the Malayan peoples. For example, on 22 December 1946, 
two days before the new constitutional proposal, the All- Malaya Council of Joint Action 
(AMCJA) was formed, with the wealthy Baba businessman, Tan Cheng Lock, as its 
chairman. On 22 February 1947, the Pusat Tenaga Rá ayat (People's United Front or 
PUTERA), consisting of the Malay National Party, the Angkatan Pemuda Insaf, the 
Peasants' Union and the Angkatan Wanita Sedara, was established by radical Malays. 
The continuing political activities against the Federation scheme were supported by 
these political organizations. However, these nascent political movements were mostly 
ineffectual and even AMCJA was unable to play an effective role in the course of 
events due to internal divisions. In the end, opposition against the Federation scheme 
failed to achieve its purpose' 
Following the implementation of the Federation of Malaya in February -1948, 
Malaya underwent a serious armed insurrection led by the MCP. In response the British 
declared 'the Emergency' which lasted for 12 years. One of the critical consequences of 
the Emergency was the intensification of racial rivalry between the Malays and the 
Chinese. The MCP's main aim was to wrest control of the country from the British. 
And, their main targets were mainly Malays and British personnel. The Chinese - 
dominated MCP obtained most of its supplies from the Chinese, in particular those 
squatters who lived near the jungle fringes. On the other hand, most members of the 
government security forces were Malays. Thus, an ideologically originated struggle 
between the British and the MCP soon evolved into intensified ethnic rivalry in 
Malaya." 
When the Emergency began in mid -1948, moderate Chinese leaders were at a 
loss. To make matters worse for the Chinese, the British government was also 
concerned with the possibility of the MCP gaining greater influence over the Chinese 
community. Therefore the British government encouraged the formation of an 
alternative political association amongst the Chinese. As a result, on 27 February 1949 
the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) was formed under the leadership of Tan 
Cheng Lock, a moderate Chinese leader, to represent the interests of the Chinese 
57 About the political activity against Federation and the claims of the AMCJA and the PUTERA, see 
PUTERA & AMCJA, The People's Constitution for Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: Ta Chong Press, 1947). 
58 See Victor Purcell, Malaya: Communist or Free? (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1954), pp. 59 -97; 
Richard Clutterbuck, 1985, pp. 167 -260; and Robert Jackson, The Malayan Emergency (London: 
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community. Though the MCA was not a mass party, rather a businessman's pressure - 
group, 'it did provide a means by which moderate Chinese activists could participate in 
the evolving political process.'s9 
In the meantime, in August 1946, the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) was 
formed to look after the welfare of Indians in Malaya. Initially the MIC was not a 
significant movement, attached as it was to the politics of India rather than Malaya. 
However, the MIC gradually began to play a role representing the interests of the Indian 
community as the Indians in Malaya, like the Chinese, tended to show their interest 
towards Malaya in the process of political development during the post -war British 
period. Meanwhile, there were several other forces transformed into political parties in 
the early 1950s. Few parties were politically influential. However, they were clearly 
divided along ethnic lines.' 
2 -6. Summary 
It is clear that ethnic identities belong to times long past and antedate the colonial 
arrival. Different ethnic groups also have a propensity to split and the ethnic diversity 
itself tends to lead toward ethnic conflicts. However, as Horowitz has stressed, it was 
the colonial powers that helped shape how ethnic groups compare and contrast each 
other. The colonial governments often promoted ethnic disparities by favoring certain 
groups over others for effective rule over the colonies.61 And it was this colonial 
experience, or discrimination, that has fostered the determined ethnic identities in many 
post -colonial nation -states. 
Also in Malaysia, the legacies of colonialism created new functions for ethnic 
groups thereby shaping the quality of inter- ethnic interactions. These relation could be 
perceived as a by- product of British colonial rule in that the segmental plurality of 
ethnic groups was transformed into a 'backward -advanced dichotomy', especially 
between the Malays and the Chinese.62 The political antagonism that arose as a result of 
war -time Japanese policies towards Malayan society tended to deepen ethnic divisions 
and sharpen inter -ethnic conflict. And it was during the post -war British administration 
Routledge, 1991). 
59J. M. Gullick, Malaysia: Economic Expansion and National Unity (London: Ernest Benn, 1981), p. 93. 
6° Those established before the Independence of 1957 were: Pan Malayan Islamic Party (PAS), People's 
Progressive Party (PPP, from 1952 -1956 known as the Perak Progressive Party), Labor Party and Party 
Rakyat. 
61 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 
108 -1I3. 
62 For more details of relations between ethnic group comparison and colonialism, see Horowitz, 1985, 
pp. 147 -166. 
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that the lines of ethnic contrast were replicated as ethnically -based parties in the modem 
political system in reaction to the British- proposed Malayan Union. 
The formation of ethnically -based parties does not necessarily mean a further 
exacerbation of ethnic conflict since they can act as agents of inter- communal 
cooperation. As Huntington asserts, the presence of institutionalized political parties is a 
crucial condition for bringing a stable political order to newly independent countries in 
the post -colonial world.ó3 Nevertheless, there might be some doubt about how far an 
ethnically -based political party system can sustain favorable conditions for successful 
management of communal conflict. At this juncture, it must be noted that mono -ethnic 
parties tend to mobilize ethnically- oriented mass discontent to derive their support from 
their ethnic communities. And it is worth noting that the formation of ethnically -based 
political parties in Malaysia, especially the politically dominant UMNO, was a by- 
product of increasing pressure to redress immediate grievances over nationalistic as well 
as communal identities. Therefore, the creation of exclusive political organizations in 
Malaysia along ethnic lines can be perceived as a modern attempt to consolidate a 
segmental plurality of ethnic configuration rather than to resolve it. To a certain extent, 
the presence of institutionalized political parties can contribute to socio- political 
stability in a plural society. However, such circumstances where ethnic cleavages are 
woven into an exclusive political framework may provide long -term obstacles to the 
achievement of the integration of diverse ethnic groups in the process of nation - 
building. The ethnically -based political parties, indeed, played a substantial role as 
institutional mechanisms for political manifestations of the communal rivalries in 
Malaysias post -colonial era. 
63 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1968). 
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CHAPTER 3 
A Trial Period of Regime Maintenance through Consociational Bargaining 
The case of Malaysia [1955 -1969] provides the... example of reasonably successful consociational 
democracy in the Third World, although the nature of its plural society and the kind of 
consociational institutions it developed differ considerably both from Lebanon and from the 
European cases! 
Kuala Lumpur was a city of fire; I could clearly see the conflagrations from my residence at the 
top of the hill and it was a sight that I never thought I would see in my life -time. In fact all my 
work to make Malaysia a happy and peaceful country through[oujt these years, and also my dream 
of being the happiest Prime Minister in the world, were also going up in flames_' 
3 -1. Introduction 
Many scholars of conflict resolution argue that intense ethnic conflicts in deeply 
fragmented societies are rarely resolved by orthodox democratic means such as pure 
majoritarianism, ordinary parliamentary opposition, political campaigning, and winning 
elections.3 Therefore, scholars have proposed the alternative 'consociational' model for 
dealing with intense conflicts, both in the smaller developed European countries and the 
post -colonial plural societies of the Third World. This chapter explores the relevance of 
consociational conflict resolution for regime maintenance, to the first period of 
Malaysian ethnic politics, 1957 -1969. 
The intense ethnic and societal cleavages in Malaysia have inclined many 
scholars to view consociational elite bargaining as the most useful theoretical approach 
to analyzing regime maintenance in the Malaysian political system. Much of the 
consociational writing regarding Malaysia, therefore, has been oriented towards 
exploring how the elites of the various ethnic groups are able to reach some measure of 
consensus to achieve and preserve socio- political stability, within a relatively 
democratic political system. These studies clearly show that some of the features of 
consociationalism are exhibited by the Malaysian political system, especially in the 
Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1977), p. 150. 
' Abdul Rahman Putra (Turku), May 13: Before and After (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Melayu Press, 1969), 
p. 91 and p. 94. Tunku Abdul Rahman was the first Prime Minister of Malaysia. 
3 See Eric A. Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies (Cambridge: Harvard University, 
Center for International Affairs, 1972), pp. 33 -39; Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Politics in 
Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 
1972); Gerhard Lehmbruch, "Consociational Democracy in the International System ", European Journal 
of Political Research, Vol. 3, 1975, pp. 377 -391; and Lijphart, 1977. 
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years shortly before and immediately after Malaysian independence. Moreover, most of 
these works conclude that the Malaysian government's efforts at achieving conflict 
resolution were praiseworthy. Arend Lijphart, as the original proponent of 
consociationalism, also claims that the case of Malaysia especially in the 1957 -1969 
period provides a reasonably successful example of consociational democracy in the 
plural societies of the Third World.4 
To analyze the relevance of consociationalism in the first period of Malaysian 
ethnic politics, this chapter is divided into three sections. The first examines the motives 
for a consociational power -sharing arrangement during the 1957 -1969 period. The main 
concern is to assess what kinds of factors have motivated the segmental ethnic elites, 
especially UMNO leaders, to choose consociational methods as major regime 
maintenance strategies. The second part explores in detail major features of 
consociational conflict management during the first period of Malaysian ethnic politics. 
The third part focuses on the breakdown of the May 1969 racial riots as a failure of 
consociational politics. Details of the political and socio- economic backgrounds for the 
breakdown of inter -ethnic consociational conflict management will be described in this 
part. 
3 -2. Motives for Consociational Power- Sharing 
According to Lehmbruch and Lijphart, the possibility of consociational democracy 
increases when certain conditions exist in a deeply fragmented society, despite intrinsic 
attributes of the society that obstruct democratic political stability. They identify 
favorable conditions for consociational elite -cooperation among conflict groups. These 
include: multiple party systems, a relatively even balance of power among the 
segmental parties, prior traditions of elite accommodation, a high degree of segmental 
isolation, small country size, the presence of crosscutting cleavages and overarching 
loyalties.5 As Lijphart noted, these conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient 
conditions for guaranteeing the success of consociational politics.6 Nonetheless, the 
likelihood of consociational power -sharing arrangements increases when a number of 
these conditions are satisfied simultaneously in a deeply divided society. 
4 See Lijphart, 1977, pp. 150 -153. 
5 Lijphart, 1977, pp. 53 -103 and Lehmbruch, 1975, pp. 377 -391. 
6 Lijphart points out these conditions are considered helpful factors. Therefore, 'even when all of the 
conditions are unfavorable, consociationalism, though perhaps difficult, should not be considered 
impossible. Conversely, a completely favorable...condition...does not guarantee consociational choices or 
success.' See Lijphart, 1977, pp. 54 -55. 
Lehmbruch, 1975, p. 380. 
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The Malaysian political system conformed to some of these favorable 
conditions especially before and at the point of independence.8 As described in the 
previous chapter, a very small degree of social interaction occurred among the main 
ethnic communities. Even residence of ethnic group was, to a large extent, segregated 
and the groups were, and still are, quite different in many aspects of daily lives, such as 
dietary habits, customs, religion, language and world- views.9 It is still a moot point to 
what extent such highly segmented isolation enhanced political autonomy among the 
segmental Ieaders in their relations with leaders of other groups. However, there is little 
doubt that this facilitated the winning of political loyalty or public support from their 
own communities as Iong as they appeared to be working for their own segments of 
society. Moreover, prior traditions which contributed to cooperative decision -making 
among communal leaders were by no means rare, though not prominent, in the Malayan 
political process. In line with Lijphart, Malaysia is also a relatively small country, 
although it is hard to assess to what extent the coalescence of ethnic group leaders is 
affected by the size of the country.1) At the point of independence the Malaysian 
population was estimated at less than seven million, even smaller than those of the 
successful European consociational democracies. 
However, the Malaysian context did not contain some of the major favorable 
conditions for consociationalism. According to Lijphart, the presence of segmental 
political parties is favorable 'only on the condition that all parties are minority parties'. n 
He continues that 'a multiple balance of power among the segments of a plural society is 
more conducive to consociational democracy than a dual balance of power or a 
hegemony by one of the segments. "2 There is no doubt that the consociational 
resolution of conflict can be facilitated in Malaysia as the salient ethnic cleavages are 
expressed through political parties which represent the segmental groups. Nonetheless, 
as shown in Table 2 -1 of the previous chapter, at the point of independence the Malays 
made up about half the whole population and the Chinese were roughly forty per cent. 
B Case analyzes the presence and value of Lijphart's favorable consociational conditions in the case of 
Malaysian society, although his focus is not directly related to interpreting the adequacy of those 
favorable conditions to the Malaysian politics. See William Case, Elites and Regimes in Malaysia: 
Revisiting a Consociaional Democracy (Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, 1996), Chapter Two. 
9 For more detailed discussion of communal differences, see Milton J. Esman, Administration and 
Development in Malaysia: Institution Building and Reform in a Plural Society (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1972), pp. 17 -23. 
1° Case claims the small size of country does not necessarily assure consensual elite unity and stable 
democracy as shown in the cases of Cambodia and a number of Arab and African countries where 
tyranny and elite disunity prevail. In the case of Malaysia, he suggests that the coalescence of ethnic 
group leaders was by no means increased by small country size. See Case, 1996, pp. 41 -42. 
u Lijphart, 1977, p. 64. 
12 Lijphart, 1977, p. 55. 
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The numerical superiority of the Malays was threatened by the minority ethnic groups 
soon after independence during the brief period of political union with Singapore, as 
shown in the following Table 3 -3. In this regard, the Malaysian political system should 
be characterized as a near- majority configuration and, in Lijphart's theory, quite 
unfavorable for consociational bargaining.13 More importantly, the political 
paramountcy of the Malays was, and still is, a special feature of Malaysian politics. The 
Malays claimed an intrinsic privileged position in political power as an indigenous 
people whereas the Chinese and the Indians were considered as transient or alien in the 
country. Although the superior economic position of the non -Malays was generally 
recognized by the Malays, the political paramountcy of the Malays was not negotiable 
from the Malay perspective. This can be viewed as a crucial barrier to consociationalism 
in Malaysian politics. 
Lijphart also assumes that the more societal cleavages crosscut each other, the 
more cross -pressures are enhanced in a plural society. The enhancing of cross -pressures 
within the various segments will encourage moderate attitudes and affect the chances of 
a consociational power -sharing arrangement.14 Similarly, the 'basic national symbols' 
accepted by all segmental group members will increase the probability of inter -elite 
cooperation in a deeply divided society.15 However, the conditions of cross -cutting 
cleavages and overarching loyalties hardly fit the Malaysian case. The main ethnic 
communities were extraordinarily different in almost every aspect of their lives. 
Furthermore, all of the national symbols in Malaysia were derived from the Malay 
tradition and this hardly produced cohesion for the society as a whole. Rather, the 
fundamental differences among the main ethnic communities mutually reinforced the 
societal cleavages in Malaysian ethnic society. To some extent, the highly segmental 
isolation might have provided political leaders with the advantage of a high degree of 
autonomy in bargaining with other communal group leaders. However, over- emphasis 
on elite -level bargaining could result in loss of support from their own community in the 
long run, especially in circumstance where the societal cleavages hardly crosscut each 
other at the gross -roots level. 
In sum, although some favorable conditions for consociationalism appeared to 
be present in Malaysia, these did not necessarily guarantee that elites would choose 
consociationalism or that it would be successful. In other words, the consociational 
13 Lijphart claims that the presence of a majority or near- majority segment is the most unfavorable 
configuration for consociational democracy. For more details, see Lijphart, 1977, pp. 55 -61. 
14 See Lijphart, 1977, pp. 71 -83. 
' Lehmbruch, 1975, p. 380. 
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power -sharing arrangement should not be perceived as the inevitable conflict -regulating 
choice by Malaysia's communal political elites. We have to ask therefore what 
motivated the leaders, especially UMNO leaders, to choose a consociational means of 
regime maintenance in a situation where conditions for consociational strategies were 
not overwhelmingly favorable? 
The Presence of Perceived External Pressure or Threat 
Nordlinger argues that 'an external threat or danger' is often the most effective binding 
force that holds centrifugal tendencies together in a single political unit." As well as an 
external threat, 'an external pressure' also can be a positive facilitator for successful 
power -sharing arrangements. In Malaysia, the presence of perceived external pressure 
or threat occurred a few years before and just after independence, as the country came 
under pressure from the British to establish inter -ethnic cooperation and later as it faced 
the threat of Indonesian 'Confrontation' respectively. 
During the period 1955 -57, the primary task of nationalist leaders was the 
achievement of independence. Independence from British colonial rule was perceived as 
a common goal among the major ethnic groups in Malaya, although there were 
differences about how that goal could be achieved.17 And, the Chinese -dominated 
Communist insurgency was perceived as a threat to both the Malay community and 
much of the Chinese and Indian community as well. In this situation, the British 
colonial government emphasized the necessity of 'active co- operation from the Chinese 
- not only from the leaders but from people of all classes.'" Therefore, the British 
administration encouraged the political role of the MCA to provide 'an alternative 
standard fto the MCP] to which loyal Chinese could rally.'19 After the Second World 
War in a situation where there was little political cooperation between the Malays and 
the Chinese, the British colonial government insisted, particularly to Malay political 
leaders, that independence would be granted only to a multi -racial government and not 
16 In this context, Nordlinger claims that an external threat or danger, as a common enemy, will submerge 
internal conflicts in deeply divided societies where there is an unfavorable domestic balance of power. 
For detailed explanation, see Nordlinger, 1972, pp. 43 -46. Also see Lehmbruch, 1975, p. 382. 
19 The huge amount of British documents during this period shows the great influence of the British 
colonial government on Malayan politics in the years of 1942 -1957. For a complete collection of these 
British documents, see A. J. Stockwell (ed.), Malaya (London: HMSO, 1995), British Documents on the 
End of Empire Project, Series B, Volume 3. The part of Malaya is composed of three parts: Part I, The 
Malayan Union Experiment (1942 -1948); Part II, The Communist Insurrection (1948- 1953); and Part III, 
The Alliance Route to Independence (1953- 1957). 
i8 "The Situation in Malaya ", Cabinet memorandum by Lyttleton, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
20 November 1951, see Stockwell, 1995, Malaya, Part II, pp. 310 -315. 
19 A note by H. Gurney, the High Commissioner of the Federation of Malaya, expressing his concern on 
the Chinese community, see Stockwell, 1995, Malaya, Part II, pp. 300 -30I. 
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to a government dominated exclusively by one race.20 In the process of struggle for 
independence, the prominent leaders of UMNO realized that independence was unlikely 
to be achieved unless they had the support of non -Malays, especially the Chinese.21 In 
this context, a grand coalition of three distinct communal parties, UMNO, MCA, and 
MIC, provided a visible arrangement to demonstrate multi- racial cooperation and meet 
the stipulations of the British administration. Whatever the British colonial 
government's motives, their determined policies acted as a catalyst for multi -racial 
political cooperation in Malaya. 
Meanwhile, 'Confrontation' with Indonesia after independence provides an 
example of how a credible external threat motivated inter -racial cooperation and 
increased multi- ethnic support for the Alliance regime. This might be well observed in 
the parliamentary elections held in 1955 and 1964. 'Independence' from the British was 
a national issue in 1955; as was 'Confrontation' with Indonesia in 1964. In 1955 the 
Alliance achieved its overwhelming victory campaigning as the party best equipped to 
gain independence from the British.Z2 Later, the 1964 election was dominated by the 
national issue of Indonesian 'Confrontation'. In the 1964 election, the voters rallied 
behind the Alliance in response to an external threat posed by 'Confrontation' with 
Indonesia. 
Compared with the 1955 and 1964 elections, the poor results of the 1959 
election showed to some extent how the presence of perceived external pressure or 
threat played an important role in the Alliance regime's obtaining multi -ethnic electoral 
support. Whenever national issues, originating from external pressure and/or threat, had 
not come to the fore, the most salient issues had taken on a communal character. Indeed, 
in the absence of a national threat following the end of the Emergency and the 
achievement of independence, the major concerns of the 1959 elections were sensitive 
20 After the Japanese Military Administration, inter -ethnic cooperation between the Malays and the 
Chinese was the least on each other's minds. The UMNO's primary aim was the protection of the Malays 
from being overwhelmed by the Chinese, while the políticaIly involved Chinese were either caught up in 
the ideological struggle between the Kuomintang and the Communists in China or were involved with a 
communist -led insurgency against the British which had very little Malay support. For a description of 
the political situations of this period, see Wang Gung Wu, "Chinese Politics in Malaya ", China Quarterly, 
No. 43, 1970, pp. 1 -30. 
21 During Lyttleton's visit to Malaya in December 1951, he stressed that 'Malaya would be granted 
independence as soon as the present Emergency had ended, and the people were united.' See Stockwell, 
1995, Malaya, Part II, p. 379. 
22 In the 1955 election, the second important issue was the ending of the 'Emergency', the common desire 
for a return to normalcy. For more detailed analysis on the 1955 election, see Francis G. Carrell, The 
Malayan Elections ", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 4, 1955, pp. 315 -330. For detail of the 1964 election, 
see R. K. Vasil, "The 1964 General Elections in Malaya ", International Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1965, pp. 
39 -56 and K. J. Ratnam and R. S. Milne, The Malaysian Parliamentary Election of 1964 (Singapore: 
University of Malaya Press, 1967). 
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domestic issues of language, education and culture. The 1959 election results for the 
Alliance were the poorest yet. This phenomenon appeared more clearly in the 1969 
election. Following the end of confrontation with Indonesia, the attention of the 
Malaysian people was again redirected to crucial domestic problems associated with the 
political position of the non -Malays and the role of their language and education, just as 
they had in the 1959 election. In short, the campaigns and results of the 1969 election 
revealed how the Alliance framework was vulnerable to racial sensitivity. Even though 
there is no clear data to prove a direct relationship between external pressure and high 
probability of elite cooperation, at the very least the presence of the external pressure or 
perceived threat seems to have been translated into votes for the Alliance coalition, as 
shown in the results of elections in the period 1955 -1969 (see Table 3 -1). 
Table 3 -1. Parliamentary Elections, 1955 -1969: Seats Won by Political Parties 
1955 1959 1964(1) 1969(2) 
Alliance 51 (81.7%) 74 (51.8 %) 89 (58.4 %) 66 (48.4 %) 
Democratic Action Party - - - 13 (13.7 %) 
Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia - - - 8 (8.6 %) 
Peoples Action Party 
People's Progressive Party 
- 
- 4 
- 
(6.3 %) 
1 (2.1 %) 
2 (3.6%) 4 (3.9%) 
Pan- Malaysian Islamic Party 1 (4.1 %) 13 (21.3 %) 9 (14.4 %) 12 (23.7 %) 
Socialist Front - 8 (12.9 %) 2 (16.2 %) - 
United Democratic Party - - 1 (4.3 %) - 
Party Negara 0 (7.9 %) 1 (2.1 %) - - 
Malayan Party - 1 (0.9 %) - - 
Independents 0 (2.2 %) 3 (4.8 %) 0 (0.7 %) 0 (0.3 %) 
Total 52 104 104 103 
Source: Compiled from NSTP Research and Information Services, Elections in Malaysia: A Handbook 
of Facts and Figures on the Elections 1955 -1986 (Kuala Lumpur: Balai Berita, 1990). 
Note: (1) The 1964 election excludes Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak. 
(2) The 1969 election excludes Sabah and Sarawak. Election in one constituency postponed. 
Unstable Political Hegemony and Weak Economic Position 
Nordlinger noted that 'economic factors' induced the dominant political elites to engage 
in cooperative conflict -regulating behavior.23 It seems that economic necessity provided 
an important motive for UMNO leaders to cooperate with the MCA leaders. The 
Chinese were in control of all trade and commerce in Malaya/Malaysia that was not 
under foreign, mostly British, control. As a result of the economic superiority of the 
Chinese, it was widely recognized that the MCA provided a large share of finance to the 
Alliance regime, while UMNO provided more voting power.Z4 UMNO's early moves 
towards financial self- sufficiency, including a party lottery, soon after its formation 
n Nordlinger, 1972, p. 46. 
24 R. S. Milne and K. J. Ratnam, "Politics and Finance in Malaya", Journal of Commonwealth Political 
Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1965, p. 196. 
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failed.25 Therefore, UMNO leaders aligned themselves with the MCA not only to win 
electoral support, but also to finance the Alliance's political campaigns, such as payment 
of helpers, financial support for the candidates, printing of posters and other propaganda 
materiaL26 
As well as UMNO's economic dependence on the cash -rich MCA, long -term 
political considerations also motivated the UMNO leaders to take part in consociational 
power -sharing with the MCA. Apart from the special political position of the Malays 
originating from their indigenous status, the more substantial political power of the 
Malay community derived from their numerical superiority in the electorate and the 
nation -wide distribution of those numbers. However, in the years after independence, 
the numerical superiority of the Malays was threatened. In detail, the numerical 
superiority of the Malays before and up to independence was mostly due to the special 
citizenship conditions based on the 1948 Federation of Malaya Agreement. This 
required residence of at least fifteen years during the previous twenty -five years in the 
Federation for acquiring citizenship of Malaya, which gave considerable advantage to 
the indigenous Malays.27 Therefore, the Chinese and Indians were absolutely weak in 
terms of political power due mainly to the lack of numbers of registered voters in the 
electorate. However, as shown in Table 3 -2, the numerical superiority of the Malays 
markedly decreased with the increased number of the non -Malay electorates. 
Table 3 -2. Communal Composition of the Electorate in the Parliamentary Elections, 1955 -1969 ( %) 
Malays Chinese Indians 
1955 84.2 112 4.6 
1959 57.1 34.5 8.4 
1964(1) 54.4 37.5 8.1 
1969(2) 55.7 36.3 8.0 
Source: Mohammad Agus Yusoff, Consociational Politics: The Malaysian Experience (Kuala Lumpur: 
Perikatan Pemuda Enterprise, 1992), p. 24. 
Note: (1) The 1964 election excludes Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak. 
(2) The 1969 election excludes Sabah and Sarawak. 
Furthermore, the overall racial composition of Malaya itself by no means 
provided a stable numerical superiority for Malays, as shown in Table 3 -3. In particular, 
the numerical superiority of Malays in Peninsular Malaysia was dramatically reversed 
during the brief period of political integration with Chinese -dominated Singapore as 
25 The lottery business was not successful because the party was based on peasant and working class 
membership. See Heng Pek Koon, Chinese Politics in Malaysia: A History of the Malaysian Chinese 
Association (Singapore: Oxford University Press, I988), p. 164. 
26 Apart from the financial support for the Alliance's election campaigns, the UMNO needed to gain 
financial cooperation with Chinese businessmen 
-politicians to open up economic opportunities in the 
modern sector for the under -privileged Malays in the earlier period of independence. 
27 For more detailed citizenship regulations, see Federation of Malaya, The Federation of Malaya 
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revealed in the figure 1964(b) of the Table 3 -3. Therefore, at least before the expulsion 
of Singapore, it appeared that UMNO leaders needed to cooperate with the MCA for 
electoral reasons. In fact, one important reason behind the decision to force Singapore 
out of the Federation of Malaysia in 1965 was the immediate desire to restore the 
former numerical superiority of the Malays. As shown in the figure 1964(d) of Table 3- 
3, the numerical imbalance between Malays and Chinese was noticeable after the 
separation of Singapore. 
Table 3 -3. Ethnic Composition of Malaya/Malaysia, 1947 -1964 (population in thousands) 
MaIaysm Chinese Indians(2) Others 
1947 2,428 (49.5 %) 1,885 (38.4 %) 531 (10.8 %) 65 (1.3 %) 
1957 3,125 (49.8 %) 2,334 (37.2 %) 707 (11.3 %) 112 (1.8 %) 
1964(a) 3,963 (50.1 %) 2,918 (36.8 %) 884 (11.2 %) 153 (1.9%) 
1964(b) 4,226 (43.3 %) 4,301 (44.1%) 1,036 (10.6 %) 200 (2.0 %) 
1964(c) 5,116 (46.1 %) 4,680 (42.2 %) 1,042 (9.4 %) 251 (2.3 %) 
1964(d) 4,853 (52.3 %) 3,297 (35.7 %) 890 (9.6 %) 204 (2.2 %) 
Source: Compiled from Means, 1976, p. 12 (Table 1) and p. 294 (Table 12). 
Note: (1) Malays includes Malays, Indonesian and aborigines. 
(2) Indians includes Pakistanis and Ceylonese. 
1964(a) refers Peninsular Malaysia only (excluding Singapore). 
1964(b) refers Peninsular Malaysia only (including Singapore). 
1964(c) refers the Federation of Malaysia (including Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak). 
1964(d) refers the Federation of Malaysia (excluding Singapore). 
For the Chinese, the acquisition of political power was necessary for insuring 
their strong economic position. The MCA was largely founded as a businessman's 
pressure group rather than a mass -based political party. Therefore, MCA leaders were 
more concerned with the maintenance of Chinese economic predominance. MCA 
leaders, however, realized that no exclusively Chinese party could ever win a legislative 
majority in an election. Therefore, while UMNO was heavily dependent on the MCA's 
financial contributions to the Alliance, MCA needed UMNO's voting power to win seats 
in the election. As shown in Table 3 -2, although they comprised about 40 per cent of the 
population, the Chinese constituted only about 11 per cent of the electorate in the 1955 
election, compared to 84 per cent of the Malay electorates.28 En sum, both UMNO and 
MCA had political and economic assets which induced them to offer trade -offs to each 
other.29 
Agreement, 1948 As Amended (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1956), pp. 40-43. 
28 Along with the absolute weakness of the electorate during the early days, even in 1959, the Chinese 
formed more than 50 per cent of the electorate in only 29 of the 104 parliamentary districts. In the same 
years, the Malay voters formed over 50 per cent of the electorate in 60 out of a total 104 parliamentary 
districts. For a more detailed explanation, see T. G. McGee, "The Malayan Elections of I959: A Study in 
Electoral Geography ", The Journal of Tropical Geography, Vol. 16, 1962, pp. 70 -99. 
29 The Indians, however, were clearly weak in terms of both commercial wealth and electoral power. 
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The Tradition of Elite Accommodation and the Experience of Inter -racial 
Cooperation 
Lehmbruch argues that successful cooperative experiences among segmental political 
leaders may induce them to internalize consociational strategies as routine patterns of 
conflict regulation.3° That is to say, rival groups may consistently employ 
consociational strategies, thereby institutionalizing them. In this context, a prior 
coalescent decision -making tradition among the conflict group leaders increases the 
possibility of cooperative power -sharing arrangements in a deeply divided society.31 
Even before the British colonial administration in Malaya, there were forms of 
inter -racial cooperation between the Malays and the Chinese, especially at the elite 
level. One example was the Kapitan China System. Traditional Malay rulers, the 
Sultans, dealt with the Chinese through this system. Malay Sultans managed communal 
disputes in consultation with the Kapitan China, who was the recognized leader of local 
Chinese communities. Though the Kapitan China played no formal political role, the 
Kapitan China System was an essential form of inter- ethnic cooperation especially 
when the Chinese were numerically small compared to the Malays. 
In terms of managing the Chinese immigrants, the role of the secret societies 
during the British rule is also worth noting. These secret societies based on clan or 
dialect associations were essential organizations affording protection and assistance to 
Chinese immigrants when they came to the Malay world, a new and often hostile 
environment. Though these societies had existed before the British administration, they 
played an increasingly important role in the Chinese immigrant community as a whole, 
as Chinese immigration expanded in the early twentieth century. The British 
administration also recognized the essential role of the secret societies in regulating 
immigrant community affairs in Malaya. hi fact, the Kapitan China himself was usually 
a leading member of a secret society and was himself subject to the loyalties and 
obligations of his own secret society.32 
After the Japanese occupation, a similar experiment of inter -communal 
consociational practice among the segmental groups in Malaya occurred. The British 
3a Lehmbruch, 1975, p. 381. 
31 Lijphart, 1977, pp. 99 -103. 
32 The Kapitan China System became less relevant to inter -racial cooperation as Chinese immigrants 
increased significantly during the British administration and activities of the Chinese were gradually 
extended to the political sphere. For more detailed explanations on the Kapitan China System and the 
secret societies, see Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Malaya (London: Oxford University Press, 1948), pp. 
155 -173; C. S. Wong, A Gallery of Chinese Kapitans (Singapore: Dewan Bahasa dan Kebudayaan 
Kebangsaan, Ministry of Culture, 1963); and R. N. Jackson, Pickering, Protector of Chinese (Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1965). 
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sponsored Communities Liaison Committee consisting of six Malays, six Chinese, one 
Indian, and three other minority representatives (Eurasian, Ceylonese and European) 
was established in 1949 and met in August and September of that year to alleviate the 
immediate problem of inter -communal tension after the outbreak of the communist 
revolt. The representatives published a statement of 'Agreed Views' as a memorandum 
of the committee's unanimous opinions on long -term political problems of Malaya.33 
Although the Communities Liaison Committee was originally initiated by the British 
administration and was never embodied in a continuing non -communal organization, 
prominent leaders of all ethnic communities viewed its style as appropriate for the 
negotiation of compromise solutions. Furthermore, the experience of the committee 
taught the communal leaders a lesson in terms of methods of inter -ethnic bargaining. In 
other words, the committee showed that a significant racial compromise was more 
likely to emerge from 'semi- secret and "off- the -record" negotiations conducted by 
communal leaders.'34 
The UMNO -MCA alliance in the 1952 election further encouraged the 
institutionalization of cooperative strategies in the Malayan political party system. It 
seemed that, particularly for the Malays, there were three alternatives in the Malayan 
political party system: a model of ethnic separatism (Pan- Malayan Islamic Party, PAS), 
a non -communal integration formula (Independence of Malaya Party, IMP), and inter- 
communal cooperation (Alliance). Of these three alternatives, the inter -communal 
bargaining model provided a winning formula for the explicitly separate ethnic parties 
as shown in elections since 1952. 
The first election in Malaya was for the Municipal Council of George Town on 
Penang held on 1 December 1951. Of the three contestant parties - the Radical Party of 
Penang, the Penang Labor Party, and UMNO - the Radical Party of Penang, 
campaigning on a 'non -communal' platform, won six of the nine seats. Though the 1951 
election did not indicate conclusively future trends in Malayan politics, the result 
suggested a significant lesson at least for UMNO facing the Kuala Lumpur Municipal 
Council election just two months later. Facing the immediate challenge of the IMP led 
by Onn bin Jaafar, campaigning against communalism in politics, UMNO had no 
effective election strategies but to cooperate with the MCA.35 The MCA, as a 
33 For details of the Communities Liaison Committee, see Gorden P. Means, Malaysian Politics (London: 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1976), pp. 122 -124. 
34 Means, 1976, p. 124. 
35 IMP was established by the UMNO's first president Onn bin Jaafar on 16 September 1951. Onn bin 
Jaafar initially tried to open UMNO membership to non -Malays and convert the party into a non - 
communal national party. But his plan was rejected by the other UMNO leaders and he formed a new 
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communally based political party, also had a reason for joining a common election front 
with UMNO against the non -communal IMP. 
The election results showed that the UMNO -MCA coalition won nine of 
twelve seats contested. The IMP took only two seats while an independent candidate 
won the remaining seat. Interestingly, the two elected candidates of the IMP were both 
MIC members.36 At this election, the term 'Alliance' was not used. Both parties, 
however, deliberately avoided political and communal issues effectively depriving the 
non -communal IMP of a campaign issue. This inter -communal electoral front plainly 
revealed which formula was the most effective of the three alternative integrative 
options mentioned above. Soon after the Kuala Lumpur Municipal Council election, 
Tunku Abdul Rahman said the UMNO 'will cooperate with other organizations, but we 
certainly want to preserve our identity [as a communal party]'.37 Again, at the following 
municipal elections between December 1952 and December 1953, the Alliance captured 
85 seats out of the 107 seats contested in fourteen cities of the Federation. Meanwhile, 
the IMP won only one seat when one of its members was re- elected in the Kuala 
Lumpur Municipal Council election in December 1952.38 The successive electoral 
victories of the Alliance provided evidence of the value of the inter -communal 
cooperative strategy and consequently led to the idea of institutionalizing the inter- 
communal power -sharing arrangement. At a National Convention on 23 August, 1953, 
therefore, both parties decided to establish a national Alliance, and a National Executive 
Council was installed as the supreme authority in September 1954. Then in October 
1954, MIC joined the Alliance. Indeed, the UMNO -MCA common election front and its 
successful experience brought Malayan ethnic politics into a distinctly new stage of 
inter -communal grand coalition. 
3 -3. The Relevance of Consociational Politics to the 1957 -1969 Period 
One of the most essential elements of consocíatíonal conflict regulation is a grand 
multiracial political party IMP. The Kuala Lumpur Municipal Council Election of 1952 was of crucial 
importance to both the non -communal IMP and the inter -communal Alliance. Apart from its symbolic 
position as the capital of Malaya, the mixed communal constituencies of Kuala Lumpur revealed that no 
communal party could win a majority with a strictly communal appeal in the election. In this context, this 
election provided a significant empirical test for altemative integrative options in Malaysian politics. For 
discussions on non -communalism versus communalism within UMNO and Malay opposition to Orin bin 
Jaafar's plan, see Means, 1976, pp. 124 -127. A detailed explanation of the early elections in Malaya is 
provided in Means, 1976, pp. 132 -137. 
36 The MIC joined with IMP during the Kuala Lumpur Municipal Election of 1952. 
37 Straits Times, 28 February 1952, quoted in Means, 1976, p. 135. 
38 For detailed results of municipal elections during this period, see Karl von Vorys, Democracy without 
Consensus: Communalism and Political Stability in Malaysia (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1975), p. 109, Table 5 -1. 
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coalition of the leaders of all significant segment groups to govern the country.39 In 
addition, in circumstances where the political risks are high and mutual confidence is 
uncertain, a larger (and longer -term) coalition is more appropriate than a minimum 
winning coalition (or government versus opposition). This Iarger, longer -term coalition 
is the very feature many scholars have focused on in consociational writings on 
Malaysian politics. 
The Alliance as a political party was officially registered in 1958. However, the 
leaders of different groups in Malaysia had already established a pattern of grand - 
coalition cooperation prior to independence. The Alliance of the three main communal 
parties won a remarkable victory in the first federal election in 1955 by taking all but 
one of the elected seats. It then formed a cabinet in which all three communal political 
parties participated. After establishing a stable governing coalition, the Alliance 
contested two more federal elections in 1959 and 1964. For three consecutive federal 
elections, the Alliance showed the strength and efficiency of the inter -communal grand 
coalition in an ethnically divided society by winning convincingly. 
As well as the grand coalition, the other key features of consociationalism 
mentioned by Lijphart are: the mutual veto rule, which serves as an additional 
protection of vital minority interests; proportionality as the principal standard of 
political representation, civil service appointment, and allocation of public funds; and a 
high degree of autonomy for each segment to run its own internal affaírs.4Ó Although 
the 1957 -1969 Malaysian political system did not fully conform to all of these 
consociational elements, it nonetheless involved the articulation of the main features of 
consociationalism. In this regard, the following section will discuss the extent to which 
the Malaysian political system conformed to the features of consociational arrangement 
during this period. Major consociational features will be described in two aspects: the 
formal organization of the Alliance regime and substantial inter -ethnic conflict - 
regulating practices. 
The Structure of the Alliance Regime: Proportionality and Mutual Balancing 
The principle of proportionality means that 'all groups influence a decision in proportion 
to their numerical strength.i41 The proportionality can be applied in various fields, such 
s9 Lijphart, 1977, p. 25. 
60 Lijphart, 1977, pp. 25 -52. In a similar context, Nordlinger assumes six conflict -regulating practices for 
the successful management of intense conflicts as follows: a stable governing coalition, the 
proportionality principle, the mutual veto, purposive de- politicization, compromises and concessions. For 
more details, see Nordlinger, 1972, pp. 20 -33. 
4' Jurg Steiner, The Principles of Majority and Proportionality', British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 
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as the allocation of parliamentary seats, administrative positions, and distribution of 
scarce resources. Insofar as the principle decreases the potential for communal tension 
in the allocation of resources, it appears to serve as an effective conflict -regulating 
practice.42 
The Alliance regime can be said to have adhered roughly to the rule of 
proportionality as far as the formal structure of its decision -making body is concerned. 
The Alliance had two supreme bodies, the National Council and the National Executive 
Committee, which comprised representatives from the three communal parties. The 
National Executive Committee consisted of six UMNO members, six MCA members 
and three MIC members. As a primary decision -making body, the National Executive 
Committee exercised the formal power of selecting candidates and chief party 
administrators, initiating party policies, and recommending disciplinary actions. The 
National Council was also composed of proportionally balanced representatives from 
each party. It was made up of sixteen representatives each from UMNO and MCA and 
six from MIC.43 In fact, MCA and MIC were over -represented in these bodies. The 
proportionality principle, however, disguised the reality that UMNO exercised far more 
influence than its numerical representation would suggest. 
In addition to the structure of the Alliance's decision -making organization, the 
governmental power -sharing in the cabinet also provided another example of apparent 
proportionality, though in reality UMNO wielded disproportional influence. In fact, 
UMNO leaders held most of the important cabinet posts - Prime Minister, Deputy Prime 
Minister, Foreign Minister, the Ministries of Education, Interior, and Rural and 
Economic Development. The limited number of MCA cabinet members, however, was 
compensated by some members holding key cabinet posts, such as the Ministries of 
Finance, and Commerce and Industry.' Furthermore, MCA played an important role in 
deciding the composition of the cabinet during this early period. According to Funston, 
1, No. 1, 1971, p. 63. 
42 Nordlinger, 1972, p. 23. 
43 The principle of proportionality was also applied to a special 'Alliance Action Conunittee . This special 
committee was set up in the aftermath of Singapore's separation in mid -1965 to handle mutual differences 
and internai conflict within the Alliance. The committee discussed: education and the role of the Chinese 
language; the Malaysian Malaysia concept, which includes the issues of second -class citizenship and 
Malay privileges; and the relationship of the three constituent parties within the Alliance structure. This 
special committee was composed of eight members from the UMNO, nine from the MCA, and four from 
the MIC. The reason for allocating only eight positions to the UMNO was to squelch the prevalent charge 
that the Alliance and the federal regime were Malay- dominated after Singapore's expulsion. For detailed 
lists of Alliance Action Committee and activities, see Cynthia H. Enloe, Multi- Ethnic Politics: The Case 
of Malaysia, Research Monograph No. 2 (California: Center for South and Southeast Asia Studies, 
University of California Berkeley, 1970), pp. 113-116. 
44 See N. J. Funston, Malay Politics in Malaysia: A Study of the United Malays National Organisation 
and Party Islam (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Educational Books (Asia), 1980), p. 13. 
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for example, MCA sometimes exercised a veto (or at least significant influence) on the 
nomination of UMNO figures for cabinet posts. For instance some UMNO figures 
sometimes could not obtain full cabinet posts or were removed from their post because 
of direct and indirect opposition or influence from MCA 45 However, such influence or 
veto by MCA only operated in a limited and informal manner within the Alliance circle 
and did not amount to the mutual veto discussed in consociational theory. 
Similarly, at first glance, the figures of the federal public service also supported 
the principle of proportionality in the Alliance government. As shown below in Table 3- 
4, in 1957, federal public service Division I positions, which covered professional and 
administrative works, were dominated by expatriate officers, mostly British. The 
percentages of positions held by three ethnic communities doubled by 1962. The 
greatest increase occurred in the Chinese communities. In 1968 the number of positions 
occupied by expatriates was no longer significant as they had mostly been replaced by 
Malays. However, the Chinese still enjoyed large numbers in the federal civil service 
compared to their overall proportion of the population during this period. Especially 
among Division I posts, the professional and technical services - medicine, health, 
engineering, statistics, telecoms - were predominantly held by non -Malays, while the 
Malays were more concentrated in semi -professional or administrative services - 
customs, prisons, forest, immigration (see Table 3 -5). 
Table 3 -4. Percentage Ethnic Composition of Federal Public Service (Division I), 1957 -1968 
1957 1962 1968 
Malays 14.1 29.3 36.3 
Chinese 13.2 34.0 36.I 
Indians 7.0 15.9 21.5 
Expatriate 61.0 14.1 0.9 
Others 4.6 6.7 5.2 
Source: D. S. Gibbon and Zakaria Hj. Ahmad, "Pol tics and Selection for the Higher Civil Service in 
New States: The Malaysian Example ", Journal of Comparative Administration, Vol. 3, No. 3, 
1971, p. 336. 
Table 3 -5. Percentage Ethnic Composition in Selective Public Service (Division I) in 1968 
Medical Telecom Education MCS(1) Police Customs Immigration 
Malays 10.1 17.9 32.2 86.7 43.2 63.4 50.0 
Chinese 40.7 ' 44.3 40.3 6.4 30.8 32.7 41.7 
Indians 44.6 31.1 24.0 6.4 21.7 4.9 - 
Others 4.6 6.7 3.5 0.5 4.3 - 8.3 
Source: Esman, 1972, p 76, Table 5 and 6. 
Note: (1) MCS refers Malaysian Civ.1 Service. 
45 According to Funston, two prominent UMNO figures, Syed Jaafar Albar and Syed Nasir Ismail, could 
not obtain full cabinet posts because of MCA's opposition. Similarly, it was because of MCA's 
intervention that the outspoken Khalíd bin Awang Osman, Assistant Minister of Commerce and Industry, 
was transferred to an ambassadorship in West Germany in late 1965. See Funston, 1980, p. 13 and p. 22 
(footnotes 30). 
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However, in reality, proportionality did not really give non -Malays 
proportionate power in the government. As mentioned earlier, the key posts in cabinet 
were dominated by UMNO leaders. And in relation to the appointment to the public 
service, the Malays predominated in the top policy -making positions in the public 
service and substantially controIIed government and administrative organizations, as 
shown in Table 3 -6. In short, while statistics might suggest that the Malays and non - 
Malays were more or less proportionately distributed throughout the government and 
administrative services, the key question is whether numerical proportionality resulted 
in proportionality of influence. The answer to that question was clearly in the negative. 
Table 3 -6. Percentage Ethnic Composition of Higher Administrative Officials in Malayan/Malaysian 
Civil Service, 1957 -1968(1) 
1957 1962 I968 
Malays 35.5 79.0 85.1 
Chinese 2.5 6.1 7.4 
Indians 0.8 5.4 6.4 
Expatriate 61.1 9.4 0.2 
Source: Gordon P. Means, "Special Rights as a Stra egy for Development: The Case of Malaysia ", 
Comparative Politics, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1972, p. 47. 
Note: (1) The Malayan Civil Service (MCS) was the administrative elite of the public service and the 
super -ordinate positions were held by members of the MCS. 
Consociational Practices of the Alliance Regime: Compromise and Concession 
The practice of inter -communal bargaining by the Alliance Iargely depended on the 
autonomy of political leaders and their ability to convince the rank and file to follow 
decisions made at the elite level. Within the Alliance, communal issues were decided by 
consensus rather than by vote. Sometimes, there was intense bargaining behind closed 
doors; however, once they came to a final decision then it was the responsibility of each 
party's leaders to obtain compliance from their own rank and file. To achieve this, 
Malay leaders often went on nationwide tours to persuade UMNO members and the 
Malay community at the grass -roots level. In addition, decisions reached between the 
communal leaders were, in general, not publicly explained to avoid the politicizing of 
communal issues. In this way, a 'purposive de- politicization' was deliberately (and 
consistently) practiced by the Alliance leaders to minimize possible differences among 
the rank and file.46 As far as possible, therefore, public discussion of controversial 
communal issues was deliberately avoided. Esman has described how in Malaysia 
before May 1969 the Alliance regulated communal conflict according to what has been 
called an 'avoidance model' of conflict management 47 Two remarkable examples of 
46 Nordlinger, I972, p. 26. 
47 For examples of avoidance exercises of conflict management, see Esman, 1972, p. 258 -261. 
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consociational practice are shown in the package deals expressed in the 1957 
constitutional contract and the national language bill of 1967. 
The Package Deals of the 1957 Constitutional Contract 
The Alliance victory in the 1955 Federal Legislative Council election was followed by a 
Constitutional Conference held in London from 18 January to 8 February in 1956. At 
this conference, representatives of the Alliance and Malay Rulers agreed that Malaya 
would become an independent state within the Commonwealth by August 1957, with an 
independent Constitutional Commission to be appointed to draw up a draft constitution. 
The Constitutional Commission, as a non -communal and non -partisan body, was 
composed of an English chairman, Lord Reid, and one member each from Britain, 
Australia, India, and Pakistan.48 However, the Alliance submitted its memorandum, the 
result of the tough bargaining over the relative constitutional position of Malays and 
non -Malays, to the Reid Constitutional Commission.49 In February 1957, the Reid 
Constitutional Commission published Report of the Federation of Malaya 
Constitutional Commission. The Report, however, was not entirely accepted in the 1957 
Federation of Malaya Constitution. Consequently, the Alliance's proposals, especially 
UMNO's views, were subsequently incorporated into the 1957 Federation of Malaya 
Constitution 5° 
The original agreement on the constitutional contract was a trade -off between 
Malays and non- Malays, in particular UMNO and MCA. As a major concession from 
the Malays, the constitutional package gave non -Malays liberal citizenship regulations. 
In return, non -Malays had to accept the constitutional status of Malay special rights in 
48 To avoid communal prejudices and local influence, the Alliance National Council had appealed and 
accepted that the commission should be an independent body consisting of members from outside 
Malaya. See R. K. Vasil, Ethnic Politics in Malaysia (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1980), pp. 31 -32. 
49 For detail on the process of constitutional bargaining, see Gordon P. Means, "Special Rights as a 
Strategy for Development: The Case of Malaysia ", Comparative Politics, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1972, pp. 29 -61; 
Vorys, 1975, pp. 124 -139; and Means, 1976, pp. 173 -181. 
5o An essential difference was the constitutional guarantee of Malay special rights. The Commission's 
Report did not recognize the constitutional status of Malay special rights. According to the Report, 'the 
Malays should be assured that the present [special] position will continue for a substantial period, but that 
in due course the present preferences should be reduced and should ultimately cease so that there should 
then be no discrimination between races or communities.' (Report of the Federation of Malaya 
Constitutional Commission 1957, p. 72). However, the recommendation of the Constitutional 
Commission on this issue was firmly rejected in the end. En the 1957 Federation Constitution, all 
provisions for their future re- evaluation or eventual abolition were deleted and Malay special rights 
received specific constitutional status as mainly defined in Article 153. For detail on the differences 
between the Constitutional Commission's Report and the 1957 Federal Constitution on the issue of the 
Malay special position, see Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission, Repon of the Federation of 
Malaya Constitutional Commission 1957 (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, 1957), pp.71 -73; Federation of Malaya, Malayan Constitutional Documents (Kuala Lumpur: 
Government Press, 1958), pp. 102 -103 (Article 153). 
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various fields, such as language, religion and the status of the Malay Rulers. 
In detail, the constitutional contract further relaxed citizenship regulations for 
non -Malays and, more importantly, accepted the concept of jus soli for those born after 
independence as stated in Article 14, that is, citizenship was obtainable, subject to 
Clause (2) of Article 14, to all those born in the Federation on or after Merdeka.51 In 
addition, provisions for acquiring citizenship by other means were made easier.52 
Consequently, these liberal citizenship requirements would - in the long run - increase 
the voting strength of the non -Malays, and therefore the potential political power of the 
non -Malays. Though the Reid Commission's recommendations to create Malayan 
citizenship on the principle of jus soli was highly controversial, all of the citizenship 
recommendations were incorporated into the constitution with the backing of the 
Alliance.53 
According to the constitutional contract, Malay was to become the sole official 
language from 1967 unless parliament decided otherwise (Article 152).54 Islam was to 
become the official religion of the Federation, but the freedom of other religions was to 
be guaranteed (Article 3). The symbolic position of Malay Rulers was to continue and 
rotate among the nine Sultans who also headed their respective states (Article 153). In 
particular, Article 153 of the Federation Constitution empowered the Yang di- Pertuan 
Agong, the King, to protect the special position of the Malays and specified the sphere 
of privileges. One crucial means of protecting the Malay special position was through 
the practice of a quota (or preference) system. These included: the operation of quotas 
within the public service reserving a certain portion for the Malays, especially in the 
administrative and diplomatic areas; the operation of preferences for permits and 
licenses for certain trades and businesses; special quotas or preferences for scholarships, 
exhibitions, and other educational or training privileges; reservation of certain lands for 
exclusive ownership and use by the Malays only (Article 153).55 
51 For a full description of citizenship regulations, see Malayan Constitutional Documents, 1958, pp. 32- 
41 and L. A. Sheridan, The Federation of Malaya Constitution (Singapore: University of Malaya Law 
Review, 1961), pp. 22 -38. 
52 For instance, any person of or over the age of eighteen years who was a resident of the Federation at 
independence was eligible to be registered as a citizen if he had an elementary knowledge of the Malay 
language, 'except where the application is made within one year after Merdeka Day and the applicant has 
attained the age of forty -five years at the date of the application'. See Malayan Constitutional Documents, 
1958, p. 34. 
53 See Means, 1976, pp. 175 -177 and Vasil, 1980, pp. 34 -38. 
54 However, the using, teaching or learning of Chinese and Tamil languages were not prohibited. For a 
period of ten years after Merdeka Day, along with Malay, the continued use of English as an official 
language in any legislative or court was guaranteed. But no other languages were permitted in legislative 
proceedings. See Malayan Constitutional Documents, 1958, p. 101. 
s For more details of preferential policies and ethnic quotas, see Boo Cheng Hau, Quotas versus 
Affirmative Action: A Malaysian Perspective (Kuala Lumpur: Oriengroup, 1998). 
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The National Language Bill 1967 
Communal disputes over language and education continued for ten years, and many 
Chinese were apprehended as the day for the adoption of Malay as the sole national 
language approached.56 The Chinese community was reluctant to accept the clause in 
the 1957 Federal Constitution which had delayed the implementation of the national 
language provisions for ten years until 1967. Most vocal were the Union of Chinese 
Teachers, Chinese guilds and associations, and the MCA Youth Organization who 
initiated protests against the implementation of the national language provision. These 
groups also demanded the establishment of a Chinese medium Merdeka University.57 
While the Central Working Committee of the MCA was not in a position to support 
these movement because of its alliance with UMNO, they asked 'for the more liberal use 
of Chinese language in selected fields and in Government notices, forms and so on.'58 
On the initiative of Tunku Abdul Rahman, then Prime Minister and President 
of UMNO, a new compromise was therefore worked out within the Alliance, which 
resulted in the National Language Bill being introduced in Parliament on 24 February 
1967. The Bill provided for the implementation of Malay as the sole official language, 
but it made provision for the continued use of English for official purposes and a liberal 
use of the non -Malay languages for non -governmental and non -official purposes.59 The 
AIliance government described the Bill as 'a course guaranteeing peace' because it was 
'opposed to that [attitude] of the chauvinists, as represented by the non -Malay 
56 For instance, the Razak Report (Report of the Education Committee) was published in 1956 to set the 
guidelines for the development of Malayan education. The Razak Report was clearly directed towards the 
achievement of nation -building through a common educational system. Followed by the provision of the 
national Ianguage in the 1957 Federal Constitution, the Chinese became increasingly suspicious of the 
emphasis on the use of the national Ianguage and common educational system. They therefore articulated 
demands for the use of Chinese as an official language and the preservation of their cultural and 
educational heritage. On the other hand, the Malays demanded that the government make a speedier 
implementation of the Razak Report's recommendations. This led to the formation of the National 
Education Policy, as spelt out in the Education Act 1961. It clearly stressed the establishment of a 
common curriculum with the main medium of instruction, Bahasa Malaysia. For a more detailed 
discussion on the issue of language and education, see K. J. Ratnam, Communalism and the Political 
Process in Malaya (Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1965), pp. 126 -141; Margaret Roff, 'The 
Politics of language in Malaya ", Asian Survey, Vol. 7, No. 5, 1967, pp. 316 -328; and Vorys, 1975, pp. 
199 -218. 
57 Funston, 1980, p. 64. 
58 Roff, 1967, p. 323. 
59 The essence of the National Language Bill was in three parts: the national language (Malay) would 
become the sole official language and used for official purposes; nothing shall affect the right of the 
Federal or any State govemment to use any translations of official documents or communications in the 
language of any other community in the Federation for such purposes as may be deemed necessary in the 
public interest; and the Yang di- Pertuan Agong may permit the continuous use of the English language 
for such purposes as may be deemed fit. See Funston, 1980, p. 73 (footnote 100). 
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opposition parties, and the "ultras" as represented by the Pan Malayan Islamic Party.'6° 
In addition to the written constitutional contract between the Malays and the 
non -Malays, inter -communal bargaining consisted of another, widely acknowledged, 
feature. That was the guaranteeing of political and governmental superiority for the 
Malays on the one hand and the continued role of the Chinese in the economy (with 
liberal political participation) on the other. At the elite level, non -Malays recognized 
that Malays were politically superior by virtue of their indigenous status and that the 
Malaysian polity would have a Malay character by means of the constitutionally 
guaranteed special positions. In particular, Malays were to be assured of safe majorities 
in both the state and federal parliament by the delineation of constituency boundaries, 
which favored the predominantly Malay rural areas. Therefore, Malays would control 
the highest positions of the government and they would dominate members of the 
federal cabinet. In return, the Malay elites were to agree that the non -Malays would not 
he unduly subject to restrictions on their economic activities. While the non -Malays 
were to assist Malays to catch up economically, they were assured of free participation 
in the entire modern economy. Esman describes the inter -ethnic compromise of the 
AIliance government as follows: 
...[the] political bargain realized great benefits for all parties, in many cases more than the original 
participants had expected to achieve. The Malays gained political independence, control of 
government, and a polity which was to be Malay in style and in its system of symbols. In return 
the Chinese gained more than overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia had dreamed of - equal 
citizenship, political participation and office holding, unimpaired economic opportunity, and 
tolerance for their language, religion, and cultural institutions,t1 
These arrangements clearly deviated from the pure consociational concept but were 
integral parts of the Malaysian constitutional bargain. 
Towards the Undermining of Consociationalism 
From 1955 to 1963, Malays felt secure in their special position in Malaya. By virtue of 
the numerical superiority of the electorate and the constitutional guarantee of Malay 
special rights, the political paramountcy of Malays had not been threatened in any 
serious manner by non -Malays. Singapore's entry into the new federation, however, had 
a huge impact on Malaysian society as a whole.ó2 Again, mutual fears and suspicions 
between the Malays and the Chinese were to spread in the rank and file as well as in the 
Roff, 1967, p. 326. 
ci Esman, 1972, p. 25. 
62 The background of the political unit between Malaysia and Singapore, see Means, 1976, pp. 292 -299 
and Vasil, 1980, pp. 145 -148. 
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communal elites. 
Firstly, the overall ethnic composition of Malaysia dramatically changed after 
Singapore joined the federation. The former numerical superiority of the Malays in the 
Peninsular Malaysia was overtaken by the increased number of non -Malays, due to the 
inclusion of the Singapore Chinese, as shown in Table 3 -3. In addition, even though the 
electorate of Singapore was not counted in the 1964 Federal election, the difference in 
the number of voters between the Malays and the Chinese had further narrowed from 
22.6 per cent (1959) to 16.9 per cent (1964) as shown in Table 3 -2. Obviously this 
electoral gap between the Malays and the Chinese would have been even narrower if the 
electorate of Singapore were considered. Therefore, UMNO leaders were immediately 
concerned with restricting Singapore's role in federal politics. This was done by 
allocating Singapore, which made up 16.6 per cent of the population, only 15 seats of 
the total 159 parliamentary seats of Malaysia (9.4 per cent). On the contrary, Sabah and 
Sarawak, where Bumiputera formed a large part of the population, were allocated 16 
and 24 seats (10.1 per cent and 15.1 per cent respectively), although their population 
made up of only 4.6 per cent and 7.4 per cent of the total population.63 
To limit the role of Singapore in federal politics, a special Singapore 
citizenship provision was also created which barred Singapore citizens from voting and 
contesting elections in Malaya.64 This was because the Singapore -based Peoples Action 
Party (PAP)'s approach to federal politics threatened both the Alliance regime and 
Malay society as a whole. In the first Singapore Legislative Assembly election after the 
formation of Malaysia, held on 21 September 1963, PAP captured a majority of thirty - 
seven seats of a total fifty -one seats. The Singapore Alliance (UMNO, MCA, and 
Singapore People's Alliance) failed to take any seats while the Barisan Socialis won 
thirteen seats. More importantly, UMNO's Singapore branches lost to PAP in all the 
Malay- majority constituencies where the latter had fielded their own Malay 
candidates.65 As the only body to achieve a genuine multi -racial social base without 
losing the confidence of the non -Malay masses, PAP gave the impression that they 
sought to replace the MCA in the Alliance. It was in this context that PAP decided to 
contest the Federal election in 1964.66 Even though the PAP leadership was very keen to 
63 The figures are calculated from Federation of Malaysia, Malaysia Population Statistics, Estimated 
Population by Races and Sex as at 31st December 1964 (Kuala Lumpur: Department of Statistics, 1965). 
64 See Vasil, 1980, p. 148. 
65 On the result of the 1963 election, see Means, 1976, p. 334. 
66 Though only nine PAP candidates contested parliamentary seats, the impact on the Malayan scene was 
far greater. Because the PAP selected several strategic areas (urban and predominantly Chinese) to test its 
electoral strength, it seemed to be a challenge to the electoral strength of the MCA in the federation. For 
more detailed explanation, see Vasil, 1980, pp. 148 -152 and Means, 1976, pp. 335 -341. 
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establish a partnership with UMNO in the Alliance, UMNO leaders, especially 'ultras', 
considered the participation of PAP in the federal election as evidence of Lee Kuan 
Yew's ambition to extend his influence across the causeway.67 
Eventually, the intense mutual suspicion between UMNO and PAP resulted in 
considerable intensification of racial antipathy in Malaysian society. One manifestation 
was the 1964 Singapore racial riots. Following the miserable defeat in the 1963 
Singapore Legislative Assembly elections and the victory in the 1964 Federal elections, 
UMNO organized a mass protest rally of about 12,000 Malays and formed an 'Action 
Committee' to demand special privileges for the Malays in Singapore.68 PAP 
strenuously rejected to the desirability of preferred treatment based on race and a bitter 
confrontation between two parties escalated into several racial riots during July and 
September 1964,69 It was reported that 30 people were killed, 260 injured, and over 
1130 arrested during the racial riots.70 Closely related to these political processes, in fact 
resulting from them, was PAP's idea of 'Malaysian Malaysiá. The essence of the idea 
was that 'Malaysia was conceived as belonging to Malaysians as a whole and not to any 
particular community or race.i71 
In brief, Singapore's entry into, and PAP's approach to, the Federation 
substantially and simultaneously threatened the two pillars of Malay political hegemony 
in Malaysia, specifically. numerical superiority and constitutional special rights. 
Consequently, extreme antagonism among Malays began appearing at both the elite and 
grass -roots levels. Finally, this series of events was followed by Singapore's expulsion 
from Malaysia on 9 August 1965. 
Although Singapore was removed from the Malaysian political scene after only 
two years of merger, its impact continued to be felt. Singapore's secession immediately 
eliminated the internal threat which had challenged Malay political paramountcy. After 
Singapore's removal, the Malays restored their former numerical superiority. For the 
Malay community as a whole, however, PAP's activities sharply intensified Malay 
67 For example, Abdul Razak, Ismail bin Abdul Rahman and Syed Jaafar Albar called upon all Malay 
voters to reject PAP to avoid the dangers of communalism in Malaysia. See Means, 1976, pp. 335 -344. 
6s The Action Committee demanded special privileges for the Singapore Malays in job quotas, 
scholarship stipends, land reservations, and exclusive Malay occupancy rates with special reduced price 
in certain government -built housing projects. For more detailed explanations, see Willard A. Hanna, "The 
Separation of Singapore from Malaysia ", American Universities Field Staff, Vol. 13, No. 21, 1965, pp. 
12 -14; Michael Leifer, "Singapore in Malaysia: The Politics of Federation ", Journal of Southeast Asian 
History, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1965, pp. 63 -65. 
69 On the 1964 racial riots in Singapore, see Richard Clutterbuck, Conflict and Violence in Singapore and 
Malaysia, 1945 -1983 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 319 -322. 
70 Means, 1976, p. 343. 
71 Vasil, 1980, p. 156. The idea of Malaysian Malaysia was formulated by Lee Kuan Yew, the Singapore 
Prime Minister, during February -March 1965. For more detail, see Lee Kuan Yew, Towards a Malaysian 
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suspicion and fear of the Chinese. On the other hand, the Chinese community became 
increasingly aware of the danger that the Chinese would be reduced to an insignificant 
minority in the federation. The Chinese were shaken by the reasons for Singapore's 
expulsion and consequently PAP had an impact on the awakening and articulating of the 
Chinese political consciousness.72 It was in this context that the Democratic Action 
Party was inaugurated on 19 March 1966. There had not been a major non -Malay 
opposition party, communally based, until DAP was established. Due to the 
intensification of communal fears, DAP was soon able to establish itself as the main 
Chinese opposition party in Peninsular Malaysia. 
Meanwhile, it is worth noting that full diplomatic relations had been resumed 
between Malaysia and Indonesia towards the end of August 1967. As well as the 
expulsion of Singapore, the end of the 'Confrontation' had a great effect on Malaysian 
ethnic politics. Improved relations between Malaysia and Indonesia eventually removed 
the external threat which had provided a strong motivation for inter- ethnic cooperation 
within the Alliance system for the last few years. Coincidentally, the tenth anniversary 
of Malayan independence approached. Again, the Alliance leaders were forced to face 
crucial issues of national language and education just as they had before independence. 
However, the political situation at this time was totally different from the years before 
and immediately after independence. In short, mutual fear and suspicion within the 
Alliance did not come out very strongly when the main preoccupation was obtaining 
independence, or when Singapore and Indonesia seemed to pose significant threats - 
although of different types. The situation, however, was totally different with no 
immediate external threats. 
Since the expulsion of Singapore from the Federation, racial tension in 
Malaysia had intensified as a result of the controversy during late 1966 and early 1967 
in connection with the National Language Bill as discussed above. Mutual fear and 
antipathy were generated during the process of compromise over the National Language 
Bill between the Malays and the non -Malays. Furthermore, the compromise over the 
national language issue led to serious divisions among Malay intellectuals, within 
UMNO as well as within the Malay community itself.73 After the passage of the Bill, 
dissatisfaction grew among many Malays within and outside UMNO. Mass 
demonstrations were held by various groups including the Malay Teachers' 
Associations, the Malay Language Society of the University, and the National Writers 
Malaysia (Singapore: Ministry of Culture, 1965). 
72 Vasil, 1980, p. 158. 
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Association. All of these groups united under the leadership of the National Language 
Action Front to get the Bill changed. Within UMNO itself there was some discontent, 
not just with the Bill but also with the leadership of the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul 
Rahman.74 More importantly, however, this controversy consequently reopened and 
intensified the emotive issues of language, education, political position of the non - 
Malays, and the Malay economic position. 
In sum, one of the crucial conditions for successful consociationalism is that 
segmental leaders be recognized by the segmental masses. However, one of the most 
important aspects of the post -1963 period in Malaysia was the increased politicization 
of both Malays and Chinese, with the result that segmental leaders no longer exercised 
sufficient authority over their own communities. And the gradual communal 
polarization during the period of 1963 -1969 was increasingly heading towards the 
breakdown of inter -ethnic consociational conflict management. 
3 -4. The Breakdown of Consociational Regime Maintenance 
When the 1969 election results were released, both the Alliance and opposition parties 
were surprised at the strong performance of Chinese opposition parties and the losses 
suffered by the Alliance. To celebrate their election success, the Democratic Action 
Party (DAP) and the Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Malaysian People's Movement or 
Gerakan) held 'victory parades' in Kuala Lumpur on 11 and 12 May. Subsequently, on 
the evening of 13 May, a 'counter -demonstration' by Malays in response to the 
opposition's victory processions was organized by local UMNO branches in the 
courtyard of the Selangor Menteri Besar's residence. Two Chinese passing by in a car 
were attacked and killed. And so the May 13 racial riots began.75 
Since independence, the May 13 racial riots were the single most intensive case 
of inter -racial violence in Malaysia. Although racial violence was nothing new to 
Malaysia during the years before and after independence, outbreaks were usually 
Roff, 1967, p. 327. 
74 Malay dissatisfaction was basically two -fold: the continued use of English for official purposes and 
semi -official status of Chinese and Tamil. The Malays thought that these two elements eventually 
introduced multi -lingualism and maintained the pre- eminent position of the non- Malays in business, 
industry, and professional occupations. For details of the National Language Bill, see Roff. 1967, pp. 326- 
328; Esman, 1972, pp. 32 -34; and Funston, 1980, pp. 66 -67. 
75 For a more detailed description of the 1969 racial riots, see National Operations Council, The May 13 
Tragedy: A Report of the National Operations Council (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1969); Abdul 
Rahman Putra (Tunku), 1969; John Slimming, Malaysia: Death of a Democracy (London: John Murry, 
1969); Goh Cheng Teik, The May Thirteenth Incident and Democracy in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: 
Oxford University Press, 1971), Chapter 3; J. Bass, "Malaysian Politics, 1968 -1970: Crisis and 
Response ", unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, 1973; and Leon Comber. 13 May 
1969: A Historical Survey of Sino -Malay Relations (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Asia, 1983), Chapter 7. 
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relatively small in scale and localized.76 The May 13 racial riots, however, resulted in an 
extensive loss of life and property. What was worse was that they erupted in the nation's 
capital, Kuala Lumpur. According to official figures, 196 people were killed from 13 
May to 31 July and some 6000 residents of Kuala Lumpur, 90 per cent Chinese, were 
made homeless 77 However, informed observers, such as journalists and non - 
government sources, claimed that the actual number was much higher.78 More seriously, 
the immediate cause of the racial riots was directly focused on a very sensitive issue in 
Malaysian ethnic politics - Malay special rights. The May 13 racial riots constituted a 
huge chaIIenge to the Malaysian political system and penetrated deeply into the national 
consciousness. 
The government initially blamed communists for the racial violence. Soon after 
the riots, Tunku Abdul Rahman claimed that 'the terrorist Communists have worked out 
their plan to take over power. They have managed to persuade voters by threat, by 
intimidation, and by persuasion to overthrow the Alliance through the process of 
democracy'.79 
However, it was later acknowledged that the influence of communism was not 
directly responsible for the 1969 racial riots. Ismail, Minister of Home Affairs, admitted 
later that 'we found they [the communists] were as much surprised as we were [at the 
outbreak of the racial violence].'80 Even before this, in a separate statement, Ismail 
76 Before the May 13 racial riots in 1969, there were other serious racial riots which took place in Penang 
in 1967. Though the 1967 Penang riots were a by- product of the British devaluation of the pound, they 
quickly took on a racial dimension between the Malays and the Chinese. It was officially reported that 29 
people had been killed, over 200 injured, and some 1300 arrested. For detailed analysis on the Penang 
racial riots, see Nancy L. Snider, "What Happened in Penang ? ", Asian Survey, Vol. 8, No. 12, 1968, pp. 
960 -975. On the earlier racial violence that occurred after World War II, see Bass, 1973, pp. 258 -273 and 
SUARAM, The White Paper on the October Affair and The Why? Papers (Kelana Jaya: SUARAM 
Kommunikasi, 1989), pp. 145 -148 (Appendix A: List of Racial Incidents Involving Malays and Chinese 
from 1945 to 1969). 
77 For more detailed figures on the casualties of the May 13 racial riots, see The National Operations 
Council, 1969, pp. 88 -90 and Straits Times, 21 June 1969. 
78 Bass claimed that the actual number of fatalities was perhaps ten times as great as the official toll. See 
Bass, 1973, p. 249. 
79 Sunday Times, 18 May 1969. Tunku Abdul Rahman claimed that the combination of communists, 
especially the Labor Party, and the provocative Chinese opposition parties was the fundamental cause of 
the racial riots. As evidence, Tunku Abdul Rahman analyzed the development of the situation initiated by 
the Labor party shortly before the 1969 elections. On 3 December 1968, the Labor Party announced its 
boycott of the election. The rationale for the Labor Party's election boycott was the arrest of a number of 
people on 9 November 1968, including prominent Labor Party members accused of working with the 
illegal Malayan Communist Party. While painting anti- election slogans, a Labor Party activist was shot 
by police on 4 May 1969. The Labor Party held the funeral procession on 9 May and 'darah bayar darah' 
(blood will be paid by blood) was among the many slogans. Tunku Abdul Rahman linked this funeral 
procession by the Labor Party with the victory parades by the Chinese opposition parties. See Abdul 
Rahman Putra (Tunku), 1969, pp. 8 -21 and pp. 197 -207. 
8° Straits Times, 21 June 1969. Though it was not the government's intention, the earlier misperception of 
the government, police, and the army in considering the racial violence as the work of communists, 
mainly Chinese, resulted in more violent suppression of the racial riots and consequently led to the 
L 
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claimed that 'democracy is dead in this country. It died at the hands of the opposition 
parties who triggered off the events leading to this violence.'81 In fact, the appeal of the 
Chinese opposition parties, especially the DAP, to Chinese communal interest during 
the elections proved more attractive than the Labor Party's call for a boycott of the 
elections. The official report of the NOC viewed the fundamental cause of the racial 
riots in terms of communal polarization and animosity between the Malays and the 
Chinese.82 
Growing Racial Sentiment and the Loss of Segmental Mass' Support 
Why was the 1969 general election so special that it caused unprecedented racial 
violence and led to the collapse of the Alliance system? When the Alliance system was 
established in 1955, the drive for Merdeka dominated Malayan society. Therefore, the 
general election in 1955 was seen as a test of the possibility of independence for both 
the Malays and non -Malays. In addition, neither the 1959 election nor the 1964 election 
fully tested the viability of the Alliance system. The 1959 election was held in a general 
mood of 'the freshness of independence' and, furthermore, the non -Malay communities 
were to a large extent on the 'defensive' during the years shortly after independence.ß3 In 
the 1964 election, the immediate external threat of Indonesian confrontation distracted 
the election campaigning from the sensitive issues of Malaysian ethnic politics - Malay 
special rights, language, and education.ß4 It should also be remembered that states of 
emergency were in place in both 1959 and 1964. Therefore, the Alliance was able to 
recover losses it had suffered in the 1959 general election. 
The political mood of 1969, however, was entirely different. Although the 
emergency had not been formally lifted, the end of 'Confrontation' with Indonesia had 
been followed by considerable relaxation. Up to 1968, the main opposition to the 
massive loss of life, mostly Chinese. About the perception and suppression of the racial riots by the FRU 
(riot squad) and the Royal Malay Regiment, see Anthony Reid, "The Kuala Lumpur Riots and the 
Malaysian Political System ", Australian Outlook, Vol. 23, No. 3. 1969, pp. 268 -270. 
81 Straits Times, 19 May 1969. 
B2 The NOC's analysis of the roots of the May 13 racial riots emphasized: (1) the Malay dissatisfaction 
over the non -implementation of long- standing policies, such as language policy and education policy; (2) 
the non -Malay provocation of Malay sensitivities by challenging their special rights or privileged position 
guaranteed under Article 153 of the Constitution; and (3) growing sense of insecurity felt by the Malays 
due to racial imbalance particularly in the economic field. For a more detailed analysis of the root causes 
by the NOC, see National Operations Council, 1969, especially pp. 23 -24; Government of Malaysia, 
Towards National Harmony (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1971), pp. 1 -2. 
63 See Vorys, 1975, p. 249 and R. K. Vasil, The Malaysian General Election of 1969 (Singapore: Oxford 
University Press, 1972), p. 1. Although the sensitive issues of language and education were raised in the 
1959 election, the non -Malay political parties were too weak and lacked the mass support to mobilize 
these sensitive issues for a full -scale election campaign. 
8° Vorys, 1975, p. 249. 
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Alliance had come from the Malay party PAS while the non -Malay opposition had been 
divided between the People's Progressive Party (PPP) and the Socialist Front. Besides, 
PPP was strong only in Perak and PAS showed its strength only in the predominantly 
Malay states of Kelantan, Terengganu and Kedah. None of these opposition parties ever 
obtained significant nationwide support in the elections before 1969. 
Two new non -Malay opposition political parties, however, were extensively 
involved in the 1969 election campaign. One was DAP. Being perceived as a successor 
of the Singapore -based PAP, DAP was well -known and became the first nationwide 
Chinese opposition party in Malaysia. The other was Gerakan. Although Gerakan put 
forward a more or less moderate non -communal platform, it also strongly appealed to 
the Chinese vote, especially in Penang. Accordingly, its policies on the sensitive issues 
of language and education were similar, though more moderate, than those of DAP.85 In 
particular, DAP introduced a new element into the Malaysian political scene as the party 
revived the 'Malaysian Malaysia' issue, which had led to the expulsion of Singapore, 
during election campaigning. This aroused strong communal sentiment in the Chinese 
community.86 
Thus, for the first time the Alliance was faced with well- organized, nationwide 
Chinese opposition parties as well as its old foe, the Malay opposition party PAS. Both 
Malay and non -Malay opposition parties appealed to sensitive communal issues in the 
absence of over -arching national issues in the 1969 elections_ On the Malay side, PAS 
instigated Malays to abandon UMNO because it was selling out the Malay's indigenous 
rights to the immigrant races. On the Chinese side, DAP mobilized the Chinese by 
accusing MCA of selling out their political rights to the Malay hierarchy. Consequently, 
toward the end of the 1960s in Malaysia the principle of 'de- politicization', one of the 
key elements for consociationalism, no Ionger operated.87 
In these circumstances, where racial tensions were exacerbated, the results of 
the 1969 election were a shock to the Malay community. Although the Malay 
85 For the full content of the election manifesto by Gerakan, see Vasil, 1972, pp. 61 -65. 
36 DAP directly attacked pro -Malay policies during the election campaign. It campaigned for multi - 
lingualism, whereby Chinese, Tamil, and English should be given official status along with the Malay 
language. It also encouraged the use of those languages as a medium of secondary and higher education. 
Particularly, the DAP gave firm support to a privately- mooted scheme for a Chinese -medium university. 
For more details of the election manifesto of the DAP, see Vasil, 1972, pp, 59 -61, Appendix I. 
87 Even before the election campaign had begun, both the major partners in the Alliance, UMNO and 
MCA, were threatened by the more open and vulnerable communal situations. As a result of the 
deepening of communal differences initiated by Lee Kuan Yew's concept of Malaysian Malaysia, MCA, 
as the component of the Alliance, had been under serious pressure from those who accused it of selling 
out Chinese political rights to the Malays. Due to the compromising attitude of the conservative UMNO 
leaders over sensitive issues, as shown in their agreeing to a fairly liberal National Language Act in 1967, 
UMNO was also in a vulnerable position against the increasing threat from PAS appealing to the Malay 
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opposition PAS increased its influence, what was apparent from the election results was 
a massive gain for the Chinese opposition parties at the expense of the Alliance, 
especially MCA. As Table 3 -7 shows, the Alliance lost control of Penang, Perak, and 
Kelantan, while it gained only half of the state seats in Selangor, creating a potential 
deadlock with the combined opposition parties.t8 Furthermore, in most states the 
Alliance recorded poorer results at both the federal and state levels. As shown in Table 
3 -8, Gerakan gained control of Penang State Legislative Assembly. PAS retained 
control of the Kelantan State Legislative Assembly. In the Perak state election, PPP 
obtained twelve seats, DAP six, Gerakan two and PAS one, while the Alliance won 
fewer than half of the seats (19 out of 40). In sum, the Alliance obtained the majority of 
votes in only four states - Johor, Kedah, Pahang and Perlis. 
Table 3 -7. Federal and State Elections: Seats Won, Contested., and Percentage of Votes by the Alliance in 
1964 and 1969 
1964 (Federal) 1969 (Federal) 1964 (State) 1969 (State) 
Johor 16/16 (71.7 %) 16/16 (67.6 %) 32/32 (67.5 %) 30/32 (65.0 %) 
Kedah 12/12 (68.6 %) 9/12 (53.5 %) 24/24 (67.8 %) 14/24 (53.5 %) 
Kelantan 2/10 (42.9 %) 4/10 (47.5 %) 9/30 (42.9 %) 11/30 (47.5 %) 
Malacca 4/4 (66.2 %) 2/3 (45.2 %)çn 18/20 (65.1 %) 15/20 (48.3 %) 
Negeri Sembilan 6/6 (58.9 %) 3/6 (46.4 %) 24/24 (58.7 %) 16/24 (46.2 %) 
Pahang 6/6 (71.3 %) 6/6 (60.8 %) 24/24 (68.4 %) 20/24 (55.1%) 
Penang 6/8 (47.3 %) 2/8 (36.9 %) I8/24 (47.2 %) 4/24 (33.6 %) 
Perak 18/20 (55.4%) 9/20 (43.2 %) 35/40 (54.7%) 19/40 (43.6 %) 
Perlis 2/2 (68.9 %) 2/2 (51.2 %) 11/12 (60.9 %) I 11/12 (53.5 %) 
Selangor 12/14 (53.9 %) 9/14 (44.0 %) 25/28 (55.5 %) 1 14/28 (41.6 %) 
Terengganu 5/6 (56.5 %) 4/6 (49.99 %) 21/24 (55.3 %) 1 13/24 (49.3 %) 
Total 89/104 (58.4 %) 66/103 (48.4 %) 241/282 (57.6 %) 1 167/282 (48.0 %) 
Source: Compiled from Vasil, 1972, pp. 73 -96; NSTP Research and Information Services, Elections in 
Malaysia: A Handbook of Facts and Figures on the Elections 1955 -1990 (Kuala Lumpur: New 
Straits Times Press, 1994). 
Note: (1) Election of one constituency in Malacca was postponed. 
Table 3 -8. State Elections: Seats Won, Contested, and Percentage of Votes by Oppositions in 1969 
Penang Perak Kelantan Selangor 
DAP 3/3 (8.4 %) 6/8 (9.5 %) -/- 9/12 (31.1 %) 
Gerakan 16/19 (46.8 %) 2/2 (3.8 %) -/- 4/8 (16.5 %) 
PPP 0/3 (0.4 %) 12/I3 (24.6 %) -1- -/- 
PAS 0/5 (7.0 %) 1/28 (18.4 %) 19/30 (52.2 %) 0/12 (9.6 %) 
Party Rakyat 1/1 (1.2 %) -1- -/- -/- 
Independents 0/3 (1.7%) 0/1 (0.1 %) 0/6 (0.3 %) 1/2 (1.3 %) 
Source: Compiled from Vasil, 1972, pp. 76, 80, 81 and 83. 
Why then did the racial crisis occur in Selangor but not in Penang and/or Perak 
where the UMNO -led Alliance government actually lost control of state power? It is 
necessary to consider this question in order to understand the political background of 
rural electorate. 
as In Selangor, out of the total twenty -eight contested seats. DAP took nine seats, Gerakan four, and 
independent took one. 
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the breakdown of consociational conflict resolutions. 
Although the Malay population in Selangor was outnumbered by the Chinese, 
its political significance was very different from Penang and Perak. In the state of 
Selangor, as one of the Malay sultanates, the Malays had traditionally dominated since 
the 1955 election. Unlike Penang where election results were not perceived as the 
transfer of power from the indigenous to the immigrant faction, if the same power shift 
had taken place in Selangor this would have been regarded as a shift of political control 
from the UMNO -led Alliance to the DAP -led Chinese opposition.t° In Perak, though it 
is also a Malay sultanate, racial tension was not as severe as in the state of Selangor.90 
However, anger and anxiety were stirred up because pro- government Malays 
perceived the pattern of voting in the Selangor state elections as a betrayal of the 
consociational bargain by the Chinese. While the Malays voted solidly for UMNO as 
shown in UMNO's overwhelming win in 12 out of the 13 state seats it contested, the 
enormous losses of MCA (11 out of 12 contested seats) to Chinese opposition parties 
were seen by many Malays as evidence that the Chinese had betrayed the Alliance 
formula by voting for an [Chinese] opposition that had revived fundamental questions 
of Ianguage and Malay special rights'.91 It seemed to the Malays that the Chinese no 
longer respected the promises (or compromises) made at the time of independence 
between UMNO and MCA, regarding language and Malay special rights. Frustration 
and anxiety amongst Malays thus arose from the uncertain situation in Selangor where 
fourteen Alliance candidates and opposition members were elected respectively. Due to 
the deadlock, UMNO tried to persuade Gerakan to join in the formation of a coalition 
state government. However, this proposal was rejected by Gerakan, demonstrated in the 
comment by Gerakan's secretary -general Tan Chee Khoon that: 'I have said many times 
that I will not sleep with Alliance partners.... Now more than ever when they are 
castrated, how can I do so ?i92 Meanwhile, DAP announced its intention of forming a 
coalition government in Selangor with other opposition parties. In addition, DAP's 
secretary- general Goh Hock Gum indicated that the party would look into the legal 
implications of the constitutional provision that only a Malay could be appointed 
Menteri Besar in Selangor.93 What was worse for the Malays, there was no Malay 
ß9 Penang had been administered by the MCA -led Alliance under the Chinese Chief Minister since 
independence. Furthermore, the Gerakan, chaired by a Malay intellectual Syed Hussein Alatas, was 
regarded as a more moderate opposition than the DAP. See Reid, 1969, p. 262. 
9° About the situation in Perak, see Goh Cheng Teik, 1971, pp. 25 -26. 
91 Reid, 1969, p. 266. 
92 Straits Times, 13 May 1969. 
93 Utusan Malaysia, 13 May 1969. According to the state constitution of Selangor, there was no such 
provision that the Menteri Besar must be a Malay or a Muslim. 
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assembly person among the Selangor opposition members who could be put forward as 
possible Menteri Besar. 
Given this background, the Chinese opposition -organized 'victory' parades on 
11 and 12 May exacerbated 'the darkest Malay fears of being turned into "aborigines" in 
their own country'.94 The slogans carried in the victory processions by the Chinese 
suggested just this: Kuala Lumpur sekarang China punya (Kuala Lumpur now belongs 
to the Chinese); Drang Melayu balek kampong (Malays go back to the villages); Melayu 
sekarang tidak ada kuasa lagi (Malays now no longer have power); and Semua Melayu 
kasi habis (Finish off all Malays). In this context, Tunku Abdul Rahman blamed the 
victory parade as the immediate cause of the racial riots, as follows: 
That this victory procession should be followed up by another by UMNO on May I3th was 
inevitable, as otherwise the party members would be demoralized after the show of strength by the 
Opposition and the insults that had been thrown at them.95 
The NOC's official report also implies that the primary cause of the racial violence was 
the fear of Chinese dominance, as follows: 'The Malays who already felt excluded in the 
country's economic life, now began to feel a threat to their place in the public services 
[i.e., political control].'96 
Ethnic Polarization Undermining Consociational Framework 
In analyzing the more fundamental causes of the disintegration of consociational elite 
cooperation, the concepts of 'group comparison' and 'group entitlement' are worth 
noting.97 According to Horowitz, ethnic differences have produced an extraordinary 
amount of ethnic conflict in many post -colonial nation -states. Specifically, he highlights 
the 'backward- advanced dichotomy' between indigenous and immigrant groups as the 
most common source of ethnic conflict in many African, Asian, and Caribbean post - 
colonial plural societies.95 In a situation where socio- economic backwardness and 
indigenousness are combined, the claims and responses of the backward -indigenous 
94 Reid, 1969, p. 266. According to Goh Cheng Teik, in Selangor, the DAP and Gerakan largely drew 
their support from aggrieved immigrant communities. Despite their numerical superiority, the Chinese 
and Indians had allegedly been suffocated under the heavy weight of Malay politicians and bureaucrats. 
Therefore, when the non -Malay opposition parties sharply increased their political power in Selangor, 
accumulated grievances rose to the surface and behavior became unrestrained. See Goh Cheng Teik, 
1971, p. 24. 
95 Abdul Rahman Putra (Tunku), 1969, p. 203. 
96 National Operations Council, 1969, p. 23. 
97 More detailed analysis on group comparison/entitlement as sources of ethnic conflict can be found in 
Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 141- 
228. 
95 Horowitz, 1985, p. 147. 
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groups are likely to be demands for preferential treatment in the socio- economic arena 
(for example, education, employment, or business), as well as political dominance.49 On 
the contrary, the advanced -immigrant groups are reluctant to accept the legitimacy of 
such demands by the backward- indigenous groups since they can be considered 
politically backward in comparison with the indigenous groups.10ö Consequently, when 
the backward -indigenous groups are dissatisfied with the progress of the so- called 'catch 
up' programs and 'feel under siege in their own home' even in the political arena, violent 
political activity can be aroused.101 
In Malaysia, the years after 1960, especially during the First Malaysia Plan, 
1966 -70, had extensive development activities. As the long MCP -inspired Emergency 
came to an end, the Alliance government was able to concentrate more on development 
than security. A new Ministry of National and Rural Development was formed to ensure 
the speedy and efficient implementation of the rural development program. More 
emphasis was placed on development and progress of rural areas, which presumably 
benefited the Malays more than anyone else. However, it must be noted that, under the 
Alliance rule in the 1960s, ethnic inequalities were mostly addressed indirectly, without 
undertaking any vigorous preferential programs to improve the economic status of the 
Malays. The Alliance government hoped that economic imbalance among the ethnic 
communities would fade away through policies aimed at rapid economic growth and 
assistance to the rural poor, who were mostly Malays. 
In this light, various quasi -government institutions came into existence. For 
example, the Federal Land Development Authority (FLDA, later FELDA) began as a 
scheme for land settlement in 1956.102 Another body, the Rural and Industrial 
Development Authority (RIDA) was established in 1950 and reorganized fifteen years 
later as the Majlis Amanah Ra'ayat (Council of Trust for the Indigenous People, 
MARA).103 Other organizations were also created, including the Federal Agricultural 
99 According to Horowitz, to be advanced means to be interested in education and new opportunities, to 
be tied into the modem sector; to be backward means to have some inhibition on taking up new 
opportunities and to be somewhat apart from full participation in the modern sector of the economy.' See 
Horowitz, 1985, p. 148. 
100 Horowitz, 1985, p. 215. 
101 Horowitz, 1985, p. 213. 
102 FELDA is engaged in land development and settlement projects, with the objectives of improving the 
standard of living and increasing the income of the rural population, which has been mainly made up of 
Malay peasants. Its primary objective was to undertake land reclamation and jungle clearing projects to 
open up new land for cultivation of high yield rubber and cash crops, primarily for Malay peasants. See 
Means, 1976, p. 16. 
103 RIDA's primary objectives were economic development and improved social services for rural areas. 
Its five divisions were concerned with transport, commerce and industry, training, technical services, and 
credit finance. For more details on RIDA and MARA, see J. H. Beaglehole, "Malay Participation in 
Commerce and Industry: the Role of RIDA and MARA ", Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, 
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Marketing Authority (FAMA) established in 1952 and the Bank Bumiputera formed in 
1965.104 The achievements of these statutory bodies, however, were limited during the 
Alliance government's fifteen years rule. For example, in 1969, the total amount of 
loans from commercial banks in Malaysia was RM1,801 míllion.105 In contrast to this, 
during 1951 -70, the total amount of loans from RIDA and MARA, the only major 
sources of credit to Malays before 1965, was only RM70 million. This meant that over a 
20 -year period, total loans to Malays amounted to less than 4 per cent of the loans from 
commercial banks during one year.1o6 
The various figures showed that the Malays were in danger of falling further 
behind the non -Malays, especially the Chinese, in regards to ownership of the 
Malaysian economy, especially in terms of the patterns of ownership, distribution of 
wealth, and participation in the modernization and development processes. The Malay 
perception of the problem of economic imbalance is demonstrated in the Second 
Malaysia Plan 1971 -1975, as follows: 
Despite the significant progress made in improving the economic well -being of the have -nots, the 
problem of economic imbalance remained.... Indications are that wide gaps in income and living 
conditions between the traditional sector (both rural and urban) and the modem sector continued to 
exist. They arose from differing opportunities for education, employment and ownership of or 
access to entrepreneurial resources. These differences were accentuated by the concentration of 
Malays and other indigenous people in the low -income activities.t°7 
The extent of economic imbalance among ethnic communities can be clearly 
illustrated in the field of ownership. As shown in Table 3 -9, only 1.5 per cent of limited 
companies' share capital in Peninsular Malaysia was owned by Malays at the end of 
1969, whereas 22.8 per cent was held by the Chinese and 62.1 per cent by foreign 
controlled companies or branches of companies incorporated overseas. 
Vol. 7, No. 3, 1969, pp. 216 -245. During the period 1966 -70, MARA provided about 4,800 Ioans totaling 
RM3 1 million for various projects. It established a number of companies in manufacturing and commerce, 
producing such products as batik garments, leather goods, handicrafts, timber products, tapioca starch and 
pellets and processed rubber. It built shophouses for Malay businesses, and entered into wholesale supply 
and contracting for construction materials. It also initiated bus services. See Second Malaysia Plan 1971- 
1975, p. 15- 
104 FAMA was established to improve the marketing system and to ensure that farmers obtained a fair 
price for their products. The Bank Bumiputera was established as a commercial bank providing credit, 
banking services, and technical assistance to Malays and other indigenous people in commerce, industry 
and other economic activities. Up to 1970, the Bank Bumiputera had made loans and advances totaling 
M$134 million, a substantial proportion of which was granted to Malay individuals and businesses for 
housing development, construction, oil palm cultivation, logging and saw -milling, import and export 
businesses, manufacturing and small -scale commercial and industrial enterprises. See Second Malaysia 
Plan 1971 -1975, pp. 17 -18. 
ios The Treasury Malaysia, Economic Report 1975 -76 (Kuala Lumpur: Treasury's Economics Division, 
1975), pp. lxxvi-lxxvii. 
166 Third Malaysia Plan 1976 -1980 (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1976), p. 192. 
1°7 Second Malaysia Plan 1971 -1975, p. 18, italics in original. 
Table 3 -9. Ownership of Share Capital of Limited Companies in Peninsular Malaysia, 1969 
Companies Incorporated in Peninsular Malaysia RM($000) Percentage 
Malays and Malay Interests 70,633 1.5 
Chinese 1,064,795 22.8 
Indians 40,983 0.9 
Federal and State Governments 21,430 0.5 
Nominee Companies 98,885 2.1 
Other Individuals and Locally controlled Companies 470,969 10.1 
Total Foreign Ownership 2,909,845 62.1 
Total 4,677,540 100.0 
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Source: Second Malaysia Plan 1971 -1975, p. 40. 
In fact, this figure shows that the predominant power and perhaps ultimate control of the 
Malaysian economy was in non -Malaysian hands, not the Chinese. However, as noted 
by Mauzy, 'perceptions and myths [of relative economic deprivation] are as important as 
the objective truth' in an ethnically divided society.108 In the early period of 
independence, the widespread perception was that the Chinese dominated the economy 
and, through various means, inhibited Malay participation in the modern economy. 
Furthermore, it could not be denied that many more Malays fell below the poverty line 
than did Chinese. The employment pattern in Malaysia until 1970 showed that the 
Malays were predominant in agricultural sectors, whereas non -Malays were 
predominant in mining, plantations, manufacturing, construction and commerce.109 At 
any rate, toward the end of the 1960s, in terms of economic power the Malays had fallen 
behind the immigrant peoples and the need to address the economic imbalance 
inevitably led to growing ethnic conflict. 
Another serious imbalance appeared in the field of education, showing a 
frustrating economic pattern for the Malays. Mainly due to the admission quotas, as 
shown in Table 3 -I0, the overall enrollment percentages of Malay students gradually 
increased from 22 to 31 to 45 during the 1961/62, 1965/66, and 1969/70 sessions at the 
University of Malaya. However, despite preferential treatment in admission, the Malays 
were greatly under -represented in the professional and technical areas. As shown in the 
period of 1965/66, Malay students' enrollment in the faculties of engineering, science, 
and medicine at the University of Malaya were only 3, 7, and 12 per cent respectively. 
108 Diane K. Mauzy, "Malay political hegemony and 'coercive consociationalism" in John McGarry and 
Brendan O'Leary (eds.), The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation (London and New York: Routledge, 
1993), p. 108. 
109 The tin mining industry which is highly capital intensive was overwhelmingly dominated by non - 
Malays. Although the National Land Council recommended the government prospect for tin in Malay 
Reservation Land and encouraged Malays to take up mining leases, only 2 per cent of mining land was 
leased to Malays. For detailed explanations on the low rate of Malay participation in the field of tin and 
timber industry, see M. H. Lim, "Affirmative Action, Ethnicity and Integration: the Case of Malaysia ", 
Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1985, p. 259. 
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Furthermore, the relatively high proportion of Malay students in the faculties of 
medicine, economic and administration during the 1965/66 and 1969/70 sessions 
concealed the higher drop -out rates for Malays, thus giving an inflated sense of their 
educational achievements.110 Though there was a gradual improvement in Malay 
enrollment in general, the overall difference between the Malays and non -Malays, 
especially the Chinese, in the professional and technical fields was profound.111 Many 
(well over half) Malay students were studying in non -professional subjects, such as 
Malay Studies or Islamic Studies. It was therefore apparent that Malays were hardly 
'keeping pace with the rapidly expanding professional and technical ranks of the other 
communities: 112 
Table 3 -10. Student Enrollment by Faculty at University of Malaya 
Malay Non -Malay 
1961/62 
Agriculture 4(16.0 %) 21(84.0 %) 
Arts 91(35.4 %) 166(64.6%) 
Engineering 1(1.2 %) 81(98.8 %) 
Science 7(7.4 %) 88(92.6 %) 
1965/66 
Agriculture 21(44.7 %) 26(55.3 %) 
Arts 294(45.0 %) 359(55.0 %) 
Engineering 3(3.0 %) 98(97.0 %) 
Science 13(7.1 %) 169(92.9 %) 
Medicine (pre -medic & first -year) 15(12.3 %) 107(87.7 %) 
1969/70 
Agriculture 25(26.3 %) 70(73.7 %) 
Arts 722(58.8 %) 505(41.2%) 
Engineering 5(4.4 %) 109(95.6 %) 
Science 79(25.7 %) 228(74.3 %) 
Medicine (pre -medic & first -year) 50(30.1 %) 116(69.9%) 
Economic & Administration 197(39.0 %) 308(61.0 %) 
Sources: Government of Malaysia, Towards National Harmony (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 
1971), pp. 11-12. 
There might be some doubt about the Alliance consociational framework being 
a major factor sustaining socio- economic ethnic polarization in the Malaysian society. 
Nonetheless, it was widely believed that the government's efforts to eliminate ethnic 
imbalances were far from effective during the 15 years of the Alliance rule. And 
towards the end of the 1960s, it became clear that many Malays were increasingly 
dissatisfied with the Alliance -type consociational arrangement which had demonstrated 
little efficacy regarding Malay economic concerns. 
110 Means, 1972, p. 45. 
ui For the breakdown of first -year students in the Humanities and the Sciences, see Towards National 
Harmony, 1971, p. 14, Table 3. 
nZ Means, 1976, p. 20. 
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3 -5. Summary 
In a study analyzing the political behavior of eighteen multi- ethnic states scattered 
throughout the world, Rabushka and Shepsle concluded that the correlation was, and 
still is, weak between political stability and cultural diversity in the post -independence 
politics of many post -colonial plural societies. Rather, they argued that 'intense ethnic 
conflict frequently erupts shortly after native peoples obtain their independence' u3 
However, the newly independent multi- ethnic Malaysian society did not seem to fit this 
picture. Until the late 1960s, the Alliance regime appeared stable enough to manage 
various controversial inter -racial tensions and was able to maintain a relatively 
successful democratic stability. At least for the first twelve years of independence, the 
newborn multi- ethnic Malaysian state seemed to provide evidence that peaceful racial 
harmony, or co- existence, was possible in a relatively competitive democratic 
framework. During this period, the Malaysian political system demonstrated some of 
the main features of consociatíonaI politics. In particular, the presence of inter -ethnic 
elite cooperation within the Alliance government and the sufficient rank and file support 
made Malaysian politics consociational in the earlier period of independence. In the 
course of elite cooperation, the segmental leaders employed some basic elements of 
consociationalism - such as the proportionality principle, mutual balancing, 
compromises and concessions - although they had rather limited application in practice. 
Nonetheless, the consociational arrangement was not always feasible for 
maintaining the political legitimacy of the Alliance regime. Since the mid- 1960s, the 
Alliance regime faced greater challenges from both Malays and Chinese demanding 
more economic shares and political rights respectively. Ethnically -based political 
forces, especially opposition parties, increasingly challenged the Alliance framework of 
compromise and bargain by instigating growing racial sentiment. This resulted in the 
increased politicization of Malaysian ethnic society especially after 1965. In these 
circumstances, it became clear that the Alliance's segmental leaders no longer exercised 
sufficient authority over their own segmental masses. 
According to the Malay perspective in particular, the consociational Alliance 
regime did not seem to guarantee their intrinsic privileged political hegemony as an 
indigenous people, even though Malays recognized the superior economic position of 
the non -Malay immigrants. The non -Malays, especially the Chinese, increasingly 
challenged Malay political hegemony, which was an essential part of the Alliance 
bargain. For Malay elites, the 1969 election results were enough to prove the 
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inadequacy of the consociational model as regime maintenance because their main 
counterpart Chinese elites were no longer fully recognized by the segmental masses. 
The consociational Alliance regime eventually collapsed when escalating Malay 
grievances over the undermining of their special political position turned into serious 
interracial riots in 1969. For UMNO leaders, it was therefore a natural step to 
renegotiate the consociational arrangement, or to find an alternative, in order to 
maintain their own political security in a situation of deepening ethnic conflict. 
13 Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972, p. 207. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Regime Change towards Unambiguous UMNO -led Malay Dominance and 
Incremental Authoritarian Control 
In deeply divided societies where consociational techniques have not been, or cannot be, 
successfully employed, control may represent a model for the organization of intergroup relations 
that is substantially preferable to other conceivable solutions...' 
This government is based on UMNO and I surrender its responsibility to UMNO in order that 
UMNO shall determine its form 
- 
the government must follow the wishes and desires of UMNO - 
and it must implement policies which are determined by UMNO.' 
4 -l. Introduction 
During the period 1957 -69, the newly established Malaysian state opted for political 
compromise which by implication meant that Malays had political preeminence while 
the non- Malays, especially the Chinese, retained a strong position in the economic 
sphere, although the modem economy continued to be dominated by foreign capital. As 
described in the previous chapter, the component parties of the Alliance government 
had strong incentives and capacities to engage in mutual compromise in order to avoid 
mutual destruction and to maintain their legitimate influence over their respective 
segmental ethnic groups. It also appeared that the intensity and volume of communal 
demands were relatively moderate and negotiable to a large extent in such a mutual 
deterrence situation. 
However, these relatively amicable ethnic relations were not built on strong 
foundations. As Mahathir Mohamad noted, racial harmony in the first decade of 
independence was 'neither real nor deep- rooted' but was rather the 'absence of open 
inter- racial strife'. Moreover, the absence of overt struggle was not necessarily 'due to 
lack of desire or reasons for strife' but mostly 'due to a lack of capacity to bring about 
open conflict.'3 The changed political environment in the second decade of 
independence, however, demonstrated that such mutual compromise (or avoidance) 
practices were no longer effective. Towards the end of the 1960s, the non -Malay 
Ian Lustick, "Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism versus Control ", World Politics, 
Vol. 31, No. 3, 1979, p. 336. 
2 Remarks by Tun Abdul Razak, the second Prime Minister of Malaysia, Straits Times, 23 September 
1970. Quoted in N. J. Funston, Malay Politics in Malaysia: A Study of the United Malays National 
Organization and Party Islam (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Educational Books [Asia], 1980), p. 225. 
3 Mahathir Mohamad, The Malay Dilemma (Kuala Lumpur: Times Books International, 1970), p. 5. 
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communities became more vocal in their demands for greater political equality. To a 
greater extent, the Malays, especially a group of young Malay leaders, also worried that 
the Alliance regime's compromising approach would ultimately cause them to be 
marginalized in the political and the economic sphere. Consequently, growing ethnic 
anxieties led to the breakdown of political order which took the form of the bloody 
racial riots in May 1969. 
It would be wrong to view the post -1969 situation exclusively in terms of the 
absence of inter -ethnic bargaining. The previous consociational compromises, however, 
were no longer perceived as workable means for maintaining the UMNO -led 
government's political hegemony. In this regard, one of the most obvious features of the 
post -1969 developments was the shift in the UMNO leaders' attitude from moderate 
consociational bargaining to one of more repressive hegemonic control. It was the May 
13 racial riots which provided crucial impetus for the younger and more radical UMNO 
leaders to take the initiative in Malaysian politics and create 'an alternative behavioral 
code'. Although the political system was restored soon after the relatively short period 
of emergency rule and the existing constitutional contract (or compromise) continued to 
be implemented, the style of Malaysian politics changed significantly after the May 13 
riots. Since then, 'the threat of a racial riot' has been used by UMNO leaders as an 
enduring means of regime maintenance. 
Consensual bargaining was not entirely absent in post -1969 ethnic politics. 
However, as Milne has argued, 'the existence of hegemony sets stricter limits on the 
consensual element' and Malaysia became 'closer to the control end' from 'near the 
consensus end' on a control- consensus spectrum.' Lijphart also notes that post -1969 
Malaysian politics violated the essential elements of consociationalism because of the 
emergence of the new rules of the game which prohibits Malay supremacy ever being 
seriously challenged.5 In fact, even before 1969, non -Malays recognized the privileged 
position of Malays. It was nonetheless after 1969 that the privileged position of Malays 
was further institutionalized at almost every level of Malaysian politics. 
What then made the UMNO -led government transform its conflict management 
strategies into strategies of more repressive control in the aftermath of the 1969 racial 
riots? In other words, what were the most significant motives for the Malay ruling elites 
changing the consensual way of regime maintenance? And, what were the essential 
R. S. Milne, "BicommunaI Systems: Guyana, Malaysia, Fiji ", Publius, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1988, p. 112, 
italics in original. 
5 See Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 150 -153. 
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elements of the new conflict management strategies? What new political developments 
occurred in the post -1969 phase of Malaysian politics? These questions are the main 
concerns of this chapter. 
Chapter four is divided into three parts. The first part analyzes UMNO's motives 
for shifting to hegemonic methods of control over consociational bargaining for 
resolving political conflict. The second part focuses on the key elements of the UMNO- 
led government's anti -crisis strategies after the May 13 racial riots. The third part 
describes the growth of intra- ethnic conflict, especially among the dominant UMNO 
leaders, in the 1980s. 
4 -2. Backgrounds and Motives behind the UMNO's Hegemonic Control 
Consociationalism, as a method of achieving political stability in deeply divided 
societies, focuses on the subnational elites' capacity for mutual compromise, bargaining 
and accommodation. The likelihood of a consociational system increases when a 
number of favorable conditions are present.6 The previous chapter noted that at the point 
of independence the Malaysian political configuration conformed to some favorable 
consociational conditions. Towards the end of the 1960s, however, the favorable 
conditions (or motives) for successful consociational arrangements were absent or had 
been replaced by negative elements. These changes seemed to help, or at least did not 
present obstacles to, the UMNO leaders' shift in conflict management strategies. 
The Absence of the Existing Favorable Consociational Conditions and the Changed 
Role of the Masses 
Lijphart claims that stable communal accommodation succeeds by disregarding pressure 
from the masses. This implies that successful adaptation of accommodative maneuvers 
by segmental group leaders requires restriction on the communication of sensitive 
public issues to the masses.? In a similar vein, it is believed that an indirect and positive' 
attitude of the masses contributes to enhancing the degree of political autonomy among 
communal leaders. It appears that in the earlier period of Malaysian ethnic politics the 
UMNO and MCA leadership enjoyed a relatively high degree of autonomy, which 
enabled successful consociational bargaining. 
However, as the Malaysian society moved into its second decade of 
independence, the role of the segmental masses became more 'direct and negative'. After 
6 For the list of favorable conditions for consociationalism, see Lijphart, 1977, pp. 53 -103. 
Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy ", World Politics, Vol. 21, No. 2, 1969, pp. 221 -222. 
Íi 
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the expulsion of Singapore in particular, the acquiescent attitudes of the masses towards 
their traditional leaders were replaced by open criticism. The non -Malay communities, 
especially the Chinese, were upset because they believed Singapore was forced out of 
the federation because it had raised the issues of non -Malays' political rights and the 
position of their cultures and languages. s For Malays, growing communal demands 
posed a serious threat to their special position and political supremacy. Although 
political elites continued to manage their respective communities when faced with the 
demands of the communal extremists, the principle of depoliticization seemed to 
operate no Ionger as both the Malay and the non -Malay communities became more and 
more politicized. 
Unlike the earlier period of independence in Malaysia, this time there were no 
external pressures or threats, which had provided the most effective incentive to 
consociational power -sharing arrangements. After the Indonesian 'Confrontation', the 
Alliance leadership tried to drum up an external threat by exaggerating the dispute with 
the Philippines over the ownership of Sabah. The AIliance, however, did not 
successfully mobilize mass support at this time .9 Instead, as the country approached the 
second decade of independence, the Alliance regime faced stronger internal pressure 
from both Malay and non -Malay opposition parties. In particular, DAP functioned as a 
channel for raising sensitive ethnic problems and in so doing gained communal support. 
Unlike PAP, which was removed from the Malaysian political scene, DAP became an 
institutionalized challenger to the stability of the Alliance regime. In these 
circumstances, the principle of mutual benefit between Alliance component parties, one 
of the key inducements for inter- ethnic compromise, was much less evident or even 
replaced by a principle of mutual costs, as shown in the 1969 election results.10 
Moreover, since the mid- 196Os, the successful experience of inter -ethnic 
cooperation had gradually been overshadowed by worsening racial violence, as 
evidenced by the 1964 Singapore racial riots, the 1967 Penang racial crisis, and the 
1969 severe racial riots. In these circumstances, mutually hostile and politicized 
attitudes became more common among the segmental masses who no longer played an 
s R. K. Vasil, Ethnic Politics in Malaysia (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1980), p. 158. 
R. K. Vasil, The Malaysian General Election of 1969 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 
23 -24. 
1° For the first time in the country's electoral history, the non -Malay opposition parties attempted to form 
an electoral alliance, or at least electoral arrangements, in the 1969 elections. The DAP, Gerakan, and 
PPP agreed on the distribution of constituencies and were able to nominate single non -Malay opposition 
candidates to contest against the Alliance candidates. This electoral arrangement among the non -Malay 
opposition parties created severe strains within the Malay community. On the electoral arrangements 
among the DAP, Gerakan, and PPP, see Vasil, 1972, pp. 21 -23. 
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indirect and positive role. When the masses began to engage in racial violence, the 
existing consociational practices failed either directly because of the masses' violence or 
because of the political leaders' inability to implement the necessary regulatory 
practices.11 In this context, Crouch accurately describes the changed situations after the 
1969 racial riots: 
In circumstances where politicians from all communities feel compelled to adopt rigid policies on 
ethnic issues, compromise becomes almost impossible to achieve with the result that multi -ethnic 
coalitions either break apart or cannot be formed in the first place. Ethnic antagonisms continue to 
grow; and, in the end, multi -ethnic democratic government is likely to be replaced by a regime 
dominated by a single ethnic group that resorts to authoritarian means to consolidate its power.12 
Undermining the Credibility of the Alliance Model as a Winning Formula 
Lijphart argues that the successful operation of a consociational model necessitates not 
only a willingness on the part of the elites to cooperate and compromise with each other 
but also the ability to maintain the allegiance and support of their respective 
communities.i3 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the successful experience of 
UMNO and MCA in the 1952 Kuala Lumpur Municipal Council elections motivated 
the beginning of the consociational Alliance regime. Since then, it has been assumed by 
some that the consociational power -sharing arrangements worked successfully to win 
elections in the first decade of independence in Malaysian politics as demonstrated by 
the uninterrupted election victories of the Alliance. 
However, this assumption may not be correct in all cases. Detailed records of the 
general elections from 1955 to 1969 reveal that the Alliance -style of inter -ethnic 
cooperation was vulnerable to campaigns dominated by sensitive ethnic issues (e.g, 
language, education, culture, political position of the non -Malays, and economic 
backwardness of the Malays). With the exception of the 1964 election, when the 
country was preoccupied with an immediate external threat, the performance of the 
Alliance deteriorated markedly in successive elections after 1955. In particular, the 
election results of 1969 revealed 'the lack of confidence' that the respective ethnic 
communities had in the Alliance's component parties, especially the MCA and MIC. 
Although Malay voters also showed an increasing preference for the Malay 
opposition PAS, UMNO's election results from 1955 to 1969 remained relatively stable 
and strong, as shown in Table 4 -1. The biggest loser was the Chinese component party 
11 Eric A. Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies (Cambridge: Center for International 
Affairs, Harvard University, 1972), p. 41. 
12 Harold Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
1996), p. 152. 
13 Lijphart, 1969, p. 221. 
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of the Alliance. Especially in 1969, the MCA lost 20 contested parliamentary seats, 
winning only 13 seats out of the total 33 contested seats. Compared with an 81.8 per 
cent success in 1964, it had dropped sharply to 39.4 per cent in 1969. What was even 
worse, among the 13 winning constituencies, 3 were in Malay -dominated constituencies 
and the remainder included relatively large numbers of Malay voters (average 30 per 
cent). Conversely, all of the Iost constituencies were Chinese -dominated and were won 
mainly by the Chinese opposition parties, the DAP and the Gerakan.14 The MCA did 
even worse in the state assembly elections, recording miserable defeats in most state 
seats where the Chinese were predominant in Selangor, Penang and Perak. As shown in 
Table 4 -3, the MCA won only 1 out of the 12 contested seats in Selangor; it failed to 
obtain any seat out of 12 contested seats in Penang; and the party secured only 1 out of 
the 17 seats it contested in Perak. Meanwhile, another Alliance party, MIC, also lost 7 
out of the 10 state seats it contested in 1969, whereas it obtained 10 out of 11 contested 
seats in the 1964 state elections.15 
Table 4 -I. The Alliance Federal Election Results, 1955 -1969: Seats Won, Contested and Percentages of 
Seats Won 
1955 1959 1964 1969(1) 
UMNO 34/35 (97.1 %) 52/70 (74.3 %) 59/68 (86.8 %) 51/67 (76.1 %) 
MCA 15/15 (100 %) 19/31 (61.3 %) 27/33 (81.8 %) 13/33 (39.4%) 
MIC 2/2 (100 %) 3/3 (100 %) 3/3 (100 %) 2/3 (66.6 %) 
Alliance Total 51/52 (98.1 %) 74/104 (71.2 %) 89/104 (85.6 %) 66/I03 (64.1 %) 
Source: Compiled from Goh Cheng Teik The May Thirteenth Incident and Democracy in Malaysia 
(Kuala Lumpur: Oxford Univers'ty Press, 1971), p. 12. 
Note: (1) The election in one constituency in 1969 was postponed. 
Table 4 -2. The 1964 and 1969 Parliamentary Elections Seats Won, Contested and Percentage of Votes 
for MCA, DAP and Gerakan 
MCA (1964) MCA (1969) DAP (1969) Gerakan (1969) 
Johor 5/5 (23.8 %) 5/5 (25.4 %) 0/6 (21.5 %) 0/2 (4.2 %) 
Kedah 2/2 (12.1 %) 2/2 (8.3 %) - ( -) 0/2 (5.5 %) 
Kelantan - ( -) - ( -) - ( -) -( -) 
Malacca 2/2 (31.5 %) 1/2 (25.9%) 1/1 (22.8%) - ( -) 
Negeri Sembilan 2/2 (17.2%) 0/2 (15.4 %) 3/3 (35.5 %) - ( -) 
Pahang 1/1 (12.3 %) 1/1 ( -) - ( -) - ( -) 
Penang 2/4 (19.3 %) 1/4 (12.5 %) 1/1 (11.2%) 5/5 (44.6 %) 
Perak 8/10 (28.8 %) 1/10 (18.4 %) 5/6 (16.1 %) 1/1 (3.7%) 
Perlis - ( -) - ( -) - ( -) - ( -) 
Selangor 5/7 (25.4 %) 2/7 (21.9 %) 3/7 (31.4 %) 2/4 (17.5 %) 
Terengganu - ( -) - ( -) - ( -) - ( -) 
Total 27/33 (18.7 %) 13/33 (135 %) I3/24 (13.7 %) 8/14 (8.6 %) 
Source: Compiled from Vasil, 1972, pp. 85 -96. 
"For more detail on seats won and lost by the MCA and the racial composition of those electorates in the 
parliamentary seats, see Vasil, I972, pp. 103 -105. 
i5 For detail of MIC results in the 1969 elections, see Vasil, 1972, p. 73, 85. 
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Table 4 -3. The 1964 and 1969 State Elections: Seats Won, Contested and Percentage of Votes for MCA, 
DAP and Gerakan 
MCA (1964) MCA (1969) DAP (1969) Gerakan (1969) 
Johor 11/11 (21.9 %) 9/10 (19.3 %) 1/12 (18.0 %) 0/3 (2.0 %) 
Kedah 5/5 (14.4 %) 2/5 (10.1 %) - ( -) 2/3 (5.0 %) 
Kelantan 1/1 (2.2 %) 1/1 (2.0 %) - ( -) - ( -) 
Malacca 4/6 (17.8 %) 4/7 (13.0 %) 4/5 (12.8 %) 1/1 (4.5 %) 
Negeri Sembilan 9/9 (22.2 %) 4/9 (15.1 %) 8/16 (36.4 %) - ( -) 
Pahang 7/7 (15.8 %) 4/7 (15.7 %) 0/1 (1.7 %) I/1 (2.0 %) 
Penang 6/12 (19.7 %) 0/12 (14.0 %) 3/3 (8.4 %) 16/19 (46.8 %) 
Perak 12/16 (21.6 %) 1/17 (15.5 %) 6/8 (9.5 %) 2/2 (3.8 %) 
Perlis 2/2 (12.2 %) - ( -) - ( -) - ( -) 
Selangor 9/12 (24.2 %) 1/12 (17.5 %) 9/12 (31.1 %) 4/8 (16.5 %) 
Terengganu 1/1 (2.5 %) - ( -) - ( -) - ( -) 
Total 67/82 (17.4 %) 26/80 (12.7 %) 31/57 (11.8 %) 26/37 (8.8 %) 
Source: Compiled from Vasil, 1972, pp. 73 -84. 
These figures suggest that the non -Malay Alliance parties, especially the 
Chinese -based MCA, could not retain the support and confidence of their own rank and 
file. The results, therefore, triggered UMNO leaders to doubt the adequacy of Alliance - 
style cooperation as a winning formula and thus created severe strains within the 
Alliance regime after the 1969 elections. 16 Even before the outbreak of the May 13 
racial riots, the MCA leadership faced increased pressure from UNLNO leaders who 
blamed the MCA for Alliance Iosses. For example, shortly after the 1969 election, a 
group of young UMNO leaders proposed a new Cabinet list which deprived the MCA of 
the two key portfolios of Finance, and Commerce and Industry.17 This was followed by 
a sharp reaction from the MCA announcing its withdrawal from participation in the new 
government.18 The MCA's move was widely viewed as a gesture to regain its support by 
focusing the Chinese community's attention on the inter -ethnic bargaining mechanisms 
of the Alliance government. Nonetheless, within MCA circles, there were growing fears 
of Malay predominance in the Alliance regime. Addressing a party seminar at Ipoh on 
16 March, Tan Siew Sin, the leader of the MCA, had expressed his concerns as follows: 
If the opposition manages to wrest key seats from the MCA, it will mean that the country will be 
ruled by an Alliance Government without Chinese participation. It would mean in effect a 
confrontation between a Government without Chinese participation and a practically all- Chinese 
opposition.19 
In short, the disastrous election outcome and the growing lack of confidence on 
16 The growing strains within the ruling Alliance after the 1969 elections are well described by Gordon P. 
Means, Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 6 -8; 
J. Bass, "Malaysian Politics, 1968 -1970: Crisis and Response ", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of 
California, 1973, pp. 502 -522; and Anthony Reid, "The Kuala Lumpur Riots and the Malaysian Political 
System ", Australian Outlook, Vol. 23, 1969, pp. 262 -263. 
17 Straits Times, 13 May 1969. 
18 Straits Times, 14 May 1969. 
19 Straits Times, 17 March 1969. 
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the part of the non -Malays in their respective communal parties in the Alliance provided 
a political reason for UMNO leaders to seek an alternative mode of regime maintenance 
after the 1969 election and subsequent racial riots. 
National Tragedy as a Circumstantial Advantage 
Meanwhile, the national tragedy itself seemed ironically to provide a 'circumstantial 
advantage' for UMNO leaders to adopt a new regime maintenance strategy strongly 
based on hegemonic control. In other words, the May 13 racial riots ensured that the 
political configuration as a whole inclined to unambiguous Malay dominance Ied by a 
more communally- oriented younger UMNO leadership. 
Within UMNO, the riots affected the power balance of party leadership and led 
to a change from a moderate and accommodative group, led by Tunku Abdul Rahman, 
to a more Malay -oriented group, led by then Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak. 
Tun Razak was able to initiate pro -Malay policies as the racial crisis contributed to 
heightened communal consciousness among UMNO members as well as to Malays in 
general. They were able to force the conservative party leadership to implement 
government policies which the former had earlier avoided. Meanwhile, the national 
tragedy provided the immediate motives for a group of young and communally- oriented 
UMNO leaders to return to the mainstream Malaysian politics. In addition, Ismail 
Rahman, an UMNO stalwart who had retired in 1967, was recalled to a top government 
position as the Minister of Home Affairs because of the riots. Further, as soon as Tun 
Razak replaced Tunku Abdul Rahman as Prime Minister in September 1970, Mahathir 
Mohamad and Musa Hitam, who had been the most overtly critical of Tunku Abdul 
Rahman's concessions to the non -Malays - and had, in Mahathir's case, been expelled 
from UMNO - were quickly brought back to mainstream UMNO politics.20 
In relation to non -Malay communities, the severe racial riots also enabled 
UMNO's political leaders to adopt more rigid preferential policies, in part because it 
was the only workable option for them. The Alliance's Chinese political leaders also 
20 Mahathir, a member of the Executive Committee from Kedah, was expelled from UMNO on 10 July 
1969 after leading the campaign calling for Tunku Abdul Rahman's resignation as Prime Minister and 
UMNO leader. In an open letter, Mahathir blamed Tunku Abdul Rahman that: Your "give and take" 
policy gives the Chinese everything they ask for.... The Chinese on the other hand regarded you and the 
Alliance government as cowards and weaklings who could be pushed around' (Letter by Mahathir to 
Tunku Abdul Rahman on 17 June 1969, cited in Vorys, 1975, p. 373). Meanwhile, Musa Hitam, former 
Executive Secretary of UMNO, was dismissed from his post as Assistant Minister to Tun Razak on 28 
July 1969. For detail on the activities of a group of younger leaders taking initiative after the May 13 
racial riots and the conflicts within UMNO, see Karl von Vorys, Democracy without Consensus: 
Communalism and Political Stability in Malaysia (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 
370 -385. 
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acknowledged the necessity of changes to restore inter -racial harmony after the bloody 
racial crisis. Although Chinese leaders did not necessarily agree with the detailed 
remedies proposed by the UMNO -led government, they acknowledged that a new 
course was required to restore political order in the post -racial crisis situations.21 In 
short, the terrifying experience of open racial strife provided the UMNO -led 
government with a legitimate reason for the adoption of authoritarian government 
control. 
To some extent, the rule of bargaining continued to be utilized. The political 
system, however, was much simpler and clearer after the racial riots. Various sensitive 
issues would not be resolved by traditional compromise among the Alliance partners. 
As Vorys notes, the final decision would be made by 'what the top UMNO leaders 
considered fair'.22 In this regard, Horowitz argues that the May 13 racial riots could be 
considered by the younger group of UMNO leaders as a 'blessing in disguise' because 
they enabled 'a realization of the need for drastic action.' He commented that: 
As disasters are often used by advocates of a policy to put it on the policymakers' agenda and to 
neutralize opposition, the violence of 1969 performed these functions in Malaysia, making 
possible the adoption of policies previously shunned because they appeared ethnically biased and 
loaded against merit criteria.23 
In sum, the 1969 general election and the May 13 racial riots threatened the 
demise of consociational conflict resolution. These crises also provided an opportunity 
for UMNO leadership to take definite measures, both to strengthen its political 
hegemony in the Alliance and to implement firmer government control over imminent 
and potential political opposition. 
4 -3. Renegotiating the Consociational Contract and the Shift toward UMNO -led 
Malay Dominance 
Following the racial riots in 1969, changes took place in almost every field of 
Malaysian society - political, legal, economic, social, and even ideological. The various 
changes or alternative strategies adopted by the UMNO -led government contained two 
main features. Firstly, most Malays rejected the existing consociational approach 
exemplified by Tunku Abdul Rahman's compromised political leadership. Secondly, 
alternative strategies necessarily led to the strengthening of UMNO as the dominant 
2f Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 
659. 
22 Vorys, 1975, p. 344. 
23 Horowitz, 1985, p. 659. 
Ìi 
89 
group in the government, in terms of its economic position as well as its political 
hegemony. These dramatic changes were initiated by the emergency government called 
the National Operations Council (NOC). 
Immediately after the May 13 racial riots, a State of Emergency was imposed 
over Selangor and Kuala Lumpur by the Yang di -Pertuan Agong (King) under Article 
150 of the Constitution. As a result, both Parliament and State Legislative Assemblies 
were suspended and the elections scheduled for Sabah and Sarawak later in May and 
June were postponed indefinitely. More importantly, all government authority was 
assumed by an emergency government, the NOC, headed by Deputy Prime Minister 
Tun Razak. The NOC consisted of several Alliance leaders and top representatives of 
the police, armed forces, and public service. The nine council members were composed 
of seven Malays and two non -Malays, one Chinese from the MCA and one Indian from 
the MIC, whereas the Cabinet was composed of ten Malays and four non- Malays.24 
Therefore, the proportionality of the Alliance's consociational formula was completely 
abandoned. 
The immediate aim of the NOC was to coordinate government, armed forces, 
and police activities in an effort to re- establish and maintain security and order. 
However, the NOC extended its role beyond the immediate attainment of social order 
and continued to exercise full power for twenty -one months until February 1971.25 
While the Cabinet continued to meet under the leadership of Prime Minister Tunku 
Abdul Rahman, its role had been reduced to a symbolic, or routine, role and substantial 
administrative power was in fact transferred to the NOC under the leadership of Tun 
Razak. Although the NOC made preliminary moves to restore representative institutions 
and intercommunal dialogue through the creation of new mechanisms, such as the 
National Consultative Council (NCC) and the Department of National Unity (DNU), the 
24 The NOC included the following: Tun Razak, Deputy Prime Minister; Ismail Rahman, Minister of 
Home Affairs; Tan Siew Sin, President of the MCA; V. T. Sambanthan, Minister of Works, Posts, and 
Telecoms (also President of the MIC); Hamzah Samah, Minister of Information and Broadcasting; 
General Osman Jewa, Chief of Armed Forces Staff; Salleh Ismail, Inspector -General of Police; Ghazali 
Shafie, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Kadir Shamsuddin, Director of Public 
Services. See Sunday Times, 18 May 1969; Straits Times, 21 May 1969. 
2' During the NOC's rule, several thousand people were detained under emergency orders. According to 
the government, these included Communists, hard -core terrorists, subversive elements, saboteurs and 
secret society members. But, they also included a number of prominent opposition leaders, such as the 
Gerakan s V. David and the DAP's Lim Kit Siang. See FEER, 29 May 1969 (Bob Reece, "Who's the 
Driver ? "). Furthermore, several local newspapers, such as China Press, one of the country's largest 
Chinese -language dailies, were suspended and all party publications, pamphlets, and posters were banned, 
including those of the Alliance. See FEER, 19 June 1969 (Bob Reece, 'News from the Outside Only "). 
For detail on the activities of the NOC, see Vorys, 1975, pp. 345 -369; R. S. Milne and D. K. Mauzy, 
Politics and Government in Malaysia (Singapore: Times Books International, 1978), Chapter 5. 
90 
ultimate power over policy and administration remained with the NOC.26 In this 
context, Means argues: 
...the emergency [government] represented a termination of the intercommunal 'elite 
accommodation system' and it also may have effectively disguised a quasi -coup whereby the 
political leadership of the Prime Minister and Cabinet had been partly supplanted by the Deputy 
Prime Minister, Abdul Razak, backed by the combined powers of the army, police, and 
bureaucracy.27 
Under the rule of the NOC, three main elements - the ideology, the bans and the 
plan - were introduced as anti -crisis strategies. These three anti -crisis strategies would 
be seen as complementary elements in a tricky situation brought to the surface by the 
racial riots of 13 May 1969. 
The Ideology: The 'Rukunegara' as the nation's guiding principle 
Drafted by the DNU, debated in the NCC, and approved by the NOC, the national 
ideology or set of guiding principles was proclaimed on 31 August 1970 by the Yang 
di- Pertuan Agong. Officially, this was referred to as the Rukunegara.28 It outlined five 
beliefs - achieving a united nation, maintaining a democratic society, creating a just 
society, ensuring a liberal society, and building a progressive society.29 In order to 
materialize these beliefs, the Rukunegara presented five principles by which the 
Malaysian peoples were to be guided. The five principles were:39 
26 The DNU, headed by Ghazali Shafie, was created to help the government in 'galvanizing the country 
and guiding it towards national unity (Straits Times, 16 July 1969). In substance, the DNU, consisting of 
two main divisions - a Research Division and an Operational Division - was charged with formulating 
broad strategies for communal reconciliation. In comparison, the NCC was a widely -representative 
intercommunal body. The ethnic representation of the NCC was 30 Malays, [7 Chinese, 7 Indians, and 1 l 
others (Straits Times, 13 January 1970). All major parties or organizations were invited to nominate 
representatives to the NCC. This included representatives of the federal government, state governments, 
political parties, religious groups, professional associations, the public service, trade unions, the press, 
teachers, and minority groups. The DAP and the Labor Party, however, did not particípate in the NCC. As 
Means argues, the NCC was to be used as 'a surrogate for Parliament' to secure consent for various 
policies among communal representatives, however, as noted by Tunku Abdul Rahman, the NCC was not 
'a substitute for Parliament.' See Means, 1991, p. 10 and FEER, 5 February 1970 (Bob Reece, "The 
Obstacle Race "). Unlike Parliament, the NCC had no public nor press gallery and no public record. For 
detail on the DNU and the NCC, see Means, 1991, pp. 10 -11; Milne and Mauzy, 1978, pp. 90 -94; and 
Diane K. Mauzy, Barisan Nasional: Coalition Government in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Marican & Sons 
Sdn Bhd, 1983), pp. 46 -48. 
27 Means, 1991, p. 8, italics added. 
Rukunegara is a compound word of rukun and negara. The Malay word rukun means harmony but it 
also refers to the five basic principles of Islam (confession of faith, prayer, fasting, charity, the Haj). 
Negara refers country or nation. Therefore the word suggests fundamental national principles or national 
guiding rules, but with a rather strong religious Islamic connotation. It was often referred to as the 
national ideology. It appears to have been partly inspired by the Indonesian national ideology of 
Pancasila (Five Principles). 
29 For the full text of five beliefs, see Government of Malaysia, Rukunegara (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan 
ChetakKerajaan, 1970), pp. 16 -17. 
ao Rukunegara, 1970, p. 15. 
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Belief in God (Keperchayaan kapada Tuhan) 
Loyalty to King and Country (Kesetiaan kapada Raja dan Negara) 
Upholding the Constitution (Keluhoran Perlembagaan) 
Rule of Law (Kedaulatan Undang2) 
Good Behavior and Morality (Kesopanan dan Kesusilaan) 
In terms of beliefs and principles, the Rukunegara was a general statement. Most 
beliefs and principles of the Rukunegara had already appeared in the existing Malaysian 
Federal Constitution. As a major product of the NCC, an inter -communal body set up to 
provide a forum for discussion of important issues in the absence of Parliament, the 
Rukunegara tended to provide reassurance of fundamental agreements, the package 
deals of the Constitution, that had been the prime product of inter -elite communal 
bargaining.31 In particular, the third principle of the Rukunegara emphasized the duty of 
Malaysian people to respect the letter, the spirit and the historical background of the 
Constitution, including such provisions as those regarding: the position of the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong and the Rulers; the position of Islam as the official religion; the position 
of Malay as the national and official language; the special position of the Malays and 
other Natives; the legitimate interests of the other communities; and the conferment of 
citizenship.32 The fourth and fifth principles described rather general, or impartial, rights 
of citizens, as follows: 'Fundamental liberties are guaranteed to all citizens. These 
include liberty of the person, equal protection of the law, freedom of religion, rights of 
property and protection against banishment.. ,33 and 'No citizen should question the 
Ioyalty of another citizen on the ground that he belongs to a particular community.'34 It 
seemed that the Rukunegara, as a set of national basic principles, was neither favorable 
to the Malays nor unfavorable to the non -Malays. In this context, the Rukunegara 
seemed to be an appropriate preamble to the Malaysian Constitution.35 
However, the significance of the national ideology declaration would depend 
less on the frequency with which people memorized it or invoked it', than on 'the 
method and the persistence with which the government could implement it'.36 From this 
perspective, it is necessary to focus on how the rhetoric of the national ideology could 
be implemented practically. The key questions are: to what extent would the UNLNO -led 
government substantially practice the tenets of the Rukunegara and succeed in 
31 Means, 1991, p. 13. 
32 Commentary on the third principle in Rukunegara, 1970, p. 18. 
33 Commentary of the fourth principle in Rukunegara , 1970, p. 19. 
34 Commentary on the fifth principle in Rukunegara, 1970, p. 19. 
35 For more explanations, see Syed Hussein Alatas, "The Rukunegara and the Return to Democracy in 
Malaysia", Pacific Community, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1971. 
36 Vorys, 1975, p. 396. 
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influencing the people in that direction? How could the government utilize the 
Rukunegara as a behavior code for daily life? 
In response to these questions, it is worth noting that the UMNO -led government 
introduced or strengthened legal restrictions in nearly every field of political life. Such 
provisions, which related to the 'sensitive' or 'controversial' matters in Malaysian 
society, were included among new or revised laws, such as the Constitution 
(Amendment) Act, the Internal Security Act, the Official Secrets Act, the Sedition Act, 
the Printing Presses Act, and the Universities and University College Act. Practically, 
restrictions operated as a compelling force for political parties as well as for individuals 
to follow the national ideology as a behavior code. Consequently, most sensitive and 
controversial issues of Malaysian society were removed from the realm of public 
discussion and the acceptance of the national ideology was to be 'a prerequisite for 
participation in the political life of the country' after the May 13 racial riots.37 
The Bans: Amendments of the Constitution and Enactment (or Revision) of 
Repressive Laws 
A clear trend towards authoritarian control was demonstrated in the amendments to the 
Constitution. After Parliament was reconvened in February 1971, its first decision was 
to pass the Constitution (Amendment) Bill. The new constitutional amendments were 
proposed in a White Paper (entitled Towards National Harmony) issued by the 
government. The proposed amendments to the Federal Constitution were designed to 
achieve two objectives: 'to remove sensitive issues from the realm of public discussion 
so as to allow the smooth functioning of parliamentary democracy; and to redress the 
racial imbalance in certain sectors of the nation's life and thereby promote national 
unity.'38 
The overt purpose of the Constitution (Amendment) Act 1971 was the removal 
of certain topics identified as 'sensitive issues' from the realm of public discussion or 
political debate.39 To achieve this aim, Article 10 (Freedom of speech, assembly and 
association) of the Federal Constitution was amended so that Parliament was 
empowered to pass laws prohibiting the questioning of certain sensitive matters. The 
i7 Means, 1991, p. 13. 
38 Government of Malaysia, Towards National Harmony (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, I971), p. 2. 
39 For a detailed account of the amendments to the Constitution, see Government of Malaysia, 
Parliamentary Debates on the Constitution Amendment Bill 1971 (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 
1972); Tun Mohamed Suffian, H. P. Lee, and F. A. Trindade (eds.), The Constitution of Malaysia, Its 
Development: 1957 -1977 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 379 -383; and Milne and 
Mauzy, 1978, pp. 94 -99. 
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new Article 10(4) of the Constitution, aimed at restricting public discussion of four 
sensitive issues, made it an offense to question 'any matter, right, status, position, 
privilege, sovereignty or prerogative established or protected by the provisions of Part 
ITl [citizenship], Article 152 [the national language], 153 [the special position and 
privileges of the Malays and the natives of Sabah and Sarawak], or 181 [the sovereignty 
of the Rulers]' of the Federal Constitution. Furthermore, the Constitution (Amendment) 
Act 1971, by amending Article 63 (Privileges of Parliament) and 72 (Privileges of 
Legislative Assembly), applied the same restrictions on freedom of speech to the 
members of Parliament and State Assemblies, removing their parliamentary immunity 
when speaking on topics identified as sensitive issues.sa 
However, even before Parliament was restored and Article 10 of the Federal 
Constitution had been amended, these changes had already been largely in force through 
the amendment of the Sedition Act 1948. The Sedition Act 1948 was amended by 
Emergency Ordinance No. 45 of 1970 promulgated by the Yang di- Pertuan Agong. 
What was newly proposed in the Constitution (Amendment) Bill was the extension of 
these restrictions on the freedom of speech on certain sensitive issues should apply to 
Parliament itself as well as to State Assemblies.41 
As well as the amendment to the provisions on the freedom of speech, assembly 
and association, the Constitution (Amendment) Act 1971 also applied to Article 152. 
Article 152(1) originally declared that the Malay language shall be the national 
language, but this clause was subject to the proviso that 'no person shall be prohibited or 
prevented from using (otherwise than for official purposes)... any other languages'.42 
There was no express definition of 'official purposes'.43 However, this time, the 
Constitution (Amendment) Act 1971 added a new clause which expressly defined the 
term 'official purposes' as any purpose of the Government, whether Federal or State, 
and includes any purpose of a public authority.'44 
40 See Article 10(4), 63(4) and 72(4) of Constitution (Amendment) Act 1971. Fan Yew Teng, a member 
of Parliament from the DAP, was the first convicted of this offense in 1971. For more details of Fan Yew 
Teng's case, see F. A. Trindade and H. P. Lee (eds.), The Constitution of Malaysia: Further Perspectives 
and Developments (Petaling Jaya: Penerbit Fajar Bakti, 1986), p. 17, footnote 61. 
61 The opposition argued that to deprive the Member of Parliament of the privilege of free speech in 
discussing certain topics was incompatible with the principle of the sovereignty of Parliament. Also, it 
was not clear whether the ban (on discussing the sensitive issues) could be applied to the discussion of the 
ban itself in Parliament. In this context, the Constitution (Amendment) Bill was constitutionally complex. 
See PEER, 27 August 1970 (James Morgan, "A Ban on the Ban ? "). For more detailed analysis on the 
legislative procedures, see Suffian, Lee, and Trindade (eds.), 1978, pp. 382 -383. 
42 See Article 152(1)(a) of Constitution (Amendment) Act 1969. 
43 See Article 160 of Constitution (Amendment) Act 1969. 
a4 Public authority' means the Yang di- Pertuan Agong, the Ruler or Yang di- Pertuan Negeri of a State, 
the Federal Government, the Government of a State, a local authority, a statutory authority exercising 
powers vested in it by federal or state law, any court or tribunal other than the Federal Court, the Court of 
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Article 153, the provision which empowers the Yang di- Pertuan Agong to 
safeguard the special position of the Malays, was also amended. The Constitution 
(Amendment) Act 1971 added the words 'and natives of any of the States of Sabah and 
Sarawak' immediately after the word 'Malays' in Clause 6 of Article 153. By virtue of 
Clause 6 of Article 153, the natives of Sabah and Sarawak were given the same special 
status as the Malays 45 In addition to elevating the status of the natives of these states, 
Article 153(8A) empowers the Yang di- Pertuan Agong to direct any university, college 
or other educational institutions at post -secondary level to reserve a certain proportion 
of places for Malays and natives of Sabah and Sarawak. The intention of such an 
amendment was to reserve places in those selected courses of study where the numbers 
of Malays are disproportionately small.'46 
Finally, changes were made in Article 159 which provides for the amendment of 
the Constitution. The major impact of this amendment was to enhance the power and 
role of the Conference of Rulers in the amendment process itself. Certain provisions 
were already entrenched by Clause 5 of Article 159, which provides that the consent of 
the Conference of Rulers was required to amend them - Article 38, 70, 71(1), and 153. 
As a result of the amendment of Clause 5 of Article 159, however, various other 
constitutional provisions were included. Article 159(5) as amended now read: 
A law making an amendment to Clause (4) of Article 10, any law passed thereunder, the 
provisions of Part III, Article 38, 63(4), 70, 71(1), 72(4), 152 or 153 or to this Clause shall not be 
passed without the consent of the Conference of Rulers (italics added). 
All these Articles concern what have been categorized as 'sensitive issues', and 
more importantly, Article 159(5) itself was entrenched. Consequently, as a result of 
these Iegal changes, discussion of so- called 'sensitive' issues was banned. 
In addition to the amendments to the Federal Constitution, the UMNO -led 
government also utilized its formidable instruments of new (or revised) coercive 
legislation for consolidating and extending its authoritarian control. 
Appeal and High Courts, or any officer or authority appointed by or acting on behalf of any of those 
persons, courts, tribunals or authorities. See Article 160(2) of Constitution (Amendment) (No. 2) Act 
1971. 
45 The elevation of the status of the natives of the Borneo States can be interpreted as part of the effort to 
restore Malay dominance in the political arena by including the indigenous peoples in East Malaysia. In 
this very context, as part of the NEP, the UMNO -led government introduced the concept of the 
Bumiputeras (incorporating both the Malays and other natives but excluding 'immigrant races'). Prior to 
the Constitution (Amendment) Act 1971, the natives of the Borneo states were not entitled to reservation 
of special positions, such as fixed proportions in relation to scholarship, exhibitions, and other educational 
or training privileges and facilities for the natives. 
46 Towards National Harmony, 1971. p. 6, italics in original. For ethnic distribution between the Malay 
and non -Malay students in certain courses of study, see Towards National Harmony, 1971, Table I, II, 
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One of the first, and most notorious, bills presented to the new Parliament in 
1971 was an amendment to the Internal Security Act (1960). The ISA was introduced 
immediately after the lifting of the first emergency in 1960 for the continuing fight 
against communist insurgency. Since the amendment to the ISA in 1971, however, the 
Act stressed the preservation of intercommunal harmony and it was actually utilized to 
block political challenges and intimidate critics'.47 In practice, the ISA was, and still is, 
the most powerful repressive law preventing any individual from questioning sensitive 
matters. The amendment to the ISA allowed the UMNO -led government to detain 
without trial anyone who may incite violence, cause public disorder, or promote 
hostility among races. Even after a detainee is released, he may be served with a 
restriction order imposing conditions upon his movements and participation in political 
or social actívities.'48 Consequently, the selective use of the ISA against political 
leaders, academics, trade unionists, NGO activists, and any critical individuals has 
effectively muted immediate and/or potential political dissent. One of the most 
frequently used instruments of control by the government to detain these political 
opponents without trial for any length of time is provided under Section 8(1) of the ISA 
(Revised 1972), as follows: 
If the Minister is satisfied that the detention of any person is necessary with a view to preventing 
him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia or any part thereof or to the 
maintenance of essential services therein or to the economic life thereof, he may make an order... 
directing that person be detained.49 
Several other laws were also amended (or promulgated) to strengthen the 
government's control after the outbreak of the 1969 racial riots. For example, the 
Sedition Act 1948 (Amendment 1970), the Official Secrets Act 1972, the Printing 
Presses Act 1948 (Amendment 1971), and the University Act 1971 (later amended to 
the Universities and University College Act in 1975) were, and still are, utilized to 
inhibit discussion of some of the country's most controversial political issues. 
Especially, the Sedition Act 1948, as amended, restricted the political opposition's scope 
for public criticism. Following the May 13 racial riots, the original Sedition Act was 
amended and widely applied to cover 'any matter, right, status, position, privilege, 
sovereignty or prerogative established or protected by the provisions of Part III of the 
and III in Appendix, pp. 11 -14. 
47 Crouch, 1996, p. 81. 
48 Simon Barraclough, "The Dynamics of Coercion in the Malaysian Political Process ", Modern Asian 
Studies, Vol. 19, No. 4, 1985, p. 808. 
49 Internal Security Act 1972, as cited by Barraclough, 1985, p. 807. 
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Federal Constitution or Article 152, 153 or 181 of the Federal Constitution.'50 As 
mentioned earlier, the amended Sedition Act applied to Parliament itself and, as a result, 
removed parliamentary immunity after the passage of the Constitution (Amendment) 
Act 1971.51 
The Official Secrets Act 1972 placed another legal restriction on public criticism 
of the government. The OSA 1972 was very broad in its coverage. It prohibited the 
taking or making of copies of any unauthorized documents, measurements, sounding or 
surveys, no matter how insignificant the matters therein or even where they were 
common knowledge. The broad application of the OSA 1972 made it difficult for the 
opposition to reveal irregularities or malpractices within the government because such 
information had to be obtained through unauthorized channels, such as leaks.52 
The 1969 riots were also the catalyst for solidifying mass media policy in 
Malaysia. The mass media, either as a source of information or a platform for public 
criticism of the government, was severely restricted by government in various ways.53 
First of all, the original Printing Presses Act, promulgated at the beginning of the first 
emergency in 1948, was significantly amended in 1971 to provide for the right to 
withdraw newspaper licenses. The criterion for issuing printing permits was broad 
enough to cover any political reason. Since 1971, all printing permits had been issued 
subject to the following conditions: no material or photograph or matter which is or is 
likely to be prejudicial to public order or national security shall be printed or 
published.... Presentation of facts related to public order incidents in Malaysia should 
not be in such a way as is Iikely to inflame or stir communal hostility' 54 Students and 
universities were not exempt from increasing government control. As a result of 
intensifying student demonstrations against Tunku Abdul Rahman's compromised 
leadership post -1969, the government passed the University Act in 1971 outlawing 
5o Section 3(f) of the Sedition Act 1948 (as amended in 1970). 
5' For several cases under the amended Sedition Act, see Crouch, 1996, pp. 83 -84. 
52' Crouch, 1996, p. 84. The first case under the amended OSA involved Lim Kit Siang, the DAP 
secretary- general, and P. Patto, the DAP Member of Parliament in 1978. Lim disclosed the possibility of 
corruption in the procedure for purchasing four patrol vessels by the Royal Malaysian Navy. His 
allegations were reported in the DAP's periodical, The Rocket, in 1978. In this context, Lim and P. Patto, 
the editor of The Rocket, were charged under the OSA shortly before the general election of 1978. See 
New Straits Times, 8 [November 1978. For the other cases of the OSA and its application, see Anne 
Munro -Kua, Authoritarian Populism in Malaysia (London: Macmillan Press, 1996), pp. 123 -124. 
53 Following the May 13 racial riots, the UMNO 
-led government exercised control over the mass media 
more directly through the publication of newspapers and/or the control of ownership. 
54 Howard Coats and Frances Dyer, The Print and Broadcasting Media in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: 
South East Asia Press Center, 1972), p. 3. In 1974, shortly after the first amendment, the Act was 
amended again. This time the Act included a clause stating that Malaysians must maintain majority shares 
in all newspapers and permitted the government to deny a license to a publication not owned by 
Malaysians. 
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student participation in outside campus political activities. Later in 1975, the University 
Act 1971 was amended and renamed as the Universities and University Colleges Act, to 
expand its controls on student activities in the political as well as the non -political 
arena. 
The Plan: The New Socio- Economic Development Strategies 
In addition to the proclamation of national ideology and the restrictive legislation on 
sensitive issues, the UMNO -led government introduced a new development plan. This 
was called the Second Malaysia Plan, which covered the period up to the end of 1974, 
but this plan, unlike the previous ones, was not a regular five -year plan. The Second 
Malaysia Plan was presented to Parliament on 11 July 1971 and it included the 
implementation of the New Economic Policy (NEP), a long -term national development 
strategy that ended in 1990. While the government acknowledged the 'ideology' and the 
ban' as one aspect of a long -term political strategy, the NEP was another long -term 
strategy stemming from its interpretation of the socio- economic background to the 
racial riots. Therefore, the detailed contents of the NEP had to cover the key issues or 
problems which were revealed in the first stage of Malaysian ethnic politics. 
Given these problems, the new development strategy had to meet at least two 
interrelated challenges. Firstly, it aimed to overcome the deep- rooted psychological 
feeling of relative deprivation, alienation, and inferiority among Malays because of their 
relative economic and social backwardness which the UMNO -led government 
recognized as the root cause of the May 13 racial riots. Secondly, but no less 
importantly, the new development strategy should contain a remedy for the precarious 
position of the UMNO -led government. The most vulnerable feature of the UMNO -led 
government during the first twelve years of independence was that UMNO, as a ruling 
political group, had dominated state power without a strong economic base. In these 
circumstances, as Jomo notes, the Malaysian political system itself was 'fragile and 
untenable in the long run'.55 Thus, the NEP had to map out in detail how ethnic political 
power could be converted into ethnic economic power, but without spoiling the 
economically dominant minority or disrupting the overall economy. 
The NEP's primary objectives and targets made clear the UMNO -led 
government's strategies to resolve these two immediate but profound problems.56 The 
ss Jomo Kwame Sundaram, A Question of Class: Capital, the State, and Uneven Development in Malaya 
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1988), p. 247. 
56 Due to the crucial importance of any political, economic, and social analyses of post -riots Malaysian 
society, the literature of the NEP is vast. For NEP official documents, see Second Malaysia Plan, 1971- 
`.. 
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UMNO -led government declared that the NEP's ultimate goal was 'national unity'. In 
order to achieve this goal, the NEP specified two strategies. Firstly, the NEP aimed 'to 
reduce and eventually eradicate poverty, by raising income levels and increasing 
employment opportunities for all Malaysians, irrespective of race.'57 Secondly, the NEP 
sought to accelerate 'the process of restructuring Malaysian society to correct economic 
imbalance, so as to reduce and eventually eliminate the identification of race with 
economic function'.58 In addition, it was assumed that the implementation of the NEP 
will be 'in such a manner that no one will be deprived of his rights, privileges, income, 
job or opportunity'.59 
In the aftermath of the severe inter -racial riots, the new plan appeared to be 
relatively well -balanced, at least at the level of rhetoric regarding its basic objectives 
and goals. Furthermore, of the three ways identified by Esman of redressing economic 
imbalance by a government representing the economically disadvantaged ethnic 
minority, the ÜNINO -led government seemed to adopt a 'positive -sum strategy of ethnic 
redistribution' rather than 'a strategy of no action' or 'an expropriation strategy'.60 In 
other words, the UMNO -Ied government believed that the task of economic 
redistribution should be carried out by expanding the economic pie without the 
expropriation of any group.61 
Yet no matter how it was explained, it was apparent that the UMNO -led 
government viewed the primary goals of the NEP, especially 'restructuring Malaysian 
1975; Mid -Term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan 1971 -1975; Department of National Unity, 'The 
New Economic Policy', A Directive to all Government Departments and Agencies, dated 18 March 1970, 
reprinted in Just Faaland, J. R. Parkinson, and Rais Saniman, Growth and Ethnic Inequality: Malaysia's 
New Economic Policy (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1990), pp. 305 -318, Document C. 
57 Second Malaysia Plan, p. 1, italics added. 
58 Second Malaysia Plan, p. 1, italics added. 
n Second Malaysia Plan, p. 6. 
60 The strategy of no action means that the government hopes for the gradual rectification of ethnic 
imbalances through autonomous but unspecified economic processes. They take no specific action 
because they fear that any serious effort to reduce or eliminate economic imbalances may inflict more 
damage on the economically disadvantaged majority than on the minority due to precipitate capital flight, 
deprivation of needed skills, and weakening and disrupting the overall economy. Examples of the strategy 
of no action include Malaysia before 1969, Thailand, Kenya, Ivory Coast, Quebec before 1960, and 
Senegal. To the contrary, an expropriation strategy suggests that the government determines to end 
minority economic domination straight -away by draconian measures such as expropriation and 
nationalization of assets and even the expulsion of ethnic minorities. Examples are shown in Algeria, 
Egypt, Vietnam against its Chinese minority, Uganda against its Asian minority, and Iraq against its 
Jewish minority. For detailed explanations, see Milton J. Esman, Ethnic Politics and Economic Power', 
Comparative Politics, Vol. 19, No. 4, 1987, pp. 395 -418. 
61 Emphasis on increasing opportunities for all Malaysians and expanding the economy, see Second 
Malaysia Plan, p. 1. To lessen non -Malays concerns over the second task of the new plan, restructuring 
Malaysian society, Prime Minister Tun Razak added again that 'the rights, properties and privileges now 
belonging to whichever groups or individuals will not be taken and be given to others. What is envisaged 
by the Government is that the newly created opportunities will be distributed in a just and equitable 
manner.' See Malaysian Digest, 15 July 1971. 
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society', almost exclusively from a Malay perspective. Though the primary objectives 
of the NEP were supposed to be implemented in the context of an expanding economic 
pie providing increased opportunities for a better life for all Malaysians regardless of 
race, the overriding emphasis was on the second task, restructuring society, with 
Malays and other indigenous peoples as beneficiaries.62 In fact, there were no special 
remedial programs for the poor, regardless of race, although concern for poverty 
alleviation was an important component of the overall strategy for economic growth. 
On the contrary, the task of restructuring Malaysian society was furthered by 
formulating a new system of quotas and Malay special rights in the field of education, 
jobs (professions and management positions), and commercial and industrial 
enterprises. Furthermore, the program for restructuring Malaysian society gave Malays 
greater access to economic power while preventing similar access to political power to 
non -Malays. 
There were several significant measures in 'restructuring Malaysian society' 
under the NEP. First of all, the most uncompromising determination was reserved for 
the goal of achieving economic and social balance. Here, balance' means that 'those 
members of the Malaysian society who have benefited relatively little from past 
development must now be assured ample opportunities to gain a fairer share of the 
increased goods and services that development brings.'63 It also refers to '[equitable] 
racial shares in management and ownership and in employment in the various sectors of 
the economy.'64 For the purpose of rectifying disparities between the 'haves' and the 
'have -nots', in reality between Malays and non -Malays, the government set a long -term 
target that 'within two decades at least 30 per cent of total commercial and industrial 
activities in all categories and scales of operation should have participation by Malays 
and other indigenous people in terms of ownership and management.'63 
The objective of inter- ethnic balance was pursued through various programs and 
policies to increase the participation of Malays and other indigenous people in the more 
dynamic and modern sectors of the economy.ó6 To implement this objective, institutions 
62 See Means, 1991, pp. 23 -27. 
63 Second Malaysia Plan, p. 41. 
64 Second Malaysia Plan, p. 41. 
65 Second Malaysia Plan, p. 158. At the end of 1969, of the total RM4,678 million share capital, Malays 
and Malay interests owned only 1.5 per cent, while the Chinese owned 22.8 per cent and foreigners 
owned 62.5 per cent of capital respectively. See Second Malaysia Plan, p. 40, Table 3 -1. 
66 Included are programs that provide business premises, finance, technical and marketing advice, training 
and business contacts to aid such persons in starting their own commercial ventures. The programs also 
included bringing about increased Bumiputera management and ownership of modern urban industries. 
One crucial element was to establish 'ethnic employment quotas' in the private sector of the economy as 
well. Namely, Malay special rights were continued and extended by employment requirements that 
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such as MARA (Majlis Amanah Rá ayat - Council of Trust for Indigenous People), 
PERNAS (Perbadanan Nasional Berhad - The National Trading Corporation), FDA 
(Federal Industrial Development Authority), MIDF (Malaysian Industrial Development 
Finance), UDA (Urban Development Authority), and SEDC (State Economic 
Development Corporations) would provide the necessary technical and financial 
assistance for Malay commercial and industrial enterprises, either wholly -owned or in 
joint- ventures with non- Malays.67 
The second implementation measures, rectifying inter -ethnic social imbalance 
and enlarging the bases for long -term Malay participation in modern economic 
activities, was the expansion of educational opportunities for the Malays. In this regard, 
greater attention was given to ensuring that Malays as well as other indigenous people 
had better access to tertiary education in the sciences and other professional fields. For 
instance, more scholarships were made available to them to pursue tertiary education 
domestically and abroad; quotas and special remedial programs were initiated to induce 
them to enter the sciences, technical, and other disciplines; educational opportunities for 
rural Malays in science and professional fields were expanded; and tertiary education 
facilities increased dramatically.68 
Although these programs were to be carried out in various ways, a crucial 
feature of the education policy was the systematic implementation of the Malay 
language (Bahasa ?Vlelayu) as the main medium of instruction in the national education 
system. The new education policy was announced immediately after the 1969 racial 
riots. Beginning in 1970, in Standard One, all subjects formerly taught in English - 
medium schools (including mathematics and science but excepting English and the 
pupil's mother tongue) were to be taught in Malay language. The next year conversion 
to Malay would apply to Standard Two, and so on, a year at a time, up to Form Six, 
which would be effected by 1982.69 In so doing, the Malay language gradually replaced 
commercial and industrial enterprises should observe quotas for the participation of the Bumiputeras, and 
establish plans for training and promotion of the Bumiputeras to the more skilled and higher paid 
managerial positions. Such specific Bumiputera employment quotas and plans were explicitly tied to the 
approval and renewal of government license and the tax and tariff concessions available to the new 
industries. For more detail on the strategy for achieving economic balance, see Second Malaysia Plan, pp. 
43 -48. For a critical review of Malaysia's quota system, Boo Cheng Hau, Quotas versus Affirmative 
Action: A Malaysian Perspective (Kuala Lumpur: Oriengroup, 1998). 
67 For detail on public sector program and financing, see Second Malaysia Plan, pp. 66 -82; 112 -119; 155 - 
162; and 177 -180. 
68 Until the end of the 1960s, there was only one university, the University of Malaya (UM), in Malaysia. 
During 1969 -1971, however, four more institutions of university status were established: the National 
University of Malaysia (UKM), University of Science Malaysia (USM), University of Agriculture 
(UPM), and National Institute of Technology (ITM)_ 
69 See Straits Times, 11 July 1969. After five years of implementing the new education policy, the 
Malaysia Certificate of Education examinations were introduced as a screen for admission to Standard 
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English as the medium of instruction in primary, secondary and university education.70 
Chinese primary schools continued to use Mandarin and some private Chinese 
secondary schools survived. However, for non -Malays this was the most discriminatory 
policy adopted by the government.71 The rationale for the implementation of the new 
policies was to provide wider educational opportunities for Malays, especially those 
whose primary and secondary education was in Malay schools and who had difficulty in 
coping with tertiary education in English. At the same time it was believed that a 
common language would provide a stronger foundation for inter -communal harmony. 
Indirectly, of course, it also underlined the Malay nature of the state. In addition to the 
push for the Malay language, the task of creating a Malay- centric national and common 
culture for purposes of national unity was given greater priority during the NEP period 
(1970 -1990).72 
Finally, but most importantly, the NEP expanded the role of the state 
qualitatively as well as quantitatively. The Second Malaysia Plan stressed that, with the 
implementation of the NEP, 'the government will participate more directly in the 
establishment and operation of a wide range of productive enterprises. This will be done 
through wholly -owned enterprises and joint ventures with the private sector.'73 The main 
aims of direct government participation were to establish 'new industrial activities in 
selected new growth areas' and to help 'create a Malay commercial and industrial 
community'.74 
Six. Among non -Malays, 18,470 failed out of 27,784 who sat for the examination. Among those who 
failed, 14,166 failed solely on account of their results in the Malay language examination. See Means, 
1976, p. 452. 
7° With the introduction of a new education policy, a new university, UKM, was established in 1970 with 
Bahasa Melayu as the sole language of instruction. 
7' For the broad debate on the development of the national language policy in Malaysia, see Richard 
Mead, Malaysia's National Language Policy and the Legal System (New Haven, Yale University 
Southeast Asia Studies, 1988), pp. 22 -40. The reactions from Malays and non -Malays to the 
implementation of the new educational policies can be found in Vorys, I975, pp. 397 -398 and Milne and 
Mauzy, 1978, p. 88. 
72 Malaysia's national cultural policy was based on the 'three principles' adopted at a national conference 
organized by the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports in 1971. The 'three principles' that defined 
Malaysia's national culture policy during the 1970s and 1980s were: (1) The national culture must be 
based on the indigenous culture of this region; (2) Suitable elements from other cultures can be accepted 
as part of the national culture; and (3) Islam is an important component in molding the national culture. 
During the NEF' period, the UMNO -led government appeared to support cultural activities it deemed 
desirable in promoting Malay cultural hegemony and censored cultural activities that were considered 
'politically subversive' or 'anti- Islamic' by using repressive laws to stop them. For the debate on national 
cultural policy and political conflict, see Kua Kia Soong (ed.), National Culture and Democracy (Petaling 
Jaya: Kersani Penerbit -penerbit Sdn. Bhd., 1985). Numerous examples of censorship of cultural activities 
in the 1970s and 1980s are provided in Tan Sooi Beng, "Counterpoints in the Performing Arts of 
Malaysia" in Joel S. Kahn and Francis Loh Kok Wah (eels.), Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics in 
Contemporary Malaysia (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992), pp. 282 -306. 
73 Second Malaysia Plan, p. 7, italics added. 
74 Second Malaysia Plan, p. 7. 
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Before the launching of the NEP, as Jomo notes, the government had largely 
played 'administrative, supportive, and regulatory' roles for the private sector but it did 
not necessarily 'represent direct and active efforts in promoting the interests of the 
governing group.'75 With the NEP, however, the role of the government expanded and 
moved to more direct participation in commercial and industrial undertakings, serving 
the particular interests of the governing group itself. It was evident that UMNO, as the 
dominant party in the government, became a major beneficiary of the expanded role of 
the state. To be exact, with the NEP, the UMNO -led government functioned as a 
medium for the accumulation of capital. This is the most significant departure from past 
relations between political and economic power. With the growth of public enterprises, 
a partnership, or patron -client relationship, was formed between the UMNO -led 
government and businesses. Consequently, a combination of political and economic 
patronage enabled UMNO to convert its political power into significant economic 
power.76 
In sum, the major anti -crisis strategies adopted by the emergency government - 
the ideology, the ban, and the plan - seemed to have been introduced as complementary 
elements to redress socio- economic racial imbalance and to consolidate political power 
of the governing group. Firstly, the national ideology asserted that the essential 
agreements of inter -elite communal bargaining were not to be rescinded in spite of 
ongoing racial discord, while it gave Malays psychological confidence that their special 
rights were inviolable. Secondly, the Iegal ban on the discussion of sensitive issues, 
including Malay special rights, embodied the rhetoric of the ideology in a substantial 
behavior code in nearly every corner of the Malaysian peoples' daily Iife. Finally, the 
new development plan demonstrated how racial imbalance in terms of social and 
economic outlook would be at least partially rectified. More importantly, the new plan 
paved the way for the governing Malay group to convert its precarious political power 
into a more secure political hegemony with Iong -term economic foundations. 
7S Jomo, 1988, p. 266. 
76 An excellent analysis of the ruling political parties' direct involvement in business in Malaysia is 
provided by Edmund Terence Gomez, Political Business: Corporate Involvement of Malaysian Political 
Parties (Townsville: James Cook University of North Queensland, Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, 
1994). Also see Peter Searle, The Riddle of Malaysian Capitalism: Rent -Seekers or Real Capitalists? 
(Sydney; Allen & Unwin, 1999). 
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4 -4. Realignment of the Political Configuration and the Growth of Authoritarian 
Rule in Malaysia 
The Formation of a New Ruling Scheme and Its Consolidation 
Another post -riot political strategy was the Tun Razak -led UMNO's reconstitution of 
the Alliance system by incorporating almost all of the previous opposition parties within 
the ruling coalition. The new ruling formula was designed to provide multiple 
representation within the government rather than each ethnic group being represented 
by only one political party. The essential motive for realigning the political 
configuration was to build a stronger and wider base of popular support for the UMNO- 
dominated governing coalition. 
The first step towards the new ruling formula was taken in July 1970 when the 
Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP) was invited to join the ruling coalition in 
Sarawak. There were many motives for coalition building links with the opposition 
parties. In the case of the SUPP -Sarawak Alliance coalition, the significant motive was 
to get a two -thirds majority in parliament in order to pass the Constitution (Amendment) 
Bill 1971.7 In February 1972, Gerakan joined the ruling coalition. One of the crucial 
motives behind the Gerakan- Alliance coalition was to increase Chinese support to 
compensate for the weakness of the MCA. As Mauzy notes, this coalition 'further 
reduced "politicking" in the nation and enabled the Alliance's participation in the 
Penang state government.78 Further co- option of Chinese opposition occurred three 
months later in May 1972 when the Alliance brought the Perak -based PPP into state 
government. The last political party to join the ruling coalition was the Pan -Malaysia 
Islamic Party (PAS) in January 1973. By forming this coalition, the Alliance was 
represented in the PAS -controlled Kelantan state government. More importantly, the co- 
option of PAS into the new ruling formula 'neutralized the only significant party capable 
of outbidding UMNO for Malay support and thus stopped the drift of Malay votes away 
from the government.'79 Finally, as another election approached in mid -1974, UMNO's 
over -all coalition scheme was transformed as a new ruling coalition, the Barisan 
77 SUPP won five parliamentary seats in the 1969 general election. SUPP was the first party formed in 
Sarawak in 1959 and since its formation had enjoyed stable grassroots support. Although SUPP was 
formed with a mildly socialist and multi- ethnic platform, in the 1960s it increasingly acquired the image 
of a Chinese party. And, it was commonly believed that SUP? had uneasy relations with the federal 
government until the party joined the Sarawak Alliance coalition in 1970. For the background to SUPP's 
entry to the ruling coalition, see Mauzy, 1983, pp. 48 -55. 
78 For the background to the coalition with Gerakan, see Mauzy, 1983, pp. 55 -62. 
79 Harold Crouch, "From Alliance to Barisan Nasional" in Harold Crouch, Lee Kam Hing and Michael 
Ong (eds.), Malaysian Politics and the 1978 Elections (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 
7. For more details of the PAS -Alliance coalition, see Alias Mohamed, PAS's Platform: Development and 
Change 1951 -1986 (Petaling Jaya: Gateway Publishing House, 1994), pp. 107 -I29; Mauzy, 1983, pp. 66- 
9 
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Nasional or National Front (BN). 
This realignment of the political landscape further undermined open political 
competition in the post -riots situation by restricting parliamentary opposition only to the 
predominantly Chinese DAP and the Sarawak National Party (SNAP). The 
effectiveness and influence of the new ruling scheme was demonstrated in the 1974 
general election when the BN won an overwhelming majority both in parliament and in 
each state legislative assembly. In parliamentary elections, the BN obtained 60.7 per 
cent of popular votes and won 135 of the 154 seats (87.7 per cent of the total 
parliamentary seats). Compared to the 1969 elections, the result showed a 14.4 per cent 
increase in the popular vote and a 25.9 per cent increase in parliamentary seats. Also, in 
the state assembly elections, the BN received solid support in every state. Especially in 
Penang and Perak where the Alliance had obtained only 4 of the 24 seats and 19 of the 
40 seats respectively in 1969, the BN won 23 of the 27 seats and 31 of the 42 seats 
respectively. Moreover, Malay voters gave overwhelming support to both UMNO and 
PAS, winning all the seats they contested in 61 and 14 parliamentary constituencies 
respectively. Meanwhile, the opposition DAP and SNAP won 9 parliamentary seats 
each.80 The SNAP, however, was persuaded to join the BN in 1976 leaving the DAP 
and the sole Pekemas representative as the only parliamentary opposition.81 
The replacement of the Alliance by a considerably expanded coalition enabled 
UMNO to gain a decisive governing role in the post -1969 period. In particular, the 
admission of Gerakan and the PPP to the ruling coalition greatly undermined the MCA 
as the sole representative of the Chinese in government. In this context, a former senior 
official of the MCA argues that: 
Although MCA faced the dominant game played by UMNO, we still had a balance of power 
within the Alliance system. Theoretically, the Chinese had a bigger voice as the MCA played as 
the sole spokesman in the ruling coalition. By having Gerakan side by side, however, UMNO 
could use a kind of check -and -balance to divide and rule.... Although UMNO was not necessarily 
using this, the BN's Chinese parties were being prepared to be divided and ruled. We had put 
ourselves in this position. So, the UMNO leaders were very happy to make use of this condition 
whenever they wanted to do something.82 
In fact, as Mauzy notes, the principle of proportionality, in qualitative terms, became 
74; and Funston, 1980, pp. 244 -247. 
B0 Another minor opposition party Malaysian Social Justice Party (Pekemas) won only one parliamentary 
seat. For detail of the 1974 general elections, see Chandrasekaran Pillay, The 1974 General Elections in 
Malaysia, A Post Mortem (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1974). 
81 SNAP is an Iban -based party with some Chinese support. The party was formed in 1961 and was in the 
Sarawak Alliance between 1963 -1966. It moved to opposition in the aftermath of the 1966 intemal 
leadership crisis. For background to the SNAP's entry to the BN, see Mauzy, 1983, pp. 105 -107. 
82 Interview with Lee Kim Sai, Kajang, 25 February 1998. 
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less significant as the MCA lost key economic portfolios.ß3 Following the loss of the 
Commerce and Industry portfolio in 1971, the MCA lost the Finance ministership in 
1974. UMNO thus held all key portfolios in the cabinet. After the mid- 1970s, the 
political position of Chinese parties was further undermined within the Bariran Nasional 
when increasing dissention between the MCA and Gerakan, and intense factional 
struggles within the MCA itself, took place.84 
After the 1969 racial riots, UMNO also experienced internal conflict between 
the old generation led by Tunku Abdul Rahman and his allies and the younger 
generation led by Tun Razak. Tun Razak's sudden death in January 1976, Hussein Onn's 
weak political base as new party president and the controversy over the appointment of 
a new deputy president accelerated factional rivalries in UMNO during the mid- 1970s. 
UMNO factional conflict, however, eventually settled down in 1977 following after the 
imprisonment of then UMNO Youth president Harun Idris, one of the most outspoken 
critics of Hussein Onn and the new UMNO leadership.85 
Meanwhile, UMNO's domination of the ruling coalition became stronger 
towards the end of 1977 when PAS was expelled from the BN following the continued 
internal leadership crises and squabbling with UMNO in the Kelantan. state 
government.86 The departure of PAS from the BN allowed UMNO to regain its previous 
83 Diane K. Mauzy, "Malay political hegemony and 'coercive consociationalism "' in John McGarry and 
Brendan O'Leary (eds.), The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation (London and New York: Routledge, 
1993), p. 111. 
84 The admission of Gerakan to the ruling coalition and the MCA top leadership's irresolute attitude in 
dealing with UMNO created internal conflict between the 'old guards' and the new bloods' in the MCA 
leadership. This led to the expulsion of a group of new bloods' in 1973 and their subsequent joining 
Gerakan. At this time, the internal conflict resulted in further diminishing the MCA's bargaining power 
within the ruling coalition whereas Gerakan's bargaining position seemed to strengthen. For detail of 
Chinese politics just after the 1969 racial riots, see Francis Loh Kok Wah, The Politics of Chinese Unity 
in Malaysia (Singapore: Methuen Asia, 1982); Lee Kam Hing, Politics in Perak, 1969-1974: Some 
Preliminary Observations with Reference to the Non -Malay Political Parties (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan 
Sejarah Universit Malaya, 1977); and Means, 1991, pp. 57 -61. 
85 At the 1975 UMNO vice -presidential election, Harun Idris received 427 votes, coming after Tun 
Razak's prominent supporters, that is, Ghafar Baba (838), Razaleigh Hamzah (642) and Mahathir 
Mohamad (474). Harun's growing popularity and outspoken criticism of Tun Razak and Hussein Onn 
made him a substantial threat to the younger leadership in UMNO. In these circumstances, Harun was 
charged on sixteen counts of corruption just two months before Tun Razak's death. Soon after Hussein 
Onn assumed the office of Prime Minister, he was convicted of corruption and was sentenced to two 
years' imprisonment. His prison sentence was later increased to four years on appeal. Despite the 
imprisonment, Harun was re- elected as a supreme council member in the 1978 UMNO general assembly. 
However, no pardon was arranged for him and Harun served his prison sentence until mid -I981. For 
details of the UMNO leadership crisis in the mid- 1970s, see Harold Crouch, "The UMNO Crisis: 1975- 
1977" in Harold Crouch, Lee Kam Hing and Michael Ong (eds.), Malaysian Politics and the 1978 
Elections (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 11 -36. 
%6 One of the major issues ensuring PAS's internal crises and difficult relations with UMNO was the 
controversy over Razak's appointment of Mohamad Nasir as the Kelantan Menteri Besar in September 
1974, replacing then PAS president Asri's nephew Ishak Lotfi. This decision caused much discontent 
among Asri's faction and most top PAS officials. Asri asked Razak to replace Mohamad Nash following 
the Kelantan PAS Liaison Committee's 'no confidence' vote in the Menteri Besar in May 1975. Razak, 
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position as the sole representative of the Malay community in government. On the 
surface, PAS's return to the opposition meant that UMNO faced the challenge of a 
strong Malay communal party for the Malay vote. The leadership split in PAS and 
subsequent political instability in Kelantan, however, provided a golden opportunity for 
UMNO to manipulate the political situation and undermine PAS's influence. During the 
period of state emergency in particular, UMNO encouraged the Kelantan Menteri Besar 
Mohamad Nasir to form a PAS splinter party, Berjasa, and closely co- operated with the 
party in the Kelantan state elections of March 1978, held a month after the emergency 
laws were repealed. The state elections were mostly three -corner fights between 
UMNO, PAS and Berjasa. UMNO's strategy then was to split the PAS vote between 
PAS and Berjasa, and this was why Berjasa did not immediately join the BN.87 UMNO 
won 23 and Berjasa 11 seats, with PAS was reduced to only two seats with 33.5 per cent 
of the total votes (declining from its total of 52 per cent in winning 19 seats in 1969).88 
Berjasa later joined the BN. The ensuing leadership crises and subsequent electoral 
defeat made PAS's position extremely insecure after nineteen years of rule in Kelantan. 
The decade after 1978 saw the consolidation of the BN's rule. In particular, 
UMNO's hegemony over the ruling coalition further strengthened during this period. 
First, the results of the 1978 general election, held soon after UMNO's success in the 
Kelantan state elections, showed that the electoral effectiveness of the BN was not 
seriously undermined despite the departure of PAS. Even compared to 1974 when the 
government enjoyed extraordinarily favorable electoral conditions, the BN recorded a 
remarkable election victory, winning 131 of 154 parliamentary seats with only a minor 
decline of popular votes. At the state level, the election results gave the BN more than 
85 per cent of winning seats, giving it control of all state governments. Similar electoral 
performances by the BN continued in a series of general elections of 1982 and 1986, as 
shown in Table 4 -4. The unusually high number of seats won by the BN was largely a 
result of unfair electoral boundaries advantaging the ruling coalition. Nonetheless, it 
cannot be denied that the BN's expanded- membership formula seemed to retain multi- 
however, did not take any action and the leadership problem within PAS developed into a serious crisis a 
few years later. In September 1977, the Kelantan PAS Liaison Committee again passed a 'no- confidence 
vote against Mohamad Nasir and expelled him from the party. The no-confidence' resolution was passed 
in the Kelantan state assembly in October 1977. The decision subsequently led to mass demonstrations in 
Kota Baru in support of Mohamad Nasir which degenerated into minor rioting. On 8 November 1977, a 
state of emergency was declared in Kelantan and the state was placed directly under federal control. 
Finally, PAS was expelled from the BN on 16 December 1977, following the Emergency Powers 
(Kelantan) Act being passed by parliament. More details on the leadership crises in PAS in the early 
1970s can be found in Alias Mohamed, 1994, pp. 138 -146. Also see Crouch, 1996, pp. 104 -106. 
87 Crouch, 1996, p. 106. 
88 For details of the 1978 Kelantan state elections, see Alias Mohamed, 1994, pp. 168 -176. 
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ethnic electoral support during this period, whereas opposition supporters were 
polarized between PAS on the Malay side and the DAP on the non -Malay side. 
Table 4 -4. Votes and Seats Won by Barisan Nasional, 1974 -1986 
1974 1978 1982 1986 
(P) (S) (P) (S) (P) (S) (P) (S) 
Popular Votes ( %) 60.7 60.7 57.2 57.4 60.5 62.8 57.6 59.7 
Seats Won ( %) 87.7 86.911) 85.1 86.9 85.7 90.3 83.6 85.2 
Source: NSTP Research and Information Services, 1994. 
Note: (1) Included Sarawak in 1974. Sabah and Sarawak were excluded in 1978, 1982 and 1986. 
In particular, the election results of 1978 -1986 demonstrate that the BN's 
victories were spearheaded by UMNO. The MIC, as a minor component party of the BN 
representing the Indian community, also performed creditably. However, the Chinese 
parties, MCA and Gerakan, showed unstable electoral support from the Chinese 
community. Though the MCA and Gerakan recorded their best performance in the 
Chinese -majority constituencies in 1982, their combined 23 seats was less than the 
DAP's 24 in 1986. In terms of votes obtained in 1986, the DAP polled more votes 
(968,009 or 20.4 per cent of the total votes) than the MCA and Gerakan combined 
(738,933 or 15.6 per cent of the total votes).89 Even in 1982 when the DAP recorded its 
worst results in the 1978 -1986 period, it was assumed that the DAP's popular vote was 
greater than the MCA's.90 On the Malay side, the opposition PAS remained a strong 
competitor to UMNO. Especially in the heavily Malay- populated northern states of 
Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah, and Perlis, PAS proved that it could still win the support 
of almost 40 per cent of Malay votes.91 Nonetheless, PAS fared badly in terms of seats. 
As shown in Table 4 -5, only 5 PAS candidates won out of over 80 who contested 
parliamentary seats in 1978 and 1982. In spite of its substantial support in terms of 
votes, PAS recorded its most dismal performance in 1986, winning only one seat out of 
the 99 parliamentary constituencies it contested, compared to UMNO's overwhelming 
victories in all but one constituency contested. In short, UMNO's continuing support in 
the Malay community and the Chinese BN parties' unstable electoral performances in 
their respective constituencies enabled UMNO leadership to obtain an even more 
dominant position within and outside the ruling coalition in the 1970s and 1980s. 
n See Sankaran Ramanathan and Mohd. Hamdan Adnan, Malaysia's 1986 General Election: The Urban - 
Rural Dichotomy (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1988), p. 54, Table 4. 
9° Harold Crouch, Malaysia's 1982 General Election (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
1982), p. 52. 
9' See Crouch, 1982, p. 61, Table 7. 
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Table 4 -5. Seats Won and Contested by Má or Political Parties, 1978 -1986 (Parliament) 
1978 1982 1986 
UMNO 69 (74) 70 (73) 83 (84) 
MCA 17 (27) 24 (28) 17 (32) 
MIC 3 (4) 4 (4) 6 (6) 
Gerakan 4 (6) 5 (7) 5 (9) 
PAS 5 (89) 5 (82) 1 (99) 
DAP 16 (53) 9 (63) 24 (64) 
Source: Harold Crouch, Lee Kam Hing and Michael Ong (eds.), Malaysian Politics and the 1978 
Election (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 297; Harold Crouch, Malaysia's 
1982 General Election (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982), p. 58; and 
Sankaran Ramanathan and Mohd. Hamdan Adnan, Malaysia's 1986 General Election: The 
Urban -Rural Dichotomy (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1988), p. 51. 
UMNO's Growing Economic Hegemony and Incremental Authoritarian Control 
The consolidation of UMNO's dominance in the 1970s and 1980s was not limited to the 
political sphere. After 1971, one of the most significant features was a notable 
enhancement of UMNO's economic position. UMNO started to involve itself directly in 
major business ventures in the early 1970s. Its corporate investments were initially 
motivated by a need to reduce its financial dependence on non -Malay supporters, 
especially Chinese businessmen within the ruling coalition.92 However, it must also be 
noted that UMNO's direct involvement in business was closely associated with 
incremental authoritarian control over political processes, especially in the media sector, 
in the 1970s and 1980s. 
The first UMNO- linked business venture was Fleet Holdings, incorporated in 
1972 by then UMNO treasurer Razaleigh Hamzah, following a request from Tun 
Razak.93 Apart from the financial independence motive, one of the crucial reasons for 
establishing Fleet Holdings was to obtain control of the Singapore -controlled publishing 
company, The Straits Times Press. In so doing, Fleet Holdings took over the Straits 
Times Press shares for the Kuala Lumpur operations with a loan from Bank Bumiputera 
which was then headed by Razaleigh. The company was then renamed as The New 
Straits Times Press (NSTP) after completion of the acquisition. Later in 1976, Fleet 
Holdings formed a wholly -owned subsidiary, Fleet Group Sendirian Berhad, to act as 
UMNO's main investment holding company.94 During Razaleigh's stewardship as 
92 The MCA was the first political party involved directly in business, setting up the Koperatif Serbarguna 
(M) Bhd (KSM) in 1968. For a detailed study of MCA's business involvement and the growth of its 
various investment arms, see Gomez, 1994, pp. 175 -239. 
9s UMNO's involvement in business can be traced back as far as the late 1940s. And in the early 1960s, 
UMNO took control of the Utusan Melayu Press, which published a widely circulated Malay daily 
Utusan Melayu. However, the control of the Utusan Melayu Press was not exercised by the party itself 
but by some UMNO leaders. It was in the 1970s that UMNO as a party first involved itself directly in 
major business ventures. See Gomez, 1994, pp. 54 -55. 
94 For detail on the formation of Fleet Holdings and its activities, see Edmund Terence Gomez, Politics in 
Business: UMNO's Corporate Investments (Kuala Lumpur: FORUM, 1990), pp. 51 -58; Peter Searle, 
1999, pp. 104 -107. 
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UMNO treasurer (1977 -1982), UMNO's involvement in business operated primarily 
through Fleet Group's various subsidiaries, especially its main publicly -listed company, 
NSTP 95 
However, UMNO's corporate involvement grew markedly and there was a 
distinct change in management style when Mahathir assumed the UMNO presidency. 
As Gomez notes, the style of UMNO's corporate involvement became more and more 
that of a conglomerate. By the mid- 1980s, Fleet Group used its control of publicly -listed 
companies, NSTP, Bank of Commerce, American Malaysian Insurance, Sistem 
Televisyen (TV3), and Faber Group, to mount its corporate forays.96 It was also in 1984 
that another UMNO -owned investment arm, Hatibudi Sendirian Berhad, was formed to 
increase the ruling party's political patronage. Hatibudi, under the direct trusteeship of 
UMNO's top leadership, acquired a substantial stake in United Engineers Malaysia 
Berhad (UEM) in 1985.97 Shortly after Hatibudi gained control of UEM, the Mahathir 
administration awarded UEM a series of lucrative government contracts, including the 
North -South Highway Project. The North -South Highway Project was the largest 
privatization project implemented in the 1980s and enabled UMNO to secure recurrent 
financial resources for 30 years by managing and collecting billions of doIIars in tolls 
and other fees along the North -South Highway,98 Apart from the Fleet Group and 
Hatibudi, another corporate group, Koperasi Usaha Berasatu Berhad (KUB), was deeply 
involved in UMNO's direct investment in business during the 1980s.99 In early 1990, all 
UMNO's main business arms, Fleet Group, Hatibudi and KUB, were consolidated under 
one company, Renong Berhad. The restructuring of UMNO's corporate assets under 
Renong enabled the emergence of one of the Iargest conglomerates in Southeast Asia 
and was 'a testament to the economic clout commanded by UMNO in Malaysia's 
9' As well as NSTP, over 20 other major investments were made by the Fleet Group during Razaleigh's 
stewardship as treasurer of UMNO. These included: Bank of Commerce, American Malaysian Insurance, 
BCB Nominees, Fleet Communications and Distribution. It was, however, believed that the performance 
of these subsidiaries, except NSTP, was rather unsatisfactory. For the full list of companies controlled by 
Fleet Group by the end of the Razaleigh era, see Gomez, 1990, p. 57. 
96 See Gomez, 1990, pp. 61 -90. 
97 The direct trusteeship of Hatibudi by the UMNO top leader was confirmed in July 1987 by then Public 
Works Minister Samy Vellu. According to him, UMNO President Mahathir Mohamad, Deputy President 
Ghafar Baba, Secretary- General Sanusi Junid, and Treasurer Daim Zainuddin were trustees of Hatibudi 
by virtue of their positions in the party. See The Star, 10 July 1987, cited in Gomez, I990, p. 110. 
96 Apart from the North -South Highway contract, UEM was awarded several other government projects 
after the mid- 1980s. For more details of the privatization of the North -South Highway Project and other 
government projects won by UEM, see Lim Kit Siang, The $62 Billion North -South Highway Scandal 
(Petaling Jaya: Democratic Action Party, 1987); Gomez, 1990, pp. 127 -130. For details of Hatibudi's 
corporate structure as of mid -1989, see Gomez, 1990, p. 135. 
99 KUB was launched in 1977 by then UMNO president Hussein Onn. Unlike Fleet Group and Hatibudi, 
KUB has been openly acknowledged as one of UMNO's business ventures. For more details of the 
growth of KUB, see Gomez, 1990, pp. 140 -165. 
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corporate economy.''oo 
In sum, UMNO became involved directly in business with the implementation 
of the NEP. It is evident that the growth of UMNO's main investment arms, Fleet 
Group, Hatibudi and KUB, were primarily attributable to government patronage. And, it 
was under Mahathir's leadership that each of UMNO's main business ventures became 
large conglomerates. What is more important, the conglomerate style of management in 
UMNO's corporate involvement under Mahathir led to unique forms of monopoly, 
especially in the media sector, and this resulted in further consolidation of UMNO's 
authoritarian controls over political processes. 
In Malaysia, most mainstream vernacular newspapers are closely related to 
political parties in power. The existing control of the mainstream media by the ruling 
coalition, however, became even stronger under Mahathir's leadership. By the end of the 
1980s, UMNO and its coalition partners were able to control all the mainstream media, 
both in publishing and broadcasting, through ownership. The UMNO -owned NSTP 
publishes and markets newspapers, magazines, periodicals, and books. Its publications 
include: New Straits Times, New Sunday Times, Malay Mail, Sunday Mail, Berita 
Harlan, Berita Minggu, Business Times, Shin Min Daily News, Malaysian Business. 
UMNO, through the Fleet Group and later Renong, also has a substantial share (43 per 
cent) in the commercial television network Sistem Televisyen Malaysia (TV3).101 In 
addition, one of the most popular English daily newspapers, The Star, is published by 
Star Publications, which is controlled by Huaren Holdings, an MCA holding 
company.102 Also, the three Tamil dailies - Tamil Nesan, Thinamurasu, and Malaysia 
Nanban - are controlled by leaders of MIC, another senior member of the ruling 
coalition.103 Meanwhile, Radio Televisyen Malaysia (RTM) is government -owned and 
run by the Information Ministry headed by a senior UMNO minister. 
Apart from direct ownership of the media, the Mahathir administration increased 
control over the media by tightening its regulations affecting the freedom of the press. 
First, in- coming foreign news was restricted in a subtle move of censorship. In so doing, 
the government strengthened the role of Bernama (the government -controlled national 
news agency) by making it 'sole distributor' of foreign news as of 1 May 1984.104 
100 Peter Searle, 1999, p. 1I6. For the background to and processes of amalgamation of UMNO's 
corporate assets under Renong, see Gomez, 1994, pp. 116 -155. 
toi For details, see FEER, 17 May 1990 (Doug Tsuruoka The UMNO Shuffle ") and Gomez, 1994, pp. 
74 -76 and 80 -83. 
02 See Gomez, 1994, pp. 197 -198. A Chinese daily, Tang Bao, is also controlled by the MCA. 
103 See Aliran Monthly, 1992:12(4), pp. 10 -13 (K. Ramanathan, "The Tamil Press in Malaysia "). 
1°4 See The Star, 4 July 1983. 
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Second, the Mahathir government passed restrictive amendments to the Printing Presses 
and Publications Act (PPPA) 1984, replacing the Printing Presses Act 1948 (revised 
1971) and the Control of Imported Publications Act 1958 (revised 1972). The new 
PPPA empowered the Home Minister - until recently, a portfolio held by Mahathir - 
'absolute discretion' to grant, revoke or suspend publishing and printing permits, both 
foreign and local, in Malaysia. Penalties for offences relating to printing, importing and 
publishing of a newspaper or magazine were also increased to a maximum of three 
years imprisonment and/or RM20,000 fine from a maximum prison term of one year 
and/or RVI438 fine.105 The PPPA was further amended in 1987 to enhance the 
executive's discretionary powers by removing the right of judicial review over the 
Home Minister's decision to revoke or suspend a printing permit.' °6 
Further authoritarian methods were demonstrated by a series of amendments to 
the Official Secrets Act (OSA) in 1984 and 1986. The amended OSA 1984 requires that 
public officials must report immediately to the police anyone seeking official secret 
information. If an official fails to do so, and is convicted, he faces a possible five -year 
prison term. The new Act defines 'secret' as any information entrusted to an official in 
confidence by another official, or obtained by virtue of a position in the public service. 
Both the leakage and the receipt of an official secret is a criminal offence and the broad 
definition of 'secret' effectively covers aII government activities. In addition, under the 
new OSA, anyone associating with a 'foreign agent' is liable to prosecution, whether or 
not information is passed on.107 The OSA was amended again in 1986 to enhance its 
intimidating effect by adding provisions for mandatory prison terms of a minimum one 
year to a maximum of 14 years for anyone convicted. Moreover, the amendments confer 
upon the executive the power to classify any document, information or material as an 
'official secret' and the classification 'shall not be questioned in any court on any ground 
whatsoever.'1°8 
What is more important, the enhanced restriction of the press laws was, and still 
is, more than just cautionary. Since Mahathir came to power, opposition- oriented 
publications increasingly lost their printing permits and journalists were occasionally 
punished for their contributions. Foreign newspapers and journals were also 
occasionally banned. Nadi Insan, a monthly magazine often carrying critical articles 
los For more details of the amendments to the PPPA, see FEER, 5 April 1984 (James Clad, "Press Under 
Pressure "). 
106 FEER, 10 December 1987 (Suhaini Aznam, "Taming the tame "). 
107 FEER, 20 September 1984 (Tan Boon Kean, "Orwell's year in the Malaysian press "). 
108 See Official Secrets Act 1972 (ACT 88), Section 2 and 16A. For more details on the amendments to 
the OSA in 1986, see FEER, 18 December 1986 (Suhaini Aznam, "An act of approval "). 
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about poverty and injustices suffered by the peasants, was the first to be banned under 
the Mahathir regime. Nadi Insan neither posed a serious threat to the ruling parties nor 
had wide circulation. The suspension, however, effectively showed how limited was the 
Mahathir administration's commitment to a free press.109 For a few years after Nadi 
Insan's ban until 1986, at least three other periodicals lost their publishing permits and 
several journalists were charged and pleaded guilty. For example, Sabry Sharif of New 
Straits Times was arrested under the OSA for using an Air Force document in an article 
and paid a fine of RM7,000. Two Asian Wall Street Journal foreign reporters Iost their 
work permits (one of them was expelled from Malaysia after being fined) because of 
their articles on cronyism in banking and economic mismanagement in government. The 
distribution of AWSJ was also suspended for three months. A Far Eastern Economic 
Review foreign correspondent was also charged under the OSA for citing an allegedly 
confidential government document and was fined the maximum RM10,000. 
Furthermore, in 1987 alone, two popular daily newspapers - The Star and Sin Chew Jit 
Poh - and a weekly Watan had their licenses revoked for several months in the wake of 
UMNO's leadership crisis.110 
Consequently, the media partisanship in favor of the ruling coalition and 
incremental authoritarian controls hardly made the Malaysian media neutral, apolitical, 
and impartial in their news reporting. During the election period in particular, unlike the 
BN component parties, the opposition as a whole suffered from the lack of equal access 
to the mainstream media in its attempts to convey its political messages to voters at the 
local level as well as at the national Ievel. 
Moreover, political parties' opportunities for communication with the electorates 
were continuously undermined. Compared with more than 30 days until the 1969 
general election, the campaigning period had been shortened to 15 days in 1974. And it 
was under Mahathir's leadership that the campaigning period was reduced to less than 
10 days, as shown in Table 4 -6. Considering public rallies had been banned since the 
1978 general election, opposition parties regarded the shortening of the election 
campaign period as a serious restriction on their potential to communicate with 
109 See FEER, 17 November 1983 (Mohideen Abdul Kader, "The press in a climate of fear"). 
110 For a more detailed explanation of how the UMNO -led government appropriated media control in the 
1970s and 1980s, see John Lent, "Restructuring of Mass Media in Malaysia and Singapore ", Bulletin of 
Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol. 16, No. 4, 1984, pp. 26 -35; Chandra Muzaffar, Freedom in Fetters: An 
Analysis of the State of Democracy in Malaysia (Penang: Aliran, 1986), especially pp. 1 -5; Kua Kia 
Soong (ed.), Media Watch: The Use and Abuse of the Malaysian Press (Kuala Lumpur: The Resource and 
Research Center, Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall, 1990); and Kean Wong, "Malaysia: In the grip of the 
government" in Louise Williams and Roland Rich (eds.), Losing Control: Freedom of the Press in Asia 
(Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, The Australian National University, 2000), pp. 115 -137. 
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voters.11 t Especially at the local level, it appeared to be physically impossible for 
opposition parties to contact the 50,000 or so voters in a particular constituency without 
aIIowing public election rallies. Consequently, opposition parties could not properly 
take their issues to the voters and failed to respond to the ruling coalition's aggressive 
election campaign conducted mainly through the one -sided mainstream media. 
Table 4 -6. Comparison of Campaigning Period for General Elections (Peninsula Malaysia) 
Year Nomination Polling Campaigning Period(i) 
1955 June 15 July 27 40 Days 
1959(2) July 15 August 19 33 Days 
1964 March 21 April25 34 Days 
1969(3) April 5 May 10 35 Days 
1974 August 8 August 24 15 Days 
1978 June 21 July 8 16 Days _ 
1982 April 7 April22 14 Days 
1986 July 24 August 3 9 Days 
1990 October 11 October 21 9 Days 
Source: NSTP Research and Information Services, 1994, p. 146. 
Note: (1) The nomination day is not counted as part of official campaigning period. 
(2) Nomination for state elections in 1959 was held on separate dates. 
(3) Nomination in Kelantan was held on 12 April 1969. 
Some claim that the Mahathir administration appeared to practice a relatively 
liberal policy towards critics of government, especially in the early 1980s. Indeed, many 
political prisoners were released and the numbers detained under the ISA remained 
relatively small after Mahathir came to power.» It must, however, be noted that the 
growing authoritarianism of Mahathir's leadership was evident even in the earlier 
period. As well as a series of amendments to the press laws, Mahathir produced an even 
wider range of political controls to reduce the scope of political societies which may 
have emerged as a potential threat to the government. 
In particular, the amendment to the Societies Act in 1981 brought about one of 
the most intense concerns among political and non -political groups. The Societies Act 
(1966), which consolidated various colonial -era ordinances, required all societies, of 
whatever nature or objectives, to be registered with the Registrar of Societies.113 The 
new amendments, however, introduced a distinction between 'political' and other 
111 Public rallies were banned after 1978 because of the armed communist insurrection. Although the 41- 
year armed struggle of the Malayan Communist Party ended with a peace agreement in December 1989, 
public rallies, even during general election, are still banned. 
u2 The number of detainees under the ISA was sharply reduced in the 1980s. For example, the ISA 
detainees at the Bate Gajah Detention Center decreased as follows: 1980 (503); 1981 (295); 1982 (163); 
1983 (33); 1984 (94); 1985 (37); 1986 (23). See Rais Yatim, Freedom under Executive Power in 
Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Endowment Sdn. Bhd., 1995), p. 303, Table 1. The total number of ISA arrests 
per annum also notably decreased as follows: 1979 (800); 1980 (668); 1981 (470); 1982 (377); 1983 
(196); 1984 (168). See Munro -Kua, 1996, p. 146, Table 9 -1. 
13 Over 14,000 societies were registered in the early 1980s, ranging from political parties and interest 
groups to cultural and religious associations of seven or more persons. 
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societies. A political society was defined very broadly, covering organizations which 
seek to 'influence in any manner the policies or activities... or the functioning, 
management, or operation of the Government of Malaysia', including any state 
government and the administration of any local authority.114 Under the amended Act, 
any organization had to register as a 'political society' to make public comment on any 
matter related to the policies or activities of the government. The Registrar of Societies, 
a civil servant under the Home Ministry, was then empowered to interpret virtually any 
comment of societies as 'political' and deregister that society accordingly. The 
Registrar's decision could be appealed to the Home Ministry, but a court challenge was 
not allowed. The Act also stipulated that no society would be permitted to challenge any 
matter provided for under the federal and state constitutions, especially provisions on 
the monarchy, Islam, national language and the special rights of Malays. As 
Barraclough stresses, the amendments clearly 'targeted almost every single source of 
political challenge; and it has been especially focussed on any activities falling outside 
the readily identifiable party system.'ns 
The executive's dominance, especially the Prime Minister's, was also 
consolidated after Mahathir assumed office. First, the 1981 constitutional amendments 
empowered the Yang di- Pertuan Agong to issue a proclamation of Emergency even 
'before the actual occurrence of the event which threatens the security, or the economic 
life, or public order' in the country simply if he 'is satisfied that there is imminent danger 
of the occurrence of such event.'116 Given the fact that the Yang di -Pertuan Agong 'shall 
act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet or of a Minister acting under the 
general authority of the Cabinet', the amendments in practice gave the executive a kind 
of absolute discretion.I17 Moreover, the formidable scope of the emergency powers in 
Article 150(2) was further entrenched by another Article 150(8), which in substance 
ousts the jurisdiction of the courts in relation to the invocation of those powers.118 Also, 
114 See Societies (Amendment) Act 1981, Section 2. 
115 Simon Barraclough, "Political Participation and Its Regulation in Malaysia: Opposition to the Societies 
(Amendment) Act 1981 ", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 57, 1984, p. 454. New amendments were made in 1982 
and 1983 to accommodate the growing opposition to the Societies Act 1981. However, most of the 
repressive provisions of the 1981 amendments remained intact. Rather, Barraclough argues that the 
powers of the Registrar of Societies increased further under the new amendments. As a result, the 
Registrar's decision still could not be challenged in court and searches of societies' premises could be 
done without warrants. An overview of the series of amendments to the Societies Act can be found in 
Barraclough's article (1984). Also see, FEER, 26 November 1982 (K. Das, "Societies in shock "); FEER, 
31 March 1983 (Jeffrey Segal, "The third time around "). 
16 See Constitutional (Amendment) Act 1981, Article 150 clause 2. 
17 The requirement for the Yang di- Pertuan Agong to act on advice is contained in Constitutional 
(Amendment) Act 1981, Article 40 clause 1. 
in Article 150(8) stipulates that the satisfaction of the Yang di- Pertuan Agong in relation to proclamation 
of Emergency 'shall be final and conclusive and shall not be challenged or called in question in any court 
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Article 150 of the Constitution was amended again in I983 to substitute Prime Minister' 
for 'Yang di- Pertuan Agong' to make executive discretion more explicit and absolute. 
All the above mentioned provisions existed, except that it was the Prime Minister's 
satisfaction - not the Yang di -Pertuan Agong's - whether an emergency exists or is 
likely to exist.' 19 After much controversy, the change effected to Article 150 by the 
1983 amendments was retracted in 1984, substituting 'Yang di- Pertuan Agong' for 
'Prime Minister'. However, the Cabinet's overarching power remained intact, and the 
possibility of a Prime Minister bypassing Cabinet on fundamental matters still existed 
under the 1984 amendments. And it must be noted that toward the end of the 1980s 
Mahathir further expanded and centralized executive power in his personal domain at 
the expense of the legislature, the monarchy, and the judiciary, as will be discussed in 
the following chapters. 
4 -5. The Deepening of UNINO`s Factional Conflicts: Towards a New Conflict 
Configuration 
Factionalism had been common in UMNO for decades. UMNO's factional conflicts, 
however, never developed to the point where the essential unity of the party itself was at 
stake. It was only after Mahathir assumed power that UMNO's internal politics 
underwent serious factional conflicts which occasionally spilled into the open, as 
evidenced in 1981, 1984 and 1987. What were the conditions that led to the deepening 
of factional conflict within UMNO? How will the increasing factional rivalries affect 
Malaysian politics, especially the dominant ruling elite's attempts to maintain its 
political hegemony? 
Mahathir came third behind Ghafar Baba and Razaleigh Hamzah in the 1975 
vice -presidential UMNO election, and he was an 'outside' candidate when he was picked 
by Hussein Onn as Deputy Prime Minister in 1976. At that time, Mahathir's support was 
relatively weak within UMNO because he was cast as a political renegade for years by 
Tunku Abdul Rahman after the 1969 general election.120 Hence, it was widely believed 
on any ground'. According to the original 1957 Constitution, it was Parliament that should be satisfied 
that an emergency exists. If Parliament is not in sitting, the executive could issue an emergency 
ordinance. An emergency ordinance issued by the executive would cease to have force 15 days after the 
date both Houses of Parliament were sitting. 
119 For more background, context, and implications of the 1983 constitutional amendments, see Azmi 
Khalid, "Emergency Powers & Constitutional Changes ", Aliran Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1983, pp. 5 -8. 
Also see H. P. Lee, Constitutional Conflicts in Contemporary Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), pp. 22 -42. 
120 Hussein Onn pointed out that he chose Mahathir as his deputy not because Mahathir had enjoyed 
popular grassroots support but simply because he 'had to pick a man with a solid education (eliminating 
Ghafar, who had no tertiary education) and a mature man (eliminating Razaleigh, who was still under 
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that Mahathir was not strong enough to dominate the ruling party when he took over 
power in 1981; he was not even in a position to select his own deputy. Mahathir thus 
needed to rely on moderate, but subtle, tactics of checks and balances to effectively 
manage strong and popular political figures who were competing for influence in the 
ruling party. 
On taking over the prime ministership, Mahathir faced a critical choice in 
selecting his deputy. Mahathir may have given the impression initially that he was ready 
to accept Razaleigh, the most senior vice -president at that time, as his deputy when he 
succeeded Hussein Onn as the party president. Razaleigh himself said that we had an 
agreement among us about the number two position and stressed that this was why his 
total support was given to the Mahathir presidency in 1981.121 Neither his seniority nor 
this agreement, however, proved sufficient for Razaleigh to secure the number two 
position. On the contrary, Mahathir needed to offset Razaleigh's strong base and thus 
check his influence within UMNO circles. Mahathir, therefore, deliberately allowed the 
choice to be made by open competition rather than appointment. But Mahathir tacitly 
supported Musa by encouraging him to compete for the deputy presidency, which he 
won in 1981.122 Holding open electoral contest for top party positions was unheard of in 
UMNO's 35 -year history.123 
In the meantime, during his first term of office, Mahathir steadily, but 
systematically, consolidated his political grip within UMNO. To begin, Mahathir started 
to change the balance of power between 'old guards' and 'young turks' within UMNO by 
recruiting a new generation of Malay leaders who were either selected or co -opted by 
himself. In so doing, Mahathir utilized candidate nomination for the 1982 general 
election to absorb a new generation of Malay politicians and thus provided himself with 
40)'. See FEER, 8 May 1981 (K. Das, "After Hussein, what ? "). Similarly, Razaleigh argued that 
Mahathir's appointment as Deputy Prime Minister had not reflected his strong position within UMNO 
circles. According to Razaleigh, he personally recommended Mahathir as Hussein Onn 's deputy when he 
was consulted by Hussein Onn because Mahathir was older than him, although he was the most senior 
vice president at that time. Interview with Razaleigh Hamzah, Kuala Lumpur, 17 February 1998. 
121 Interview with Razaleigh Hamzah, Kuala Lumpur, 23 February 1998. 
122 It has been argued that Musa would not have challenged Razaleigh without Mahathir's tacit support in 
the 1981 party election. According to Razaleigh, he was not prepared for the election and was even 
surprised by the choice to be made by the delegates. See Ranjit Gill, The UMNO Crisis (Singapore: 
Sterling Corporate Services, 1988), p. 20. For the details of the 1981 party election, see FEER, 3 July 
1981 (K. Das, "The old guard changes "). 
'23 In fact, UMNO's incumbent president was once challenged during the UMNO general election in 
1978. Hussein Onn, the then acting UMNO president, was challenged by Sulaiman Palestin, a candidate 
put up by the Harun Idris faction, in order to register their disapproval over the way Hussein Onn treated 
Harun Idris. By then, Harun Idris, one of the most outspoken critics of Hussein Onn, had been expelled 
from UMNO after corruption charges. But Sulaiman was easily defeated. For more detail, see Means, 
1991, pp. 56 -57. 
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a new form of leverage to check the balance of power within UMNO.124 Mahathir went 
further by publicly endorsing Musa as his running mate at the second contest for the 
deputy leadership in 1984 that gave an enhanced victory to Musa. Mahathir's grip on 
power within UMNO seemed to be stronger in the subsequent cabinet reshuffle of 
1984.125 Nevertheless, it had been critically argued that Mahathir's dominance in the 
ruling party was still fragile at this time.126 
Meanwhile, Musa's consecutive victories for the deputy presidency largely 
increased his influence and popularity within the party. Musa's rise was seen as firmly 
establishing him as Mahathir's likely successor, although there was no sign of 
Mahathir's early retirement as he had only just begun his second term in office. Musa's 
supporters seemed to enjoy the term '2Ms leadership (Mahathir- Musa)' rather than 
'second -ranking leader' as Musa's influence grew within and outside UMNO circles. 
Perhaps more unpleasantly to Mahathir, Musa expressed strong concern about the 
retention of his arch -rival Razaleigh in the cabinet, as he wanted to prevent another 
Razaleigh challenge and thereby strengthen his own position as Malaysia's prime- 
minister-in-waiting. Again, it was alleged that there was an 'unwritten agreement' 
between the 2Ms leadership that Razaleigh would be purged from the cabinet and 
denied any nominated post in UMNO if he contested again in 1984 and lost.127 
Mahathir's dilemma, then, was how to offset Musa's influence. This time 
Mahathir used the Razaleigh card. It was in this light that Mahathir kept Razaleigh as 
Trade and Industry Minister, a lesser but still influential post, despite the alleged 
unwritten agreement and Musa's efforts to remove Razaleigh from the political 
mainstream. Musa and his supporters argue that Mahathir kept only half of his promise 
by depriving Razaleigh of the party's treasurer post but keeping him as a cabinet 
minister, although Razaleigh initially offered his resignation from the cabinet.128 
124 For instance, almost half of the existing Members of Parliament (45 per cent) and state assemblymen 
(46 per cent) were dropped from re- nomination for the 1982 general election. One of most influential 
young figures was Anwar Ibrahim, then president of Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement (ABIM). 
Within a year of joining the party, Anwar was elected as UMNO's Youth chief (one of the five vice - 
presidents of the party) and appointed as a full minister. See FEER, 24 July 1981 (K. Das, "Mahathir 
picks his men ") and Crouch, 1982. 
25 See FEER, 7 June 1984 (K. Das, "All the president's men "); and FEER, 26 July 1984 (K. Das, "New 
faces of 1984 "). 
126 Means argues that Mahathir commanded only a slim majority of support within UMNO at the 
beginning of his second term in 1984, based on the ratio of 'loyal' and 'disloyal' lists over the conflict 
between Mahathir and the Malay Rulers in 1983. See Means, 1991, pp. 113 -120. The conflict between 
Mahathir and the Rulers was related to the 1983 constitutional amendments aimed at removing certain 
powers of the Rulers, especially the royal assent to a Bill. And this created much controversy among the 
UMNO leaders and members. See H. P. Lee, 1995,22-42. 
127 Interview with Musa Hitam, Kuala Lumpur, 13 February 1998. 
128 It was alleged that Mahathir persuaded Razaleigh, in a ninety- minute discussion, to remain in the 
cabinet. See Ranjit Gill, 1988, p. 21. Apart from checking Musa's influence, it is believed that Razaleigh's 
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Whatever the motive, Musa believes that Mahathir strategically kept the Razaleigh card 
alive at this time in order to leave the door open for a third competition in 1987 and thus 
check his growing influence within the party.129 After this, rumors of a rift between 
Mahathir and Musa were reported for years. In the meantime, at the outset of his second 
term, Mahathir depended more and more on the hand -picked third -echelon party 
leaders, such as Daim Zainuddin, Anwar Ibrahim and Sanusi Junid, as leverage to offset 
Musa's influence within UMNO,13° 
Given these circumstances, it was Musa's sudden resignation from his 
ministerial posts that gave rise to the long -simmering distrust between Mahathir and 
Musa bursting into the open and forcing party leaders and members to take sides.131 
Towards the end of 1986, wild rumors were spreading that Razaleigh and Musa would 
join together in the 1987 party election with a common aim of ousting Mahathir.132 
Indeed, by the mid- 1980s, Razaleigh and Musa's resentment over Mahathir's leadership 
style had already reached boiling point and both shared an animosity towards Mahathir. 
It was, therefore, not a total surprise that the Razaleigh -Musa combination saw its 
formal beginnings in early December 1986, when Musa's aide and representative of 
Razaleigh joined to discuss a possible alliance between the two camps. At this meeting, 
it was alleged, an electoral pact was tacitly made between the two camps: Razaleigh 
contesting for the party presidency against Mahathir; and Musa defending his deputy 
presidency against Ghafar.133 Although Razaleigh and Musa refused to acknowledge 
such an electoral pact had been sealed, such a combination was symbolically confirmed 
widespread popular support especially in Kelantan, opposition PAS's stronghold, was one of Mahathir's 
major reasons for retaining RazaIeigh as a cabinet minister. See FEER, 5 July 1984 (K. Das, "The 
Mahathir dilemma "). 
129 Interview with Musa Hitam, Kuala Lumpur, 13 February 1998. 
130 See FEER, 26 July 1984 (K. Das, "New faces of 1984 "). 
131 Musa submitted his resignation as Mahathir's deputy in party and government on 27 February 1986. In 
his seven -page letter to Mahathir, Musa revealed his reservations over the lack of trust in Mahathir, Later, 
Musa decided to remain as party deputy president, resigning only his two cabinet portfolios - Deputy 
Prime Minister and Home Minister. On the culminating leadership conflict between Mahathir and Musa, 
see Asiaweek, 16 March 1986 ( "Rift at the Top "). 
132 In the midst of wild rumors alleging a possible teaming up of Razaleigh and Musa, Mahathir 
introduced a new code of ethics for party elections in December 1986. It was widely viewed that the code 
of ethics was framed for Mahathir's advantage in order to prevent Razaleigh and Musa from teaming up 
against him. Under the code of ethics, the following are prohibited in campaigning: (1) the use of 
influence in party or government to obtain votes; (2) the use of money or organizing functions in 
campaigning; (3) the distributing of pamphlets; and (4) the making of pacts. The supreme council also 
appointed an independent committee to supervise the observance of this code of ethics in the run -up to the 
party elections. For detailed analysis of the code of ethics, see The Star, 9 December 1986 ( "Code of 
ethics to fight vote- buying "); 20 December 1986 ( "How effective will the code be ? "); 28 December 1986 
( "Pacts will continue despite UMNO code "); 19 February 1987 ( "Those who can hold closed door 
meetings "). Along with the adaptation of the code of ethics, Mahathir effectively cut the time for 
campaigning by bringing forward the date of the triennial party election itself to 24 April 1987, to a few 
months earlier than usual. 
133 See Means, 1991, pp. 200 -201. 
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by their mutual invitations to each other's divisional meeting in Segamat, Johor, on 27 
February 1987 and in Gua Musang, Kelantan, on 20 March 1987 respectively, about a 
month before the 1987 party election, scheduled on 24 April.134 
As the contest intensified, factional alignment became more evident in almost all 
levels of UMNO along Mahathir -Ghafar and Razaleigh -Musa lines. Although forming 
electoral pacts had been outlawed by the newly introduced code of ethics, the two 
factions were publicly identified as 'Team A' and 'Team B' respectively by the media. 
The battle lines were finally drawn when Razaleigh officially announced his candidacy 
for the party presidency at a gathering on 11 April 1987, with the group of Team B 
supporters. The Team B supporters included almost half of the 13 UMNO cabinet 
ministers, a number of former cabinet ministers and chief ministers.135 Team A also 
made an extraordinary effort to increase its support. The core supporters of Team A 
mostly came from the incumbent party Ieaders, such as divisional leaders, chief 
ministers, elected MP and state assemblymen, who were hand -picked by Mahathir.136 
As the campaign reached its final stages, it appeared that no aspirants for party posts 
were allowed to remain neutral; they had to openly declare their allegiance in order to 
secure the vote from either one or the other team. As a result, as shown in Table 4 -7, the 
six candidates for three vice -presidents and the 69 contenders for 25 supreme council 
seats fell evenly into one team or the other at the time of the party election.137 
134 See FEER, 12 March I987 (Suhaini Aznam, "In everything but name "). 
135 It included: UMNO deputy president, Musa Hitam; UMNO vice -president and Defense Minister, 
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi; Foreign Minister, Rais Yatim; Welfare Services Minister, Shahrir Samad; 
Minister in the Prime Minister's Department, Ajib Ahmad; Deputy Primary Industries Minister, Radzi 
Sheikh Ahmad; Deputy Energy, Telecommunication and Posts Minister, Zainal Abidin Zin; Deputy 
Foreign Minister, Kadir Sheikh Fadzir; Deputy Transport Minister, Rahmah Osman; former Land and 
Regional Development Minister, Adib Adam; former Deputy Labor Minister, Zakaria Rahman; former 
Deputy Minister in the Prime Minister's Department, Sharifah Dora; former Selangor Menteri Besar, 
Harun Idris; and former Pahang Menteri Besar, Rahim Bakar. See NST, 12 April 1987 ( "For Two 
Reasons "). Two former Prime Ministers, Tunku Abdul Rahman and Hussein Onn, were also closely 
associated with Team B. See The Star, 12 April 1987 ( "Hussein: Contestants are not traitors "). Culture, 
Youth and Sports Minister Najib Abdul Razak was drifting towards Team B, but returned to Team A at 
the last minute. See FEER, 23 April 1987 (Suhaini Aznam "Close to the end "). 
136 As the incumbent leader, Mahathir was able to secure a public pledge of support from all Malay chief 
ministers. He also had been nominated as party president by more than 70 per cent of the total party 
divisions. Larger support from the incumbent officials was expected since their appointments were the 
result of Mahathir's patronage. 
137 It was also alleged that about 85 -90 per cent of the total 1,479 party delegates were evenly grouped 
into the two teams while only 10 -15 per cent were considered fence -sitters before the voting day. Out of 
the 69 contenders for the supreme council seats, 34 publicly declared their support for Mahathir- Ghafar 
team while the rest 35 for Razaleigh -Musa team. 
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-7. The 1987 UMNO Elections: Contenders and Winners by Team A and Team B 
Team A Team B 
President Mahathir Mohamad* Razalei h Hamzah 
Deputy President Baba* 
. _.............................. .........................._Musa Hitam 
.............._........ 
Vice -president 
_........._.............._Ghafar 
Wan Mokhtar Ahmad* Abdullah Ahmad Badawi* 
Anwar Ibrahim* Rais Yatim 
Ramli Ngah Tal ib 
............................... ... 
Harun Idris 
Supreme Council Member(t) 
........ 
Yusof Noor* Rithauddeen* 
Muhyiddin Yassin* Mohammad Yacob* 
Khalil Yaakob* Kadir Sheikh Fadzir* 
Sabaruddin Chik* Rahman Othman* 
Muhammad Taib* Shahrir Samad* 
Tajol Rosh* Zainal Abidin Zin* 
Abu Hassan Omar* Radzi Sheikh Ahmad* 
Siti Zaharah* Marina Yusof* 
Mohamed Isa Samad* Abdul Rahim Bakar* 
Osman Aroff* Ajib Ahmad 
Hamid Pawanteh* Adib Adam 
Rahim Tamby Chik* Syed Hamid Jaafar 
Khalid Yunos* Suhaimi Kamaruddin 
Megat Junid* Kamaruddin Mat Isa 
Wan Abu Bakar* Ibrahim Ali 
Napsiah Omar Aziz Shamsuddin 
Kassim Ahmed Malik Ahmad 
Mohamed Rahmat Ibrahim Hassan 
Mustaffa Mohammad Daud Taha 
Syed Nahar Othman Saat 
Sharifah Dorah Zakaria Rahman 
Dusuki Ahmad Zainol Abidin Johari 
Abdullah Ahmad Tajuddin Rahman 
Awang Jabar Nik Hussein Rhaman 
Alias Ali Muhsein Kader 
Nawawi Mat Awin Ahmad Shahibuddin 
Abu Bakar Daud Yahya Shafie 
Zain Ibrahim Hisan Ibrahim 
Syed Hassan Al -Attas Sulaiman Palastine 
Nordin Selat Abu Bakar Rautin 
Razak Abu Samah Tawfit Ismail 
Kamarulzaman Bahadon Abu Bakar Shaari 
Ahmad Mustapha Shariff Omar 
Idris Rauf Hang Tuah Arshad 
Ahmad Manaf 
Source: Shamsul A. B., "The Bat le Royal: The UMNO Elections of 987 ", Southeast Asian Affairs 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1988), pp. 182 -183. 
Note: *Elected. 
(1) The number was originally 73, but 4 withdrew from the contest. 
The results of the battle turned out in Mahathir- Ghafar's favor. Both Mahathir 
and Ghafar won, but by very slim margins of 43 and 40 votes - only 51.45 and 49.96 per 
cent of the total 1,479 votes cast - respectively. Beyond the top two posts, the rest 
weighted 2 -1 in Team A's favor. Two of the three vice- presidencies and sixteen of the 
25 supreme council seats went to Team A, while Team B retained one vice -president 
and 9 supreme council seats (see Table 4- 7).138 
138 For the full election results, see NST, 24 April 1987; 25 April 1987; and FEER, 7 May 1987 ( "The 
vital forty -three "). 
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Given the number of divisional nominations before the election, the Mahathir 
team's victory was widely expected, but the result was much closer than anticipated. 
Wild rumors even speculated that Razaleigh was the 'official winner' after the first ballot 
count, but Mahathir was declared the 'official winner' after a recount.139 Accusations 
were also made that the election itself was null and void, for there were illegal branches 
which participated in the assembly without adhering to the party's constitution and 
affected the election outcome. A Iegal challenge to the validity of the elections finally 
led to UMNO being banned in 1988 and the party split into two with the Mahathir -led 
UMNO (Baru) and Razaleigh -led Semangat 46.140 
4 -6. Summary 
UMNO's political dominance within and outside the ruling coalition became more and 
more definite in the 1970s and 1980s. A group of younger communally -oriented UMNO 
leaders under the patronage of Tun Razak adopted a new regime -maintenance strategy 
based on hegemonic control rather than consociationalism in the aftermath of the May 
1969 riots. Also, UMNO's economic position was enormously enhanced by dispensing 
patronage in the form of government contracts, privatization awards and other business 
benefits through government and semi -government institutions. Consequently, critical 
features of consociationalism became increasingly irrelevant, though not entirely absent, 
in post -1969 Malaysian politics. Instead, elements of authoritarianism became more 
common, as in the single- party -dominant political configuration, the highly 
disproportional electoral system, and a dominant executive increasing control over the 
rest of government. 
However, post -1969 Malaysian politics has also seen an increase in intra- ethnic 
conflict especially within the ruling coalition's component parties. The character of 
factionalism also changed. In particular, factional conflict within UNLNO circles 
frequently spilt into the open in the 1980s and even developed to the point where the 
essential unity of the party itself was at stake. Some claim that the deepening of the 
leadership conflict during this period should not be viewed as simply a reaction to the 
challenge of political rivals. They stress that the growing factional conflict and 
subsequent UMNO leadership split should be understood in terms of social, economic, 
cultural and even ideological differences between the Mahathir -led Team A and 
'39 See Ranjit Gill, 1988, p. 37 and Means, 1991, p. 204. A close associate of Razaleigh's claimed that 
Razaleigh was informed the 'unofficial result' a few years later by a senior official of Team A who had 
been in charge of the 1987 UMNO election processes. Confidential interview in February 1998. 
140 For details of the controversy after the 24 April election, see Ranjit Gill, 1988, pp. 41 -44. The steps 
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Razaleigh -led Team B.141 Indeed, the more substantive issues of economic policy and 
different socio- cultural visions among UMNO leaders had seemed to drive UMNO's 
factional rivalries especially when the country experienced a prolonged economic 
recession in the mid- 1980s. It must, however, be noted that UMNO's severe factional 
conflict was exacerbated mainly due to Mahathir's relatively vulnerable political 
position within UMNO and his consequent political maneuverings for power. Given 
Mahathir's weak base in UMNO, the question of succession to Mahathir rose to such 
prominence as Mahathir manipulated strong and popular political figures in the ruling 
party in highly irregular ways. 
During the years after independence when inter -ethnic conflict was perceived as 
the main threat to regime stability, inter- ethnic cooperation was the most crucial 
element in the maintenance of the dominant Malay ruling elites' power. In the first 
decade of independence (1957- 1969), therefore, UMNO leaders used consociational 
power -sharing to maintain regime stability. The 1969 general election and subsequent 
May 13 racial riots, however, demonstrated that the inter -ethnic consociational 
bargaining was less relevant for the Malay ruling elite to maintain political power. This 
was one of the main reasons the Malay ruling elite adopted a more hegemonic strategy 
leading to the unambiguous UMNO -led Malay dominance during the 1970s and 1980s. 
The nature of conflict undermining the power and position of the dominant ruling elites, 
however, changed again as factional conflicts within UMNO deepened in the mid - 
1980s. Especially toward the end of the 1980s, UMNO factional rivalries took an 
increasingly life -or -death quality and, thus, appeared to be a more crucial threat to the 
Mahathir -led ruling elite's power. Rivalries intensified after the 1987 UMNO leadership 
crisis, necessitating Mahathir's regime to engage in a greater degree of conflict 
resolution to maintain power. The maintenance and consolidation of Mahathir's power 
is the subject of the next chapter. 
towards the ban of UMNO will be discussed in the following chapter. 
141 See Khoo Kay Jin, "The Grand Vision: Mahathir and Modernisation" in Joel S. Kahn and Francis Loh 
Kok Wah (eds.), Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia (Sydney: Allen & 
Unwin, 1992), pp. 44 -76; Aliran Monthly, 1987:7(5), pp. 12 -15 (Chandra Muzaffar, "After the UMNO 
Election: The Real Challenge Begins "); and Mohamad Abdad Mohamad Zain, "Mahathir's Corporatism 
vs Razaleigh's Liberalism: Capitalist Expansionism, Class Fractionalization and Intra- Bourgeoisie Party 
Factionalism ", Kajian Malaysia, 1988, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 22 -41. 
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CHAPTER 5 
The Nexus of UMNO Factionalism and Transition from Authoritarian Rule: 
Regime Change or Regime Consolidation? 
[Tlhe first critical threshold in the transition to democracy is precisely the move by some group 
within the ruling bloc to obtain support from forces external to it.' 
I am sad and disappointed that UMNO which my colleagues and I had built and supported until it 
became a huge and powerful party, a party which for 42 years the Malays depended upon to 
protect their well -being has suddenly been demolished and destroyed.... It is those with power that 
have destroyed UMNO. It is because they have become intoxicated with their power that they 
forgot to save UMNO.2 
5 -1. Introduction 
Until recently, many scholars have given primary attention in their analysis of conflict 
management in multi -racial societies to the role of national elites and subelites. And it 
has been generally assumed that the national elites and subelites in a severely divided 
society tend towards a consociational framework in preserving regime stability as well 
as democratic procedures.3 In a recent study of Malaysia, Case argued that the behavior 
of the ruling elites and the extent of consensual unity between them was crucial in 
managing socio- political and ethnic conflicts.4 
But, what if the ruling elites are not unified? What if they are divided, being 
from different ethnic communities and from different factions within ruling bloc? In 
other words, how do rivalries within the dominant ruling elites affect their behavior and 
the extent of consensual unity in a multi -racial society? In Malaysia, would the 
unambiguous Malay dominance after the 1969 racial riots be renegotiated towards the 
recovery of consociational frameworks or would the Malay dominance be strengthened 
Adam Przeworski, Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy ", in Guillermo 
O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (eds.), Transition from Authoritarian Rule: 
Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 56. 
2 Tunku Abdul Rahmani s speech on the situation in UMNO after the party was declared an unlawful 
society. Quoted in Aliran Monthly, 1987:7(12), pp. 1 -2. 
3 See Arend Lìjphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Eric 
Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies (Cambridge: Harvard University, Center for 
International Affairs, 1972); Karl von Vorys, Democracy without Consensus: Communalism and Political 
Stability in Malaysia (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975); and chapters by H. Daalder, G. 
Lehmbruch, J. Steniner, Val R. Lorwin, S. J. R. Noel, W. Ormsby in a volume edited by Kenneth McRae, 
Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies (Toronto: McClelland & 
Stewart Limited, 1974). 
William Case, Elites and Regimes in Malaysia: Revisiting a Consociational Democracy (Clayton: 
Monash Asia Institute, 1996). 
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and consolidated, if the national leadership were severely fragmented? Or would it 
eventually be replaced by an another, possibly more severe, form of authoritarian rule? 
For our purpose, the few years after the 1987 UMNO general assembly, which 
led to a bitter split in the ruling bloc, provide an invaluable and unprecedented trial 
period to understand not only the relations between elite disunity and ethnic politics but 
also the very nature of the Malay ruling elites' political adaptability and responsiveness 
to the changing structure of conflict in an ethnically divided society.5 While the 1969 
inter -racial riots marked a new epoch in renegotiating the post -independent 
consociational contract in multi- ethnic Malaysian society, the 1987 intra -Malay 
leadership crisis was another turning point. The dominant Malay political party, 
UMNO, had never experienced such a divisive and bitter fight over the question of 
leadership. And the country was able to witness political events which had never been 
seen, heard nor even read of before. 
The period 1987 -90 was very controversial. On the one hand, this period is 
perceived as a more responsive and competitive one than any other in the history of 
Malaysian politics.6 There might even have been a transition from 'semi` to 'full' 
democracy due to the factional rivalries and the growing electoral competitiveness 
within ruling -elite circles during this period. Indeed, as Przeworski observes in his 
chapter in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, regime 
change in authoritarian or semi -authoritarian states has often been attributed to conflicts 
and/or disintegration within the ruling group, especially in countries with a strong 
tradition of single dominance power.8 In Malaysia, therefore, a more responsive 
political system would be expected from the severe factional split in the country's 
dominant political party, UMNO. It was in this light that Gomez and Jomo speculated 
that the breakdown of an authoritarian regime, if it is to emerge, may come from severe 
5 Not many scholars have focused on the relationship between leadership splits and ethnic relations in a 
multi -racial society. For detail on the various types of ethnic conflicts and conflict management, see 
Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkley: University of California Press, I985); David 
Brown, The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 1994); Rodolfo 
Stavenhagen, Ethnic Conflicts and the Nation -State (London: Macmillan Press, 1996); H. D. Forbes, 
Ethnic Conflict: Commerce, Culture and the Contact Hypothesis (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1997); and Michael E. Brown and Sumit Ganguly, Government Policies and Ethnic 
Relations in Asia and the Pacific (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1997). 
6 See Harold Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
1996), especially pp. 114 -129. 
7 William Case, "Semi- democracy in Malaysia: Pressures and Prospects for Change ", Regime Change and 
Regime Maintenance in Asia and the Pacific, Discussion Paper Series Number 8 (Canberra: The 
Australian National University, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, 1992). 
$ Przeworski reviews several other factors which lead to the breakdown of authoritarian regimes and, 
thus, the possibility of political liberalization. They include functional needs for regime changes, loss of 
legitimacy, conflicts within the ruling elite and foreign pressures. See Przeworski, pp. 47 -63. 
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factionalism within UMNO circles.g 
However, there is another side to this argument. While conflicts within the 
ruling bloc seem to have contributed to more competitiveness and more favorable 
consociational conditions in the political sphere than ever before, such a desperate 
situation also encouraged the ruling elites to adopt more repressive and intransigent 
strategies to defend their political positions. Musa Hitam, former Deputy Prime 
Minister, stressed in a recent interview that the national leaders tend to look for a 
scapegoat when faced with a desperate crisis situation'. In a multi -ethnic society like 
Malaysia, they are inclined to racial tactics to justify repressive controls and to fill their 
own 'empty stomach'.10 Similarly, a senior government official argued that the period of 
1987 -90 can be viewed as a 'systematic process to consolidate Mahathir's personal 
dominance within UMNO circles as well as nationwide'." If there were any 
accommodative gestures by Mahathir in managing political and ethnic conflicts at this 
time, they could be attributed to tactical calculations to avoid greater risks to his control, 
rather than his growing commitment toward political democracy. As Lustick has 
stressed, a consociational or responsive approach can be deployed effectively only if an 
alternative form of control or domination is available to the ruling elite.12 
This chapter explores Mahathir's strategies towards regime maintenance during 
the controversial period 1987 -90. The main focus will be on an analysis of how 
Mahathir successfully restored political power and national leadership from the 
challenges of a bitter leadership struggle within UMNO circles and an unusually strong 
opposition led by dissident UMNO factions. 
5 -2. Motives behind Mahathir's Dominance: Checks -and -Balances as a Half 
Success 
Immediately after the battle over the party leadership in 1987, Mahathir seemed to face 
two contradictory political options, both of which would pose difficulties. One was to 
eradicate all remnants of leadership rivalry within UMNO. This option would have 
secured his own hegemony in UMNO, but possibly created a permanent split within the 
Malay community as a whole. The other was to accommodate the losers according to 
9 Edmund Terence Gomez and Jomo K. S., "Authoritarianism, Elections and Political Change in 
Malaysia ", Public Policy, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1998, pp. 113 -144. 
10 Interview with Musa Hitam, former Deputy Prime Minister, Kuala Lumpur, 13 February 1998. 
11 Interview with Rais Yatim, former Foreign Minister and Deputy President of Semangat 46, Kuala 
Lumpur, 4 February 1998. 
'Z Ian Lustick, "Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism versus Control ", World Politics, 
Vol. 31, No. 3, 1979, pp. 325 -344. 
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his own advice to the MCA leaders during their leadership crisis a few years earlier.13 
While this may be seen as preserving the accommodative tradition of Malaysian 
politics, it may also have led to the existence of continuous factional rivalry within 
UMNO and quite possibly have laid the ground for the comeback of his political rivals 
during the three years leading to the next party election in 1990. 
Of these two alternatives, Mahathir signaled clearly that he would choose the 
first option. Immediately after the election he stated that he had no intention of 'menang 
sorak kampung tergadaí' (win cheers but lose the land).14 In line with Machiavelli's 
suggestion in The Prince, Mahathir, this time as a dominator, set about ruthlessly 
driving out all of his political rivals rather than acting as a manipulator and forming a 
viable coalition to overcome his leadership crisis.15 If there were any room for the 
accommodative tradition after 1987, it was not until 1990 when Mahathir had 
completely consolidated his dominance within the ruling party. 
In contrast to his relatively moderate attitude during the earlier period, why did 
Mahathir show such an uncompromising attitude towards his political opponents within 
UMNO after the 1987 leadership crisis? In other words, what enabled the Mahathir 
government to take more repressive control and efficiently tighten his own political grip 
after the 1987 UMNO leadership crisis? 
Factionalism is a common feature of party organization although political parties 
are often perceived as unitary actors in political theories. Likewise, factional conflicts, 
especially within dominant political parties, are a significant means of restraining the 
oligarchic tendencies of party leaders, though they are sometimes treated as less 
legitimate and even as negative. 
13 Commenting on the 1985 MCA party election which was accompanied by a severe factional dispute 
within MCA, Mahathir advised the MCA leaders to observe the accommodative tradition of the 
Malaysian political system. He mentioned that 'winners should not take all, while those defeated should 
not lose all. After all, even losers have their supporters and they have the right to their views'. For more 
detail, see The Star, 26 November 1985. 
16 In his closing speech at the 1987 party assembly, Mahathir stressed that: '[w]e must be aware that if we 
win, we get something and that if we lose, we will not get it. I myself realized that fairly early and I 
accepted the fact that in the event that I lost, it was impossible for me to continue living in Seri Perdana 
and remain as Prime Minister' (The Star, 27 April 1987). Another example of how deeply upset Mahathir 
was with his political opponents was revealed by Musa who said that Mahathir had refused to meet mid- 
level UMNO leaders associated with Team B at his home during the Hari Raya festival in May 1988. 
Musa alleged that it was 'a sign of great discourtesy to form -conscious Malays'. Of course, Mahathir 
refuted the allegation. See FEER, 8 September 1988 (Suhaini Aznam, "The People Say' No"'). 
15 Machiavelli mentions two ways political leaders attempt to maintain power: 'the fox' and the lion'. The 
fox is a manipulator playing one rival group off against another in order to keep them dependent on him 
through the careful use of political maneuvers. By contrast, the lion seeks to dominate rather than 
manipulate to maintain power. Machiavelli suggests that a successful leader must know how to switch 
nature, either as a manipulator or as a dominator, as present circumstances demand. See Harvey C. 
Mansfield (trans.), Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1998), pp. 68 -71. 
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In this context, UMNO's experience was, and still is, not all that distinctive 
because factionalism had been common enough in the party since its formation in 1946. 
Although factional conflicts within UMNO had not often occurred within the public 
purview, the internal life of UNLNO had undergone a series of quiet, but constant, 
struggles for the strengthening of factional alliances during the 1960s and 1970s, which 
frequently spilt into the open in the 1980s.16 To some extent the incumbent party 
leaders' influence was effectively checked, at least until the mid- 1980s, by the strength 
of well- defined factional alliances within UMNO circles. This was one key feature that 
kept the Malaysian political system dynamic and relatively responsive, despite the long 
occupancy of government by dominant parties in the ruling coalition, specifically 
UMNO. 
As described in the previous chapter, Mahathir, as the new leader, adopted a 
checks -and -balances strategy to manage strong and popular political figures within the 
ruling party. Many believe that Mahathir's subtle tactic was quite successful in dealing 
with strong party stalwarts in the period of 1981 -87, given the vulnerable circumstances 
of his political dominance in UMNO. However, it must be noted that such a strategy 
was only half successful in the end. A more critical view claimed that it was a 
Mahathir's complete failure as he deliberately allowed further development of 
identifiable factions within the party.'7 Ironically, the unprecedented level of electoral 
competitiveness provided Razaleigh Hamzah and Musa Hitam with the opportunity to 
mobilize grassroots support.'$ Perhaps more unpleasantly to Mahathir, the dynamics of 
political competition contributed to the emergence of more clearly defined and better 
organized factional alignments around his political rival's personality within the ruling 
party, and eventually caused the leadership crisis in 1987. For Mahathir, this was a 
totally unexpected result. 
Several other post -election phenomena may have motivated Mahathir to switch 
to other means of maintaining his leadership. Most of all, the political behavior of the 
election losers was largely unexpected and even unprecedented in Malay tradition. The 
unusual open declaration of support for the defeated challengers and the resistance to 
16 An excellent overview of the UMNO leadership crisis in the 1970s is provided by Harold Crouch, "The 
UMNO Crisis: 1975 -77" in Harold Crouch, Lee Kam Hing and Michael Ong (eds.), Malaysian Politics 
and the 1978 Election (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 11 -36. 
17 See Malaysian Business, 16 May 1987; Zakry Zbadi, Why Anwar ?: Political Games of Umno's 
Leadership (Kuala Lumpur: Gelanggang Publishing, 1993), p. 31. 
18 Although Razaleigh lost to Musa, he consistently captured more than 40 per cent of the total vote and 
enjoyed widespread grassroots support within the ruling party, not only in his home state of Kelantan but 
also in the other states. See Ranjit Gill, The UMNO Crisis (Singapore: Sterling Corporate Services, 1988), 
pp. 6 -7. 
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the elected incumbent were enough to indicate that the traditional UMNO shadow -play 
(wayang kulit) would be replaced by direct confrontation. Neutrality would no longer be 
possible. Such vigorous and open factional antagonism was enough to convince 
Mahathir that there would be continuous reactions and responses to his leadership, 
despite his electoral victory. A clear example was the series of nationwide tours after 
the 1987 UMNO elections, organized by Razaleigh and Musa, expressing resentment of 
Mahathir's leadership and demonstrating their factional strength. 
Furthermore, there were indications from dissident leaders, especially from the 
Razaleigh faction, that they would not accept Mahathir's leadership style and would 
provide an alternative to it.19 Although dissident leaders occasionally pledged their 
support to Mahathir, they stipulated conditions such as 'no witch -hunting', 'no 
intimidation' and/or 'change of leadership stylé .20 
Even worse, there was open speculation that another attempt to overthrow 
Mahathir's leadership might be launched at the next UMNO election in 1990 and that, 
given his narrow margin of victory in 1987, Mahathir would not survive such a battle.21 
The battle lines between Team A and Team B were already being drawn after the 1987 
party election. As a clear example, on 9 May 1987, one day before Team B started its 
nationwide tour to promote 'Malay unity', Razaleigh made clear that his team's strategy 
for the next UMNO supreme council elections of 1990 would be launched at the UMNO 
Youth and Wanita elections in 1988.22 
In short, although the results of the 'battle royal' favored Mahathir, the aftermath 
of the party elections showed that Malay politics in particular, and Malaysian politics as 
a whole, would never be the same again. Everything was openly discussed as factional 
antagonism became more intense. For Mahathir, there were enough signs that the 
checks -and -balances strategy was no Ionger enough to maintain his leadership. It can 
19 Razaleigh's strong resistance to Mahathir's leadership was closely related to the fairness of the 1987 
UMNO election. He alleged that there was unfairness in the vote counting because it was run by the 
headquarters of the party which was controlled by Mahathir. Razaleigh heard of corruption in vote 
counting from a former minister and senior UMNO leader who was allied to Mahathir, although he 
decided not to protest about it. Interview with Razaleigh Hamzah, Kuala Lumpur, 23 February 1998. 
25 For examples of strong statements by dissident leaders, see The Star, 27 April 1987 (Rais Yatim); The 
Star, 28 April 1987 (Tunku Abdul Rahman); and The Star, 1 May 1987 (Razaleigh). 
21 Tunku Abdul Rahman argued that Team B could claim a moral victory and there would be fighting 
until the next party election in 1990. For more details, see FEER, 7 May 1987; The Star, 28 April 1987; 
and The Star, 1 May 1987. 
22 See The Star, 10 May 1987. RazaIeigh also instructed his followers in Kelantan to boycott Berita 
Harlan and New Straits Times for allegedly publishing 'wild and biased' reports in the run -up and the 
aftermath of the 1987 UMNO general assembly. Then, he urged his business associates to withhold 
advertising in the two newspapers (NST, 9 May 1987). He also urged his supporters 'to choose only 
branch and division leaders who could see eye -to -eye with him if they wanted him to continue his 
involvement in politics' (NST, 10 May 1987). 
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therefore be assumed that Mahathir felt the necessity of shifting from a moderate 
checks -and -balances strategy to one of more direct domination in order to consolidate 
his position within the ruling party. 
5 -3. Prelude to Mahathir's Loyalist Party: Operation Lalang as a Diversionary 
Exercise 
In the midst of his own leadership crisis, Mahathir needed to overcome an internal party 
problem and tighten his political grip on UMNO. However, Mahathir must have been 
aware that it would not go down well among the already -split Malay community, even 
among the Malays who supported him, if he were seen to be suppressing dissident 
factions in UMNO at this time. Mahathir therefore used the racial card as a legitimizing 
factor to justify drastic action and thus to move toward the tightening of his grip on 
political power in the ruling party. 
Indeed, relations between the Malays and the Chinese were tense in the early 
1980s. The severe economic recession in the mid- 1980s, in particular, caused the non - 
Malay communities to voice their anxieties about affirmative- action economic policy 
and its probable continuation. Furthermore, opposition parties and various social 
activists increased their criticisms of the Mahathir government - over such issues as 
corruption, scandals, government wrong-doing, and draconian laws. Given this 
relatively liberal situation, sensitive racial issues were openly debated in the early 
1980s. Examples involved the issues of Bukit China, Chinese signboards, the Lion 
Dance, elective subjects at the University of Malaysia, and the new primary school 
curriculum.23 
Nonetheless, the ethnic tensions did not evolve into overt political antagonism 
until the UMNO leadership crisis in 1987. The event which stirred ethnic tension 
between the Malays and the Chinese was the collapse of many Deposit Taking Co- 
operatives (DTCs), some of which had been associated with MCA. By April 1987, the 
DTCs had experienced massive financial losses mainly due to the economic downturn 
and financial mismanagement. The MCA leadership proposed in May 1987 bailing out 
the DTCs in a dollar- for -dollar rescue scheme to save Chinese investors. The requested 
23 Details of ethnic conflict in the 1980s can be found in Lim Kit Siang, Malaysia: Crisis of Identity 
(Petaling Jaya: Democratic Action Party, 1986); Ministry of Home Affairs, The Government White 
Paper: Towards Preserving National Security, 14 March 1988; K. Das and SUARAM (eds.), The White 
Paper on the October Affair (Selangor: SUARAM Kommunikasi, 1989); Kua Kia Soong (ed.), Malaysian 
Cultural Policy & Democracy (Kuala Lumpur: The Resource and Research Center, 1990); and Kua Kia 
Soong, A Protean Saga: The Chinese Schools of Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: The Resource and Research 
Center, 1990), pp. 161 -175. 
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bailout by the MCA was similar to a previous bailout, when the Mahathir government 
propped up some troubled Bumiputera financial institutions such as Bank Bumiputera 
and Bumiputera Malaysia Finance when they lost over RM2.5 billion in Hong Kong. 
Another Bumiputera firm, Perwira Habib, had also been rescued by the Mahathir 
government in early 1987. 
The Mahathir government, however, appeared reluctant to accommodate MCA's 
proposal, especially after the 1987 UMNO elections. Consequently, relations between 
the Malays and the Chinese, UMNO and MCA in particular, worsened.24 Ethnic tension 
increased again in mid- September 1987 when the government posted non- Mandarin- 
educated headmasters and senior assistants to National -Type Chinese primary schools.25 
Racial tension subsequently rose to boiling point as a result of strained interaction 
between UMNO and the Chinese community. The escalating ethnic conflict eventually 
provided a rationale for a series of mass arrests under the Internal Security Act (ISA), 
commonly known as Operation Lalang, in October 1987. 
Why did Mahathir's government adopt such an uncompromising attitude toward 
the Chinese community in the wake of the 1987 UMNO leadership crisis? Whatever the 
motives behind its stance, the issue of non -Mandarin school teachers was so sensitive 
within the Chinese community that even the ruling Chinese parties, MCA and Gerakan, 
felt compelled to involve themselves in public protests along with many other Chinese 
associations, including the DAP. A former minister and senior MCA Ieader said that the 
MCA had no option but to fight hard on this issue to retain any credibility among the 
Chinese community. The party had already lost enormous credibility over the DTCs 
issue a few months ago.26 
Even though the MCA, UMNO's main partner in the ruling coalition, was in a 
dilemma dealing with its Chinese supporters at the time, the Mahathir government's 
response over MCA's request appeared to be intransigent. For example, on 4 October, 
Anwar Ibrahim, then Education Minister, made it clear that the government would stand 
by its decision on the non -Mandarin school teacher issue and would not bend to political 
24 In particular, then MCA deputy president Lee Kim Sai warned that the party might withdraw from the 
BN coalition if their refund scheme for the DTCs were not approved by the government (NST, 24 May 
1987). In responding to this, Najib Tun Razak, then acting UMNO Youth chief, mentioned in an open 
statement that UMNO would review MCA's position within the BN coalition before the party decided to 
pull out (NST, 19 June 1987). For detail of political developments on the controversy over the DTCs 
issue, see FEER, 29 January 1987 (Nick Seaward, New Year's Resolution'); 5 March 1987 ( "Picking up 
the Pieces "); 2 April 1987 (Nick Seaward, "The Tangled Web of Deposit Cooperatives"); 9 July 1987 
(Suhaini Aznam, "Staying on the Inside "); and 16 July 1989 (Nick Seaward, "Cooperative Venture "). 
L' In September 1987, the Penang Education Department sent 66 non -Mandarin educated headmasters and 
teachers to National -Type Chinese primary schools, and 14 non -Chinese educated teachers were similarly 
promoted in Melaka, 5 in the Federal Territory and 2 in Selangor. See NST, 1 I October 1987. 
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pressure from the Chinese community. Thereafter, the Mahathir government's stand 
over the issue was reiterated without change, even though various Chinese associations 
suggested that they were willing to accept even non -Chinese teachers as long as they 
were qualified in Mandarin.27 
In these circumstances, on 11 October, the agitation in the Chinese community 
came to a head at a public rally at Thean Hou Temple in KL organized by the MCA, 
Gerakan, the DAP and 15 other Chinese organizations. At the rally, they decided to 
boycott classes in Chinese primary schools on 16 and 17 October.28 In the meantime, 
UMNO Youth also organized a mammoth rally at the Jalan Raja Muda Stadium in KL 
on 17 October.29 The Ministry of Home Affairs, of which Mahathir was Minister, 
announced that the government would allow the UMNO Youth to carry on with the 
rally even though it was aware of increasing racial tension.30 At the rally, attended by 
about 15,000 people, some UMNO politicians deliberately stirred up Malay racial 
sentiments and various provocative banners were also displayed. They claimed that the 
Chinese component parties in the BN were threatening Malay special rights by secretly 
working with the DAP in the wake of the intra -Malay leadership crisis.31 
UMNO then announced that it would hold a mammoth rally on 1 November to 
celebrate its 41st anniversary in the Merdeka Stadium in KL. About 500,000 UMNO 
members and sympathizers were expected to participate in the planned UMNO unity 
rally and UMNO national leaders made a considerable effort to mobilize Malay 
support.32 The scheduled UMNO unity rally added to the atmosphere of uncertainty and 
fear due to the sheer size of the rally and the gathering place reminiscent of the May 13 
racial riots which took place in 1969.33 
It was in these circumstances that the police launched a series of arrests under 
the ISA on 27 October. By the end of the day, 55 people had been detained and the 
26 Interview with Lee Kim Sai, then Deputy President of MCA, Kai ang, 25 February 1998. 
27 See Kua Kia Soong, A Protean Saga, 1990, p. 169. 
2E The boycott of classes was called off later except in Penang. 
29 Before the massive Malay rally on 17 October 1987, more than 500 UMNO members held a protest 
rally on 12 October 1987, organized by the Bagan UMNO division, against MCA for objecting to the 
appointment of non -Chinese -educated teachers as administrators of Chinese primary schools. 
3° See Kua Kia Soong, A Protean Saga, 1990, p. 172. 
31 The main slogans were 'Sack. Lee Kim Sai' and 'MCA get out'. Among other banners were: 'May 13 Has 
Begun'; 'Revoke the Citizenship of Those Who Opposed the Malay Rulers'; and 'Soak It with Chinese 
Blood'. See NST, 18 October 1987. 
32 UMNO had originally planned to hold its 41st anniversary in Johor but later changed the place to 
Merdeka Stadium in Kuala Lumpur for the purpose of asserting Malay political dominance and 
maximizing mobilization of people. 
33 In addition, in an unrelated shooting incident on 18 October 1987, a Malay soldier ran amok in a 
predominantly Chinese area and killed a Malay and wounded a Chinese and another Malay, adding fuel to 
an already explosive situation. While the incident turned out to be an isolated criminal act, tension had 
mounted as wild rumors circulated about the nature of the shooting incident. 
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figure increased to at least 106 by mid- January 1988. The detainees included the 
parliamentary opposition leader, MPs, state assemblymen, academics, social activists, 
Chinese educationalists, environmentalists and even humble workers. Among the 
arrested were 3 UMNO members, 8 MCA members, 5 Gerakan members, 15 PAS 
members, 16 DAP members and 2 PSRM members.34 The three UMNO members 
arrested were all closely associated with Team B, although the UMNO rallies were 
strongly supported and initiated by Mahathir's allies.35 Their arrests, therefore, were 
widely viewed as a stern warning to dissident factions in UMNO. 
Furthermore, the Mahathir government immediately banned two popular daily 
newspapers - the English -language The Star, and the Chinese -language Sin Chew Jit 
Poh - as well as the Malay -language by- weekly Watan. A senior journalist from The 
Star, who asked not to be named, said that the newspapers were carefully targeted to 
include ones with different languages. This was intended to warn the media as a whole. 
The Star, in particular, was banned because the paper had provided some avenues for 
the expression of alternative views from non -established groups, specifically some 
dissident Team B leaders.36 The UMNO rally scheduled for 1 November was finally 
canceled. 
Government officials later announced that the ISA arrests were for security, not 
political, reasons. Mahathir claimed that he had to take immediate action to prevent 
racial riots and save the country from eventual danger and disaster, as the ISA detainees 
had been creating unnecessary tensions for years.37 The Ministry of Education also 
insisted that there were an insufficient number of Mandarin- educated teachers applying 
for the posts of Chinese primary schools.38 It was also claimed that some Chinese 
34 The inclusion of these BN politicians was viewed as a simple gesture that the Operation Lalang was a 
multi- racial exercise. Otherwise, it would have increased resentment among non -Malay society. In fact, 
all detainees from UMNO, MCA and Gerakan were released within two months, while many others from 
opposition parties and NGOs were detained much longer. For more details about the detainees, 
organizations and the date of release, see K. Das and SUARAM (eds.), 1989, Appendix I, pp. 113 -122. 
35 For example, Anwar made a statement, just a day before the UMNO Youth rally on 17 October 1987, 
that UMNO should demonstrate to make no mistake about its strength (NST, 17 October 1987). Also, at 
the UMNO Youth rally, Najib Tun Razak summed up his speech by saying that: Our elders should not 
compromise anymore. We are simply fed up.' (NST, 18 October 1987). Even after the ISA arrests started, 
Ghafar strongly supported the 1 November UMNO unity rally, while assuring the safety of all 
Malaysians. He said that 'what is there to be afraid of [the 1 November UMNO rally]? We guarantee the 
safety of everyone.' (The Star, 28 October 1987). 
36Interview with a senior journalist from The Star, Petaling Jaya, February 1998. 
37 NST, 29 October 1987. For the official explanation of the ISA arrest in October 1987, see Ministry of 
Home Affairs, The Government White Paper: Towards Preserving National Security, 14 March 1988. For 
a counter explanation of the basis of the ISA arrest, see Fan Yew Teng, "The Mahathir Concoction: An 
Alternative White Paper on the ISA Detentions" in K. Das and SUARAM (eds.), 1989, pp. 32 -53. 
38 It is alleged that it takes at least seven to ten years of experience to apply for posts in National -Type 
Chinese primary schools, although different states have different rules on this. A senior Chinese 
educationist suggested that the government should have relaxed its ruling on the minimum number of 
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educationists and politicians, including the MCA and Gerakan Ieaders, were strident in 
voicing their views and played on racial sentiment to prove their commitment to the 
Chinese community. Clearly the nation was rushing towards a headlong collision in 
September and October 1987, particularly in Kuala Lumpur. According to government 
officials, the ISA arrests were simply a means of defusing ethnic tension which was 
escalating spontaneously. 
This interpretation, however, overlooked some obvious questions. Who had been 
responsible for heightening racial tension, especially during the few weeks before the 
1st November UMNO unity rally? Why did the Mahathir government make the highly 
contentious move of transferring the non -Mandarin- educated teachers to National -Type 
Chinese primary schools at a time when racial relations were fraught and, despite 
widespread protests, maintained such an uncompromising stance? Indeed, the shortage 
of non -Mandarin- educated teachers was a decade -old issue in Malaysian society. 
Moreover, it was widely acknowledged among the Chinese community that the UMNO- 
led government would not send non -Mandarin- educated teachers to National -Type 
Chinese primary schools, except teachers of Malay or English. In addition, for this issue 
at least, the Mahathir government had the capacity to keep it out of the public arena, if it 
were merely an administrative matter. For this reason, a senior MCA official believes 
that there was a 'hidden agenda' pursued by certain UMNO factions to divert public 
attention away from their own desperate leadership crisis by using 'a deviation in 
implementation of the Chinese education policy .39 Tunku Abdul Rahman, the first 
Prime Minister of Malaysia, argued that Mahathir desperately needed to create a 
national crisis to mobilize the Malays together 'as a united force to a common enemy - 
and the imaginary enemy in this case was the Chinese community .40 
It is difficult to prove whether Mahathir deliberately allowed, or even 
encouraged, the rise of ethnic tension at this time to foster an atmosphere of fear, 
thereby providing conditions for strengthening his own political position within UMNO 
circles. However, it cannot be denied that escalating racial tension gave Mahathir a 
circumstantial advantage for reinstating emergency rule, just as the 1969 racial riots had 
years of service rather than opening the position to teachers who were not qualified in Mandarin. 
Interview with Lee Ban Chen, Deputy Director of Planning & Development Bureau in United Chinese 
School Committees' Association of Malaysia (Dong Zong), Kajang, 20 January 1998. 
39 Confidential interview in February 1998. Interestingly, whether it is a coincidence or not, racial tension 
reached a climax when the 'UMNO 1I case' finally went to the High Court for judgement after the 
UMNO unity council failed to reach an out -of -court settlement, on 14 October, over the question of the 
legality of the 1987 UMNO general assembly. After that, the issue of the internal UMNO crisis was 
suddenly removed from media coverage as well as public attention. Instead, fanning racial tension 
became a real issue. The 'UMNO 11 case' will be discussed in the following part of this chapter. 
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given a similar advantage to the ruling Malay elite almost two decades ago.41 While the 
background and causes of rising racial tension in both cases appears to be different, the 
outcome was similar. In short, Mahathir was the main beneficiary of the heightened 
racial tension and the subsequent security situation after the ISA arrests. 
Operation Lalang in October 1987 created considerable fear outside and inside 
UMNO circles. As one ISA detainee argued, 'it was not the matter of the number of the 
detainees but the fears that Mahathir created ... anybody can be detained. Mahathir 
created the fears and paralyzed the whole Malaysian society by the invention of 
Operation Lalang'.42 A senior Team B leader also stressed that Operation Lalang was 
quite successful in creating a culture of fear within the dissident UMNO circles in 
particular and thus served its purpose very effectively in the midst of Mahathir's own 
leadership crisis situation 43 Lim Kit Siang, then parliamentary opposition Ieader who 
was also detained under the ISA, summed up the situation: 
Mahathir used the racial sentiment and even allowed the escalation of the situation so that he could 
crack down to consolidate his position against his internal challenge. So I would say the ISA arrest 
was more UMNO directed and motivated rather than the racial crisis during that time. This was in 
fact in order to fight for real challenges from inside [UMNO]." 
5 -4. Creation of a New Ruling Party around Mahathir's Personality 
While Operation Lalang created a culture of fear which favored Mahathir, the 
formation of a new party provided another situational advantage for the consolidation of 
Mahathir's power in the ruling party. In fact, what Mahathir actually did for the first 
year after the 1987 UMNO general assembly was to destroy the party that already 
existed and rebuild the ruling party around his dominant personality. In doing so, his 
actions closely resemble Machiavelli's advice in The Discourses: the best thing a leader 
can do in order to retain his influence, if the foundations of his power are weak, is to 
reorganize everything in the state from scratch.45 
40 Quoted in K. Das & SUARAM, 1989, p. 10. 
61 Horowitz, 1985, pp. 657 -659. 
42 Interview with Nasir Hashim, currently pro -tern president of Socialist Party, Kuala Lumpur, 15 January 
1998. 
63 Interview with Rais Yatim, Kuala Lumpur, 4 February 1998. According to Rais Yatim, it was not until 
Mahathir obtained maximum effect that the planned UMNO unity rally was called off. He argues that if 
Mahathir had not achieved his expected objective with the ISA arrests, the UMNO mass rally on 1 
November would not have been cancelled. 
44 Interview with Lim Kit Siang, Petaling Jaya, 19 February 1998. In the same way, a DAP national 
leader argues that the ISA detainees were not the cause but the scapegoat in the middle of the infra- 
UMNO leadership tussle. See Chen Man Hin, "DAP made scapegoat for UMNO's civil war ", The Rocket, 
November 1987, Vol. 20, No. 6. 
45 See Leslie J. Walker (trans.), 1991. The Discourses of Niccolo Machiavelli, Vol. I (London: Routledge, 
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First Step: An Immediate Political Purge and Intransigence 
Mahathir's intransigence over UMNO dissident leaders who were critical of his 
leadership was clear even before the end of the 1987 UMNO general assembly. The 
very first hint that the cabinet posts were likely to be replaced by a choir of pro- 
Mahathir yes -men appeared in his adjournment speech at the assembly: If I had chosen 
those who were loyal to me, then there would not have been any contest for the 
presidency this time'.46 This was an oblique, but clear, message to the dissident UMNO 
leaders to step down voluntarily. Also, in contrast to the Malay way of obliquely 
communicating a wish, Mahathir openly attacked dissident UMNO factions' attitudes as 
treacherous by claiming that they disclosed a series of classified government documents 
during the party election campaigns.47 
Less than a week after the UMNO election and one day after they had submitted 
their resignation letters, Mahathir accepted the resignations of Razaleigh as Trade and 
Industry Minister, and Rais Yatim as Foreign Minister. A day later, Mahathir also sent 
dismissal letters - stating that their services were no longer required after 7 May - to 
three other Ministers and four Deputy Ministers who had mounted a campaign against 
him during the last UMNO election. The political purges were announced just a few 
hours before Mahathir went overseas for his personal visit to the United States and 
Japan.48 
The timing and extent of Mahathir's political purge surprised many people, even 
though such a move had been widely expected after the party election 49 The dismissal 
of Abdullah Badawi even surprised Mahathir's supporters. Abdullah Badawi had won a 
vice -president's post with the second highest number of votes, and both Ajib Ahmad 
1991), pp. 273 -274. 
46 NST, 27 April 1987. 
47 NST, 27 April 1987. There were many other groups and associations calling for the resignation of 
Ministers, Deputy Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries who had opposed Mahathir's leadership during 
the UMNO general election. Those organizations included that World Association of Muslim Youth 
(WAMY) for the Asia and the Pacific region, Malaysian Youth Council (MYC), State Malay Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry in Penang, and State Cuepacs. Wanita UMNO president Rafidah also said 
dissidents should quit their governmental positions. See NST, 29 April 1987. 
48 The ministers dropped from the Cabinet were: Defense Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi; Welfare 
Minister Shahrir; and Minister in the Prime Ministers Department Ajib Ahmad. The Deputy Ministers 
were: Kadir Sheikh Fadzír (Foreign Affairs Ministry); Rahman Osman (Transport Ministry); Zainal 
Abidan Zin (Energy, Telecommunication and Posts Ministry); and Radzi Sheikh Ahmad (Primary 
Industries Ministry). For details of the dismissal of several ministers, see FEER, 14 May 1987 (Suhaini 
Aznam, "Dr. Mahathir's Surgery "). 
49 According to Rais Yatim, Mahathir's drastic action on the very first day of Ramadan - the fasting month 
to seek forgiveness and to forgive fellow Muslims for any trespass they may have committed during the 
past year - in sacking the three Ministers and four Deputy Ministers shocked the Malay community. 
Moreover, it was claimed that these seven ministers and deputy ministers 'had no intention' of resigning 
from their positions because they won at the 1987 UMNO election. Interview with Rais Yatim, Kuala 
Lumpur, 4 February 1998. 
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and Shahrir had retained their supreme council seats in the party election. All four 
Deputy Ministers had also been elected as supreme council members. In the light of 
these surprising dismissals, Mahathir's immediate political purge was regarded as a 
clear indication that there would be no spirit of consensus nor accommodation after the 
tightly- contested leadership contest. Even Mahathir's allies saw that he was 'taking 
revenge' against his political opponents during this period.'° 
As expected, all of Mahathir's allies, including Daim Zainuddin, Anwar Ibrahim, 
Megat Junid and Rafidah Aziz, retained their ministerships and the vacancies were 
filled by Mahathir's loyal supporters on 19 May. In a further move to consolidate his 
position, the Federal Territory Ministry was abolished and its functions transferred to 
the Prime Minister's Department. In addition to the Home Affairs Ministry, Mahathir 
also held the Justice Ministry, left vacant since 1986.51 According to Means, Mahathir's 
takeover of the justice portfolio was a significant step as 'Iegal issues were assuming 
more political importance for the future of his government'.52 
In the same way, Mahathir made changes in the line -up of the state liaison 
chairmen of UMNO. According to Clause 13.5 of the UMNO constitution, the party 
president need only consult division heads in the respective states on the appointment of 
state chairmen and deputies but is not bound by their opinion. In addition, their services 
could be terminated by the president at any time. Consequently, the reshuffle of the state 
liaison chairmen affected AbduIIah Badawi (replaced by Anwar) and Ajib Ahmad in 
their respective states, Penang and Johor. 
Shortly after the reshuffle at the higher level, political purges continued at the 
lower levels not only within the party but also in both federal and state governments. 
Within a week of the dismissal of the dissident cabinet ministers, several Johor state 
executive council members were 'forced to resign'.53 Political purges were carried out 
extensively in other states as well and were a clear warning to dissident factions. 
An example of Mahathir's intransigence was his refusal to participate in round- 
table talks with Team B leaders. As the internal leadership struggle deepened, Tunku 
Abdul Rahman urged Mahathir, as the incumbent, to invite Razaleigh and Musa for 
talks to strengthen party unity.54 However, Mahathir made it clear that there was no 
5o See NST, 2 May 1987 and The Star, 6 May 1987. 
n The Star, 20 May 1987. 
52 Gorden P. Means, Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1991), p. 205. 
53 For more details on the resignation of state executive council members, see The Star, 6 May 1987; 
FEER, 14 May 1987 (Suhaini Aznam, "Dr. Mahathir's Surgery "); and Malaysian Business, 16 May 1987 
(Jayasankaran, "Clean -up time "). 
54 NST, 14 September 1987. 
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need for such talks because there had never been such a practice in UMNO nor the 
Barisan Nasional.55 Rather, Mahathir blamed his political opponents and branded them 
'traitors' during his state unity tours a few days later.56 Instead of unity talks, Mahathir 
attempted to separate Razaleigh from the other dissident leaders in Team B, that is 
Musa and Abdullah Badawi. A prominent political commentator said that, based on his 
'very reliable source', there was a secret meeting between Mahathir and Musa as well as 
Abdullah Badawi during this early period.57 It was not until 3 October, almost six 
months later, that Mahathir and Razaleigh finally met for the first time since the UMNO 
election. 
Second Step: Towards the Dissolution of UMNO 
A clearer indication of Mahathir's intransigence was shown in the political 
developments that led to the dissolution of UMNO itself. It was even speculated that 
Mahathir and his supporters deliberately allowed the dissolution of UMNO. Two 
months after the acrimonious 'battle royal', 12 UMNO members, from seven party 
divisions, filed a suit in the High Court on 25 June 1987 asking for the April 24 UMNO 
election to be declared 'null and void'.58 In the suit, the 12 UMNO members argued that 
about 78 of the 1,479 delegates were 'deliberately' or 'recklessly involved in illegalities, 
in spite of their verbal and written complaints to the incumbent party leaders, including 
party secretary - general Sanusi Junid before the general assembly 59 They claimed that 
53 unregistered branches from seven party divisions had sent delegates to the divisional 
elections which then elected the delegates to the UMNO general assembly. 
Consequently, the results of the election were substantially affected by the 78 illegal 
delegates, from the seven party divisions, since the margins of victory for the two top 
posts (president and deputy president) - 43 and 40 votes - were very narrow. The 12 
1.JMNO members thus alleged that the UMNO assembly was 'unconstitutional and 
illegal' and sought a court order for a fresh general assembly and election of all posts.6o 
Finally, Justice Harun Hashim of the Kuala Lumpur High Court, in dismissing the 
UMNO 11 case on 4 February, ruled that under Section 12 (3) of the Societies Act, 
ss NST, 16 September 1987. In response to Mahathir's rejection of round -table talks, Tunku Abdul 
Rahman commented that there had been no occasion before to call for such talks because there had never 
been such trouble in UMNO. See The Star, 21 September 1987. 
'6 The Star, 21 September 1987. 
57 The Star, 27 September 1987 (Mohamed Sopiee, "Will UMNO Split Like the Congress Parry ? "). 
55 For the detailed lists of 12 UMNO members and their divisions, see The Star, 26 June 1987 and FEER, 
9 July 1987 (Suhaini Aznam, "See You in Court"). 
'9 The Star, 26 June 1987. 6°Later in August, one of the 12 UMNO members, Hussain bin Manap, withdrew his appeal. Hereafter, I 
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UMNO was an unlawful society at that material time' because of the existence of 
unapproved branches.61 
What are the indications of Mahathir's intransigence, and why did he 
deliberately allow the dissolution of the party itself during this period? To begin with, it 
was widely viewed that the 11 UMNO members' suit was filed on behalf of anti - 
Mahathir factions since three of the seven divisions were in Kelantan, the stronghold of 
Razaleigh, and three more came from Penang, home of Abdullah Badawi. Furthermore, 
there was speculation that Razaleigh was funding the suit as well as providing legal 
assistance.62 RazaIeigh, however, said that some of the 11 members were 'pro -Mahathir 
people' and 'they were in Team A'. At that time, he was unable to explain properly 
because 'these people [pro- Mahathir] said they are all Team B members, but actually 
they are not.'63 If this is true, what does it imply ?64 Whether or not it is true, the UMNO 
11 case did not come as a surprise to Mahathir's faction as they had been aware of the 
move for several weeks. Sanusi, then UMNO secretary- general and close confident of 
Mahathir, said that the party headquarters, in fact, expected legal action and were quite 
well prepared for such a move.65 
In fact, it was largely due to the uncompromising attitude of the incumbent party 
leaders that the early settlement within the party failed and the case went eventually to 
the legal judgment, which led to the dissolution of the party. After UMNO had set up a 
five -member UMNO unity committee on 26 September 1987, the High Court granted a 
postponement of the hearing for two weeks to enable the committee to solve its Iegal 
problem in an out -of -court settlement.66 Nevertheless, during the committee's 
negotiations from 1 October to 14 October, the incumbent UMNO leaders showed no 
intention of granting concessions to appease Team B leaders and members regarding the 
guarantee of their political future and/or the issues relating to the validity of the recent 
will refer to the number as 11. 
61 Section 12 (3) of the Societies Act says: 'Where a registered society established a branch without the 
prior approval of the registrar, such registered society and the branch so established shall be deemed to be 
unlawful societies.' Justice Harun said if the facts showed that UMNO had established branches without 
the approval of the Registrar of Societies, it seemed to him that UMNO itself was an unlawful society. He 
said he did not have to declare the UMNO assembly and the UMNO election in 1987 null and void 
because what happened in 1987 was invalid all the way. See NST, 21 February 1988. 
62 Means, 1991, p.206. 63Interview 
with Razaleigh Hamzah, Kuala Lumpur, 17 February 1998. 
64 A senior journalist suggested that 6 of 11 were Mahathir's men and that Mahathir set up the legal case 
to destroy UMNO. Interview with M.G.G. Pillai on 24 February 1998. 
6s FEER, 9 July 1987. 
66 The committee comprised a mix of Team A and Team B supporters. It included vice -president 
Abdullah Badawi and supreme council member Kadir Sheikh Fadzir of Team B; party secretary -general 
Sanusi Junid, UMNO information chief Senator Hussein Ahmad and supreme council member Napsiah 
Omar of Team A. 
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UMNO election.67 Although Mahathir claimed that the five -member UMNO unity 
committee was given 'the necessary powers' to solve the UMNO 11's legal action in an 
out -of -court settlement, the UMNO unity committee's essential role seemed not to 
accommodate differences between Team A and Team B, but to prevent any immediate 
and possible chaIIenges to the party leadership.68 The failure of the negotiated 
settlement meant that the final decision was eventually forwarded to the High Court. 
After the High Court decision, Mahathir did not take any steps to avoid the 
judiciary's death sentence to UMNO, nor to save the party from de- registration by the 
Registrar of Societies. Furthermore, the very person who first brought the legal status of 
UMNO into question, by drawing the attention of the High Court to Section 12 (3) of 
the Societies Act, was none other than Sri Ram, the leading counsel for UMNO. In 
contrast to this, the leading counsel for the 11 UMNO members, Raja Aziz Addruse, 
made it very clear that he wanted the High Court to concentrate on the illegal branches 
only, rather than to link their case to the question of UMNO's legality as a whole. By 
raising that line of questioning by Sri Ram, however, the party leadership gave the High 
Court no option but to declare the party null and void. On this decision, Tunku Abdul 
Rahman argued that 'UMNO was deliberately allowed to be declared unlawful through 
the action of the UMNO lawyer himself.69 
In addition, Mahathir's government intensified its pressure on the judiciary 
before the High Court judgment over the UMNO 11 case. This was largely due to 
strained relations between Mahathir's government and the judiciary in the few years 
before the judgment. Specifically in the past two years, there had been several cases 
where the judiciary decided in favor of the plaintiff against the Mahathir government, as 
shown in the series of cases of Asian Wall Street Journal (AWSJ) in November 1986, 
Aliran in 1987 and United Engineers (Malaysia) just a few months before the crucial 
UMNO 11 case in February 1988.79 To make matters worse, several prominent judges 
fi7 It should be noted that racial tension between UMNO and the Chinese community had reached a climax 
at this time. 
66 For Mahathir's remarks, see The Star, 30 September 1987. 
69 Quote in Aliran Monthly, 1987:7(12), p. 2 ( "Stop Press: UMNO's Misfortune "). 
7° On 3 November 1986, the Supreme Court, presided over by then Lord President Mohamed Salleh Abas, 
reinstated the work permit of two AWSJ Malaysia -based correspondents after the Immigration 
Department's cancellation of them on 26 September 1986. For more details, see FEER, 9 October 1986 
(Nick Seaward, "Silenced Voices ") and FEER, 13 November 1986 (Suhaini Aznam, "Journalist 
Reprieved "). In 1987, the court also ruled in favor of Miran, which was permitted to publish a Bahasa 
version of its English- language monthly journal after the Home Minister had refused it a license. 
Moreover, just a few weeks before the first ISA arrest on 27 October 1987, the High Court decided 
against the Mahathir government and United Engineers Malaysia (UEM)'s bid to remove an injunction 
preventing them from signing a proposed contract for the privatization of the North -South Highway. The 
suit against Mahathir, including several cabinet ministers, had been lodged by opposition leader, Lim Kit 
Siang. In the suit, he alleged corruption for approving the award of a letter of intent to LEM to build and 
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increasingly emphasized the essential role of judicial independence during this period." 
Put simply, the several court judgments in favor of plaintiffs and emphasis on judicial 
independence were enough to worry the Mahathir government as the crucial court 
judgment in the UMNO I I case was approaching. 
In this context, Mahathir criticized the independent judges in an interview with 
Malaysian Business just one month before the hearing of the UMNO 11 case. Mahathir 
likened the independent judges to 'black sheep' and blamed these 'fiercely independent' 
judges who 'hammer the government' just to prove their independence and courage.72 
This criticism was followed by the government's reshuffle of the judiciary just a few 
weeks before the decision of the UMNO 11 case. Nine judges, including Justice Harun 
Hashim who was due to preside over the UMNO 11 case, were transferred between 
state capitals or between different departments of the Kuala Lumpur High Court. Justice 
Harun, who was also well known for his independent judgments, was transferred from 
appellate and special powers to commercial crimes. This was widely viewed as a 
warning to the judiciary, even though Harun was still in charge of the UMNO 11 case.73 
In these circumstances, the High Court decided in favor of the incumbent party 
leadership against the plaintiff, which led to UMNO being declared an unlawful 
organization after all. 
Even after UNLNO was declared unlawful by the court, there was still a chance 
to save the party from de- registration. The incumbent UMNO Ieadership, however, was 
unwilling to take the necessary steps to revive the party. Rather, they took a tougher 
stand and did not offer a compromise to the dissident UMNO leaders. Salleh Abas, then 
Lord President, made it clear that Mahathir showed no interest in reviving UNLNO after 
it was declared unlawful.74 
Firstly, it is claimed that UMNO would not have been de- registered if then 
UMNO secretary- general, Sanusi, had submitted a stronger appeal to the show -cause 
letter sent by the Registrar of Societies asking why UMNO should not be declared 
operate the 900 -km North -South Highway. See FEER, 15 October 1987 (Nick Seaward, "Their Day in 
Court"). 
91 For example, in response to Mahathir's resentment over the case of AWSJ, Mohamed Suffian Hashim, 
former Lord President, asserted that 'judges are neither pro nor anti -government. Judges are neutral 
servants of the law' (NST, 5 February 1987). 
72 Malaysian Business, 1 January 1988. After the 11 UMNO members brought the matter to court, 
Mahathir made several speeches attacking so- called 'fiercely independent' judges for interfering in politics 
and abusing their power of judicial review. For more details about Mahathir's criticism of the judiciary 
during this period, see The Star, 7 September 1987; NST, 8 September 1987; NST, 3 October 1987; NST, 
4 December 1987; PEER, 14 January 1988; and NST, 18 March 1988. 
73 For more details of the judiciary reshuffle, see FEER, 14 January 1998 (Suhaini Aznam, "A Judicial 
Shake -up "). 
74 See Salleh Abas and K. Das, May Day for Justice: The Lord President's Version (Kuala Lumpur: 
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illegal. But he submitted only a one -page reply to the show -cause letter. In the same 
way, the party leaders, including supreme council members, division heads, secretaries, 
information chiefs, Youth and Wanita leaders, could have been asked to make a strong 
appeal to the Registrar of Societies not to de- register the party. Such steps necessary to 
save the party, however, were not taken by the party leadership at that time. 
Secondly, it is believed that Mahathir as Home Minister could also have invoked 
Section 70 of the Societies Act to exempt the party from Section 12 (3) and even from 
the entire Societies Act if he had really wanted to save UMNO from de- registration.75 In 
this case, Mahathir could have re- registered the illegal branches and called for a fresh 
UMNO general election. Mahathir, however, refused to use his power as Home Minister 
because in this case the incumbent UMNO headquarters would be required to conduct a 
fresh party election after the illegal branches had been re- registered.76 It appears that, 
instead of reviving the de- registered UMNO, the ruling UMNO faction (Team A) 
believed that the creation of a new party was the most desirable solution to overcoming 
internal leadership problems. This is supported by the remark of Ghafar Baba, then 
party deputy president, as follows: 
To me, the formation of UMNO (Baru) is the best way out of the crisis of the [old] UMNO. What 
can be lost and what is wrong in forming UMNO (Baru) to continue the struggle of UMNO 
1946.77 
Third Step: Creation of a New Loyalist Party 
After the judgment of the High Court, the setting up of the new party by Mahathir was 
done in cloak- and -dagger style. To begin with, Mahathir submitted an application to 
register a new party called UMNO 88 on 9 February, a day after UMNO Malaysia's 
application was made by Tunku Abdul Rahman and Team B of the old UIvNO 78 The 
Registrar of Societies, however, rejected both applications because the old UMNO had 
not been de- registered yet. A few days later, Mahathir gave a speech in front of about 
Magnus Books, 1989), p. 57. 
75 This allegation was raised by Razaleigh on a motion to the Dewan Rakyat, on 5 December 1988, to 
present a Private Member's Bill to amend the Societies Act 1966 to enable the revival of the de- registered 
UMNO. The motion was seconded by Musa. However, the motion was rejected by 108 to 35 votes. See 
The Star, 6 December 1988. For more details of the UMNO 11 case, see Rais Yatim, Freedom under 
Executive Power in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur; Endowment Sdn. Bhd., 1995), Chapter 7 and Salleh Abas 
and K. Das, May Day for Justice: The Lord President's Version (Kuala Lumpur: Magnus Books, 1989), 
Chapter 6. 
76 Mahathir claimed that he did not use his powers as Home Minister because he had to take into account 
the fact that the court had ruled the party as unlawful. He said that even if he had the powers to cancel the 
Registrar of Societies' de- registration order, 'it did not mean that he could do as he liked'. See NST, 7 
December 1988. 
77 See Utusan Malaysia, 8 May 1988. 
78 Hereafter I refer to UMNO as old UMNO to distinguish it from UMNO (Baru). 
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600 Barisan Nasional supporters at the Banquet Hall of the Parliament House in which 
he said that the laws of man could be changed' whereas the laws of God could not be. 
The impression was that the Societies Act might be amended to allow the revival of the 
de- registered UMNO.79 This was on 14 February, one day after Mahathir resubmitted a 
fresh application for setting up a new party and apparently intended to disguise 
Mahathir's real intentions. Finally, the application was approved by the Registrar of 
Societies on 15 February and Mahathir announced that a new political party - 
Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu (Baru) or United Malays National 
Organization (New) - had been officially registered. The new party, hereafter UMNO 
(Rani), was accepted as a member of the Barisan Nasional on the same day. It was 
widely believed that the Registrar of Societies, who was under the authority of the 
Home Minister, informed Mahathir of the status of the old UMNO before Mahathir 
submitted a new application in the name of UMNO (Baru).80 
The formation of a new party provided Mahathir with another great opportunity 
for strengthening his political power since replacing all dissident cabinet members with 
the newly appointed Mahathir loyalists immediately after the April 24 party election. 
Again, Mahathir was quite exclusive when forming the pro -tem committee for the new 
party. As expected, most elected supreme council members allied to Team B were not 
included in the UMNO (Baru) pro -tern committee.81 A senior UMNO (Baru) official 
said the members of the UMNO (Baru) pro -tem committee were strictly limited to 
Mahathir loyalists and were all hand- picked. With this hand -picked pro -tern committee, 
Mahathir could ensure that all the divisions and branches of UMNO (Baru) were filled 
by his own people from the very beginning.82 It was believed that at least 33 former 
UMNO divisional heads were excluded from the new party's pro -tem divisions. As 
shown in Table 5 -1, many former UMNO leaders were dropped as divisional heads in 
UMNO (Baru) because either they were associated with Team B leaders during the last 
UMNO elections or they failed to show their loyalty to Mahathir after the elections. 
79 See Aliran Monthly, 1987:7(12), pp. 3 -7 ("Commentary on the UMNO Saga ") and NST, 7 December 
1988. 
85In this context, Team B leaders argued that the registration of UMNO (Baru) was made unduly in favor 
of the ruling Mahathir faction to the detriment of the dissident factions in old UMNO. Interview with Rais 
Yatim, Kuala Lumpur, 4 February 1998. 
81 Those who were not in the UMNO (Baru) Supreme Council members from Team B were: former 
Welfare Minister Shahrir, former Minister in the Prime Minister's Department Ajib Ahmad, former 
Deputy Foreign Minister Abdul Kadir Sheikh Fadzir, former Deputy Energy, Posts and 
Telecommunication Minister Zainal Abidin Zin, former Deputy Home Affairs Minister Radzi Sheikh 
Ahmad, former Deputy Transport Minister Hajah Rahman Othman, and lawyer Marina Yusoff. See NST, 
22 February 1988. 
82 Interview with Ibrahim Saad, former Deputy Chief Minister of Penang and UMNO (Baru) Supreme 
Council member, Petaling Jaya, 19 February 1998. 
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Some of them were not even accepted as members of the new party. 
Table 5 -1. The 33 Divisions whose Heads were Replaced in UMNO (Baru) and Their Divisional 
Nominations during the 1987 UMNO Elections 
Division President Deputy -P Vice -President 
Balik Pulau Mahathir Ghafar Badawi Mokhtar Sanusi 
Baling Mahathir Ghafar Sanusi Anwar Mokhtar 
Jelebu(t) Mahathir Ghafar Badawi Rais Yatim Mokhtar 
Kangarz) Mahathir Ghafar Badawi Anwar Mokhtar 
Padang Terap Mahathir Ghafar Badawi Anwar Mokhtar 
Sepang Mahathir Ghafar Badawi Mokhtar Kamaruddin 
Sik Mahathir Ghafar Badawi Anwar Sanusi 
Sungai Siput Mahathir Ghafar Talib Anwar Sanusi 
Taiping Mahathir Ghafar Badawi Talib Sanusi 
Tanjung Karang Mahathir Ghafar Sanusi Kamaruddin Talib 
Bagan Serai(3) Mahathir Musa Badawi Talib Anwar 
Jelutong Mahathir Musa Badawi Sanusi Mokhtar 
Kulim- Bandar Batu Mahathir Musa Badawi Ghafar Sanusi 
Rasah Mahathir Musa Badawi Rais Yatim Mokhtar 
Bakri Razaleigh Musa Badawi Mokhtar Yusoff 
Batu Gajah Razaleigh Musa Badawi Rais Yatim Talib 
Besut Razaleigh Musa Badawi Rais Yatim Mokhtar 
Bruas Razaleigh Musa Ghafar Talib Sanusi 
Gua Musang* Razaleigh Musa none none none 
Kuala Krai Razaleigh Musa Badawi Ghafar Rithauddeen 
Kuala Nerus Razaleigh Musa Badawi Rais Yatim Mokhtar 
Ledang RazaIeigh Musa Badawi Anwar Ghafar 
Mersing Razaleigh Musa Badawi Ghafar Mokhtar 
Muar Razaleigh Musa Badawi Mokhtar Yusoff 
Puchong Razaleigh Musa Harun Idris Sanusi Anwar 
Raub Razaleigh Musa Badawi Yaakub Anwar 
Seremban Razaleigh Musa Badawi Rais Yatim Anwar 
Tanjung Razaleigh Musa Badawi Anwar Sanusi 
Tasek Chenderoh Razaleigh Musa Badawi Anwar Mokhtar 
Tasik Gelugor Razaleigh Musa Badawi Anwar Mokhtar 
Johor Baru Musa Razaleigh Badawi Harun Idris Mokhtar 
Kuantan* n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Pengkalan Chepa* none none none none none 
Source: Compiled from Malaysian Business, 01/04/1987, pp. 10 -12 and daily newspapers during March 
1988 to June 1988. 
Note: (1) Former Foreign Minister Rais Yatim (Team B) was the head of the division. 
(2) Former Deputy Primary Industries Minister Radzi Sheikh Ahmad (Team B) was the head of the 
division. 
(3) Former Deputy Energy, Telecommunication and Post Minister Zainal Abidin Zin (Team B) was 
the head of the division. 
* Gua Musang: no nominations for the vice -president post; Kuantan: null and void; Pengkalan 
Chepa: no nominations for all posts. 
Along with the exclusion of the dissident leaders from the pro -tern committee at 
national, state and divisional level, the ordinary membership to UMNO (Baru) was also 
limited only to those who supported Mahathir's leadership. Mahathir made it clear that 
the new party would not accept those who had rejected the election results of the old 
UMNO held on 24 April 1987.83 He also clarified that the pro -tern committee members 
and the supporters of U v1INO Malaysia would not be qualified as members of UMNO 
83 NST, 8 March 1988. 
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(Baru).84 In sum, UNLNO (Baru) was entirely formed around Mahathir's personality. 
Indeed, the formation of a new party provided a long -awaited opportunity for Mahathir 
to eliminate all his political rivals from the ruling political party's mainstream. In this 
context, the dissident leaders in the old UMNO argued that they were 'forced to become 
opposition' in the midst of Mahathir's leadership crisis.85 Likewise, Tunku Abdul 
Rahman criticized Mahathir's political behavior as follows: 
Dismissing or sacking people from any organization is a normal practice. It happens in every 
organization, but what Dr. Mahathir has done is to form a new party to do this.ß6 
Final Step: The End of the Legal Battle 
Although Mahathir had formed a new political party, the legal battle for the revival of 
the old UMNO continued. The 11 UMNO members filed their notice of appeal to the 
Supreme Court soon after the formation of UMNO (Baru).87 The main focus of their 
appeal to the Supreme Court was that the High Court should not have gone to the extent 
of deeming UMNO unlawful, but should have judged only the illegal branches to be 
unlawful and allowed their claim for fresh party elections. 
This appeal had enormous political significance, especially for the future of the 
UMNO (Baru) leadership. If the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the appellant, the legal 
status of the de- registered UMNO would be restored and Mahathir would have to 
contend with all his political enemies again for the party leadership at a fresh party 
election. The outcome might not be in the interests of the incumbent Mahathir faction.88 
Further, the odds seemed to be unfavorable for the incumbent UMNO (Baru) leadership 
due to rising tensions between the Mahathir government and the judiciary at that time. 
In the middle of the conflict between Mahathir and several independent judges, 
the Lord President Salleh Abas suddenly set 13 June 1988 as the date to hear the 
UMNO 11 case and stipulated that all nine judges of the Supreme Court would preside - 
the first case heard by a full panel in Malaysian history. Four days later, however, the 
Lord President Salleh Abas was unexpectedly summoned by Mahathir and was 
suspended. Almost immediately after the suspension of Salleh Abas, the new Acting 
Lord President Abdul Hamid Omar postponed the case until August 1988. A few weeks 
later, five other Supreme Court judges were also suspended. Many Malaysians believed 
84 NST, 12 March 1988. 
85 Interview with Razaleigh Hamzah, Kuala Lumpur, 23 February 1998. There was an allegation at this 
time that members of the new UMNO would be required to swear allegiance to Mahathir. See Aliran 
Monthly, 1988:8(4), p. 40. 
86 The Star, 16 May 1988. 
87 NST, 20 February 1988. 
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that these five Supreme Court judges were critical of the suspension of the Lord 
President during the process of Salleh Abas's impeachment tribunal. Finally, on 8 
August 1988, the UMNO 11 case was heard not by a full panel but by the three 
remaining Supreme Court judges and two judges of the High Court nominated by the 
Acting Lord President. On the following day, 9 August, the Supreme Court dismissed 
the UMNO 11 case and the legal battle ended.89 
According to the official announcement from the Attorney General, Salleh Abas 
was dismissed from his post due to misbehavior as Lord President.90 However, Salleh 
Abas insisted that the crisis was precipitated by his decision to fix two particular cases - 
the UMNO 11 case and Karpal Singh's case - and that he had been victimized by 
Mahathir due to his alleged bias in the UMNO 11 case.9t His allegation about 
victimization by Mahathir was largely based on the contents of a private meeting with 
Mahathir on 27 May 1988. According to Salleh Abas, in a private meeting together with 
Ghafar, the Deputy Prime Minister, and Sallehuddin Mohamed, the Chief Secretary, 
Mahathir accused him of 'bias' and therefore he was 'not qualified to sit in UMNO [111 
cases'. Sallehuddin Mohamed meanwhile 'was writing in a note book'.92 Mahathir 
strongly denied that he had made such a remark. In an interview, Mahathir claimed that 
he was never 'prepared to discuss politics with a judge in those circumstances'.93 
Who lied about this matter? There is no way of clarifying conflicting allegations 
relating to the UMNO 11 case and the assault on the judiciary except their own verbal 
allegations 94 Therefore, circumstantial evidence and background factors at this time are 
89 Interview with Rais Yatim, Kuala Lumpur, 4 February 1998. 
S9 For more details on the relations between the suspension of the Lord President and the UMNO 11 case, 
see Salleh Abas, The Role of the Independent Judiciary (Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan A -Z Sdn. Bhd., 
1989), pp. 1 -51; Salleh Abas and K. Das, 1989; Raja Aziz Addruse, Conduct Unbecoming (Kuala 
Lumpur: Walrus Books, 1990), pp. 83 -88; Peter Alderidge Williams, Judicial Misconduct (Petaling Jaya: 
Pelanduk Publications, 1990), 26 -50; Means, 1991, pp. 234 -243; Rais Yatim, 1995, Chapter 7; Crouch, 
1996, pp. 137 -142; Aliran Monthly 1988:8(4) and 1988:8(5). 
90 There were five charges against Salleh Abas: a critical speech at the University of Malaysia on 1 
August 1987; a critical book -launching speech on 12 January 1988; adjourned sine die a case which 
involved the issue of a minor's choice of religion; the letter to the King and the Malay Rulers on 26 March 
1988, criticizing Mahathir's interference with the Malaysian judiciary; and various public statements after 
his suspension. For the full contents of the written charges by the Attorney General, see Aliran Monthly, 
1988:8(4), pp. 3 -5. 
91 Salleh Abas, 1989. 
92 Private notes made by Salleh Abas. For the full content of the private notes, see Aliran Monthly, 
1988:8(4), p. 7. 
93 For the full contents of Mahathir's interview, see Williams, 1990, pp. 229 -233. 
94 In defense of Mahathir's allegation, Williams criticized Salleh Abas's arguments on two grounds: 
Firstly, there was absolutely no evidence to support such an allegation except oral statements coming 
from Salleh Abas himself, and secondly, as a judge, Salleh Abas was in an improper position to influence 
the outcome of the appeal in the UMNO 11 case, therefore, Mahathir should not have mentioned the 
UMNO 11 case at the meeting. See, Williams, 1990, chapter 3. However, William has been criticized as 
his account revealed lack of understanding of the political context and ignorance of the background facts 
of the UMNO 11 case. See, Crouch, 1996, p. 140 and Raja Aziz Addruse, 1990, pp. 83 -88. 
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essential to any attempt to understand this matter. 
As mentioned earlier, the judgment of the Supreme Court would have affected 
the political future of the incumbent UMNO (Baru) Ieadership enormously if the 
decision had been made in favor of the appellants. More importantly, this would have 
seriously affected Mahathir's prime ministership according to the constitution of the old 
UMNO. The constitution prescribed that 'any of its members joining another political 
party would automatically cease to be its member'. Hence, according to the legalistic 
argument, it can be assumed that Mahathir, as the then pro -tern president of a new party, 
would lose his membership if the old UMNO recovered its legality. Mahathir's 
eligibility to be Prime Minister would then have been in question because it was an 
established convention for the UMNO president to become the Prime Minister of 
Malaysia.95 In this connection, the results of the 11 UMNO members' appeal would 
have affected the political survival of not only the party but also of Mahathir himself.96 
In fact, Mahathir strongly asserted that it was 'absolutely sure' that the old UMNO 
would 'never be revived unless the law is disregarded'.97 This was just a few days before 
the suspension of the Lord President. 
Bearing in mind the crucial significance of the UMNO 11 case, Mahathir 
seemed uncertain as to whether the impending legal battle in the Supreme Court would 
bring him a favorable result. It can be assumed that Mahathir was genuinely concerned 
that the Supreme Court might overturn the High Court's decision in the midst of 
growing tension between him and members of the judiciary.98 In fact, it was none other 
than Salleh Abas who had paved the way for the uneasiness between Mahathir and the 
judiciary. In November 1986, Salleh Abas overturned the High Court's decision over 
two correspondents of the Asian Wall Street Journal against the Mahathir government's 
withdrawal of their work permits.99 This was the starting point for growing tension 
between Mahathir and members of the judiciary over the next two or three years. 
To make matters worse, the tension between them deepened just before and after 
the High Court's judgment, and Salleh Abas as Lord President was supposed to preside 
99 Raja Aziz Addruse, 1990, p. 87. 
96 In fact, this is a very legalistic argument and politically it is quite unreal. Nevertheless, such a legal 
provision seemed to be significant at the time UMNO dissidents fought strongly for the revival of the old 
UMNO. 
97 NST, 22 May 1988. 
98 Rais Yatim, 1995, p. 331. 
99 For more details, see FEER, 13 November 1986 (Suhaini Aznam, "Journalist Reprieved "). Salleh 
Abas's judgment against the government was the reason why the Mahathir government amended the 
Printing Press Act soon after his judgment. According to the amendment, any decision by the Home 
Minister, Mahathir himself, to refuse to issue, revoke or suspend a license would be final and would not 
be reviewed by any court on any grounds whatsoever. See FEER, 14 January 1988 and Aliran Monthly, 
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over the UMNO 11 case in the Supreme Court. Sharpening tension between Mahathir 
and Salleh Abas was revealed in a critical response of Salleh Abas to Mahathir's attack 
on the 'fiercely independent' judges in January 1988. At a book launching ceremony on 
12 January 1988, Salleh Abas criticized Mahathir as follows: 
...some of the comments made recently [by Mahathir]... not only question our neutrality and 
independence but the very nature of it as an institution. It is very much to be regretted if a court 
decision is to be understood as an act of hostility against the government if it loses the case and as 
a proper decision if it wins it. Our responsibility of deciding the case "without fear or favor "... does 
not mean... that the court decision should, whatever happens, be in favor of the Government all the 
time.100 
Later, on 26 March 1988, Salleh Abas wrote a letter to the King, on behalf of all 
the judges of the country, which was circulated among the Malay rulers. In this letter, 
Salleh Abas claimed that Mahathir made 'the various comments and accusations' against 
the judiciary 'not only outside but within the Parliament'.101 
Given these circumstances, it was not surprising that the Mahathir government 
increased its assault on the judiciary. All the events which led to the suspension of the 
Lord President, however, happened 'at a frenzied pace'.102 As mentioned above, 
Mahathir summoned Salleh Abas to his office on 27 May 1988, just four days after he 
had fixed the hearing date of the UMNO 11 case Immediately after the private meeting 
with Mahathir, Salleh Abas received a letter from Mahathir informing him of the King's 
order that he be suspended from the Lord Presidency with effect from 26 May 1988, a 
day before the meeting with Mahathir. And it was the very first task of the Acting Lord 
President to postpone the UMNO 11 case on the same day Salleh Abas received the 
letter. 
To sum up, the suspension of the Lord President and the challenge to judicial 
independence seemed to be largely a by- product of the legal battle over the UMNO 
crisis, although the events were in part linked to the mutually uneasy relationship 
between Mahathir and the judiciary. As a consequence, Mahathir's new loyalist party 
became the only registered party which could claim the old UMNO's legacies. 
1988:8(3), pp. 10 -11. 
100 Cited in Salleh Abas, 1989, p. 145. 
101 See Salleh Abas, 1989:152. It is believed, based on the initial statement issued by the Prime Minister's 
Department on 31 May 1988, that the primary reason for Salleh Abas's sacking was closely related to his 
letter to the King and the Malay. For the full text of Salleh Abas's letter, see Salleh Abas, 1989, pp. 150 - 
I53. Mahathir's view on the judiciary was well expressed in an interview with Time magazine as follows: 
'If we [the Mahathir government] find out that a Court always throws us out on its interpretation, if it 
interprets contrary to why we made the law, then we will have to find a way of producing a law that will 
have to be interpreted according to our wish.' (Time, 24 November 1986; as cited by Salleh Abas, 
1989:9). 
102 Rais Yatim, 1995, p. 330. 
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5 -5. The Recovery of Old UMNO Legacies and Making UMNO (Baru)'s New 
Legacies 
Mahathir made two main efforts to strengthen his political position after he formed the 
new party. One was to recover the strong psychological and physical attachments of the 
Malays to his new party. The other was to create new legacies within the different 
political configuration. 
The Recovery of the Old UMNO's Legacies 
In order to recover the old UvINO's legacies, a series of necessary and systematic 
measures was taken to identify UMNO (Baru), as the patron party of the Malays, with 
the old UMNO_ 
Firstly, along with the pre -emption of the term 'UMNO', the first move to 
identify, or rather confuse, the new party with the old UMNO came with UMNO 
(Baru)'s new flag and symbol. Minimum alterations had been made to the old UMNO 
flag design so that UMNO (Baru)'s flag and symbol were almost identical to those of 
the old UMNO as shown below: 
The OId Flag The New Flag The Old Symbol The New Symbol 
Source: New Straits Times, 22 February 1988 
Secondly, the new party gradually removed the term Baru and called itself 
UMNO, like the de- registered old UMNO. During a membership drive in July 1988, the 
UMNO (Baru) Information Chief, Senator Hussein, officially directed party members to 
drop the word Baru on banners and other documents. He argued that the term Baru was 
not used when the new party was registered with the Registrar of Societies. Although 
the Malay version was Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu (Baru), the English 
name remained as United Malays National Organization. Accordingly, he claimed that 
it was wrong to use the word Baru.103 One week later, Mahathir admitted that he 
registered the party as UMNO (Baru) but 'there is no need to call it by that name, just 
toi The Star, 11 July 1988. 
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refer to it as UMNO'.10' Considering that most Malays had, and still have, a strong 
emotional attachment to the magic name of UMNO, it was important to use the same 
name in order to make headway among old UMNO members not only physically but 
also psychologically. 
UMNO (Baru) leaders' steps to drop the word Baru provoked a strong reaction 
from the dissident factions in the old UMNO.105 Initially, as a result of a legal complaint 
by two former UMNO members, the High Court, on 5 August 1988, placed an interim 
injunction on two newspapers - Utusan Melayu and New Straits Times - requiring them 
to refer to the party as UMNO (Baru), not UMNO. The Supreme Court, however, 
eventually lifted the interim injunction upon Utusan Melayu on 19 October 1988 and set 
aside the High Court's order requiring New Straits Times to use the word Baru on 31 
October 1988.106 Immediately after this, the word Baru was dropped from all 
newspapers when they referred to the new party. 
Thirdly, during its first general assembly on 31 October 1988, Mahathir decided 
to celebrate the anniversary of UMNO (Baru) on 11 May, the foundation date of the old 
UMNO, not on 4 February, the actual registration date of the new party. In the same 
way, the UMNO (Baru) general assembly agreed that the term of the supreme council 
members would be continued only until 31 December 1990, the same expiration date as 
the old UMNO supreme council members.107 As Means mentions, gradually but 
systematically, the political transmigration' of symbolic legacies from the old UMNO to 
Mahathir's new party was completed, as if the new party was merely a continuation of 
the old party.108 
Finally, the real transfer of old UMNO's legitimacy as the patron of the Malays 
appeared in its aggressive membership drive during the first year of UMNO (Baru). 
Unlike various symbolic features - name, flag and symbol - the membership drive was 
directly related to the recovery of the assets of the de- registered UMNO.109 To begin 
with, soon after the creation of the new party, the Mahathir government tabled an 
amendment to the Societies Act on 15 March 1988. Although several other amendments 
were proposed to the Societies Act, the primary concern seemed to be to allow a 
The Star, 17 July 1988. 
105 For more details, see FEER, 14 April 1988 (Suhaini Aznam, "Mine, yours or ours ? ") and Aliran 
Monthly, 1988:8(5), pp. 33 -35 (Tunku Abdul Rahman, "Abuse of Power: Tunku on the Current Crisis "). 
106 NST, 1 November 1988. 
`57 NST, 31 October 1988. 
10s Means, 1991, p. 230. 
109 The estimated $1 billion assets of the old UMNO had been placed under the custody of the Official 
Assignee since the de- registration of the old UMNO by the High Court in February 1988. For the details, 
see FEER, 10 March 1988 (Nick Seaward, "UMNO's Who Owns What "). 
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favorable and smooth transfer of various properties and share -holdings from the de- 
registered UMNO to the UMNO (Baru) of Mahathir.Ito According to the amendment, 
without accepting all the former members as new members, the new party could still 
claim all the assets and liabilities, as long as it had the backing of the majority of 
members, at least 50 per cent, from the old party. After the amendment of the Societies 
Act, it was a natural step that UMNO (Baru) leaders repeatedly claimed that the 
membership of the old UMNO had been highly overestimated. It was in this light that 
Mahathir claimed that the total membership of the old UMNO had not reach the claimed 
1 4 million but was less than 1 million 111 Similarly, Mohamed Rahmat, then secretary - 
general of UMNO (Baru), announced that the old UMNO merely had between 800,000 
and 900,000 members before it was de- registered in February 1988. He insisted that the 
total membership of the old UMNO was overestimated mainly due to double 
membership.112 Nevertheless, it was widely believed that the reduction of the estimated 
membership of the old L'MNO was directly linked to the smooth transfer of assets to 
UMNO (Baru). Ironically, Mohamed Rahmat announced again that the total 
membership of the old UMNO was 1,326,627 after UMNO (Baru) successfully 
recovered almost 80 per cent of the old UMNO members.113 
Various methods were used to attract the maximum number of the old UMNO 
members. In its typical way, the Mahathir government organized a year -long series of 
public rallies, the so- called 'Semarak Movement', throughout the country. Of course, 
most public rallies were sponsored by federal and state funds. It was widely 
acknowledged that the public rallies were closely coordinated with the UMNO (Baru) 
membership drive to obtain the majority of the old UMNO members.114 The various 
advantages of incumbency were also openly utilized for the same purpose. For example, 
the reappointment of village chiefs and other influential officials was used by state 
11° According to the amendments to Section 12 (3) of the Societies Act, only the branches of a society 
would be declared unlawful if the branches were set up improperly. In addition, the amended Societies 
Act allowed discretionary powers for the Registrar of Societies to determine the purpose of a client 
seeking to inspect documents. As a result, the Registrar of Societies, who is subordinate to the Ministry of 
Home Affairs - of which Mahathir was Minister, could effectively prevent Team B from inspecting the 
old UMNO documents. For more detailed explanations, see NST, 15 March 1988; The Star, 3 April 1988; 
NST, 4 April 1988; and FEER, 24 March 1988 (Suhaini Aznam "Multi- Fronted Battle "). 
111 Berita Harian, 25 June 1988. 
112 The Star, 3 August 1988. According to Mohamed Rahmat, the investigation by UMNO (Baru) showed 
that some members of the old UMNO were registered with two or three branches. This was mainly 
because the old UMNO had no proper registration list of its members and the total numbers were only 
based on the annual membership fees received. And the payment for the annual membership fee was 
made by the branch heads in many cases. Therefore, sometimes the rich branch heads registered more 
than one person as a member in order to send more members to be represented at the party general 
assembly. 
13 NST, 14 February 1989. 
114 For more details about the Semarak Movement, see Means, 1991, pp. 229 -230. 
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governments to woo, and/or threaten, the current village chiefs or leaders to support 
UMNO (Baru). In a clear case, Johor Menteri Besar Muhyiddin Yassin, who was also 
the Johor UMNO (Baru) state chief, announced that village chiefs who refused to join 
the new party would not be re- appointed when their terms came to an end. In the same 
way, he promised that positions on the kampung development and security committees 
would be granted only to UMNO (Baru) members or sympathizers,115 
Meanwhile, the UMNO (Baru) leadership made a more direct threat to the 
former UMNO members who were reluctant to join UMNO (Baru). The UMNO (Baru) 
secretary -general Mohamed Rahmat, who was also Information Minister, openly 
warned Team B UMNO members that they would be obliged to bear all debts incurred 
by the old UMNO if they failed to join the new party within a limited time, whereas 
UMNO (Baru) members need not worry as they had signed forms handing over assets 
or liabilities to the Official Assinee.116 Without revealing the exact amount of assets or 
liabilities, he claimed that the debts of the de- registered UMNO had been estimated to 
exceed its assets.117 
Due to the various incentives and warnings used to maximize membership of 
UMNO (Baru), it was estimated that 1,055,348 people (about 82 per cent of the 
membership of the old UMNO) applied to join UMNO (Baru) whereas only 231,097 of 
the old UMNO members had not registered as new members by 12 January 1989. The 
membership in two states - Terengganu and Kedah - had even exceeded the original 
numbers in the old UMNO. At divisional level, four divisions - Baling, Kuala Nerus, 
Marang and Dungun - had doubled their original membership while another five 
divisions - Sik, Setiu, Kuala Terengganu, Puchong and Jasin - increased about 150 per 
cent in membership compared to the old UMNO. As a whole, 82 divisions had 
increased membership by more than 50 per cent while 17 - 13 in Johor and 4 in 
Kelantan - increased less than 50 per cent.118 It seemed that UMNO (Baru) achieved 
more than its original target during the first year of its membership drive as shown in 
Table 5 -2, even though there were some 'double applications'.119 
"s The Star, 14 February 1989. 
116 The new amendment to the Societies Act also suggested that an old member who objected to joining 
the new party would be not only be compensated for his or her share of the net assets of the old party but 
also liable for his or her shares of the debts. 
"' NST, 16 January 1989. 
"s Berita Harian, 18 January 1989. 
u9 Mohamed Rahmat said the original target was between 700,000 and 800,000 when UMNO (Baru) was 
formed to replace the old UMNO (The Star, 7 April 1989). About the double applications, Mohamed 
Rahmat admitted that about 8,000 people submitted two sets of membership application forms. Half of 
the double applications were from Johor (The Star, 30 January 1990). 
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-2. Chanced Number of Membership between old UMNO and UMNO (Baru) (12/01/1989) 
_ 
b 
Old UMNO New UMNO Variation ( %) 
Terengganu 59,349 99,505 167.7 
Kedah 131,566 135,639 103.1 
Pahang 102,243 97,230 95.1 
Selangor 152,922 136,871 89.5 
Penang 68,699 60,504 88.1 
Melaka 52,688 46,285 87.8 
Federal Territory 48,122 40,521 84.2 
Negeri Sembilan 92,821 75,522 81.4 
Perak 139,350 137,795 98.9 
Kelantan 136,559 93,586 68.5 
Perlis 30,676 19,225 62.7 
Johor 271,450 112,665 41.5 
Total 1,286,445 1,055,348 82.0 
Source: Modified from Berita Harian, 18 January 1989 
A year later (by January 1990), membership of UMNO (Baru) increased by 
about 10 per cent compared to the old UMNO. Among 12 states, only 4 - Johor (83 %), 
Penang (97 %), Perak (92 %), and Negeri Sembilan (81 %) - could not reach the level of 
the old UMNO.120 With the recruitment of a majority of former members, UMNO 
(Baru) was able to claim all the assets registered in the name of the de- registered 
UMNO from the Official Assignee. Along with the political transmigration of the 
symbolic legacies of the old UMNO, the successful membership drives enabled 
Mahathir's UMNO (Baru) to recover the financial resources needed to provide 
patronage to its clients. 
Making UMNO (Baru)'s New Legacies 
Open competition for the top posts of the party, as occurred in 1981, 1984 and 1987, 
had become a new tradition in UMNO politics and the role of the political party 
therefore was enhanced since Mahathir took over. Electoral competitiveness in UMNO 
during the early Mahathir years was a key democratic feature of the Malaysian political 
system. However, as mentioned earlier, such electoral competitiveness resulted less 
from the party leadership's strong commitment to democracy than from the relative 
weakness of Mahathir's political position within the party. As a result, Mahathir 
suffered a challenge from well -organized dissident factions within the party. 
It can be assumed that Mahathir had felt the necessity of limiting electoral 
competitiveness and factionalism in the new political configuration. In the light of this 
consideration, he stressed, in a speech just a few months before the first of the divisional 
120 More details of membership comparison between the old UMNO and UMNO (Baru) up to January 
1990 are as follows: Perlis (105 %), Kedah (130 %), Kelantan (113 %), Terengganu (190 %), Pahang 
(113 %), Selangor (106 %), Federal Territory (103 %), Melaka (108 %). Compiled from Berita Harian, 24 
January 1990. 
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elections of UMNO (Baru), the importance of the 'no- contest tradition' for the 
leadership of the old UMNO during the 1960s and 1970s.121 This was followed by 
strong advice to the party members to 'avoid contests' at the first branch and divisional 
elections in 1989 to prevent a possible split in the party.122 Mahathir's advice appears to 
have been heeded as almost 70 per cent of the total UMNO (Baru) division heads - 93 
out of 133 - retained their posts without contest in the divisional elections in 1989.123 
Further, 86 out of 93 who were returned unopposed were incumbents. Besides, more 
than half of the contested divisions were also retained by the existing division heads. To 
sum up, 110 out of 133 divisions were retained by the incumbent division heads who 
had been appointed by Mahathir when he formed the new party in February 1988. 
Furthermore, most of the new division heads were also regarded as pro -Mahathir 
people. This marked a practical turning point towards a new tradition - reducing 
politicking or de- politicization, in the Malaysian political system in the 1990s. 
The initial steps to reduce politicking, however, were taken much earlier. During 
the first special supreme council meeting of UMNO (Baru) on 14 April 1988, three key 
proposals were approved in an effort to cut down rampant internal politicking.124 These 
were finally added to the newly amended UMNO (Baru) constitution in October 1988 
during the first UMNO (Baru) general assembly. 
Firstly, the elections for the top two positions of the Youth and Wanita wings 
were abolished. Hence, for the first time in UMNO politics, the heads and deputy heads 
of the Youth and Wanita wings were to be appointed by the party president among 
division heads, with the concurrence of the supreme counci1.125 
Secondly, the branch and divisional elections were carried out triennially not 
121 The Star, 12 May 1989. 
122 The Star, 15 June 1989. Mahathir's advice was then followed by many party leaders' in their 
supporting statements. For examples, see The Star, 17 June 1989 (Youth chief Najib Tun Razak's 
statement); The Star, 19 June I989 (Wanita chief Rafidah's statement); NST, 19 June 1989 (Vice - 
president Anwar's statement); and NST, 19 June 1989 (Negeri Sembilan Menteri Besar Mohamad Isá s 
statement). 
70 per cent was an unusually high number especially at a time when an early general election was 
widely expected, compared to the bitterly fought 1986 divisional election which was held prior to the 
general election. For more details of the results of the divisional elections in 1989, see The Star, 10 
September 1989. 
124 Among the other rejected proposals were: reclassification of the status of the Youth and Wanite as a 
bureau not as a national movement; appointment of the branch and divisional leaders by the party 
president; and automatic 10 bonus -votes system for the posts of divisional head and its deputy. 
125 Many division leaders and delegates, however, believed that the appointment of the Youth and Wanita 
national leadership was a temporary expedient until the internal situation was calmer while they claimed 
the appointment for the posts of division level was unnecessary. After all, later in November 1991, the 
party constitution was amended to allow the heads and deputy heads of the Youth and Wanita wings to be 
elected. See NST, 7 November 1991. 
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biennially as in the old UMNO.126 
Thirdly, a new voting system was introduced for the election of the party 
president and deputy president. This was called the '10 bonus -votes system'. Under the 
new voting system, any person nominated by a division for the party presidency and 
deputy presidency would automatically receive 10 extra votes. These 10 extra votes 
from each divisional nomination were to be added to the actual number of votes secretly 
cast by the delegates at the triennial party election. As a result, an extra 1,330 votes 
were created from the total of 133 UMNO (Baru) divisions in addition to the original 
1,479 votes case by the 11 delegates from each divisions. Considering the total number 
of extra votes (47.3 per cent of the total 2,809 votes), it was a decisive factor in the 
contest for the party president and deputy.127 This was a by- product of Mahathir's 
frustration over the 1987 UNLVO election when individual delegates voted against 
candidates nominated by their division in secret ballots. The introduction of the 
automatic 10 bonus -votes system was widely viewed as a step to consolidate Mahathir's 
political grip as incumbent because it was anticipated that anti -Mahathir divisions 
would not want to openly oppose him at the nomination stage. 
Finally, UMNO (Baru) also amended the party constitution to stop party 
members from going to court to resolve internal party issues. While the party members 
could directly appeal to the judiciary in the old UMNO, in the UMNO (Baru) taking 
internal party matters to court would lead to expulsion. In addition, anyone opposing the 
supreme council's decision would be taken to the disciplinary committee of the party. 
5 -6. A Return to 'Normalcy' 
As UMNO (Baru) was successfully built around Mahathir's dominance, he needed a 
tactical change to soften his intransigent image to a more accommodative one as the 
battle with the UMNO dissidents was moving towards the political Ievel. For Mahathir, 
this change was necessary because one of the key criticisms of the UMNO dissidents 
focused on his uncompromising leadership style. Moreover, their attack on Mahathir's 
leadership style was appealing to voters and the political battle seemed more fierce than 
the legal battle as dissident UMNO factions were forced into open opposition. They 
planned a series of by- elections to gauge the political legitimacy of Mahathir's new 
'u There was a proposal that the branch and divisional leaders be appointed by the party president. This 
proposal, however, was rejected by the UMNO (Baru) special assembly. 
122 The JempoI division in Negeri Sembilan proposed that candidates for the posts of divisional head and 
their deputies also receive 10 automatic votes. However, this proposal was rejected by the UMNO (Baru) 
special assembly. The special assembly also rejected a proposal by the Tambun division in Perak that 
Youth and Wanita leaders at division and branch levels be appointed. 
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party in terms of political influence at the grass -roots level. 
The turning point in Mahathir's strategy was the Johor Baru parliament by- 
election on 25 August 1988, the first electoral battle between UMNO (Baru) and the 
dissident groups in the old UMNO.'28 The Johor Baru by- election was held because 
Shahrir, who refused to join UMNO (Baru), vacated his parliamentary seat and forced 
the by- election to test Mahathir's new party.129 The Johor Baru by- election had 
enormous political significance because of its racially mixed urban voters (48.2 per cent 
Malay, 40.7 per cent Chinese, 8 per cent Indians and 3.1 per cent others). In this crucial 
battle, Shahrir, as an independent candidate from Team B in the old UMNO, gained 
23,581 (64.6 per cent of the total votes) while the UMNO (Baru) candidate received 
only 10,968 (29.8 per cent). In the 1986 general election, Shahrir, as an UMNO 
candidate, had obtained 19,346 (51.8 per cent of the total votes) while a PSRM 
candidate had taken 17,114 (45.8 per cent),139 It was widely believed that Shahrir had 
won a substantial share of the Malay vote although Chinese support was also 
impressive, especially from DAP. Due to UMNO (Baru)'s crushing defeat in this first 
political battle, Mahathir seemed to experience a loss in standing as a national leader. 
This was mainly because one of the key issues during the Johor Baru by- election was 
Mahathir's leadership style. While the BN component parties focused election issues on 
development and unity and tried to downplay the by- election itself as just another by- 
election to fill only one vacancy in a 177 -member parliament, it was Mahathir himself 
who brought the key issue back to his intransigent leadership style.131 
It was in this context that Mahathir's uncompromising attitude started to change 
before another crucial by- election in Pant Raja, Johor, on 20 October 1988. The Parit 
Raja state assembly by- election was the second battle for support between the old and 
128 In fact, the first electoral test for UMNO (Baru) was the Tanjung Puteri state assembly by- election in 
Johor Bans, where Malays formed the majority of voters, on 5 March 1988 (NST, 20 February 1988). The 
UMNO (Baru) candidate, Yunos, was returned to the state assembly seat in one of the closest electoral 
battles in Malaysian electoral history. He won by a 31 vote majority against a PSRM candidate, compared 
with 506 in the 1986 general election. UMNO dissidents did not contest this Tanjung Puteri by- election. 
129 Three UMNO MPs - Shahrir Abdul Samad (Johor Baru), Tawfik Tun Ismael (Sungai Benut), and 
Radzi Sheikh Ahmad (Kangar) - announced their decisions to become independent MPs on April 18, May 
8 and May 14 respectively. The UMNO (Baru) supreme council then decided to recommend to the BN 
supreme council that all MPs and State Assembly members from the old UMNO who refused to join 
UMNO (Baru) should be expelled from the BN. They included 100 old UMNO members, including MPs 
and State Assemblymen. By the middle of 1988, at least 16 MPs and 10 State Assembly members had 
been expelled from the BN. For details on the independent MPs, see The Star, 15 May 1988; The Star, 20 
May 1988; NST, 22 May 1988; NST, 23 May 1988; The Star, 10 June 1988; and The Star, 11 June 1988. 
13° The DAP did not contest the by- election and asked its supporters to vote for Shahrir. This must be the 
first time the DAP had campaigned for someone Iinked to UMNO. For more details of the comparison 
between the 1986 general election and the 1988 by- election, see The Star, 4 September 1988 (Mohamed 
Sopiee, "The JB Polls: How They Voted and Why "). Also see NSTP Research and Information Services, 
Elections in Malaysia: Facts and Figures (Kuala Lumpur: NSTP, 1990), p. 123 and p. 167. 
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new configurations of UMNO.132 Like the Johor Bans by- election, the main issue was 
Mahathir's leadership style. But, unlike Johor Baru, Pant Raja was overwhelmingly 
Malay in composition. For Mahathir, if UMNO (Baru) were to Iose the Pant Raja by- 
election, it would not be just a second loss but a fatal blow to his claim for majority 
support among the Malay constituencies. In this connection, on 15 October 1988, 
Mahathir publicly announced the three decisions of the UMNO (Baru) supreme council 
regarding the dissident UMNO members. This was just four days before the Pant Raja 
by- election took place. Firstly, Mahathir lifted the ban on the former UMNO Ieaders 
and members who had earlier been blacklisted and barred from joining UMNO (Baru). 
They included the It UMNO members who had taken the party to court in February 
1988. Secondly, the three leaders of Team B in the old UMNO were given back their 
supreme council seats which they had won in the 1987 UMNO elections.133 Finally, 
Mahathir invited Razaleigh and Musa to join him and Ghafar for Malay unity talks.'34 
It is doubtful whether Mahathir was sincere in wanting to accommodate all his 
political foes at this time; rather his accommodative approach may have been no more 
than an election tactic before the crucial by- election. Mahathir's reconciliation move, 
however, at least softened his image as an intransigent national leader in contrast to the 
over -cautious response from Razaleigh and Musa.135 Mahathir's action seemed to appeal 
to many Malays who were unhappy with the continued acrimonious quarrel which 
would weaken the political interest of the Malays in the long run. In the Pant Raja by- 
election, the independent candidate from Team B was beaten by the UMNO (Baru) 
candidate by a very narrow majority of 413 votes, although it was widely believed that 
he was comfortably in the lead during the election campaign.136 
13' FEER, 8 September 1988. 
132 The Parit Raja state assembly seat in Johor fell vacant following the death of its assemblyman, Syed 
Zain Idrul Al- Shahab. 
133 These three were: former Minister in the Prime Minister's Department Ajib Ahmad, former Deputy 
Foreign Minister Kadir Sheikh Fadzir and former Pahang Menteri Besar Rahim Bakar. In fact, there had 
been a sign from the UMNO (Baru) leaders for reconciliation just before the Pant Raja by- election 
campaign started. For instance, Anwar, the then UMNO (Baru) vice president, mentioned that Mahathir's 
decision not to accept the 11 UMNO members and those who backed them was just a 'temporary 
arrangement' and UMNO (Baru) was prepared to accept those dissident members based on certain 
conditions. See The Star, 1 October 1988. 
134 The Star, 16 October 1988. 
135 With respect to the proposed unity talks with Mahathir, Musa immediately said that Mahathir's action 
could be a political ploy (The Star, 18 October 1988). Razaleigh was also very cautious about the 
sincerity of Mahathir's offer of reconciliation talks. Finally, a few days later, Razaleigh decided to reject 
the invitation after meeting with the UMNO dissidents, including Musa (NST, 23 October 1988). As a 
rationale for the rejection, Razaleigh claimed that Mahathir's invitation was nothing but a political ploy to 
lure former members of the old UMNO into joining UMNO (Baru). Nonetheless, Razaleigh worried that 
his rejection of Mahathir's offer was misconstrued as being anti -unity at the time. 
136 See NSTP, 1990, p.168. After the Pant Raja by- election, there were 13 by- elections prior to the 1990 
general election. The UMNO (Baru) -led BN was successful in twelve by- elections. For more details, see 
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Mahathir repeated this tactic on the final day of the first UMNO (Baru) general 
assembly on 30 October 1988. In striking contrast to the aggressive and hostile attitudes 
against the dissident groups shown by most division leaders and delegates, Mahathir 
offered an unexpected invitation to Razaleigh and Musa to join his cabinet as Ministers 
without portfolio for the sake of Malay unity.137 Again, on 2 December 1988, in the 
wake of the rejection and/or hesitation by Razaleigh and Musa, Mahathir offered 
supreme council seats to five prominent critics of his leadership,138 
Razaleigh's and Musa's options seemed to be very limited at this time. Refusal 
of Mahathir's reconciliation offer might have been interpreted as proof of their 
unwillingness to support Malay unity. On the other hand, if they accepted the offer, they 
might have been accused of abandoning their struggle and the principles they had 
upheld for the last two years. To make matters worse, even if they decided to join the 
new party to continue their struggle, they would have to mn the risk of being 
marginalized in the new configuration of UMNO (Baru). This was mainly because the 
new party was already built around Mahathir's personality and it was not until all the 
key posts were occupied by Mahathir's people that his conciliatory gesture was offered 
to his political foes.139 Razaleigh and Musa faced a dilemma as Mahathir eventually 
consolidated his position and authority within the new party and the government. Due to 
their shared antipathy towards Mahathir's leadership, Musa joined what was popularly 
known as Team B, but the movement was overwhelmingly dominated by Razaleigh. In 
fact, it would be a misnomer to describe their relations as a Razaleigh -Musa alliance 
due to the mutual distrust and disagreement between them as well as their supporters. 
Musa's continued role as a junior partner had been under question since the April 
24 UMNO election. While Razaleigh turned his back irreversibly on UMNO (Baru) and 
risked his political fortunes by attempting to revive the old UMNO, Musa remained in 
UMNO (Baru) and was rewarded with appointment as UMNO (Baru)'s divisional 
NSTP, 1990, pp. 168 -170 and NSTP Research and Information Services, Elections in Malaysia: A 
Handbook of Facts and Figures on the Elections 1955 -1990 (Kuala Lumpur: NSTP, 1994), pp. 61 -62. 
137 The Star, 31 October 1988. The first UMNO (Baru) general assembly seemed to be a deliberately 
designed drama. Just one day before Mahathir's adjournment speech to the general assembly, one delegate 
after another took the rostrum to denounce the dissident UMNO leaders and members. It was evident to 
any observer that 'non- compromising with the dissident UMNO factions' was the main theme in most 
delegates' speeches representing various party organization. Some delegates even urged Mahathir to arrest 
the splinters of the old UMNO in order to ensure the security of the nation. For details, see The Star, 30 
October 1988. 
138 The five members were: former Welfare Minister Shahrir, former Deputy Primary Industries Minister 
Radzi Sheikh Ahmad, former Deputy Transport Minister Rahmah Osman, former Deputy Energy, 
Telecommunications and Posts Minister Zainal Abidin Zin and lawyer Marina Yusoff. These people were 
regarded as die -hard members of the old UMNO. All five were elected supreme council members of the 
de- registered UMNO and were rejected as members of the new UMNO supreme council. 
139 Interview with Ibrahim Saad, Petaling Jaya, 19 February 1998. 
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chairman in Segamat.140 He resigned later and left UMNO (Baru) to seek his political 
future as an independent. He then supported his protege Shahrir in the Johor Baru by- 
election and was able to enhance his political image as a leader who brought victory to 
the independent candidate. A few weeks after the Johor Baru by- election, Musa 
proposed reconciliation talks to Mahathir but Razaleigh's faction was unhappy with the 
way the call for unity was made by Musa.141 Various reasons could he given for their 
discordance depending on whom we speak to. Razaleigh's supporters argued that Musa 
had not been consistent in his opposition to Mahathir's new party; as a team player, he 
had often been fickle and even 'dubious'.142 On the other hand, those aligned with Musa 
said that the two groups had always differed in their approach to the problem. In this 
context, Musa himself insists that he 'was associated [with them] for convenience'. 143 
Therefore, the fragile Razaleigh -Musa partnership was seriously tested by 
Mahathir's gesture of appeasement in October 1988. Further, Mahathir started to 
separate Musa's faction from the dissident group at this time. In this context, Mahathir 
announced in public that he had received written replies from Razaleigh and Musa 
about his offer to appoint them as cabinet ministers. Mahathir said that Razaleigh had 
rejected his offer whereas Musa had indicated several possible bases for reconciliation 
and the restoration of Malay unity in the new party rather than directly rejecting his 
offer.144 
Given the circumstances of mutual distrust, it was at the Johor Malay unity 
14° There were clear signs that Razaleigh's camp was not interested in reconciling its differences with 
UMNO (Baru) but was more preoccupied with the task of gearing itself for a fresh general election. 
According to Harakah, RazaIeigh's camp wanted to rule the country and was, therefore, prepared to ally 
itself with PAS to topple the Barisan Government even before they had officially formed a new political 
party (Harakah, 7 October 1988). Especially in Kelantan, Terengganu, Pahang, Kedah and Perak, the 
Razaleigh group had been making strenuous efforts to invite discussions for the setting up of an 
opposition front to topple the Barisan National. The state leaders of Razaleigh's group had been directed 
to approach PAS leaders to discuss the formation of an opposition front or Barisan Bans (Harakah, 30 
September 1988, "UMNO'46 Woos PAS "). In a speech at a gathering in October, Razaleigh even said that 
he would not join UMNO (Baru), even though he was born again (The Star, 10 October 1988). 
141 There was an allegation that Musa had 'hijacked' the idea of reconciliation talks with Mahathir from 
Razaleigh. Initially, the issue of reconciliation was discussed by Razaleigh in a speech at a gathering of 
Team B leaders in the middle of 1988. At that time, the view of Team B leaders was that 'the negotiations 
should have been initiated by the ruling party as they have the authority to implement whatever decisions 
are made in the discussions'. Therefore, when Musa proposed a call for Malay unity to Mahathir, 
Razaleigh's followers were unhappy with Musa's unpredictable and even capricious move, although 
Razaleigh had given his blessings to the Musa's proposal. This allegation was originally written in the 
weekly Mingguan Kota (18 September 1988) and was reported again in NST, 26 September 1988. 
'42Interview 
with Rais Yatim, Kuala Lumpur, 4 February 1998. 
143 Interview with Musa Hitam, Kuala Lumpur, 13 February I998. 
144 The Star, 3 December 1988. It was widely known that both of them turned down Mahathir's invitation. 
Immediately after the offer was made, Musa rejected it because its sincerity was questionable. Also, he 
insisted that the cabinet offer had no connection with the question of Malay unity. On the other hand, 
Razaleigh proposed a second Malay National Congress including all Malay political organizations, like 
the one held in 1946 under the leadership of Dato Onn Jaafar, rather than a meeting of the four leaders 
only. See The Star, 23 October 1988. 
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forum, held on 18 December 1988, that relations between the two dissident groups 
worsened and eventually led to the termination of their ill- matched teamwork. 
Ostensibly, the Johor Malay unity forum was initiated by 51 Malay organizations in 
Johor Baru to re -unite the UMNO dissidents and UMNO (Baru). However, it was 
widely believed that the unity forum was initiated by the Johor faction of UMNO 
dissidents led by Musa. At the unity forum, 170 delegates unanimously passed a six - 
point resolution for Malay unity. The six -point resolution called for: restoration of the 
former UMNO constitution; the automatic acceptance of former UMNO members; 
reinstatement of former branch and divisional leaders; acceptance of the UMNO 
national leadership elected on 24 April 1987; legal steps to ensure there was only one 
UMNO for the Malays; and the creation of a political environment conducive to Malay 
unity and solidarity.145 As expected, the six -point resolution appeared to echo Musa s 
approach. 
Razaleigh's supporters argued that the unity forum's purpose was to undermine 
the position of Razaleigh and his supporters. They maintained it was a deliberate step 
initiated by the Johor faction of the UMNO dissidents to prepare a face -saving excuse 
for them to join the new party. A former deputy minister from the Razaleigh group even 
claimed that the unity forum itself was planned and sponsored by UMNO (Baru).146 
The UMNO (Baru) supreme council decided to accept the six -point resolution. 
According to Mahathir's statement, however, the acceptance of the six -point resolution 
would be implemented within the framework of the existing provisions of the UMNO 
(Baru) constitution. More importantly, the procedure for joining the new party, like 
automatic acceptance, applied only to the former UMNO members in Johor. Mahathir 
made it clear that UMNO (Baru) would not extend the same procedure to the other 
states.147 On 31 January 1989, Musa announced his decision to join UMNO (Baru). 
Therefore, the Razaleigh -Musa coalition, so- called Team B, was formally dissolved 
after a marriage of convenience lasting only 22 months. Later, automatic admission into 
UMNO (Baru) was extended to all other states.148 This decision, however, was not 
made until Razaleigh announced in public that there would be 'no more negotiations' 
and he would 'fight the existing leadership to the end'.149 
By accepting the six -point resolution, Mahathir and his new party were able to 
obtain several advantages. Firstly, Mahathir further softened his obstinate image and 
145 NST, 19 December 1988. 
'46 The Star, 25 December 1988. 
147 The Star, 14 January 1989. 
148 NST, 21 February 1989. 
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reduced the general anti -Mahathir mood. Secondly, UMNO (Baru) doubled its 
membership in Johor (from 41.5 per cent of the old UMNO membership in January 
1988 to 83 per cent in January 1989) due to the acceptance of the Johor dissidents. 
Thirdly, UMNO (Baru) successfully delivered the Malay votes to defeat the 
independent candidate, Harun Idris, at the Ampang Jaya parliamentary by- election, 
which was held just two weeks after the acceptance of the six -point resolution. Unlike 
the two previous by- elections, the Musa faction did not make any serious move to 
jeopardize the BN candidate during the Ampang Jaya by- election campaign. Finally, by 
separating Musa from Razaleigh, the political situation eventually took a favorable turn 
for Mahathir. Musa's defection from the anti -Mahathir front left very little room for 
Razaleigh to maneuver and put him in danger of being isolated and pushed to the 
periphery. More seriously, Musa's political influence would be eventually neutralized as 
he was absorbed into the new party. 
Efforts to marginalize the Musa faction started immediately after Musa joined 
UMNO (Baru). First of all, Ghafar proposed to the supreme council a time limit for the 
automatic admission of former members into the new party. There was, of course, no 
time limit when the UNLNO (Baru) supreme council accepted the Johor Malay unity 
forum's resolution. Besides, he made it clear that the applications 'have to be studied 
first' although they would not be rejected automatically.t5o Finally, the supreme council 
set 31 March 1989 as the deadline for the automatic admission of former UMNO 
members.I51 Thus, all applications for the entry to UMNO (Baru) were subjected to 
screening from 1 April 1989. 
Meanwhile, it seems that so- called 'delaying tactics' were deliberately practiced 
to prevent the return of certain former UNLNO leaders and members into UMNO (Baru). 
The shortage of membership forms was a typical ploy to delay and/or prevent the 
admission of former UMNO members.152 For example, Shahrir insisted that he received 
less than 2,000 membership forms while there were 3,717 former UMNO members in 
Johor Baru who wanted to join with hím.I53 Also, it was alleged that about 4,000 former 
UMNO members in Perak were prevented from rejoining UMNO (Baru) because of the 
149 The Star, 18 February 1989. 
'so The Star, 9 February 1989. 
151 NST, 5 March 1989. 
152 Ghafar later argued that two million forms were printed while UMNO (Baru) received only about 1.1 
million members up until March 1989. In the case of Johor, he mentioned that the party headquarters had 
sent about 450,000 forms but only about 170,000 application forms were received. See NST, 1 April 1989 
and The Star, 3 April 1989. 
153 Utusan Melayu, 2 March 1989. 
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shortage of membership forms.154 Regarding the reasons for the shortage of membership 
forms during this period, Muhyiddin Yassin, then Johor UMNO (Baru) chief, explained 
that it could be a result of some branch and division leaders keeping the forms for the 
purpose of future registration.155 The real background, however, was clearly revealed in 
the warning of Mohamad Rahmat, the then UMNO (Baru) secretary- general. He warned 
that certain groups were persuading as many former UMNO members as possible to 
return to UMNO (Baru) in order to undermine the party from the inside,156 
In addition, the reinstatement of former branch and divisional leaders, one of the 
six point resolutions, was not properly implemented because of the unwillingness of 
existing branch and divisional leaders. Rather, the UMNO (Baru) leaders made it clear 
that the old UMNO leaders could not be re- appointed to their former posts at the 
expense of the existing people.157 In these difficult circumstances, Shahrir's application 
to join UMNO (Baru) took almost five months after he submitted an application on 1 
March 1989. Even before the application, 42 of the 45 branches in the Johor Baru 
UMNO (Baru) division sent a memorandum to the state liaison committee rejecting 
Shahrir's return to the division:511 Shahrir's application was finally accepted on 29 July 
1989. This was just one week before the Tambatan state by- election in Johor on 5 
August 1989, the first election in which Razaleigh's supporters participated with a 
registered political party.159 However, it took another seven months for Shahrir to be 
reinstated as a Johor Baru division leader on 3 March 1990. Meanwhile, Musa had been 
sent abroad as Malaysia's special envoy to the UN in August 1989 before UMNO 
(Baru) held its general assembly in November 1989. At first glance, this appointment 
was regarded as a 'conciliatory step' by Mahathir or even as a sign of Musa's 
'rehabilitation'.16o However, as Case noted, it turned out to be 'a customary way of 
removing influential, but disloyal UMNO elites with minimal disruption'.161 
In the meantime, Mahathir made a gesture of appeasement towards Razaleigh 
and the remainder of the old UMNO. On 3 June 1989, Mahathir announced the 
im The Star, 20 March 1989. 
ss NST, 3 April 1989. 
'56 Se NST, 18 March 1989 and The Star, 14 April 1989. 
`57 For the examples of statements, see The Star, 13 February 1989 (Najib Tun Razak, UMNO (Baru) 
Youth chief); The Star, 15 February 1989 (Mohamed Khalil Yaakob, Pahang Menteri Besar); and The 
Star, 17 February 1989 (Muhyiddin Yassin, Johor Menterí Besar). 
158 The Star, 28 February 1989. 
159 For the relations between the acceptance of Shahrir and the Tambatan by- election in Johor, see The 
Star, 13 August 1989 (Mohamed Sopiee, "UMNO Move Helped to Win Tambatan "). 
16o FEER, 14 September 1989. 
161 Case, 1996, p. 224. Finally, restoration of the old UMNO constitution, one of the six points in the 
Johor Malay unity forum resolution, was also rejected by Mahathir. Mahathir made it clear that the 
UMNO (Baru)'s constitution would be amended from time to time rather than restore the old UMNO 
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acceptance of several dissidents, including Hamdan Yahya, the defeated independent 
candidate in the Pant Raja by- election. In a similar conciliatory gesture, on 11 
November 1989, Mahathir invited Tunku Abdul Rahman to attend the UMNO (Baru) 
general assembly where he publicly kissed his hand. Mahathir's invitation was viewed 
as a dramatic move mainly because this gesture was made just a few weeks after Tunku 
Abdul Rahman's scathing statement about Mahathir and UMNO (Baru).162 Again, 
during the UMNO (Baru) general assembly in November 1989, Mahathir reiterated his 
willingness to meet Razaleigh with a view to strengthen Malay unity. However, it was 
commonly believed that neither Mahathir nor Razaleigh was seriously considering 
Malay unity at that time. As to why Mahathir should reach out to the dissident group in 
a situation where he had secured most of the old UMNO members behind him, it seems 
that he needed to avoid blame for the failure of talks aimed at Malay unity, as the next 
general election was approaching soon. Whatever his motives, a series of conspicuous 
conciliatory gestures by Mahathir helped him to be perceived as a magnanimous leader 
seeking to end his differences with his opponents. 
5 -7. The 1990 General Election: The End of the Mahathir Controversy 
If the last three years were characterized by escalating intra- ethnic militancy within 
UMNO circles, the year 1990 was of broader significance for the Malaysian political 
system as another general election was approaching.163 Firstly, the October 1990 
general election was the first time Mahathir's new party had tested its popularity and 
political legitimacy at the national level. Mahathir himself needed a new mandate not 
only from the Malay community but also from the non -Malay electorate to put an end to 
the dispute over his national leadership. Secondly, for the first time in Malaysian 
electoral history, the ruling coalition faced a challenge by opposition coalitions led by 
the UMNO dissidents with long experience in government. Indeed, many political 
observers saw the 1990 general election as a golden opportunity for Malaysia's single - 
party- dominant political landscape to realign to a new two -coalition party system. 
constitution. See The Star, 8 October 1989. 
'620n 12 October 1989, in his address at the inaugural general assembly of Semangat 46, a new political 
party formed by the dissident group in the old UMNO, Tunku Abdul Rahman had called on the Malays to 
destroy Mahathir's new party by throwing their support behind Semangat 46. Immediately after his 
speech, many UMNO (Baru) leaders called for the withdrawal of the title of Bapa Kemerdekaan (Father 
of Independence) accorded to Tunku Abdul Rahman and to remove his statue from Parliament House. 
163 The Election Commission scheduled federal and state elections in Peninsular Malaysia for 21 October 
1990 and the federal election in East Malaysia for 20 -21 October 1990. 
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Unprecedented Political Realignment among the Disparate Opposition Parties 
Having failed in the legal battle to revive the old UMNO, Razaleigh's faction moved to 
form a new political party known as Semangat 46.164 The Razaleigh -led Semangat 46 
was allowed to register as a political party on 3 June 1989, even though its registration 
certificate was given on 5 May 1989 by the Registrar of Societies. 165 
Soon after the formation of the new party, Razaleigh initiated a political 
alignment with other disparate Malaysian opposition parties, including the Chinese- 
based DAP and the Islamic fundamentalist PAS. The very first assessment of the 
political alignment came during the Teluk Pasu state by- election in Terengganu held on 
24 June 1989.166 In this by- election, three Malay opposition parties, namely Semangat 
46, PAS and Berjasa, offered themselves as an alternative opposition coalition to the 
ruling BN coalition through their Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah (Muslim Community 
Unity Movement: APU).167 At the Teluk Pasu by- election, PAS, backed by Semangat 
46, won with 3,671 votes to the BN's 3,530. Despite a slim 141 -vote majority, PAS's 
victory was very significant because electoral co- operation during the Teluk Pasu by- 
election showed that both former political rivals could work together as a team to 
challenge the UMNO (Baru) -led ruling coalition. For PAS, it had never before defeated 
the BN candidate in a by- election and it seemed that the alignment of Razaleigh's 
Semangat 46 was crucial for the victory of the PAS candidate. In mid -1990 APU was 
officially registered as a Muslim -based electoral alliance, comprising Semangat 46, 
164 Semangat 46 means 'Spirit of 1946' referring to the year of the establishment of the old UMNO. For 
details of the leadership composition of Semangat 46, see NST, 13 October 1989. 
165 The Razaleigh group had to wait about a month until the Election Commission finally approved its 
symbol of the numbers 46. The rust application by the Razaleigh group to register Semangat 46 as a 
political party was rejected by the Registrar of Societies due to the symbol of Semangat 46 containing 
various similarities to UMNO (Baru) (The Star, 2 May 1989). This was a complete contrast to the case in 
which the Mahathir -led UMNO (Bars) easily obtained the legal and police permits to hold its 43rd 
anniversary celebrations at the Istana Besar in Johor Baru on 10 and 11 May 1989, the same place and 
date on which the old UMNO was originally formed in 1946. There was an appeal to the High Court, by a 
former UMNO member Abdul Rahman, seeking to restrain the UMNO (Baru) from holding its 43rd 
anniversary celebration at the same place and on the same day as the old UMNO was formed. He insisted 
that UMNO (Baru) was trying to masquerade as the old UMNO and there would be a 'culmination of 
public deception since the flag of UMNO (Baru) was hard to distinguish from the flag of the old UMNO 
(NST, 3 May 1989). His court appeal was rejected on 3 May 1989, two days after the Registrar of 
Societies rejected Razaleigh faction's initial application for Semangat 46. About the High Court decision 
on this matter, see NST, 4 May 1989. 
166 Teluk Pasu is a rural Malay constituency comprising all Malays, except two Chinese and one Indian. 
In the 1986 general election, BN candidate defeated PAS candidate by a 776 majority. For more details of 
the Teluk Pasu state by- election, see FEER, 6 July 1989 (Suhaini Aznam, "Heartland Murmurs "). 
167 Berjasa was founded by the former PAS Kelantan Chief Minister, Mohammad Nasir and other PAS 
dissidents in September 1977. It initially joined the BN in December 1977 to fight against PAS in the 
1978 state election. Following the election, Berjasa formed the state government with UMNO in Kelantan 
in 1982. Berjasa, however, decided not to take part in the 1986 general election due to its dissatisfaction 
over the acceptance of Hamim, another breakaway group from PAS, into the BN. Finally, Berjasa left the 
BN in May 1989 to join forces with PAS and Semangat 46 in a new Muslim -based opposition coalition. 
164 
PAS, Berjasa and Hamim, to unseat the ruling coalition during the 1990 general 
election.'68 
As well as the electoral alliance with several Muslim opposition parties, 
Semangat 46 also tried to co- operate with the non -Malay opposition parties. The 
Tambatan by- election in Johor on 5 August 1989 was the first election in which 
Semangat 46 had nominated its own candidate and provided another assessment of the 
electoral alliance among the opposition parties, especially Semangat 46, DAP and PRM. 
In view of PAS's win in the recent Teluk Pasu by- election, Semangat 46 had met 
separately with DAP and PRM Ieaders to field a candidate who could represent the 
opposition parties.169 As a result, DAP and PRM decided not to contest the Tambatan 
by- election so that non -Malay votes could flow to Semangat 46.170 Although Semangat 
46 lost this by- election, such co- operation developed into the first joint rally between 
Semangat 46 and DAP in Penang in February 1990, and eventually resulted in the 
formation of another electoral alliance just before the 1990 general election. This multi- 
racial electoral alliance was called Gagasan Rakyat Malaysia (Malaysian People's 
Front: Gagasan), comprised of Semangat 46, DAP, PRM and a newly formed All - 
Malaysia Indian Progressive Front (IPF).171 
In spite of disparate ideologies, serious organizational weaknesses and 
vulnerable image problems, it was considered an unprecedented 'de facto multi -ethnic 
and multi -religious opposition coalition' in peninsular Malaysia.172 Therefore, one of the 
persistent questions many political observers were asked in 1990 was whether the nation 
could move towards a two -coalition party system, that is, the Barisan Nasional coalition 
led by Mahathir's UMNO (Baru) versus an alternative opposition coalition led by 
Razaleigh's Semangat 46. It was estimated that the ruling BN coalition would lose its 
168 Hamim was also formed in 1982 by former PAS leaders, led by the former PAS chief Mohamed Asri 
Muda. Hamim joined the BN in July 1986, but many key party members joined UMNO in September 
1988. Finally, Hamim withdrew from the BN and joined a new opposition coalition, APU. 
169 The Star, 11 July 1989. 
170 Tambatan is a semi -urban constituency, comprising Malay 58.4 per cent, Chinese 35.1 per cent, 
Indians 6.3 per cent. In the 1986 general election, UMNO gained 8,726 votes while PRM obtained 5,586 
votes. In the by- election on August 5, 1989, PRM decided not to field a candidate. For more details of the 
Tambatan by- election in Johor, see NST, 5 August 1989; The Star, 13 August 1989 (Mohamed Sopiee, 
"UMNO move helped to win Tambatan"); and PEER, 17 August 1989 (Suhaini Aznam, "Tactical 
voting "). 
171 The All -Malaysian Indian Progressive Front (1PF) was formed by an expelled MIC vice -president M. 
G. Pandithan in July 1990. Meanwhile, PRM, an essentially Malay -based socialist party, was formed as 
Parti Rakyat in 1955 and it changed its name to Party Socialist Rakyat Malaysia in 1969. The party won 
three state seats in the 1969 elections, but since then it had not obtained a single seat at either state or 
parliamentary level. Under the leadership of Syed Husin Ali, the party dropped its socialist tag in March 
1990 and aligned itself with Gagasan. 
172 Jomo K. S., "Election's Janus Face: Limitations and Potential in Malaysia ", in R. H. Taylor (ed.), The 
Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia (Cambridge: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge 
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traditional two- thirds parliamentary majority with only a 10 per cent swing of the vote 
to the opposition coalition. If the swing was 20 per cent, then the opposition coalition 
would be in power :73 
Even the leaders inside the ruling coalition were somewhat cautious in their 
assessments of the election results.174 It was alleged that the main Chinese component 
party in the ruling coalition, MCA, openly debated 'the option of attempting to realign 
Malaysian politics' by affiliating with the Razaleigh -led opposition coalition in the 1990 
election, due to its 'nearly powerless' position in the Mahathir government.175 Gerakan, 
the junior Chinese party in the ruling coalition, was also 'quietly contemplating a 
switch'.176 Although the major component parties decided on remaining within the 
ruling coalition, a number of leaders in non -Malay parties, especially MCA, privately 
wished that the factional split within the ruling Malay political elite would become 'a 
permanent feature of the Malaysian political landscapè.177 For them, at least, there 
would be every probability of returning to the previous consociational system of rule 
because each coalition was made up of different ethnic and religious groups. 
Indeed, the anti -establishment mood appeared to be spreading to the masses as 
the polling date was getting closer. The anti -Barisan atmosphere in peninsular Malaysia 
at this time even brought about the crossover of the Kadazan -based Parti Bersatu Sabah 
(PBS), which has been in control of the Sabah state as a partner of the ruling coalition 
since 1986, to the opposition coalition just five days before the election day.178 The 
University Press, 1996a), p. 101. 
173 See Asiaweek, 19 October I990. In fact, these figures were used by DAP as one of their major slogans. 
Under the main theme of the election slogan 'Change', DAP added as follows: '12% Swing - No Two - 
Thirds Majority, 20% Swing - A New Prime Minister'. Unlike Chinese educationists who had supported 
the non -Malay BN component parties in the previous elections, this time some 20 leaders of the Chinese 
teachers' guilds and schools associations, known collectively as the Dongjiaozong, had announced, in 
August, their support and direct participation in the I990 elections with an opposition DAP ticket. 
Furthermore, it was first time ever that the Malaysian Trade Unions Congress (MTUC), the largest trade 
union in Malaysia, openly endorsed the opposition. In line with this, Zainal Rampak, the president of 
MTUC, contested the 1990 general election under Semangat 46's banner. 
174 See Khong Kim Hoong, Malaysia's General Election 1990: Continuity, Change, and Ethnic Politics 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991) 
175 Means, 1991, p. 249. 
176 Diane K. Mauzy, "Malay Political Hegemony and Coercive Consociationalism" in John McGarry and 
Brendan O'Leary (eds.), The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 124. 
177 See Means, 1991, p. 250. For details of internal politics in the ruling BN coalition during the period of 
1987 -1989, see Means, 1991, pp. 248 -250. 
176 There are various reasons which explain the PBS withdrawal from the Barisan Nasional, all of which 
are closely linked to federal -state relations for the last few years before the 1990 elections. It was alleged 
that the PBS was unhappy with the federal government about various issues, such as ignorance of its 
requests for a bigger share of Sabah's oil revenue, a university in Sabah and a television station in Sabah 
as part of Radio and Television Malaysia. For further detail on the relationship between the UMNO -led 
federal government and PBS -led state government, see Francis Loh Kok Wah, "Modernization, Cultural 
Revival and Counter -hegemony: The Kadazans of Sabah in the 1980s ", in Joel S. Kahn and Francis Loh 
Kok Wah (eds.), Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia (Sydney: Allen and 
Unwin, 1992), pp. 225 -253; Audrey Kahin, "Crisis on the Periphery: The Rift between Kuala Lumpur and 
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withdrawal of PBS from the BN in the midst of the election campaign gave an added 
boost to the anti -establishment mood in the 1990 general election.179 This was the first 
time in its electoral history that the ruling coalition started unfavorably compared to 
opposition parties, in contrast to the high number of uncontested victories in the 
previous elections.180 In previous elections, the ruling coalition faced fragmented 
opposition parties but this time there was a strict division between the ruling coalition 
led by Mahathir's UMNO (Baru) and the opposition coalition led by Razaleigh's 
Semangat 46 in almost 90 per cent of the parliamentary constituencies in peninsular 
Malaysia.181 hi these circumstances, Mahathir was deeply concerned whether his new 
party would be able to obtain significant electoral support, especially from the Malay 
voters in the 1990 general election.t82 
Frustrated 'Now or Never Opportunity' for Two - Coalition Party System 
The results of the 1990 general election did not confirm earlier expectations. Again the 
ruling BN coalition was returned to power with more than its traditional two- thirds 
parliamentary majority, although it Iost much ground compared to previous elections. In 
brief, as shown in the Table 5 -3 and 5 -4 below, Mahathir's ruling coalition successfully 
secured a convincing majority of 127 seats in a 180 -seat parliamentary, whereas the 
combined opposition clearly performed below expectation with only 49 out of 180 
parliamentary seats and 98 of 351 state assembly seats. 
Although initial reports carried mixed assessments, the detailed results of the 
1990 general election demonstrate at Ieast two distinct features: the overall success of 
Mahathir's UMNO (Baru) and the considerable decline in support for the Chinese 
Sabah ", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 1, 1992, pp. 30 -49; and Aliran Monthly, 1992:12(11), pp. 2 -12. 
`79 In an interview immediately after the elections, Mahathir states that When PBS swung, we had doubts 
about Kelantan. We felt we could make it, but of course the certainty was not as strong as before the 
elections.' See Asiaweek, 2 November 1990. 
1ß0 The withdrawal of PBS from the BN after the closure of nominations deprived the BN of the 
opportunity to field its own candidates in the 14 BN seats allocated to PBS in Sabah. Besides, the BN 
won only two parliamentary seats in East Malaysia unopposed in the 1990 general election, whereas it 
had enjoyed a relatively high number of unopposed victories in the previous elections. The number of 
unopposed BN victories are as follows: 1955 (1); 1959 (3); 1964 (2); 1969 (20); 1974 (47); 1978 (8); 
1982 (12); and 1986 (6). For more detail on uncontested constituencies in parliamentary elections, see 
NSTP Research and Information Services, Elections in Malaysia: Facts and Figures (Kuala Lumpur: 
NSTP Research and Information Services, 1990), pp. 177 -179. 
181 See NSTP Research and Information Services, 1994, pp. 109 -118. 
182 Mahathir's uncertainty about the 1990 elections was shown in his personal phone call to his former 
political rival Musa Hitam, who was staying in New York at that time. It was alleged that, in an almost 20 
minute telephone discussion, Mahathir expressed his deep anxiety about the materialization of an 
unprecedented opposition coalition and asked Musa Hitam to be a parliamentary candidate in order to 
mobilize the Malay voters. According to Musa Hitam, Mahathir was deeply disappointed to hear that he 
euphemistically refused Mahathir's personal offer. Interview with Musa Hitam, Kuala Lumpur, 13 
February 1998. 
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political parties, MCA and Gerakan, in the ruling coalition; and a miserable defeat of 
Razaleigh's Semangat 46 and the relative success of the other opposition parties, DAP, 
PAS and PBS, in the opposition coalition.t83 
Table 5 -3. Comparison of the 1986 and 1990 General Elections (Parliamentary) 
Barisan Nasional Opposition and Independents 
1986 1990 1986 1990 
UMNO 83 (84) 71 (86) Semangat 46 - 8 (61) 
MCA 17 (32) 18 (32) DAP 24 (64) 20 (57) 
MIC 6 (6) 6 (6) PAS 1(98) 7 (30) 
Gerakan 5 (9) 5 (9) PRM 0 (4) 0 (3) 
Hamim(i) 1 (2) - Hamim - - 
PBS(1) 10 (14) - PBS - 14 (14) 
USNO 5 (6) 6 (6) AMIPF(2) - 0 (5) 
PBB 8 (8) 10 (10) Permas - 0 (9) 
SNAP 5 (5) 3 (5) Plus - 0 (1) 
SUPP 4 (7) 4 (8) Akar - 0 (4) 
Berjaya 0 (8) - Independent(a) 4 (52) 4 (64) 
PBDS 4 (4) 4 (4) 
Total 148 (185) 127 (166) Total I 29 (218) 53 (248) 
Source: NST, 23 October 1990; FEER, 1 November 1990; and Khong Kim Hoong, 1991 
Note: Figures in parentheses are numbers of seats contested. 
(1) Quit Barisan Nasional to join opposition bloc in I990 general election. 
(2) Newly formed by dissidents from MIC. 
(3) The large majority were in Sabah and Sarawak - 24 and 25 respectively. 
Table 5-4. Comparison of the 1986 and 1990 General Elections in Peninsular Malaysia (State)(1) 
Barisan Nasional Opposition Parties 
1986 1990 1986 1990 
UMNO 228 (240) 196 (246) Semangat 46 - 19 (152) 
MCA 43 (62) 34 (64) DAP 37 (118) 45 (87) 
MIC 12 (13) 12 (13) PAS 15 (266) 33 (114) 
Gerakan 13 (22) 11 (21) Berjasa(2) - I (1) 
Total (Won) 299 253 Total (Won) 52 98 
Source: Utusan Malaysia, 5 August 1986; NST, 23 October 1990; NSTP, 1994, pp. 69 -92; and Khong 
Kim Hoong, 1991 
Note: Figures in parentheses are numbers of seats contested. 
(1) State elections in Sabah and Sarawak were held separately. 
(2) Berjasa was a component party of the BN and did not take part in the 1986 elections. 
In Kelantan, the Muslim -based opposition alliance APU swept all 52 
parliamentary and state seats it contested and added a few more seats in Terengganu, 
compared to the 1986 elections. In particular, PAS made substantial gains in this 
election. As shown in Tables 5 -3 and 5-4 above, PAS obtained 7 parliamentary seats 
and 33 state seats in 1990, an increase from the 1 parliamentary and 15 state seats it won 
in 1986. More importantly, PAS could control the Kelantan state government with its 24 
seats won in the 39 -seat Legislative Assembly regardless of its coalition partner 
Semangat 46. 
183 For the detailed figures of the I990 general election, see Khong Kim Hoong, 1991; NSTP, 1994, pp. 
69 -122; FEER, 1 November 1990, Suhaini Aznam, "Price of Victory", pp. 10 -13; and Asiaweek, 2 
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In Sabah, the opposition PBS, after its recent defection, secured all 14 
parliamentary seats it contested with the endorsement of DAP. As a result, in the 
aftermath of the 1990 general election, the Mahathir government was faced with two 
state governments, in Kelantan and Sabah, run by the opposition parties. 
Furthermore, the election results in Penang clearly show that the Chinese voters 
tended to swing in favor of the opposition. Although MCA added one parliamentary 
seat in 1990, the party could not recover its disappointing parliamentary election results 
in 1986, when it won only 17 of the 32 seats it contested (compared to 24 out of the 28 
seats in 1982). Gerakan, another Chinese component party of the ruling coalition, also 
suffered a further setback in the 1990 elections.184 On the other hand, DAP repeated its 
good performance of the 1986 elections. Though the number of its parliamentary seats 
dropped from 24 to 20 and its percentage of total parliamentary votes declined 
marginally from 20.4 to 16.9, the party swept most predominantly Chinese urban seats. 
It needs to be noted also that the party contested fewer seats as part of its electoral 
understanding with the other opposition parties. DAP's most significant improvement 
was in the Penang state elections where it added 4 more seats, bringing the total to 14 
compared to the BN's 19.185 
Overall, the opposition parties whittled down the electoral superiority of the 
ruling coalition, reducing its share of the total votes for parliamentary seats from 57 per 
cent in 1986 to 52 per cent.186 Nevertheless, the relatively good performance of DAP, 
PAS and PBS was viewed as a limited success. It was mainly because of the localized 
nature of the opposition parties' electoral success that no clear indication of any 
meaningful political change throughout the country from single party dominance to 
two -coalition party system was offered. 
Perhaps the most significant result of this election was the overwhelming 
success of Mahathir's UMNO (Baru) and the miserable defeat of Razaleigh's Semangat 
46. Despite strong anti -establishment votes in several states, Malay voters clearly 
favored Mahathir's UMNO (Baru). It is worth noting that UMNO (Baru) won all the 65 
parliamentary constituencies it contested except in Kelantan and Terengganu. In 
Terengganu, the party secured 6 out of 8 contested seats. It was only in Kelantan that 
November, "In Victory, New Tests ", pp. 20 -21. 
184 MIC was the only Barisan member that held its ground in the 1990 elections. The party won all the six 
parliamentary and twelve of the thirteen constituencies it contested throughout the country. This victory 
was largely dependent on the assistance of UMNO (Baru) since all the MIC constituencies had high 
proportions of Malay voters_ For more details about MIC in the 1990 elections, see Khong Kim Hoong, 
1991, pp. 32-34. 
185 See FEER, 1 November 1990. 
186 Asiaweek, 2 November 1990. 
II' 
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UMNO (Baru) totally lost ground.'87 Overall, the party won 71 out of the 86 
parliamentary seats it contested (82.6 %), less than 83 of the 84 constituencies in 1986. 
UMNO ( Baru)'s electoral strength was also shown in the state elections. Although there 
was a marginal decline from 1986, UMNO (Baru) won in 196 of the 246 (79.7 %) state 
constituencies in 1990. In short, despite the severe setback in the northeastern states, 
Mahathir's UMNO (Baru) had successfully drawn the traditional support of the Malay 
community. 
Meanwhile, the results demonstrated a tremendous blow to UMNO dissidents in 
general. The old UMNO breakaway party Semangat 46 won in only 8 of the 61 
parliamentary constituencies (13.1 %) it contested. Semangat 46, which had 12 MPs 
before parliament was dissolved, lost 8 of these seats. The party's performance in the 
state elections was even worse. The party won in only 19 seats of the total 152 contested 
constituencies (12.5 %). It was only in Kelantan, Razaleigh's home state, that the party 
did very well, winning all 14 state seats it contested. This meant that Semangat 46 
gained only 5 of the 138 contested seats (3.6 %) in the other states. Indeed, the poor 
electoral performance of UMNO dissidents raised serious questions regarding their 
long -term viability in the aftermath of the 1990 general election. 
In sum, the 1990 general election clearly demonstrated that the Razaleigh -led 
Semangat 46, as the adhesive of the multi -racial opposition coalition, did not make 
much headway in this nationwide showdown for who or which party represents the 
Malay community. Besides, the Chinese component parties in the ruling coalition were 
completely unsuccessful in seizing the chance to restore the former Alliance type of 
consociationaI rule, in spite of the increasing electoral significance of the non -Malay, 
especially Chinese, voters. Ironically, UMNO (Baru)'s dominant position in the ruling 
BN coalition was further strengthened after the 1990 general election. It seems that a 
long- lasting leadership split within the old UMNO circles intensified communal demand 
for assertion of Malay supremacy in politics, instead of evolving towards a new political 
landscape based on a more equitable multi- ethnic power sharing. 
Inherent Unfairness of Malaysian Electoral Procedures and Racial Politics 
Several reasons can be suggested to explain the overall success of the ruling coalition 
and UMNO (Baru) in circumstances where the anti -establishment mood was 
widespread amongst Malays as well as non -Malays. Most of a1I, under Mahathir's 
leadership, the power of incumbents had increased greatly. Although this built -in 
187 See NSTP, 1994, pp. 110 -112. 
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incumbent advantage was not new in Malaysian electoral history and was common in 
many other countries, it reached a new level of sophistication in the 1990 general 
election. 
By law, no campaigning was to occur until elections were announced. But in 
fact Mahathir's UMNO (Baru) had already been on the campaign trail far more than 6 
months before the 1990 general election.188 An example was the nationwide 'mock 
general election exercise' by UMNO (Baru) from 16 February to 30 February 30. 
During this period, all 114 UMNO (Baru) divisions were conducting various de facto 
pre -election campaigns, including mock house -to -house campaigning, ceramahs and 
helping voters locate their voting centers.189 For example, the UMNO (Baru) divisions 
in Kelantan distributed the first batch of 150,000 Barisan Nasional posters to its 13 
divisions in February.199 It was the first time in Malaysian electoral history that the 
ruling party conducted a mock general election exercise, although on other occasions 
the regular party machinery had moved into high gear before the dissolution of the 
parliamentary. 
Another feature of inherent unfairness for the opposition was the BN's ability to 
offer patronage to voters. Though similar things had happened in all previous elections, 
it was believed that Mahathir's government spent more than ever before in the run -up to 
the 1990 general election.191 Even official figures show that the Mahathir government 
increased the government budget sharply in running the 1990 elections compared to the 
1986 elections, from RM11 million to RM20 million.192 However, it was alleged that 
the actual expenses incurred by BN candidates in 1990 were at least 10 times more than 
the legally allowed RM50,000 per parliamentary candidate. Especially in some 
constituencies where there was a close contest, the BN candidates were given nearly 
RM2 to RM3 million. A BN candidate was even reported to have spent almost RM12 
188 Public rallies have been banned since 1978 under the pretext of the security of the country. 
189 NST, 13 February 1990. 
190 The Star, 20 February 1990. 
191 Some examples of the BN government's vote -wooing in the name of so- called 'official functions' 
included: financial assistance for delayed public projects, mostly undertaken by Bumiputera contractors 
(NST, 22 July 1990); increasing salaries and easing terms of service for the civil servants (The Star, 3 
August 1990; 27 August 1990); increasing number of licenses for businesses (NST, 18 August 1990); 
announcement of new projects to improve the economic position of the Malays (The Star, 10 September 
1990); building new mosques, townships, houses and industrial sites (NST, 19 July 1990; NST, 19 
October 1990); subsidies for schools (The Star, 18 October 1990; NST, 20 October 1990); and subsidies 
for inshore fishermen, rubber and palm oil small -holders, FELDA settlers, padi farmers and petty traders. 
For other selective examples of buying votes and bribing voters, see NST, 16 July 1990; The Star 20 July 
1990; The Star, 27 July 1990; NST 10 August 1990; NST 13 August 1990; and The Star, 10 September 
1990. Also see Aliran Monthly, 1990:10(9), pp. 2-4 ("Buying Votes & Bribing Voters "). 
192 Government budget for each general election: 1955 (RM1.125 million); 1959 (RM1.047 million); 
1964 (RM1.9 million); 1969 (RM2.42 million); 1974 (RM2.426 million); 1978 (RM4.3 million); 1982 
(RM8.25 million); 1986 (RM11 million) and 1990 (RM20 million). See NSTP, 1994, p. 138. 
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million in one constituency.193 
In addition, a newly introduced vote -counting system was a very significant 
factor, making voters reluctant to vote for the opposition parties in 1990. On 15 March 
1990, the Mahathir government altered vote- counting procedures to allow ballot 
counting at the individual polling stations whereas in the previous elections the votes 
were all mixed and then counted in one common center for each constituency. One of 
the rationales behind the new vote- counting system was that this would reduce the 
chance of ballot boxes being tampered with in transit to common counting centers.194 
With this new vote -counting system, however, it could be easily seen whether voters in 
a particular town, village, or even several blocks of streets in a constituency had voted 
for the ruling party or opposition. This new system was considered threatening to voters 
since there were only about 700 voters per polling station.195 Given the fact that so- 
called development funds have been granted or withheld in proportion to the level of 
support for the government, it was widely believed that voters were frightened and/or 
reluctant to vote for the opposition coalition in the 1990 elections for the fear of being 
labeled as an anti -government area, especially in rural Malay areas and Chinese - 
dominated new villages.196 
Furthermore, various electoral malpractices and discrepancies were seen as 
significant in favoring Mahathir's ruling coalition.197 For example, postal votes from the 
police and armed forces were not scrutinized by any official of the Election 
Commission.198 According to the report by the 12- member Commonwealth observer 
team, there was a total of 196,522 postal votes in 1990, including 120,000 from military 
193 For these allegations, see Aliran Monthly, 1990:10(12), p. 11 (Tan Chee Khoon, "Opposition has to 
prove itself first "). The opposition alleged that UMNO (Baru) spent RM300 million during 9 days of 
campaigning. It was reported that voters in different constituencies were paid different rates ranging from 
RM50 up to RM1,000 to vote for UMNO (Baru). For example, in Gua Musang voters were given 
RM1,000 in an attempt to topple the Semangat 46 president Razaleigh Hamzah. See Lim Kit Siang, The 
Dirtiest General Elections in the History of Malaysia (Petaling Jaya: Oriengroup Sdn. Bhd., 1991). 
194 NST, 16 March 1990. 
195 Asiaweek, 20 April 1990. 
196 One should note that only BN state assembly people get an annual allocation of RM75,000 to 
RM130,000 each, depending on their respective state, while BN parliamentary members receive 
RM200,000 each for the implementation of minor projects in their constituencies. Elected representatives 
from the opposition are not entitled to the funds for minor development projects, such as the construction 
or repairs of roads, bridges, community halls, and mosques; the improvement of water supplies; and the 
supply of materials for schools. It is worth noting that those MPs and state assembly people of the old 
UMNO who refused to join UMNO (Baru) lost their annual allocation after mid -1988. See NST, 11 June 
1988. 
197 Among the popularly alleged electoral discrepancies were: (1) the transfer of the voters, so- called 
'phantom voters', (2) disappearance of voters' names from the electoral rolls without their knowledge, (3) 
duplicate names and identification numbers, and (4) dead voters whose names still remained in the 
electoral rolls. 
198 See Lim Kit Siang, 1991, p. 5. 
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personnel and 72,000 from the police.199 That means about 3.4 per cent of the total 
5,786,920 ballots cast in parliamentary elections in 1990 were postal ballots. 
Considering the small margin of 4 per cent between 52 per cent and 48 per cent of the 
total votes obtained by the ruling coalition and opposition coalition respectively, the 
total 3.4 per cent of postal ballots, which went mostly to the ruling coalition, were more 
crucial in the 1990 general election than ever before. In addition, according to the 
Election Commission, it was estimated that discrepancies in the numbers of voters 
amounted to about 300,000 of the total 7.96 million registered voters (3.8 per cent) 
during the 1990 elections.200 It even reached up to 5.2 per cent of the total votes cast in 
the parliamentary elections. These electoral discrepancies could have affected the 
outcomes in closely contested constituencies since most of the phantom voters were in 
these areas.201 
Finally, once again but far more seriously, the unequal access to the media and 
unbalanced content of reporting were crucial factors in the victory of the ruling coalition 
and specifically UMNO (Baru) in the 1990 general election. 202 In particular, Mahathir's 
massive racial onslaught through the mainstream media, especially in the three or four 
days before the polling day, became a turning point reversing the early anti- 
establishment mood among the Malay community to a siege mentality. Of course, 
199 See Commonwealth Secretariat, 1990, p. 18. On 21 June 1990, Mahathir invited a Commonwealth 
observer team to monitor the 1990 general election. The underlying rationale of inviting the observer 
team was mainly to undermine an independent panel called Election Watch', organized by a former Lord 
President Mohammed Suffian Hashim on 26 February 1990 to check various electoral malpractices 
during the 1990 elections. Mahathir, however, was in disagreement with the observer team as he 
discovered that he could not control who the observer team met, such as opposition leaders and the local 
Election Watch members. It was in this light that Mahathir later expressed doubts over the observer 
team's impartiality. For more details of Election Watch, the Commonwealth observer team, and 
Mahathir's reactions to formation of Election Watch, see Aliran Monthly, 1990:I0(3), pp. 2 -7; Asiaweek, 
20 April 1990, p. 24; Aliran Monthly, 1990:10(7), pp. 9 -11; The Star, 11 July 1990; and Asiaweek, 10 
August 1990, p. 18. 
200 See FEER, 27 December 1990. 
201 A Malay businessman, who asked not to be named, said some UMNO (Baru) members who lived near 
the state boundaries voted twice in the morning and afternoon at two different states respectively in 1990. 
Interviewed in March 1996, Petaling Jaya. For more detail on electoral malpractices before and during the 
1990 general election campaign, see Aliran Monthly, 1990:10(7), p. 9; Aliran Monthly, 1990:10(10), pp. 
38 -39; Asiaweek, 19 October 1990, pp. 35 -37; and FEER, 27 December 1990, p. 27. 
202 The selective examples of negative comments or reports against the opposition during the 1990 
campaign period were as follows: The Star 15 October 1990 ( "Save Malaysia from the Opposition "); 
Berita Harian 16 October 1990 (Kamikaze, "Manifesto atau Moneyfesto "); NST 16 October 1990 (P. C. 
Shivadas, "Of EIection PIedges and Realities "); NST 17 October 1990 ( "Weaker Market if BN Loses 
Majority "); NST 18 October 1990 ( "Why a Change When There's No Need for It ? "); The Star 18 October 
1990 (V. K. Chin, "Pairin's Action a Big Blow to Racial Harmony "); The Star 18 October 1990 ( "Doubt 
over BMF Report"); NST 18 October 1990 (Ahmad Sebi, "Opposition Promises: Propaganda or Fact ? "); 
NST 19 October 1990 ( "PBS and DAP to Fight It Out "); NST 19 October 1990 ( "PBS Getting Foreign 
Aid "); NST 20 October 1990 ( "PBS and DAP Still Engaged in a War of Words "); and The Star 20 
October 1990 (V. K. Chin, "Why Gagasan Wants Change "). 
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arguments about the media's effect on public opinion are always controversial.2 °3 
Nonetheless, the 1990 general election seemed to be a most typical example of how far 
a party -tied and controlled media, as an ideological state apparatus, was able to divert 
the public's attention away from the serious issues by reporting pseudo- events and 
exaggerating trivial issues in the interests of the ruling party within a short time.204 
In fact, the run -up to the 1990 general election was less marked by communal 
emotion at least until the middle of the electoral campaign, though a racial syndrome 
has been a constant factor in Malaysian politics. This was mainly because of the multi- 
racial character of both ruling and opposition coalition,2o5 
Mahathir's electoral slogans, however, changed dramatically just before polling 
day. The turning point was the PBS's withdrawal from the ruling BN coalition to join 
the opposition coalition Gagasan on 15 October. From the very moment of PBS's 
withdrawal, UMNO (Baru) and Mahathir campaigned viciously exploiting both 
religious and racial sentiments to create fear among both Malay voters and non -Malay 
communities. 
Within a day, Mahathir turned the PBS's withdrawal into a major racial issue 
and managed to create a siege mentality amongst a substantial segment of the Malay 
community. Swiftly, news came through the ruling party -tied mainstream mass media 
of the 'Christian' PBS teaming up with the 'Chinese' DAP and other non -Malay groups 
to destroy 'Ketuanan Melayu (Malay Supremacy)' in politics. Semangat 46 and PAS 
were alleged to be traitors to the Malays and their leaders were reported guilty of 
destroying Malay supremacy because of their cooperation with other non -Malay and 
non -Muslim political groups. It was at this point that the ruling coalition's multi -racial 
slogans were overwhelmed by the fear in the Malay communities of losing their 
political leverage. 
Then, how did Mahathir generate such fear among Malay communities? 
Mahathir immediately portrayed the Kadazan -based PBS as a Christian party that had 
203 Some, like liberal and pluralist theorists, claim that the mass media have only a very limited influence 
on public opinion. And if the media have any impact, its effects are largely dependent upon the various 
members of a society. To the contrary, other critical studies argue that the media can influence and divert 
a wide range of the public to a large degree. Therefore, the media often play a strategic role in reinforcing 
and legitimizing dominant social norms and the present power structure. For the various theoretical 
approaches about the media influence on public opinion, see J. Curran, M. Gurevitch and J. Woollacott, 
"The Study of the Media: Theoretical Approaches" in Michael Gurevitch, Tony Bennett, James Curran 
and Janet Woollacott (eds.), Culture, Society and the Media (London and New York: Methuen, 1982), pp. 
11 -29. 
204 For details of the role of the media and the 1990 general election, see Mustafa K. Anuar, "The 
Malaysian 1990 General Election: The Role of the BN Mass Media" in Kaftan Malaysia, 1990, Vol. 8, 
No. 2, pp. 82 -102. 
los See Asian Survey, 1991, Vol. 31, No. 2. 
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an ulterior religious motive of proselytizing Malay- Muslims. He claimed on several TV 
interviews and in the major Malay newspapers that the motive behind PBS's request for 
a television station in Sabah was to make the station a vehicle for 'Christian 
propaganda'.206 Then, he accused PBS of receiving financial aid from foreign non- 
Muslim sources and extended the accusations to the Muslim -based opposition coalition 
APU.207 It was at this time that a letter, allegedly written by the Pope John Paul II to the 
PBS president Pairin Kitingan urging him to demolish mosques and to continue 
Christianizing Sabah, was widely distributed in mosques throughout the country.208 
Compounding the propaganda by Mahathir and UMNO (Baru) was Mahathir's 
unrelenting onslaught against the Semangat 46 president Razaleigh alleging he had 
given in to the so- called Christian PBS by sacrificing Malay political supremacy. The 
malicious and deliberate distortion reached a peak when Razaleigh visited Sabah on 18 
October. From his visit to Sabah until polling day, Razaleigh was repeatedly slandered 
in most major newspapers for wearing traditional Kadazan headgear (sigah), which 
allegedly had a Christian cross on it. Mainstream media coverage, including TV3, was 
slanted in such a way as to make the ethnic Kadazan headgear appear to have a 
Christian cross on it, thus leading the Malay- Muslims to a general belief that 
Razaleigh's Semangat 46 was selling out Malay interests as well as the Islamic faith in 
order to win the 1990 general election. Although the Archbishop Emeritus of the 
Catholic Church issued a press statement denying any connection between the ethnic 
Kadazan headgear and Christianity, and the statement was carried in the Chinese press, 
no Malay daily reported ií209 With the UMNO (Baru) -tied mass media providing such 
coverage, enough damage was done and the suspicion surrounding Razaleigh was 
successful in creating insecurity and a siege mentality among the Malays. 
In addition, the Mahathir government stirred up more racially -based fear by 
resorting to the May 13 syndrome, a psychological after -shock of the racial riot which 
had occurred over 21 years ago in 1969. The opposition leader, Lim Kit Siang, even 
claimed that Mahathir's exploitation of the politics of racial fear was the most 
lob See Berita Harlan, 18 October 1990 and Utusan Malaysia, 19 October 1990. 
207 NST, 19 October 1990. 
208 See Aliran Monthly, I990:10 (10), p. 8. 
209 See Tan Chee Beng, 1991, p. 22. Any Sabahan knows that the so- called cross on the Kadazan 
headgear has nothing to do with Christianity. The headgear is usually made by the Bajau community, the 
majority of whom are in fact Muslims, and is usually given to guests as a gesture of welcome. In fact, 
during his previous visits to Sabah, Mahathir himself was also given similar headgear with exactly the 
same motif on it. For the picture of Mahathir with the Kadazan headgear bearing the so- called 'Christian 
cross', see Aliran Monthly, 1990:10 (11), p. 12. 
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inflammatory ever in Malaysia's electoral history, in its imagery and visual impact.21Ó 
Indeed, the very day after PBS's withdrawal from the ruling coalition, Mahathir publicly 
announced that the May 13 racial riots would be repeated if the ruling coalition failed to 
retain its two -thirds majority in parliament.`" A few days later there was a full -page 
advertisement in Utusan Malaysia and the same full -page advertisement, but in color 
this time, in Nanyang Siang Pao to create maximum racial fear among Malaysian 
voters. The advertisement was the painting of a blood- splattered battle for the defense of 
the Melaka sultanate by the Malays against the Portuguese, under the headings of 
'Sokong Membawa Rebah (Support Brings to Collapse)' and Recollection of History' 
respectively.212 Without doubt, the advertisement was clearly intended to strike terror 
into the hearts of both Malays and non -Malays by warning of the repetition of May 13 
bloodshed, violence, arson and carnage.213 hi describing UMNO (Baru) and Mahathir's 
dramatic shift toward the racial syndrome, a senior opposition leader makes it clear that: 
In any country, the party in power that controls all the instruments, in particular the mass media, 
decide the direction of the politics. In Malaysia, as long as UNLNO is mono ethnic, therefore, no 
matter what opposition parties or coalition do, it will be coined in terms of the strait jacket of 
racialism. Because it is not UMNO's advantage to portray opposition parties as multi- raciaL214 
On the effects of the exploitation of the politics of racial fear, a senior UMNO 
(Baru) official believes that the culmination of racial fear was crucial for regaining lost 
ground especially among the Malay voters. A deliberate promotion of a Malay siege 
mentality through the mass media, especially in the last two or three days before polling 
day, prompted a substantial proportion of Malay voters to unite behind the Mahathir 
leadership -215 In the same way, Musa Hitam summarizes that: 
I simply say that, whatever Razaleigh -led opposition's strategies were, they were confined to a 
marginal force as long as they did not have access to the masses. It was really amazing how the 
Mahathir government had been using the incumbent power [for the distortion of the facts or bad 
image making over the opposition] especially during the 1990 general election_ That is what I 
mean by the awesome power of incumbency.216 
210 Parliamentary speech by Lim Kit Siang, then DAP Secretary- General, on 5 December 1990. 
211 NST, 17 October 1990. 
212 See Utusan Malaysia, 19 October 1990 and Nanyang Siang Pao, 20 October 1990. 
213 It was even alleged that some voters were given money a day before voting with very specific message 
that 'they should use them to buy rice and provisions in case there was trouble or May 13 on polling day 
See Lim Kit Siang, 1991, p. 8. 
216 Interview with Tan Seng Giaw, Vice -Chairman of DAP, Petaling Jaya, 4 February 1998. 
215 Interview with Ibrahim Saad, Petaling Jaya, 19 February 1998. 
216 Interview with Musa Hitam, Kuala Lumpur, 13 February 1998. 
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5 -8. Summary 
By the end of 1990, everything was firmly set. A new ruling party, UIVINO (Baru), had 
been built around Mahathir's personality through the creation of new political legacies 
as well as the recovery of the symbolic and physical legacies of the old UMNO. 
Mahathir's intransigent image as a national leader had also been softened to a 
considerable degree through a series of appeasement gestures towards UMNO 
dissidents. Then, Mahathir's new ruling party successfully tested its nationwide 
popularity and political legitimacy through the general election of 1990. Indeed, the 
1990 general election was a turning point for Mahathir's leadership, which up to that 
point had been disputed. In short, the new electoral mandate and the decisive defeat of 
his long -time political rivals in the 1990 elections enabled Mahathir to further 
consolidate his political grip over the political process without having to look over his 
shoulder all the time. 
Since Mahathir took power, open competition for the party's top posts, as 
happened in 1981, 1984, and 1987, has become a new tradition in UMNO politics, and 
the role of factionalism has grown. Thus, some might claim that it was under Mahathir's 
early leadership that UMNO politics added another key element to the lists of so- called 
democratic features found in the Malaysian political system. In a way, it cannot be 
denied that the Malaysian political system became more competitive and more 
responsive in the period of 1987 -90. At least on the surface, political observers viewed 
this period as holding out the prospect of a more competitive and accommodative 
political system in Malaysia. There was indeed a series of intermittent concessions to 
the non -Malay communities in an attempt to attract their votes during the by- election 
campaigns. 
However, such openness and competitiveness did not appear to stem from the 
ruling Malay elites' growing commitment to political liberalization Rather, the leaders 
were taking a calculated risk in order to maintain power. Considering Mahathir's 
vulnerable leadership and the strong criticism he endured from his political rivals in the 
wake of the UMNO leadership crisis, it would have been more risky for Mahathir to 
refuse a greater degree of competition toward the end of 1980s.217 At the same time, 
217 The electoral competitiveness has been Iimited or was completely suspended after Mahathir eventually 
restored his dominance. That is, in the middle of 1989, UMNO (Baru) submitted a proposal to amend the 
Election Act which stated that unless elected representatives resigned for valid reasons (such as sickness), 
they were prevented from recontesting for five years (The Star, 22 June 1989). In March 1990, this 
became law after the Mahathir government tabled a Constitution (Amendment) Bill in Dewan Rakyat. 
Although the Mahathir government claimed the new law was necessary to spare Malaysian taxpayers, it 
was commonly believed that the real reason was to obstruct the oppositions by- election tactics of 
checking its political influence among the Malay community. In this context, the competitiveness and 
177 
however, Mahathir had maneuvered to consolidate his position within and outside the 
ruling party. This had been done at the expense of democratic constraints and practices. 
Examples included the political scapegoating, the widespread ISA arrests and the 
subsequent marginalization of the judiciary as a whole. In short, this controversial 
period 1987 -90 illustrates that the necessary conditions for the practice of democracy, or 
even the granting of basic civil rights, can be allowed only if the ruling elite's political 
ground, especially that of the top leader, is not seriously threatened. 
responsiveness in the political sphere during the period of 1987 -90 should be understood as an aberrant 
phenomenon in the political process of Malaysia. 
li 
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CHAPTER 6 
Consolidation of Mahathir's Authoritarian Rule and Minor Liberalization in 
Ethnic Politics in the 1990s: Changes within Continuity 
Why not say bravely that the people of Malaysia are too immature for a workable democracy? 
Why not say that we need some form of authoritarian rule? We are doing that anyway and it looks 
as if we are going to do that for a very long time to come. The racial composition of our country is 
such that real democratic process can promote as much ill -will as authoritarian rule. The 
disadvantage of the democratic process is that it satisfies no one. Authoritarian rule can at least 
produce a stable strong government.... we must accept that there is not going to be a democracy in 
Malaysia; there never was and there never will be.' 
DAP's defeat in the last 1995 general election was not because DAP did not make reform... BN's 
great victory was because Mahathir was more liberal. Several issues, like language, culture and 
education, which DAP fought for before was adopted and practiced by the BN government.' 
6 -1. Introduction 
As shown in the period 1987 -1990, the presence of substantial opposition within the 
dominant Malay community did not necessarily bring about greater political openness 
or democratic accountability in Malaysia. On the contrary, the deepening UMNO 
factionalism since the mid -1980s seemingly encouraged the dominant Malay political 
elite to adopt a more assertive approach. It curtailed political and civil liberties of its 
political opponents, while provoking racial sentiment when politically expedient. As a 
result of the political challenge from UMNO dissidents, regaining Malay support 
became a priority for the Mahathir government. Under these circumstances the 
government could hardly exhibit greater sensitivity to the demands of non -Malay 
supporters, despite their growing political importance. A series of tactical appeasement 
gestures before and during the 1990 general election was also implemented in ways that 
avoided alienating Malay support. The situation during 1987 -1990 was such that the 
Mahathir government could not afford to appear to be making concessions to non - 
Malays which might incite the Malay emotion. 
However, it must be stressed that there has been greater tolerance for the 
traditional non -Malay concerns in the 1990s, despite the widespread expectation of 
Mahathir Mohamad, "Democracy is Dead" in Opinion, 25 August I969, quoted in Aliran Monthly, 
1990:10(2), p. 39. 
2 Interview with Lim Kit Siang, Massa, 12 July 1997 ( "Wawancara: Dasar Liberal BN Bunuh DAP "); 
quoted in Francis Loh Kok Wah, "Pluralism & Democracy in Malaysia: Political, Cultural and Social 
Challenges ", paper presented in Islam, Culture and Democracy: A Regional Roundtable, 17 -18 August 
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further erosion of the consociational elements in Malaysian politics, as a result of the 
increasing vulnerability of the Chinese component parties within the ruling coalition. 
Soon after UMNO secured its political dominance in the 1990 general election, the 
Mahathir government introduced a series of accommodative policies aimed at the non- 
Malay communities through the so- called 'cultural liberalization'. It was therefore in the 
years after 1990 that political sensitivity towards the non -Malays, involving minority 
cultural heritage, language and education, has been noticeably blunted. Moreover, some 
of the issues that were central to Malay demands, such as the position of the Malay 
rulers, Malay Ianguage and Islam, were treated in a more relaxed way, or at least 
redefined, on the initiative of the UMNO leaders, and Mahathir in particular.3 Since the 
non -Malay communities have long been sensitive to preserving cultural expression as a 
political right, the Mahathir government's initiative in liberalizing these controversial 
issues has been politically attractive. In this regard, even the Chinese -dominated DAP 
regarded the years after 1990 as a period of 'minor liberalization' in Malaysian politics .4 
Nevertheless, as implied in the term 'minor liberalization', the growing cultural 
tolerance was not necessarily accompanied by greater political liberalization. Instead, 
the tolerance level for political expression in the Malaysian political system has become 
increasingly limited, despite the cultural Iiberalization of the 1990s. Continuing political 
detention, using selective and politically- motivated discriminatory laws, highlight the 
vulnerability of Malaysian civil society at this time. In the 1990s the political 
dominance of the ruling coalition, especially its dominant partner UMNO, has been 
further consolidated. By the mid- 1990s, the loose alliances among the opposition parties 
were considerably undermined by internal weaknesses, as well as by external pressures 
from the Barisan government. Eventually, the multi- ethnic opposition coalition 
Gagasan was dissolved before the 1995 general election, and its component parties 
became even more marginal in Malaysian politics after their miserable defeat in the 
1995 elections .5 Similarly, inherent ideological differences between the secular 
Semangat 46 and the Islamic PAS began to widen soon after they took over the 
Kelantan state government in 1990 and the fragile relationship eventually broke down 
1998, Kuala Lumpur, p. 10. 
3 For more details of cultural liberalization in the 1990s, see Francis Loh, 1998, pp. 5 -10. 
4 See Democratic Action Party, DAP Policies For Malaysia: Full Liberalization, released on 3 October 
1994 as the basis of the 1995 general election campaign, available on < http : / /www.malaysia.net/dap /poll- 
l.htm>. 
5 Although PBS won the Sabah state election in 1994, the ruling BN coalition, directly led by UMNO, 
took Sabah back into its fold following a series of defections of several PBS state assembly 
representatives. The DAP also suffered the greatest defeat in its electoral history in the 1995 general 
election and subsequently experienced a severe internal factional split a few years later. 
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soon after the 1995 general election. In 1996, the Razaleigh -led Semangat 46 finally 
returned to the fold of Mahathir's UMNO following ceaseless defections of party 
leaders and members. 
Furthermore, Mahathir appeared much less tolerant toward potential challengers 
to his political dominance, both within and outside the ruling party. It is obvious that 
Mahathir's main concern in the 1990s was to continually increase the centralization of 
power under his personal control. He frequently invoked the fear of intra -Malay strife to 
modify the UMNO constitution in a more authoritarian direction and, in addition, the 
underlying reasons behind the constitutional amendments of this period increasingly 
reflect the obvious motives of aggrandizing executive power in the hands of Mahathir as 
Prime Minister.6 As Jomo stressed, the key features of political democracy in Malaysia 
were further eroded in the 1990s due to the growing concentration of power in 
Mahathir's personal grip.? In fact, the notion of a strong executive authority had been 
enshrined in Malaysian politics in the decades since independence, but what Mahathir 
did in the years after 1990 illustrated how the power of one man came to be seen in a 
more centripetal way. In short, the years after 1990 saw an intermittent replay of the key 
authoritarian features of the previous period 1987 -90, especially in the political sphere. 
How can these ambivalent features of Malaysian politics in the 1990s be 
understood? What are the motives behind such ambivalent levels of tolerance for 
political and cultural expression? Malaysia's political system has been variously 
characterized by scholars, both foreign and domestic, as 'semi-democracy, 'limited 
democracy' and 'illiberal democracy'.8 These concepts tend to categorize 'mixed' 
features of the Malaysian political system along a continuum between liberal democracy 
and authoritarianism. In this regard, Crouch characterizes the admixture of the 
Malaysian political system as a 'repressive- responsive regime'.9 Although the notion of 
'repressive- responsive' is not directly related to the contradictory tendency of the 
6 For more details of the escalating executive powers through the constitutional amendments in the period 
of 1957 -1993, see Rais Yatim, Freedom Under Executive Power in Malaysia: A Study of Executive 
Supremacy (Kuala Lumpur, Endowment Sdn. Bhd., 1995), especially pp. 75 -115. 
7 Jomo K. S., "Deepening Malaysian Democracy with More Checks and Balances ", in Muhammad Ikmal 
Said and Zahid Emby (eds.), Malaysia Critical Perspectives (Petaling Jaya: Persatuan Sains Sosial 
Malaysia, 1996a), p. 74. 
8 An excellent overview of illiberal democracies in countries like Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, is 
illustrated in Daniel A. Bell, David Brown, Kanishka Jayasuriya, and David Martin Jones, Towards 
Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995). Also see, F. Zakaria, "The Rise 
of Illiberal Democracy ", Foreign Affairs, November -December, 1997, pp. 22 -43; William Case, 
"Malaysia: Still the Semi- democratic Paradigm ", Asian Studies Review, Vol. 21, No. 2 -3 (November 
1997), pp. 79 -90; and Michael Ong, "Malaysia: The Limiting of a Limited Democracy ", paper presented 
at the workshop on The Political System and Nation -building in ASEAN, Singapore, 23 -25 January 1986. 
9 Harold Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
1996), p. 236. 
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Mahathir government towards political and cultural expressions, such an admixture 
helps us to understand the 'ambiguous' features of the Malaysian political system in the 
1990s. This chapter analyzes the background, context and outcome of the 'repressive - 
responsive' Malaysian political system especially towards the mid -1990s after the 
general election of 1990. 
6 -2. The Consolidation of Mahathir's Supremacy within UMNO 
To maintain his influence in the 1990s, Mahathir appeared to mix two tactics: indirect 
checks -and -balances, and tighter domination. Mahathir adopted these two strategies, not 
alternately, but as mutually supportive strategies for his power maintenance within the 
ruling party. To a certain extent factional rivalries among the second -echelon leaders 
were allowed, or even encouraged, to counter the growing pressure of a generational 
shift in the party leadership. However, it must be noted that Mahathir did not forget to 
reiterate the 'rhetoric of de- politicization': that excessive internal politicking would lead 
to a repetition of the same disastrous schism of 1987. At the same time, it was necessary 
for Mahathir to appear to have the supposed cruelty of the dominator, as he had shown 
in the process of rebuilding UMNO around his personality after the 1987 leadership 
crisis. By doing this, throughout the 1990s, whenever the new factional forces attempted 
to increase their influence and thus undermine Mahathir's supremacy in the ruling party, 
tighter authoritarian rules were applied to further consolidate Mahathir's grip on 
political power. 
A Process of Grooming, Filtering, and Tighter Ground Rules 
As expected, the process of UMNO (Baru }'s first party election of 1990, scheduled for 
29 November - 2 December, appeared to be a quiet affair. Of the total 133 party 
divisions, Mahathir and his deputy Ghafar Baba received 128 nominations each. 
Kubang Pasu, chaired by Mahathir, and Jasin, led by Ghafar, were the only divisions 
that did not nominate candidates for all party posts by the direct request of Mahathir, 
whereas the other three divisions had technical difficulties in nominating the 
candidates.1° In this context, in effect 100 per cent of the party divisions nominated 
Mahathir and Ghafar as the party president and deputy president respectively in this 
very first party election. Under the new voting system of the party, they automatically 
received 1,280 bonus votes each. Considering the total number of 1519 delegates in the 
° Jerai division in Kedah and Kuala Pilah division in Negeri Sembilan had been given extensions to hold 
their divisional meetings after the deadline for the nomination. The remaining Pasir Mas division was 
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1990 party elections, they were virtually certain of being returned as party president and 
deputy president. However, there was no necessity for the new 10 bonus -vote system to 
be applied this time as both posts were filled without contest. 
By contrast, the competition for the three vice- presidential posts was intense and 
costly.» This was mainly because it was widely believed that one of the three vice - 
presidents would be the most likely successor to the party presidency in the not -too- 
distant- future, given that both Mahathir and Ghafar were in their mid -sixties. In this 
regard, there was an early indication of the growing factional competition among the 
possible successors to the Mahathir presidency as the party election was approaching. It 
appeared that Mahathir remained neutral during the intense campaigning for the vice - 
presidencies. Mahathir's most common warning to the party leaders before the party 
election was aimed at preventing vice -presidential candidates from forming electoral 
factions to consolidate their support.°Z 
Nevertheless, it became clear that Mahathir was grooming Anwar Ibrahim as his 
possible successor after the 1990 general election. Given a clear, though indirect, sign of 
being Mahathir's favorite, Anwar amassed the highest number of votes among the field 
of six vice -presidential candidates.13 In a cabinet reshuffle in February 1991 following 
the resignation of Daim Zainuddin, Anwar, then Education Minister, was appointed as 
Finance Minister.i4 At this time, the Finance portfolio was regarded as a necessary step 
suspended before the nomination day. See NST, 19 November 1990. 
11 Initially, 14 people were nominated for the three vice- presidential posts and 75 people for the 25 
elected seats of the supreme council. However, 6 and 48 candidates were finally vying for the positions 
respectively. Among the vice -presidential candidates, Anwar Ibrahim gained the highest number of 
nominations with 108, meanwhile Muhyiddin Yassin scored the second with 48, followed by Sanusi 
Junid 44, Wan Mokhtar Ahmad 35 and Abdullah Badawi 25. For the final tally of the nominations, see 
Berita Harlan, 23 November 1990. 
12 For example, see The Star, 12 November 1990; NST, 13 November 1990; and FEER, 13 December 
I990 (Suhaini Aznam, "Prune and Propagate "). One of Mahathir's typical remarks aiming to discourage 
internal politicking was as follows: 
It would be most sad if the process of leadership change destroys the party. Three presidents have 
led UMNO without any serious challenge. The fact that there was no challenge did not mean that 
the previous leaders did not have any weakness. There was no challenge because the capable 
personalities in the party then were not prepared to challenge the leadership. Party unity was more 
important than the ambitions of any personality (The Star, 1 December 1990). 
13 Born in the Chinese -majority state of Penang, Anwar was a former student leader once detained under 
the ISA for two years when Mahathir was Education Minister. As a young Muslim leader, who also 
founded ABIM, Anwar had been strongly critical of UMNO. Ironically, it was Mahathir who brought 
Anwar into UMNO soon after he took over power in 1981. Since then, Anwar rose steadily within the 
party with the help of Mahathir himself. In 1982, in the same year he joined UMNO, Anwar won a seat in 
parliament and was appointed Deputy Minister in the Prime Minister's Department. In the same year, he 
was also elected as UMNO Youth chief. Mahathir subsequently appointed him Minister of Culture, Youth 
& Sports, then Agriculture, then Education. In 1987, Anwar was elected one of three vice -presidents of 
UMNO. 
la It was reported that the retiring Finance Minister Daim Zainuddin, a close political colleague of 
Mahathir, had made clear his intention to retire even before the October 1990 general election. For the 
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to the Malaysian prime ministership due to the rise of the entrepreneurial and business 
classes among the Malays. The move, therefore, was regarded as a clear sign of 
Mahathir promoting Anwar as his favorite successor. 
Mahathir, however, did not neglect to check the new balance of power among 
the second -echelon Ieaders within the party. In particular, Anwar's political rise within 
UMNO was effectively counter- checked by the influence of the other two elected vice - 
presidents, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi and Sanusi Junid. Both were viewed as Anwar's 
long -time political rivals and possible candidates to succeed Mahathir. Abdullah 
Badawi's victory in the party election was unexpected because Mahathir made clear his 
intention to prolong the former Team B leader Abdullah Badawi's stay in the political 
wilderness by leaving him outside the government in the post -general election cabinet 
reshuffle in 1990.'' However, Abdullah Badawi's political comeback ironically 
provided Mahathir with a chance to efficiently check Anwar's growing popularity 
within UMNO. Eventually, Abdullah Badawi returned as Foreign Minister in February 
1991 after nearly four years in the political wilderness. 
At this time, any talk of leadership succession seemed premature and a series of 
political developments in the early 1990s was simply viewed as a grooming and 
filtering process for the second -echelon leaders of UNINO.16 Mahathir himself rarely 
discussed the succession issue. Nevertheless, it must be noted that political rivalries 
among the possible successors to the Mahathir presidency were heating up ahead of the 
UMNO divisional elections scheduled for 1992. For possible successors, these elections 
were regarded as crucial battles, due to the important role of delegates who would be 
sent to vote at the second party elections scheduled in 1993. Therefore, the internal 
politicking had already intensified and spilled into the open, even a year before the 1992 
divisional elections, to enhance their national profiles at the branch and divisional 
levels.' There were continuous reports that possible successors to Mahathir ceaselessly 
maneuvered to expand their political networks in the early 1990s.18 
Given this situation, Mahathir postponed the scheduled 1992 divisional 
elections, except for Sabah, to just a few months before the party general assembly of 
details of the cabinet reshuffle in February 1991, see PEER, 21 February 1991 (Doug Tsuruoka and 
Suhaini Aznam, "Filling Daim's Shoes "). 
15 For the details of the post -election cabinet line -up, see FEER, 8 November 1990 (Suhaini Aznam, 
"Cabinetmaker's tools "). 
t6 For more details of political development in the early 1990s, see Shafruddin Hashim, "Malaysia 1991: 
Consolidation, Challenges and New Directions ", Southeast Asian Affairs 1992, pp. 183 -201. 
17 FEER, 13 August 1992, (Michael Vatikiotis, "Power Machinations "). 
18 See Aliran Monthly, 1993:13(2), pp. 2 -6 (Edmund Terence Gomez, "Anwar's Men Gain Media 
Control ? "); Aliran Monthly, 1993:13 (9), pp. 35 -39 (Edmund Terence Gomez, "Anwar's Friends: 
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1993.19 Speculation also arose that the 1993 party election would be postponed to 1994 
to reduce the level of mutual recrimination and internal politicking among the second - 
echelon leaders of UMNO. Mahathir himself said that the one -year delay of the 
divisional elections was a necessary move 'to pre -empt politicking in the run -up to 
UMNO Supreme Council elections in 1993'.20 The decision, however, had been 
projected as a measure to prevent possible successors from enhancing their national 
influence too early at the grassroots level. Mahathir effectively turned the intensifying 
battle for supremacy among the second echelon to his advantage by the removal, or 
constraint, of opportunities for possible successors to exercise their powers of patronage 
among the rank -and- file.21 
Soon after the delay of divisional elections, Mahathir also amended the party 
constitution to consolidate the incumbent's built -in advantages. 22 The authority of the 
supreme council had been enhanced not only to determine the election date but also to 
postpone divisional elections for a maximum of 18 months. This new amendment gave 
the incumbent leaders a free hand in party affairs for up to 18 months in the name of 
reducing internal party politicking among the ranks. While the power of the supreme 
council was extended, Mahathir's political control in the supreme council was further 
consolidated by another amendment to the party constitution. It allowed the party 
president to increase the number of appointed members of the supreme council from 
seven to ten. 
Furthermore, tighter ground rules were imposed on the party leaders and 
members by the supreme council a few months before delegate meetings at the branch 
and divisional levels of 1993. The supreme council, in the name of curbing 'over - 
politicking', banned divisions from inviting national leaders to open delegates' 
meetings, as was previously the practice in the party. It only allowed such meetings to 
be opened by the respective divisional heads. In addition, a shorter timeframe for 
delegates' meetings at branch and divisional levels was also set in order to reduce 
politicking. Consequently, all divisional meetings had to be held within a 22 -day period 
from 9 September 1993. In an unprecedented move, the supreme council also decided to 
hammer out 'guidelines on campaign styles and convening of division and branch 
Factionalism and Money Politics in UMNO (Baru) "). 
19 NST, 13 October 1991. 
2° FEER, 31 October 1991 (Michael Vatikiotis, "Contest on Hold "). 
21 For further explanation of the delay of divisional elections for a year, see FEER, 31 October 1991 
(Michael Vatikiotis, "Contest on Hold "). 
22 NST, 7 November 1991. 
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meetings'.23 Although most party leaders and members dutifully welcomed a set of 
tighter regulations, some sections of the party worried that the party leadership was 
'over -doing things' to avoid 'over -politicking' at this time.24 
Mahathir's Choice in 1993: Intentional Shift or Reluctant Endorsement? 
Mahathir's deft way of handling the growing pressure for the generational leadership 
change was vividly revealed in the process of the 1993 party election. Despite tighter 
ground rules and Mahathir's reiterated remarks on party unity throughout the year, it 
became clear that the factional conflicts crystallized around the possible successors to 
Mahathir.25 The battle line became more distinct as the 1993 party election was 
approaching. The two incumbent vice -presidents, Abdullah Badawi and Sanusi, were 
moving closer to Ghafar, while the other younger leaders, Najib Razak, Muhyiddin 
Yassin and Muhammad Muhammad Taib, were openly viewed as Anwar's team.26 
Mahathir himself could not simply deny the growing demands for a succession race 
between the old and new factional forces in the party. 
Perhaps one of the most heated controversies during this period was Mahathir's 
shift in attitude from one where he emphasized the tradition of the party and then that of 
neutrality to more direct intervention. At an early stage of the leadership competition in 
1993, Mahathir's main concern was keeping the growing politicking between old and 
new guard from running out of control. At one point, Mahathir showed his seeming 
support for the party's incumbent line -up and advised a 'no- contest' for the two top 
posts. Mahathir, however, also appeared reluctant to close the competition for the post 
of his deputy. It was indeed Mahathir himself who stirred up public debate on the 
possible competition in the early phase of the nomination process, by equally 
emphasizing 'party tradition' and 'democratic values'.27 Mahathir's two- pronged attitude 
23 For the details of the list of regulations, see The Star, 28 March 1993 ("Rules for smooth polls "). 
24 See The Star, 3 April 1993 ("UMNO members happy with proposed rules "). 
25 For some examples of Mahathir's remarks, see NST, 26 July 1992 ( "Maintain party image, says Dr M "); 
NST, 14 August 1992 ("Don't repeat mistakes, members told "); The Star, 1 November 1992 ( "Mahathir: 
Reject deceitful candidates "); and The Star, 3 November 1993 ( "Mahathir: Preserve UMNO's family 
spirit "). 
2 After mid -1992, cloak- and -dagger methods, such as poison -pen letters, sponsored overseas -trips and 
the use of government facilities by aspiring contenders, were widely employed to gain advantage over 
rivals. For details of the poison -pen letters during this time, see The Star, 11 July 1992 ( "Anwar: Stop 
poison pen letters "); The Star, 13 July 1992 ( "Group running down UMNO leaders "); NST, 13 July 1992 
( "Megat Junid's warning on poison pen letters "); Berita Harian, 15 July 1992 ( "Dr M mina hentikan 
surat layang "); NST, 27 July 1992 ( "Selangor MB: Stop poison pen letters "); and FEER, 13 August 1992 
(Michael Vatikiotis, "Power Machinations "). 
Z7 On the final day of the 1992 party assembly Mahathir said: 'the man who holds the No. 2 post or deputy 
succeeds the president and that is still the way I feel it should be' (The Star, 9 November 1992). However, 
a day before, Mahathir also emphasized that for him naming his successor would be 'undemocratic' and 
'merely naming a successor will not reduce politicking and ensure party unity' (The Star, 8 November 
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was clearly seen throughout the succession race in 1993. 
When Anwar first openly denied his intention to challenge the incumbent deputy 
president Ghafar on 24 April 1993, Mahathir pointed out that it was the delegates' 
democratic right to nominate Anwar for the deputy president's post, though he 
welcomed Anwar's decision.28 A few weeks after Anwar's second denial of challenging 
Ghafar, Mahathir again qualified his support for a 'no- contest' for the party's top two 
posts as something which should be decided by the divisions and members 
themselves.29 After that, in reiterating the rhetoric of 'no- contest' as a party tradition, 
Mahathir emphasized that 'the tradition is that there is usually no contest but the party 
constitution allows a contest'.30 The party members thus believed that Mahathir had 
indirectly thrown the game open at this time,31 
As nomination day drew closer, Mahathir finally announced that he would 
remain neutral if there were a contest for the deputy's post.32 Mahathir's shift to such a 
neutral stand was a tactical but de facto endorsement of Anwar's challenge. Mahathir 
claimed in his opening address at the 1993 party assembly that he did not intentionally 
give the impression that he was not neutral during the election campaign for the party 
leadership.33 In fact, it cannot be denied that there was continuous intervention by 
Mahathir to preserve the status quo at the top level. However, it must also be noted that 
there was no serious intervention by Mahathir to check Anwar's influence in the process 
of the leadership elections. Political opponents of Anwar believed that Mahathir, as a 
party president who had spoken out strongly against excessive politicking and its 
potential to split the party, should have wielded his influence in more unequivocal terms 
to stop the party leaders from backing Anwar.34 Several senior UMNO officials and 
journalists stressed that it was highly unlikely that Anwar would be making his bid for 
the deputy presidency without his mentor Mahathir's tacit approval, given that Mahathir 
was in much greater control of the party than ever before. Anwar himself mentioned 
that he would not have challenged Ghafar if Mahathir had objected when he approached 
Mahathir about his intention to contest. Anwar insisted that there were no objections 
1992). 
28 NST, 28 April 1994. 
29 The Star, 23 July 1993. A week after Mahathir's advice, the majority of UMNO backbenchers, 35 out 
of 38, came out openly to support Anwar for the deputy president's post. See The Star, 30 July 1993. For 
more explanations of the supporting statement by the majority of UMNO backbenchers, see The Star, 8 
August 1993 ( "When UMNO leaders are extra sensitive "). 
3o The Star, 6 August 1993. 
31 The Star, 10 November 1992 ("Ridding UMNO of ghosts of 1986 "). 
32 The Star, 8 August 1993. 
33 The Star, 5 November 1993. 
i4 See FEER, 28 October 1993 (Michael Vatikiotis, "End Game "); Alíran Monthly, 1993:13(8), pp. 2 -4 
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from Mahathir.35 
Anyway, Mahathir's promise of neutrality paved the way for Anwar to contest 
the deputy presidency.36 On 23 August 1993, Anwar announced his willingness to 
accept divisional nominations and this was followed by successive nominations for 
Anwar from one division after another, leaving Ghafar far behind in the race.37 Ghafar 
received only seven nominations from the 153 UMNO divisions.38 Even after Anwar's 
announcement to challenge Ghafar, Mahathir emphasized his neutral stand. However, 
there was no doubt that Mahathir strongly pressed for Ghafar to give way to Anwar.39 
Following Ghafar's resignation from all his official and party posts before the election, 
Anwar finally secured the deputy presidency without contest.40 
At this juncture, Mahathir dramatically shifted his attitude from a `neutral' stance 
to that of 'direct intervention' by showing his unequivocal disapproval of a team 
( "Battle for the UMNO Crown"). 
35 See The Star, 8 September 1993 ( "Anwar: I would not contest if PM objected "). Meanwhile, it was 
argued that Anwar had little choice during this time. First of all, Anwar was facing greater demands from 
the party ranks who had already staked their political and financial futures on him. But, more importantly, 
Anwar also saw his road to the top as tougher if Ghafar, who is slighter older than Mahathir, were to 
succeed Mahathir as president, because it was clearly noticed that his long -time political rivals, Badawi 
and Sanusi, were gaining ever greater influence with Ghafar. For further explanation, see FEER, 15 July 
1993 (Michael Vatikiotis, "Nearly There "); Zainuddin Maidin, The Other Side of Mahathir (Kuala 
Lumpur: Utusan Publication & Distributors Sdn Bhd, 1994), pp. 239 -261. 
36 Soon after Mahathir shifted his attitude to neutrality, several well -known Mahathir men openly 
expressed their opinion on the succession race. At first, the then Law Minister Syed Hamid announced 
that '[the party] tradition should never be allowed to overrule the party constitution' (NST, 13 August 
1993). Also, the party secretary- general Mohamad Rahmat more clearly pointed out that 'the regeneration 
process in which the young takes over the leadership from old guardians must continue to preserve the 
strength of the party' (The Star, 20 August 1993). This was followed by another remark by him that: 'the 
contest for the deputy president's post is unavoidable as negotiations to avert it have failed' (The Star, 21 
August 1993). 
39 Anwar's press conference on announcing his candidacy was more a show of strength than anything else 
with an unprecedented show of support from almost all senior leaders of UMNO. Anwar was 
accompanied by the party secretary- general, all eight Menteri Besars and a Chief Minister, 9 UMNO 
Cabinet Ministers, 18 Deputy Ministers, and 5 parliamentary secretaries. The gathering even included 
leaders from the Federal Territory and Sabah, which Ghafar was heading. 19 of the 20 UMNO divisions 
in Sabah decided to support Anwar. But most interesting of all was the presence of those who used to 
belong to the Ghafar's camp, for instance, Information Minister Mohamad Rahmat, Terengganu Menteri 
Besar Wan Mokhtar Ahmad, Justice Minister Syed Hamid, and Negeri Sembilan Menteri Besar Mohd Isa 
Abdul Samad. Those who were absent at the press conference were Foreign Minister Abdullah Badawi, 
Agriculture Minister Sanusi Junid, and International Trade and Industry Minister Rafidah Aziz. It was 
inconceivable for all the UMNO state Chief Ministers and most Cabinet Ministers to show up at such a 
power -packed press conference without Mahathir's support for Anwar. For the details of who's who at 
Anwar's press conference and the text of Anwar's announcement, see The Star, 24 August 1993. 
33 For the full list of divisional nominations for the 1993 party elections, see The Star, 14 October 1993. 
39 Some examples are as follows: (1) Immediately after Anwar's press conference, Mahathir openly 
expressed his hope that one of the two deputy presidential candidates would withdraw from the race 
(NST, 24 August 1993); (2) Mahathir made it clear that the no- contest for the deputy presidency became 
history (The Star, 7 September 1993); and (3) In his statement in Terengganu in September, Mahathir 
mentioned that 'the person who felt to be the loser should withdraw' (Cited in Zainuddin Maidin, 1994, p. 
245.) 
4° It was certain that Anwar would win the deputy presidential election by a huge margin if there were a 
contest, having already secured 1,450 bonus votes. Ironically, it was Ghafar himself who had advocated 
the 10 bonus -vote system after the 1987 UMNO Ieadership crisis and he became the very first victim of 
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approach' and 'money politics' in the succession race.41 His message obviously targeted 
Anwar's Wawasan team, a pack of aspiring young party leaders in their 40s competing 
for the vice- presidency.42 His caustic remark was repeated a day before the vice- 
presidential election and increased uncertainty among party members. The intervention 
by Mahathir may have come too late to affect the results as Anwar's Wawasan team 
swept all the top elected positions. However, it should be noted that the actual votes 
were more evenly distributed than had been earlier indicated by the number of 
nominations. In fact, the rival faction enjoyed much more support in the election than 
had been reflected in the nominations received.0.3 Anwar's supporters believed that this 
was largely due to Mahathir's sudden shift in attitude to check the new balance of power 
especially after Anwar's landslide victory.44 
Mahathir's moderate attitudes on the party tradition and the neutral position were 
seemingly undisturbed when internal politicking was deepening even further among the 
second -echelon leaders. Then why did Mahathir again shift his attitude to more direct 
intervention at the very moment when Anwar emerged victorious in a landslide? 
Political observers had expected Anwar to sweep most of the divisional 
nominations, but not by the Iandslide that had compelled the incumbent Ghafar to 
withdraw from the race even before the election was held. Mahathir was also 
dumbfounded at such an unprecedented wave of support for Anwar.45 It was even 
claimed that Anwar's remarkable victory demonstrated that his grassroots support 
within the party was greater than that of Mahathir.46 Although Mahathir's own political 
leadership remained intact, such considerable support for Anwar could impact on 
Mahathir's own political grip on the party much sooner than he thought. Mahathir 
this system. 
41 For Mahathir's open warning about the team approach and money politics at this time, see The Star, 3 
November 1993. 
42 Anwar's vision team included Muhyiddin Yassin, Najib Tun Razak and Muhammad Muhammad Taib 
as vice- presidential candidates, as well as Rahim Tamby Chik as Youth chief candidate. 
43 In the process of divisional nominations, Badawi and Sanusi received only 16 and 13 each, while Najib 
Tun Razak, Muhammad Muhammad Taib and Muhyiddin Yassin secured I48, 138 and 133 respectively. 
The difference in the number of votes in the election, however, was unexpectedly narrow, especially 
between Badawi and the third vice -president. Badawi and Sanusi obtained 927 and 525 votes each, 
compared to Muhyiddin Yassin, Najib Tun Razak and Muhammad Muhammad Taib who received 1,413, 
1,202 and 1,189 votes respectively. More interestingly, Rahim Tamby Chik, the Wawasan team's Youth 
chief candidate, won by only 44 votes out of a total of 484 votes, even though he had secured 106 
divisional nominations against only 10 for his opponent, Mohamed Isa Samad. Furthermore, although it 
was widely viewed that the supreme council was dominated by Anwar's followers at the expense of old 
party leaders, in fact only four were newly elected to the 25 elected seats in the supreme council. See 
NST, 14 October 1993; Utusan Malaysia, 4 November 1993 and 5 November 1993. 
44 See The Star, 3 November 1993 ( "Veep race thrown wide open "). 
45 See Aliran Monthly, 1993:13(9), pp. 2 -6 ( "Anwar Ibrahim: Prime Minister- To -Be "). 
46 Jomo K. S., "Election's Janus Face: Limitations and Potential in Malaysia ", in R. H. Taylor (ed.), The 
Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia, Cambridge: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge 
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desperately needed to create 'as many buffers as possible', especially after the 
devastating downfall of the old guard in the party.47 Therefore, it was a necessary step 
for Mahathir to promptly shift his key concern to checking Anwar's rise within the 
party, a change from neutrality to stem intervention. Too much delay might further 
increase the pressure from the new factional forces for a generational shift in the 
national leadership as a whole. As Zainuddin asserted: 
Mahathir knew what he was doing. He felt his role had ended when he laid down the path for his 
successor [Anwar). He did not feel it was his job to deal with the nitty gritty of the succession right 
down to the composition of the political line -up for Anwar's team.48 
Checking the New Balance of Power 
After the 1993 party election, there were other examples evidencing Mahathir's 
intention not only to check Anwar's growing popularity but also to further consolidate 
his political grip within the party. At first, Mahathir strategically delayed the time -frame 
of appointment for his deputy to assert his authority, as the balance of factional forces 
within the party had shifted clearly in Anwar's favor.49 Political observers believed that 
the too -early appointment of Anwar might have weakened Mahathir's own leadership 
position within the party at that time. In fact, Mahathir had already downplayed the 
significance of the 1993 party election by emphasizing that he would not be bound by 
the election results in determining the likely successors to the national leadership.5° 
Mahathir finally appointed Anwar as Deputy Prime Minister sooner than expected on 1 
December 1993. Observers, however, saw this as an attempt by Mahathir to check 
further demands for changes in the party and government hierarchy, to reflect the new 
balance of power after the party election of 1993. Again, Mahathir did not forget to 
appoint all electoral losers and several other loyalists as members in the supreme 
council, soon after the appointment of Anwar. Abdullah Badawi and Sanusi were also 
included.51 
In his closing speech at the 1993 party general assembly, Mahathir also 
proposed another amendment to the party constitution in order to check money politics 
University Press, 1996b), p. 108. 
47 See FEER, 18 November 1993 (Michael Vatikiotis, "A Matter of Time"). 
48 Zainuddin Maidin, 1994, p. f46. 
49 The Star, 3 November 1993. Mahathir strongly implied that the appointment would be possibly delayed 
at least until the next supreme council meeting in January I994. See The Star, 7 November 1993. 
5° See The Star, 1 June 1993 ( "PM: It's No Big Deal "). 
5I In addition, Ghafar also later came back to the mainstream of party politics in March 1995, just a month 
before the 1995 general election. Although Ghafar's comeback was widely viewed as his possible role in 
the forthcoming general election, the UMNO leaders also saw that 'his return was meant somehow to 
check Anwar's power' within the party. For more detailed explanation, see FEER, 23 March 1995 (S. 
Jayasankaran, "Back to the Front "). 
190 
in the party. The proposed amendment to the party constitution was approved at the 
UMNO extraordinary general assembly held in June 1994. The key element of the new 
amendment was the introduction of a 'Code of Ethics' for party members, which is as 
follows: (1) observe party directives; (2) carry out party policies; (3) abide by and 
respect party decisions; (4) protect party secrets; (5) safeguard the good name of the 
party; and (6) at all times reflect good ethics. More importantly, the new amendments to 
the party constitution included provisions which, once again, further empowered the 
supreme council with punitive authority. Now, the supreme council can inflict the 
following punishments on any party member who violates the 'Code of Ethics': (1) 
warning; (2) suspension; (3) barring from contesting party posts or standing as a 
candidate in state or general elections for a period of time determined by the supreme 
council; and (4) dismissal from the party.52 
Due to the wide- ranging coverage of the 'Code of Ethics', many party leaders 
and members expressed their fear that the new amendments would lead to further 
control by the top party leadership in the name of checking unhealthy party trends. 
However, as a senior party official said, they had little choice but to accept, although 
they knew what the new amendments were all about.53 This was largely because the 
extraordinary general assembly to amend the party constitution was held just a few 
weeks before the pro -tern committee appointments for the forthcoming general election, 
following the constituency delineation exercise of 1993.54 Hence, the delegates for the 
extraordinary general assembly, mostly divisional leaders, were more worried about 
whether they would be retained in the pro -tern line -up. The pro -tern committee was 
supposed to continue to serve the party until the next general election which was 
scheduled before December 1995. It was generally believed that the members of the 
pro -tern committee would be the same set of state and parliamentary candidates in the 
forthcoming general election. Indeed, during the UMNO extraordinary general 
assembly of 1994 and the following annual general assembly in November 1994, there 
seemed to be 'an unspoken understanding' among the party leaders and members that the 
party president was not to be offended or even questioned.55 
At this juncture, it seemed that Mahathir had no plans for early retirement. 
32 For the full texts of the amendments to the party constitution, see The Star, 18 June 1994. 
53 See comments by several senior party officials in The Star, 18 June 1994 ( "Assembly to focus on 
appointments "). 
54 The number of state and parliamentary seats was increased in line with the re- delineation exercise in 
1993. And, the appointment for the members of new pro -tern committee was scheduled in July 1994, 
while the extraordinary general assembly was held in June 1994. 
55 For further explanation of the UMNO general assembly held in November 1994, see Aliran Monthly, 
1994:I4 (10), pp. 2 -5 ( "The UMNO (Baru) General Assembly: Reading between the Line "). 
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Instead, whether it was intended or not, Mahathir's own political grip within UMNO 
became practically unassailable as another general election was approaching in 1995. 
Until recently, it was, and occasionally still is, argued that factionalism within UMNO, 
in some ways, gave more room for democracy in Malaysian politics no matter how 
authoritarian the political system was perceived. However, towards the mid -1990s 
UMNO factionalism became more and more dependent upon Mahathir's personal 
tolerance rather than bringing checks and balances to his authoritarian form of 
governance. 
6 -3. Politics over Opposition Parties: A Process of Conciliation, Discrimination, 
and Victimization 
While Mahathir further consolidated his personal grip on power in the 1990s, UMNO 
and the BN government's political dominance also appeared to be strengthened. Three 
distinct types of political strategies were used by Mahathir and UMNO leaders towards 
opposition parties after the 1990 general election: 'conciliatory gestures', whereby the 
Mahathir government co -opted the irritant opposition members; 'marginalization', a 
more indirect but discriminating approach to paralyzing opposition forces; and 
'victimization', a more direct and coercive measure by the UMNO -led government. 
However, it must be stressed that the Mahathir government's political dominance in the 
years after 1990 escalated through a mixture of these distinct political maneuverings, 
from conciliation as a milder approach through marginalization to victimization as a 
more coercive one. 
Pressure and Conciliatory Gestures towards Semangat 46 
As analyzed in Chapter 5, the dissident UMNO members led by Razaleigh failed to 
emerge in 1990 as a new element in Malaysian politics capable of providing an 
alternative leadership with another multi- ethnic coalition. Furthermore, Semangat 46 
itself was no longer viewed as a viable political force with a national presence. The 
UMNO- splinter party was much less represented than its counterpart DAP both at state 
and parliamentary levels and the party had been downgraded as a junior partner of the 
other Malay Muslim party, PAS. 
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Razaleigh's Semangat 46 was an annoying 
element in so far as UMNO politics is concerned. As Gomez correctly noted, the 
presence of the UMNO - splinter group in Malaysian politics symbolizes the lack of 
consensus within the Malay community, and therefore suggests that the rhetoric of 
192 
'Malay unity by the UN/NO leaders is 'at best illusory'.56 Apart from this symbolic 
aspect, Semangat 46 was still capable of influencing the Malay voters, as evidenced in 
Semangat 46's victories in two Kelantan state by- elections held in August 1991.57 
Moreover, the presence of Razaleigh's Semangat 46 seemed to play a key role in 
heightening the anti -federal sentiments in Malaysian politics in the years after 1990. 
The 1990 general election at least proved that Razaleigh was a crucial factor in 
persuading a major portion of the UMNO supporters in Kelantan to the anti -UMNO 
side.58 Without Semangat 46's secular- Muslim votes based on regional sentiments, PAS 
could not recapture Kelantan on the basis of its traditional Islamic votes in the 1990 
elections. As Chin observed, the post -1990 general election circumstances in Kelantan 
suggested that PAS held winning electoral formulae, that is, a religious element (Islam) 
and an anti- federal sentiment (regionalism).59 For Mahathir and UMNO leaders, there 
was fear that these winning formulae would become a constant threat to UMNO's 
political supremacy in certain Malay- dominated states if necessary measures were not 
taken to stop, or at least impede, the growing regional sentiments in Kelantan. 
Great efforts, therefore, were made by the UMNO leadership to undermine 
Semangat 46's influence after the 1990 general election. A typical measure by the 
UMNO leaders was to foster the break -up of Semangat 46 by inducing its leaders and 
members to return to UMNO. In this context, hardly a day passed without the BN- 
controlled media publicizing defections of Semangat 46 leaders and members to UMNO 
and the dissolution of Semangat 46 branches and divisions, especially in early 1991.60 It 
was even widely speculated that the party itself would be dissolved in the near future. 
Although reports of Semangat 46's imminent death were perceived as premature, 
UMNO's propaganda exercise had been very successful. The speculation became more 
intense when the UMNO leaders spread rumors about the possible defections of a 
56 Edmund Terence Gomez, Political Business: Corporate Involvement of Malaysian Political Parties 
(Townsville: James Cook University of North Queensland, 1994), p. 64. 
n There were seven by- elections in 1991. BN won all but two by- elections to Semangat 46. See NSTP, 
1994, pp. 63 -65. 
56 Razaleigh, a member of the Kelantan royal family, had played a key role in UMNO's rise in Kelantan 
since the mid- 1970s. Detailed accounts of how UMNO lost and recaptured Kelantan during the 1960s and 
1970s can be found in William Roff (ed.), Kelantan: Religion, Society, and Politics in a Malay State 
(Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974); Clive Kessler, Islam and Politics in a Malay State: 
Kelantan 1838 -1969 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978); and Alias Mohamed, PAS's Platform: 
Development and Change 1951 -1986 (Petaling Jaya: Gateway Publishing House, 1994). 
59 James Chin, "Politics of Federal Intervention in Malaysia with Reference to Sarawak, Sabah and 
Kelantan ", paper presented at the First International Malaysian Studies Conference, University of Malaya, 
11 -13 August 1997, p. I6. 
60 For examples, see NST, 8 January 1991 ( "Marina on why she resigned from Semangat "); NST, 21 
January 1991 ("Semangat men want to defect "); NST, 23 January 1991 ( "Five Semangat 46 leaders quit 
party posts "); NST, 24 January 1991 ( "Four Kelantan Semangat men quit "); and The Star, 31 January 
1991 ( "Kelantan Semangat secretary quits post "). 
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number of elected representatives of Semangat 46, by either identifying their names or 
anonymously.61 
The first major sign of UMNO's recovery in Kelantan was the defection of 
Ibrahim Ali, Semangat 46 Youth chief and MP for Pasir Mas, in March 1991. Ibrahim 
Ali was the first elected representative to join UMNO and his defection prompted many 
other Semangat 46 leaders to follow suit 62 Within a few weeks after Ibrahim Ali s 
defection, two more Semangat 46 state assembly members quit the party and joined 
UMNO.63 Then in August 1991, another Semangat 46 MP Ahmad Shukri Hassan 
returned to the UMNO fold together with about 3,000 supporters. As a result, less than a 
year after UMNO had lost all 13 parliamentary and 39 state assembly seats in Kelantan 
at the 1990 general election, the party regained two parliamentary seats and two state 
assembly seats. Moreover, it must be noted that a number of top Semangat 46 leaders 
retired from active politics, either quitting their party posts or going on Iong study 
leave. 
On the surface, despite the massive influx of Semangat 46 members into 
UNLVO, Razaleigh did not appear defensive, claiming that it was indeed better to rid the 
party of traitors or those who strive for personal gains 65 Nevertheless, few other 
Semangat 46 Ieaders and PAS leaders regarded the increasing number of defections so 
lightly. In particular, PAS leaders appeared concerned over Razaleigh's ability to hold 
his influence both at the grassroots and top levels. Semangat 46 supporters at ceramah 
61 For example, Semangat 46 supreme council member Harun Idris, Youth chief Ibrahim Ali, Wanita 
chief Hajjah Rahmah Osman, vice president Marina Yusoff and Perlis party chief Sheikh Radzi Ahmad 
were among those frequently mentioned as possible defectors during early 1991. See The Star, 11 March 
1991 ( "Top Semangat leaders to join UMNO ") and The Star, 17 March 1991 ( "Spirit of Semangat put to 
test "). As a typical example of media blaring by the UMNO leadership, then UMNO secretary- general 
Mohamed Rahmat announced that he had received a letter from Semangat 46 deputy president Rais 
Yatim claiming his exit from the party (The Star, 7 November 1991). Later, Rais Yatim dismissed the 
rumors (NST, 12 May 1992). Opposition leader Lim Kit Siang stated that UMNO's political maneuvering 
at this time was a 'phantom culture of Malaysian politics, where phantom members and phantom branches 
of opposition parties are given life in the Barisan Nasional- controlled media to create the impression that 
the days of the opposition parties are numbered'. See Media Statement by Lim Kit Siang, 20 April 1991. 
62 Ibrahim All's defection occurred just a few days before Mahathir's first visit to Kota Baru after the 1990 
general election. See The Star, 23 March 1991. For more details of subsequent exodus of the Semangat 46 
members following after Ibrahim Ali s defection, see NST, 25 March 1991 ( "16 Semangat men follow ex- 
leader out "); The Star, 25 March 1991 ( "Seventeen Kelantan Semangat leaders resign "); Utusan 
Malaysia, 26 March 1991 ("100 Pemuda 46 tinggalkan parti"); NST, 26 March 1991 ( "600 more 
Semangat members likely to quit "); and NST, 27 March I991 ( "Eight more Semangat leaders quit "). Also 
see NST, 6 April 1991; 8 April 1991; 15 April 1991; 21 April 1991; 27 April 1991; 30 April 1991; 10 
May 1991; and 18 May 1991. 
63 See The Star, 28 March 1991 and NST, 11 April 1991. 
fi4 For example, party deputy president Rais Yatim took long study leave to London (The Star, 21 January 
1991); vice president Marina Yusoff resigned from all party posts (NST, 8 January 1991); and Wanita 
chief Hajjah Rahmah Osman also took a two -year study leave. 
bs Razaleigh's response is clearly revealed in NST, 13 May 1991 ( "Party weeding out bad hats "); The Star, 
17 August 1991 ( "Members are free to go "); and The Star, 23 November 1991 ( "Two sacked from 
Semangat council "). 
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were dwindling even in RazaIeigh's solid bases in Kelantan after a series of defections 
of the Semangat 46 elected representatives.66 In this regard, the PAS -Ied Kelantan state 
government was keen to amend the State Constitution requiring an elected state 
assembly member to vacate his or her seat in case of crossing over to another party. In a 
rather hasty manner, the Kelantan state government even proposed that the amendment 
would be retroactive to the date the opposition assumed power in Kelantan in October 
1990.67 The anti -party hopping law was finally passed with its retroactive provisions by 
the Kelantan state assembly in April 1991. 
UMNO's approach toward Semangat 46, however, became more open and 
flexible after the Kelantan state government proposed to amend its constitution to adopt 
the anti- hopping law. On the one hand, UMNO further expanded its efforts to encourage 
the departure of Semangat 46 leaders by assuring re- nomination of Semangat 46 
defectors as UMNO candidates in any by- election, if they were made to vacate the state 
assembly seat.68 In this context, the two former Semangat 46 state assemblymen, who 
had returned to UMNO before the introduction of the anti- hopping law, were re- 
nominated as UMNO candidates in the Kelantan state by- elections held in August 
1991.69 Meanwhile, the Mahathir government brought a legal suit against the Kelantan 
anti -hopping law to remove obstacles and facilitate the transfer of Semangat 46 leaders 
to UMNO. As expected, in November 1991, the High Court ruled against the Kelantan 
state assembly and asserted that the amendment to the State Constitution was against the 
Federal Constitution. A few months later in April 1992, the Supreme Court finally 
confirmed the High Court's decision that the Kelantan anti -hopping law as ultra vires of 
the Federal Constitution.7° 
Another major appeasement gesture towards the Semangat 46 members can be 
66 For PAS's concern, see The Star, 8 September 1991 ( "More cracks in the Semangat house "). 
67 See The Star, 27 March 1991. The introduction of the anti -party hopping law in Kelantan was adopted 
from the provision in the Sabah constitution which automatically declares a seat vacant if an assembly 
person quits his or her seat. The proposed move to retrace the Iaw to the day APU formed the state 
government was initially advocated by top state Semangat 46 leaders. The proposed amendment, 
however, was even criticized openly by some Semangat 46 state assembly members on the grounds that 
'it is undemocratic and un- Islamic as the provision is something concocted by the [Christian] PBS in 
Sabah'. For example, see NST, 28 March 1991 ( "S46 reps oppose anti- hopping rule"). 
69 NST, 11 April 1991. 
69 In these by- elections, both Semangat 46 defectors were defeated by new Semangat 46 candidates. For 
more detailed results of the by- elections, see NSTP, 1994, p. 64. 
70 There was another state which has passed such an anti- defection law. In 1989 the Sarawak Barisan 
Nasional state government amended the state constitution to provide that any state assembly person who 
left the party, under whose banner he or she had elected, would be deemed to have vacated his or her seat 
requiring a by- election to be held. At that time, it was believed that the Sarawak anti -hopping law had 
been introduced to protect the power position of the Sarawak Chief Minister Taib Mahmud. In this 
context, opposition parties argued that Mahathir's attitude on the Kelantan anti- hopping law was 
contradictory and rather 'undemocratic'. See Press Statement by Lim Kit Siang, 4 September 1991. 
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found in the UMNO special assembly in November 1991, when the UMNO leadership 
approved the amendments to the party constitution to prevent the branch and divisional 
levels from delaying or rejecting membership application of Semangat 46 members to 
UMNO.71 Under the new amendment, any applicant who had not received a reply from 
a branch or divisional level three months after submitting an application form could 
appeal directly to the UMNO supreme council to seek automatic admission to the 
party.72 It was also around this time that a special 'coordinating committee' was set up in 
Kelantan by 42 former Semangat 46 leaders to facilitate the smooth and efficient re- 
entry of former Kelantan UMNO members 73 
The so- called 'open door policy' towards Semangat 46 was continued in the early 
1990s by Mahathir and UMNO leaders. Consequently, another key figure of Semangat 
46, Harun Idris, former Menteri Besar of Selangor, returned to UMNO in January 1992. 
In addition, IO out of the 11 former UMNO politicians who had challenged the validity 
of the 1987 UMNO election, were accepted as new members by early 1992.74 Semangat 
46 vice -president Marina Yusoff, who had retired from politics after the 1990 general 
election, also joined UMNO in May 1993. Immediately after Marina's defection, 
UMNO announced that all Semangat 46 leaders, except Razaleigh, were free to join the 
party and vie for divisional posts in the coming party elections scheduled in mid- 1993.75 
It must be noted that this announcement came when the dispute between the existing 
UMNO members and Semangat 46 defectors was intensifying a few months before the 
scheduled branch and division elections.76 Despite the apparent internal feuds at branch 
71 NST, 9 November 1991. There were reservations among UMNO branch and division Ieaders who 
feared the increasing number of Semangat 46 defectors would threaten their political interests. Especially 
in Kelantan, the massive defections of Semangat 46 members became an obsession with the existing 
UMNO branch and division leaders because they worried the increasing numbers of former Semangat 46 
members would be a threatening factor for the present UMNO branch and division leadership when the 
next divisional elections were held in mid -1993. In this regard, as a typical way of obstructing the influx 
of Semangat 46 members, membership applications were often delayed or even rejected at the UMNO 
branch levels. For examples, see The Star, 3 April 1991 ( "Crossovers worry many in state UMNO ") and 
The Star, 15 June 1991 ( "Leaders' fear delays AGMs of UMNO branches ") 
72 To demonstrate its conciliatory gesture, the top UMNO leaders occasionally warned the branch and 
divisional leaders who were reluctant to re -admit former Semangat 46 members. For examples, see The 
Star, 4 April 1991 ("Kelantan UMNO told to curb resentment"); NST, 23 September 1991 ( "UMNO may 
allow appeals to council "). However, it also must be noted that the UMNO leaders intermittently counter - 
warned of infiltration by Semangat 46 members who were out to sow discord after joining UMNO. A 
good example is shown in NST, 6 July 1992 ("Be wary of group out to split UMNO "). 
73 NST, 9 November 1991. 
74 The Star, 29 February I992. 
75 The Star, 10 May 1993. 
76 A good example of sharp conflict between the old and new UMNO members can be found in NST, 21 
April 1993. Indeed, the conflict of interest had been intensified when the UMNO leadership attracted 
Semangat 46 by implying that some new branches would be allocated to Semangat 46 defectors in 
revamping branches and divisions to accommodate the newly increased 12 parliamentary seats. The 
Constitution (Amendment) Bill was approved for the increase of 12 additional parliamentary seats in 
October 1992. See NST, 27 October 1992. 
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and divisional levels, it is widely believed that the continuous conciliatory gestures at 
this time reflected the increasing self- confidence of Mahathir and top UMNO leaders 
over the Malay hegemony following the miserable defeat in the 1990 elections. 
On one level, the influx of Semangat 46 leaders and members into UMNO 
seemed to reflect their dissatisfaction with the way the PAS -led state government 
handled state matters. In particular, the marginalization of their role in the Kelantan 
state government was a major complaint among Semangat 46 officials in the early 
1990s. One of the controversial disputes can be found in the case of the failure of a 50- 
50 allocation of positions in the state administration and government -owned companies 
in Kelantan. The appointment of the second deputy Menteri Besar in Kelantan was 
another sensitive issue between Semangat 46 and PAS 77 And it must be stressed that 
the UMNO leaders repeatedly instigated, through the BN- controlled mass media, the 
fragile partnership between Semangat 46 and PAS as a kahwin mutaah (temporary 
marriage of convenience) where all the key positions in the Kelantan state government 
were monopolized by the latter. 
However, irrespective of increasing feuds between Semangat 46 and PAS, it 
seemed that there were already strong demands and internal discussions among 
Semangat 46 leaders to return en bloc to UMNO immediately after the 1990 general 
election. In particular, several top party leaders, including deputy president Rais Yatim, 
proposed to Razaleigh to join UMNO as one group and fight within UMNO circles for 
the purpose of Malay unity.78 Razaleigh, however, firmly denied that there were 
increasing demands from the top party leaders to return to the old UMNO circle.79 
Whether this is true or not, it is worth noting that there was a growing fear within 
Semangat 46 circles that they would eventually be sent to the political wilderness if they 
remained any longer out of the establishment circles. This was, and still is, the psyche of 
the UMNO members who were habituated to the high absorptive capacity of the ruling 
party. For them, it was obviously hard to endure the political hardships expected of 
opposition forces, and 'political survival' in all likelihood was the most practical reason 
77 After the 1990 elections, Semangat 46 wanted the position of deputy Menteri Besar to go the party. But 
the issue was resolved by creating two deputy Menteri Besars and this caused serious internal conflict in 
the Kelantan state government. For more reports on internal feuds between Semangat 46 and PAS soon 
after the 1990 elections, see The Star, 20 December 1990; The Star, 11 January 1991; NST, 23 January 
1991; NST, 31 January 1991; NST, 26 February 1991; The Star, 17 March 1991; and FEER, 11 April 
1991 (Suhaini Aznam, "Crossover season "). 
78 It was alleged that Razaleigh was very agitated by such strong demands from the top Semangat 46 
leaders to go back to the old UMNO circles. However, they considered it impossible to fight the 
establishment from outside UMNO where there were no political platforms, such as funds, media and 
publications. Interview with Rais Yatim, Kuala Lumpur, 4 February 1998. 
9 Interview with Razaleigh Hamzah, Kuala Lumpur, 23 February 1998. 
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to return to the UMNO mode. 
Unlike Razaleigh, most other Semangat 46 Ieaders and members were not 
financially independent. Given the vulnerable circumstances of being heavily dependent 
on government patronage networks such as business licenses, bank loans and state 
contracts, they had no option but to creep back to the establishment circles when their 
patronage resources were called in by the UMNO -led government.80 For the remnants 
of Razaleigh's supporters, Semangat 46 was no longer viewed as an alternative or even 
potentially viable 'guardian' for their political and financial survival. In fact, Razaleigh 
himself admitted that he could not afford to provide enough patronage resources to his 
supporters as he lost mainstream political platforms in Malaysia. He therefore believes 
that a number of Semangat 46 leaders left not because they had given up Semangat 46's 
cause or because of internal disputes in the Kelantan state government, but because they 
were financially rewarded or persecuted to leave the party by the Mahathir 
government.st However, as a Semangat 46 official correctly observed, most Semangat 
46 defectors were gradually pushed into 'oblivion', or at best 'rehabilitation', after 
returning to the UMNO fold.82 
Marginalization and Discrimination 
The Mahathir government's undermining of opposition forces in the 1990s is also 
evident in the process of the paralyzation of the opposition -run state governments in 
8° Based on his interview, Case argued that the retaliatory process by the Mahathir government after the 
1990 general election covered not only business elites associated with Razaleigh but also relatives of 
opposition supporters. See, William Case, "Pseudo- democracy in Southeast Asia: Uncovering State 
Leaders and the Business Connection ", paper presented at the Asia in Global Context Conference, 
University of New South Wales, 28 September - 1 October 1998, pp. 23 and 35. A former senior 
government official, who asked not to be named, pointed out that there was, and still is, a special branch 
in the Prime Minister's Department which keeps secret files on all Malaysian politicians, including top 
government and UMNO officials. He alleged that Mahathir often abused the secret files to victimize, or 
pressure, his political opponents and there had been cases of Semangat 46 leaders and supporters who 
resigned or left the party due to the details of individual secret files in the PM's Department. Confidential 
interview in February 1998, Kuala Lumpur. 
81 In this interview, Razaleigh pointed out that Ibrahim Ali s defection was a typical example of 
Mahathir's pressure and financial rewards for the Semangat 46 members. He believes that Ibrahim Ali 
was nearly bankrupted when he decided to leave the party and there was no doubt that the Mahathir 
government could have bankrupted him if he didn't return to UMNO. Interview with Razaleigh Hamzah, 
Kuala Lumpur, 23 February 1998. Ibrahim Ali himself categorically denied that his defection was due to 
financial reasons. He claimed that even before the 1990 general election there was a belief within 
Semangat 46 circles that if the party won the general election Razaleigh would restore the old UMNO, 
but if the party lost it would be dissolved and go back to the old UMNO circles to restore the Malay unity. 
Semangat 46's struggle to revive the old UMNO ended with the party's defeat in the 1990 elections and 
that was why he returned to the UMNO fold. Interview with Ibrahim Ali, Kuala Lumpur, 23 February 
1998. Meanwhile, a close associate of Ibrahim Ali, who declined to be identified, asserted that Ibrahim 
Ali would have inevitably been bankrupted if he refused or delayed the defection to UMNO in early 
1991. Confidential interview, Kuala Lumpur, February 1998. 
82 Interview with Ahmad Shabery Chík, former Semangat 46 Information Chief, Kuala Lumpur, 13 
January 1998. 
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Kelantan and Sabah, by their exclusion from the political mainstream and patronage 
resources for development. Mahathir's intransigent attitude towards the opposition -run 
state governments can be seen in his speech on the UMNO general assembly of 1990: 
The Federal Government will not go out of its way to help the PAS government. We know that 
any form of [federal] assistance will be used by PAS to prove that there is nothing to lose in 
electing PAS as a government.... For this reason, the Federal Government will not help the PAS 
government to succeed.83 
From the very beginning after the 1990 general election, Mahathir deliberately 
Ieft out the Chief Ministers of Kelantan and Sabah when he called federal meetings with 
state chief ministers to discuss economic activities in the states. Kelantan and Sabah 
were instead represented by the most senior ministers from these states in the ruling BN 
coalition. Mahathir then repeatedly announced that the federal government would not 
give any financial assistance to Kelantan and Sabah, apart from their annual budgets in 
conformity with the minimum requirements provided under the Federal Constitution.84 
Given the vulnerable circumstances where the financial status of local authorities has 
long been dependent on the federal government's patronage resources, there seemed to 
be little the opposition -run Kelantan and Sabah state governments could do in carrying 
out economic activities without federal assistance.85 Although Mahathir intermittently 
claimed that development should not be mixed with politics, it was commonly believed 
that the Mahathir government utilized the federal assistance for development projects as 
an effective way of discriminating against the Kelantan and Sabah state govemments.86 
A senior member of the Kelantan Chinese Chamber of Commerce stressed that there 
was not a single new development project in Kelantan for at least the first six months 
after the 1990 general election and no new foreign investment came into the state during 
this period.87 
83 The Star, 1 December 1990. 
84 See FEER, 22 November 1990 (Suhaini Aznam, "Out in the Cold "). 
85 It must be stressed that the Federal Constitution restricts, to a large extent, the discretionary power of 
the state governments to raise alternative financial resources for themselves. For example, the state 
governments' capacity to apply for loans is limited by law. For a thorough account of financing local 
governments, see Phang Siew Nooi, Financing Local Government in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: 
University of Malaya Press, 1997). For an analysis of how the federal government utilizes its financial 
resources to control the local authorities in Peninsular Malaysia, see Shafruddin, B. H., The Federal 
Factor in the Government and Politics of Peninsular Malaysia (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 
1987). 
86 See Mahathir's statement on the issue of development and politics in NST, 31 May 1991. 
87 See Malaysian Business, June 1 -15 1991 (Jayasankaran, "The Siege Within "). As another example of 
isolating the opposition -run state government, Kelantan was also excluded from a joint agreement, signed 
soon after the 1990 general election, between the BN government in Pahang and Terengganu to promote 
regional economic activities, such as tourism and industries, in the east coast states. See Khong Kim 
Hoong, Malaysia's General Election 1990: Continuity, Change, and Ethnic Politics (Singapore: Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), p. 48. 
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The Mahathir government, however, could not sever development projects and 
federal funding altogether because it would result in the deepening of anti -federal 
sentiment among the people in the states of Kelantan and Sabah. The most effective 
scenario for the Mahathir government was, therefore, to paralyze those opposition -run 
state governments without giving an impression of victimization In this context, the 
federal funds were directly channeled through a newly created federal agency, the 
Federal Development Department (l'UD) directly under the Prime Minister's 
Department, to bypass the Kelantan and Sabah state governments. In the same way, 
especially in Kelantan, Mahathir empowered the UMNO division chiefs to approve 
development projects in their respective constituencies, even though they were no 
longer elected representatives.88 It was then openly promoted by Mahathir that sufficient 
federal funds would be allocated to finance various development projects approved by 
the UMNO division heads in Kelantan. It was also advised that all the Kelantan division 
heads set up 'service centers' in their respective constituencies to facilitate development 
projects.89 By doing this, UMNO was able to promote its traditional selling point, that is 
patronage networks for development, to the people in the opposition -mn states in the 
1990s. 
Even so, the Mahathir government did not neglect to apply sanctions against the 
people of Kelantan and Sabah who had brought the opposition into power at the 1990 
general election. At a superficial level, it seemed that development projects were being 
carried out in both states. However, the numbers and size of the projects were not equal 
to those in other states and there were frequent delays in implementation of the 
scheduled projects.90 There was therefore widespread speculation that the Mahathir 
government was seeking to strangle the opposition -run state governments of Kelantan 
and Sabah at the expense of economic development, mainly because of their political 
differences. 
A prime example of economic sanctions can be found in the case of the federal 
development allocation by states under the Sixth Malaysia Plan, covering the period 
1991 -95. As shown in Table 6 -1, the percentage of the post -1990 general election 
88 It must be noted that only elected MPs and state assembly persons from the ruling BN coalition were 
authorized to identify development projects for implementation in their respective constituencies before 
the 1990 general election. 
89 The Star, 7 April 1991. 
90 A clear example of project delay can be found in the case of the Sultan Ismail Petra Airport in 
Kelantan. The extension project of the airport's runway had been approved under the previous BN state 
government to boost the tourism industry of the state. The scheduled project, however, was delayed for 
more than three years after the opposition took power in 1990, even though the land had been acquired 
and landowners had been re- settled with compensation. See Malaysian Business, February 1 -15, 1991 
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development allocation by the federal government sharply decreased in both Kelantan 
and Sabah from 11.2 per cent (1986 -90) to 8.0 per cent (1991 -95), compared to the 
relative increase, or at most minimal decrease, in the other states. It is worth noting that 
when the BN controlled the states in the 1980s there was an increase in total federal 
development allocation in Kelantan and Sabah, from 10.6 per cent (1981 -85) to 11.2 per 
cent (1986 -90).91 Furthermore, the actual federal development allocation in Kelantan 
was later cut to 2.6 per cent from the initial 3.8 per cent in the period 1991 -95.92 It must 
also be noted that some portion of the federal allocation had to be deducted as a 
payment for accumulated state debt of some RM753 million, most of it being owed to 
the federal government by the previous UMNO -controlled Kelantan state government. 
Moreover, out of the original development allocation (RM2.063 billion), only RM676 
million (33 %) had been expended by the end of 1993 while the national average 
expenditure reached about 53 per cent 93 According to a PAS leader, it was only after 
mid -1993 as another general election was approaching that some of the federal 
allocation was given to the PAS -led Kelantan state govemment94 
Table 6 -1 ederal Government Development Allocation by State, 198I -1995 ($million/ %) 
State 1981 -1985(2) 1986 -1990(3) 1991 -1995 
Selangor 3,924 (8.0) 2,288 (6.1) 4,295 (7.8) 
Federal Territory 5,264 (10.7) 2,228 (6.0) 4,608 (8.4) 
Johor 3,357 (6.9) 2,658 (7.1) 3,794 (6.9) 
Melaka 653 (1.3) 378 (1.0) 924 (1.7) 
Negeri Sembilan 1,297 (2.7) 911 (2.4) 1,548 (2.8) 
Pahang 3,091 (6.3) 2,496 (6.7) 2,837 (5.2) 
Perak 3,676 (7.5) 2,054 (5.5) 2,563 (4.7) 
Perlis 637 (1.3) 421 (1.1) 505 (0.9) 
Penang 1,469 (3.0) 725 (1.9) 1,548 (2.8) 
Sarawak 3,286 (6.7) 1,946 (5.2) 3,209 (5.8) 
Terengganu 2,544 (5.2) 2,063 (5.5) 2,729 (5.0) 
Kedah 2,621 (5.3) 2,363 (6.3) 2,826 (5.1) 
Sabah 2,585 (5.3) 2,253 (6.0) 2,307 (4.2) 
Kelantan 2,618 (5.3) 1,933 (5.2) 2,063 (3.8) 
Multi- StateO 12,015 (24.5) 12,566 (33.7) 19,243 (35.0) 
Total 49,026 (100.0) 37,290 (100.0) 55,000 (100.0) 
Source: Fifth Malaysia Plan 1986 -1990, p. 231 (Table 7 -4) and Sixth Malaysia Plan 1991 -1995, p. 64 
(Table 2 -4). 
Note: (1) Multi -State means those whose beneficiaries are nation -wide and whose locations cannot be 
determined by state. 
(2) 1981 -85 figures round off the fractions to decimal place from the original figures. 
(3) 1986 -90 figures are revised allocation. 
('Growing with [slam'). 
91 It was alleged that the federal allocation for development in Kelantan was slashed by about a third after 
UMNO's defeat in the 1990 elections from the initially requested allocation by the previous UMNO- 
controlled Kelantan state government. See Malaysian Business, June 1 -15, 1991 (Jayasankaran, "The 
Siege Within "), p. 20. 
92 See Seventh Malaysia Plan 1996 -2000, p. 181, Table 6 -4. 
93 See Mid-Tenn Review of the Sixth Malaysia Plan 1991 -1995, p. 50, Table 2 -16. 
94 See Kelantan Mentent Besar Nik Aziz Nik Mats interview in Malaysian Business, February 1 -15, 1994 
( "Growing with Islam "), p. 3. 
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Meanwhile, there was only a marginal increase in approved manufacturing 
projects especially in Kelantan, from 25 in the period 1986 -90 to 26 in the period 1991- 
95 (4 %), whereas other states recorded noticeably higher increases from 3,205 to 4,297 
(34 %) in the same period. In addition, Kelantan received the lowest amount of capital 
investments, totaling RM1.1 billion out of RM116.2 billion (0.9 %) under the Sixth 
Malaysia Plan (1991 -95), whereas capital investments mostly increased among the other 
states. Terengganu, for example, received the second highest amount of capital 
investments valued at RM16.4 billion (14.1 %), while Perlis, which had recorded the 
lowest number in the period 1986 -90, increased from RM36 million to RM2.2 billion 
(double Kelantan's total capital investments) along with increasing numbers of 
manufacturing projects from 10 to 39 for the same period.95 
During the 1980s, the ratio of GDP per capita to the national average had 
gradually decreased from 0.46 to 0.39 in Kelantan and from 0.95 to 0.83 in Sabah. 
Compared to the other states, the ratio of per capita income in Kelantan and Sabah to 
the national average remained steady in the 1980s. But after the 1990 general election, 
their shares fell behind the other states and the national average, as evidenced in Table 
6 -2. Sabah's share of GDP per capita has sharply decreased from 0.83 per cent in 1990 
to 0.61 per cent in 1995. Consequently, Sabah, one of the middle- income states in the 
1980s, fell into line with Kelantan as a low- income state by 1995. On the other hand, 
Kelantan's relative economic backwardness became even worse during this period, 
declining from 0.39 per cent in 1991 to 0.34 per cent in 1995. Furthermore, there is no 
significant sign that Kelantan and Sabah's economic status vis -a -vis the other states was 
rising during the five years from 1995, as shown in Table 6 -2. 
Table 6 -2. Ratio of Per Capita GDP to Malaysian Average by State, 1980 -2000 in 1978 prices 
State 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000(2) 
Selangor 1.43 132 1.43 1.49 1.46 
Federal Territory 1.98 2.07 1.92 2.00 2.02 
Johor 0.91 0.88 0.92 0.97 1.03 
Melaka 0.71 0.74 0.84 0.94 1.04 
Negeri Sembilan 1.07 1.02 0.85 0.88 0.96 
Pahang 0.99 0.93 0.82 0.79 0.80 
Perak 0.89 0.85 0.80 0.83 0.91 
Perlis 0.70 0.69 0.66 0.65 0.66 
Penang 1.13 1.10 1.19 1.34 1.43 
Sarawak 0.71 0.82 0.88 0.80 0.78 
Terengganu 1.15 1.26 1.58 1.50 1.48 
Kedah 0.65 0.63 039 0.65 0.71 
Sabah(1) 0.95 0.95 0.83 0.61 0.49 
Kelantan 0.46 0.46 0.39 034 032 
Source: Fifth Malaysia Plan, pp. 172 -175 (Tab e 5 -2 and Table 5 -3) and Seventh Malaysia Plan, p. 142, (Table 5 -2). 
Note: (1) Includes the Federal Territory of labuan. (2) Estimated ratio of per capita GDP to Malaysian average. 
95 Total investment in approved manufacturing projects doubled from RM58.6 billion in the period 1986- 
90 to RM116.2 billion in the period 1991 -95. For more details of approved manufacturing projects by 
state, see Seventh Malaysia Plan 1996 -2000, p. 147, Table 5 -4. 
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Victimization and Direct -Intervention 
The Sabah opposition was in a weaker position to resist the political maneuvering by the 
federal government than its counterpart in Kelantan as the entire machinery of UMNO 
and the federal authority were mobilized to enter directly in Sabah politics.96 Indeed, 
federal government harassment was widely expected even before the 1990 general 
election as Mahathir himself had laid the blame on PBS's defection to the opposition 
and described it as 'a stab in the back' on the eve of the general election. Mahathir's 
anger towards the Sabah opposition was often revealed in his post -election speeches. As 
a clear example, he warned during the 1990 UMNO general assembly that: 
I would Iike to emphasize that the Federal Government will not hesitate to act against anyone who 
goes against the law even if the Federal Government is accused of suppression by taking such 
action. Those guilty should be regarded as such, irrespective of the political implications.97 
About a month after Mahathir's warning, Maximus Ongkili, a close aide and 
relative of Sabah chief minister Pairin Kitingan, was arrested under the ISA on charges 
of endangering national security.98 Then, two days later, Pairin himself was charged and 
briefly detained under the Anti -Corruption Agency (ACA) on three charges of 
corruption, allegedly committed in 1985.99 A few months later, Pairin's younger brother 
Jeffery Kitingan, executive chairman of IDS and director of the Sabah Foundation, was 
also arrested under the ISA for alleged involvement in a plot to take Sabah out of the 
Malaysian federation.100 Since then, federal -state relations have been particularly 
tenuous in Sabah. While Mahathir and UMNO leaders denied any political malice, 
many political observers viewed a series of arrests of PBS leaders as politically - 
motivated victimization by the Mahathir government. 
It was also in early 1991 that UMNO, for the first time since the formation of 
96 For background on the federal -state relationship in Sabah, see Francis Loh Kok Wah, "Modernization, 
Cultural Revival and Counter -hegemony: The Kadazans of Sabah in the 1980s ", in Joel S. Kahn and 
Francis Loh Kok Wah (eds.), Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia 
(Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1992), pp. 225 -253; Audrey Kahin, "Crisis on the Periphery: The Rift 
between Kuala Lumpur and Sabah ", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 1 (Spring 1992), pp. 30 -49. 
v7 Mahathir's speech at the 1990 UNLNO general assembly. See NST, 1 December 1990. 
98 Maximus Ongkili was the deputy chief executive of the state government's "think tank" IDS (Institute 
of Development Studies) and was working as a press consultant for the PBS during the 1990 general 
election. Mahathir's federal government often accused IDS of inciting anti -federal sentiments. For 
examples of Mahathir's accusations against IDS, see NST, 10 November 1990. Meanwhile, immediately 
after the 1990 general election, Sabah's deputy chief minister, Yong Teck Lee, and another PBS 
assemblyman, Philip Tay, were charged with illegal assembly. 
v9 Soon after his detention, Pairin was released on bail. For more details of Pairin's arrest and corruption 
charges, see FEER, 17 January 1991 (Suhaini Aznam, "Links under stress "). 
100 Jeffrey Kitingan had also been charged with seven counts of corruption a few months before the ISA 
arrest. See FEER, 23 May 1991 (Suhaini Aznam, "Double blow "). Jeffrey was released in January 1994 
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Malaysia in 1963, set up branches in Sabah with the ultimate aim of directly controlling 
the state government.101 Although it has generally been assumed that UMNO's 
membership has been open only to the Malays in the peninsula, Sabah UNL TO relaxed 
its boundaries by opening its membership to non -Malay indigenous groups in Sabah. 
Within a few months of UMNO's expansion in Sabah, the Muslim -based USNO 
president Mustapha Harun left the party and won a by- election held in Usukan as an 
UMNO candidate.102 However, with the exception of its president Mustapha, the 11 
other USNO state assemblymen had been prevented from joining UMNO by Sabah's 
anti -hopping Iaw which bars the assemblymen from switching parties on pain of Iosing 
their seats. It was in this context that, immediately after the Supreme Court ruling on 3 
April 1992 declaring the Kelantan anti -hopping law as ultra vires of the Federal 
Constitution, UMNO decided to challenge Sabah's anti -hopping law to enable the 11 
USNO assemblymen to join the party without having to vacate their seats. The Supreme 
Court finally ruled on 8 March 1993 that Sabah's anti -hopping law was invalid and 
seven USNO assemblymen had joined UMNO by early April 1993.103 Shortly afterward 
USNO, the once -powerful Muslim -based party which had ruled Sabah between 1967 
and 1975, was defunct as the party completed its duty as UMNO's vehicle for entry into 
Sabah. t°4 
UMNO's political maneuvering to take control of the state Ieadership climaxed 
in the run -up to the 1994 Sabah elections and its aftermath. Shortly before the state 
elections in February 1994, PBS deputy president Yong Teck Lee withdrew PBS's 
Chinese portion to form a new party, Sabah Progressive Party (SAPP). The new 
after having been detained for more than two years. 
101 Until PBS's defection to the opposition, UMNO leaders reiterated that UMNO had no intention of 
expanding into Sabah unless national security was threatened. For example, see Ghafar Babas remarks in 
The Star, 11 September 1989. It was, however, just a couple of days after the 1990 general election that 
the UMNO supreme council decided to set up UMNO branches in Sabah. See NST, 24 October 1990. 
102 The Muslim -based USNO (United Sabah National Organization), as a BN component party, won 12 
seats at the Sabah state elections in July 1990, while another BN component party PBS won 36 out of the 
total 48 state seats. Soon after the by- election, Mustapha became UMNO's Sabah liaison chief and was 
later appointed as Federal Minister for Sabah Affairs in May 1993. Mustapha, however, fell out with 
UMNO just before the 1994 Sabah state elections and publicly supported PBS. 
103 NST, 6 April 1993. The remaining five USNO assemblymen were involved in the formation of a 
coalition government with the PBS and stood as PBS candidates in the next state election in Sabah in 
1994. However, only one of them was re- elected as state assemblyman in the 1994 elections. 
104 Soon after abolishing Sabah's anti- hopping law, the Federal Constitution was amended in July 1993 to 
obtain two objectives: to allow a member of the State Legislature to be appointed as a Federal Minister 
without relinquishing his or her state assembly seat; and to prevent a by- election from taking place within 
the last two years of a parliament's life if the majority of a party in power is not affected by a casual 
vacancy. Interestingly, the constitutional amendments were proposed by the UMNO supreme council just 
three weeks after Mustapha's appointment as Federal Minister for Sabah Affairs. It was therefore widely 
believed that the proposed amendments were to avoid a state by- election in Mustapha's Usukan 
constituency for the sake of UMNO's interest in Sabah. The Usukan state by- election was, however, 
eventually held and Mustapha retained his seat as an UMNO candidate. For more discussion of the 1993 
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Chinese -based SAPP immediately allied itself with the UMNO -led BN and garnered 
PBS's traditional Chinese support for the BN in the 1994 Sabah electíons.105 Although 
money politics is nothing new in Malaysia's electoral history, it must be noted that 
UMNO's campaigning in Sabah at this time was characterized by 'an unusually high 
level of financial inducement'.1o6 The electoral results, however, revealed that PBS 
retained the state leadership, but with a narrow majority of two seats (25 of the 48 seats) 
and with a reduced popular vote (dropping from 53.9 to 48.7 per cent).107 Given the slim 
majority, it was not altogether surprising when a series of crossovers by three PBS 
assemblymen enabled Sabah UMNO to topple the PBS state government within a few 
weeks of the PBS victory. It is widely speculated that the PBS defectors were offered 
RM3 million each to cross -over to the BN.105 Shortly afterward, the post -election 
defections of PBS assemblymen were followed by the emergence of new political 
parties led by former PBS leaders, leaving PBS with just five seats.109 
Meanwhile, UMNO's expansion into Sabah exacerbated the politics of ethnicity 
in Sabah. Certainly, UMNO's resorting to racial sentiments was a key element of its 
successful inroads into Sabah politics, as evidenced by the 1994 election results. UMNO 
took all the 18 state seats it contested in Muslim -majority constituencies, while almost 
all Kadazan -Dusun majority areas continued to endorse PBS. Although PBS's support 
was clearly more multi -ethnic than that of the Sabah UMNO -led BN, PBS was forced to 
become a Kadazan -Dusun party. Meanwhile, the newly formed SAPP substantially 
divided the previously united Chinese vote, winning three of the seven Chinese -majority 
seats, whereas PBS had gained a majority of the Chinese vote in two previous elections. 
It was therefore not surprising that the redelineation of state constituencies in 1993, 
which would be applied from the next state elections, favored Sabah UMNO in 
particular. Muslim- dominated constituencies were increased to 26, more than half of the 
constitutional amendments, see Aliran Monthly, 1993:13(6), pp. 2 -16. 
toe Sabah's two million population is roughly divided into 40 per cent Muslim indigenous, 40 per cent 
non -Muslim indigenous, and 20 per cent Chinese and other non- indigenous. 
1°6 See James Chin, "The Sabah State Election of 1994 ", Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 10, 1994, p. 911. For 
more details of electoral funding in the state elections, see Edmund Terence Gomez, "Electoral Funding 
of General, State and Party Elections in Malaysia, Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1996, 
pp. 81 -99 and Aliran Monthly, 1994:14(2), pp, 2 -5 (Francis Loh, 'The Sabah State Elections 1994: 
Probing the Larger Issues'). 
t07 For more detailed results of the 1994 Sabah elections, see James Chin, "The Sabah State Election of 
1994 ", Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 10, 1994, pp. 911 -912. Also see FEER, 3 March 1994 (Michael 
Vatikiotis, "A Close Run Thing "). 
108 James Chin, 1994, p. 912. Also, see Aliran Monthly, 1994:14(10), pp. 29 -31 (K. George, "Beware! 
Money Politics Will Boomerang ") 
109 Initially three new parties were to formed: the Parti Bersatu Rakyat Sabah (PBRS); the Parti 
Democratik Sabah Bersatu (PDSB); and the Parti Demokratik Sabah (PDS). PDSB led by Jeffery 
Kitingan, however, was unable to register as a political party. See, James Chin, 1994, p. 913. 
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48 state seats. The number of Kadazan-Dusun seats, however, was notably reduced 
from 18 to 12 in the 1994 elections. As Chin noted, the new electoral boundaries in 
Sabah ensured that 'Kadazan -Dusun would never be in a position to challenge Muslim 
dominance in the polls'.110 
6 -4. Restricting 'Limited Democracy' and the Centralization of Executive Power 
In Malaysia, the political system has continually been modified to curtail the opposition 
challenge to the ruling coalition's dominant position, using a battery of discriminatory 
laws and precautionary measures.ut In this context, despite continuous electoral 
competition and political stability which have been features of Malaysian politics since 
independence, the political system cannot be described as fully democratic but rather as 
a 'semi', 'illiberal' or 'limited' democracy. It was, then, in the 1990s that the ruling 
coalition increasingly used its two -thirds majority in parliament to prevent the 
emergence of any significant political challenge to its political dominance. 
Probably the most notable restriction on Malaysia's limited democracy was the 
redelineation of parliamentary and state constituencies undertaken in the early 1990s. 
Under the Federal Constitution, the Election Commission is responsible for reviewing 
the delineation of electoral boundaries at 'an interval of not less than eight years'.» 
However, a much earlier move to redelineate the electoral boundaries was initiated soon 
after the 1990 general election, even though the minimum eight -year period only ended 
on 8 November 1992. Moreover, despite the UMNO leaders' claim that the ruling party 
was not involved in the redelineation exercise, it was evident that the manipulation of 
electoral boundaries had to do with the design and plan of the ruling coalition, UMNO 
in particular. As a clear example, even a few months before the Election Commission 
decided to create 12 new parliamentary constituencies, the UMNO supreme council had 
already decided on the establishment of 12 new divisions of UMNO.113 Considering that 
115 About the redelineation exercise in Sabah, see James Chin, "'Kataks', Kadazan -Dusun Nationalism and 
Development: The 1999 Sabah State Election ", Regime Change and Regime Maintenance in Asia and the 
Pacific, Discussion Paper Series Number 24 (Canberra: The Australian National University, Research 
School of Pacific and Asian Studies, 1999), pp. 13 -14. 
111 See Crouch, 1996, pp. 77 -95. 
112 See Legal Research Board, Federal Constitution (Kuala Lumpur, International Law Book Services, 
1995), p. 135, Article 113 (2) (ii) and (iii). 
113 Dtusan Malaysia, 14 September 1992. It must be noted that UMNO leaders openly expressed the 
ruling party's wishes in the redrawing exercise of electoral boundaries. For example, UMNO secretary - 
general Mohamed Rahmat told TV3 news on I May 1991 that UMNO would be writing to the Election 
Commission on how the electoral boundaries should be redelineated. Considering UMNO's position in 
the government, its wishes or recommendations were no less than a command to the Election 
Commission. As expected, about a month later it was reported that the Election Commission directed all 
state election supervisors to attend a 1992 national constituency redelineation special meeting at the 
Cameron Highlands on 24 -25 June in preparation for redelineation of parliamentary and state 
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UMNO divisions are based on the parliamentary constituencies, there was little doubt 
that the UMNO leadership was actively involved in dictating when and how the 
Election Commission should redelineate the electoral boundaries, thus violating the 
independence of the Election Commission. 
As expected, the redelineation exercise again consolidated the dominance of the 
ruling coalition, especially UMNO. For example in Sabah, as briefly mentioned in the 
earlier section, considerable voters were carved out to the advantage of the newly 
launched Sabah UMNO, turning at least four Kadazan -Dusun majority areas into 
Muslim- dominated constituencies.114 Unfair constituency delineation also occurred with 
the provision of state seats within parliamentary constituencies in peninsular Malaysia. 
In Selangor's case, the opposition -stronghold parliamentary constituencies of Klang, 
Petaling Jaya (Utara) and Petaling Jaya (Selatan), despite their relatively large numbers 
of voters, were allocated only two state seats each, whereas the other 14 constituencies 
were all allocated three state seats each. The opposition -held parliamentary constituency 
of Puchong was divided into two - one a Malay- majority seat and the other a mixed 
constituency - by taking part of Shah Alam (a BN stronghold). Similar gerrymandering 
benefiting the ruling coalition took place in Kuala Lumpur with the increase of three 
new parliamentary seats.115 
Apart from this, the redelineation of electoral boundaries continued to defy the 
basic democratic principle of the one -person one -vote system. Penang, which has 
traditionally been DAP's stronghold, failed to add an additional parliamentary seat, 
though the state's 50,838 electorates had outnumbered the national average of 47,000 
voters per constituency. By contrast, Kedah, Kelantan, Pahang and Perlis added one 
more seat each, despite the numbers of voters per constituency in these states being less 
than the national average. Consequently, Perlis had an average of 34,732 voters per 
constituency after the redelineation exercise of 1993. Moreover, after the 1993 
redelineation the disparity in numbers of voters between constituencies became even 
more distinct at state level. For example, the post -delineation figures show that Penang 
has an average of 19,234 voters per state constituency compared with 6,946 in Perlis. 
constituencies. See Sin Chew Jit Poh, 4 June 1991. 
114 Edmund Terence Gomez, The 1995 Malaysian General Elections: A Report and Commentary 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1996), p. 11. The 1994 Sabah election was not affected 
by the redelineation exercise of 1993 as the state election was called before the official promulgation of 
the new electoral boundaries. According to Chin, one of the reasons for calling an early election in Sabah 
by the PBS -led state government was to prevent the federal government from consolidating Muslim 
voters to the advantage of Sabah UMNO using the newly introduced electoral constituencies. See James 
Chin, 1994, p. 908. 
"5 For more detailed analysis of the 1993 redelineation exercise, see Gomez, 1996, pp. 6 -I I. 
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Before the redelineation, the figures were 16,946 in Penang and 7,078 in Perlis 
respectively.116 
The 1957 Merdeka Constitution originally stipulated that the disparity in voters' 
numbers between constituencies shall not exceed 15 per cent. A series of constitutional 
amendments, however, has continuously increased the disparity. In the 1995 elections 
for example, while Hulu Rajang parliamentary constituency in Sarawak had 15,849 
voters, Ampang Jaya in Selangor recorded the largest numbers with 85,954 voters.117 It 
must be noted that the numbers of voters in constituencies has always been 
disproportionally larger in opposition -supporting areas than in the relatively smaller 
electorates in the BN- supporting constituencies. Such unfair constituency delineation 
was revealed in the election results of 1990 (see Table 6 -3). 
Table 6 -3. Disparity in Size of Constituencies Won by the BN and the Opposition in 1990 (Parliamentary) 
Penang Terengganu Perak Selangor Kuala Lumpur Melaka 
BN 
Opposition 
40,151 
59,745 
38,071 
48,984 
42,481 
56,062 
58,604 
92,659 
74,171 
76,330 
48,363 
71,608 
Source: Compiling from NSTP Research and Information Services, Elections in Malaysia: A Handbook 
of Facts and Figures on the Elect "ons 1955 -1990 (Kuala Lumpur: NSTP, 1994), pp. 109 -118 
Note: All seats from Perlis, Kedah, Pahang, Negeri Sembilan and Johor were won by the BN, whereas the 
opposition coalition took all seats from Kelantan. 
It is indeed nothing new in Malaysian politics that the Constitution has been 
continuously amended whenever it suits the government's need to maintain its 
hegemonic control over the political procedure, especially in dealing with the 
opposition. The unbroken two- thirds majority in parliament has allowed the UMNO -led 
government to introduce amendments to the Constitution at an average of once a year 
since independence.118 The pace of constitutional amendments, however, further 
accelerated in the aftermath of the 1987 I NDIO leadership crisis, and the underlying 
reasons for constitutional amendments increasingly pertained to Mahathir's desire to 
concentrate power in the Executive, especially in the hands of Mahathir himself. 
The most significant move to further enhance Mahathir's dominance over the 
political process in the years after 1990 . was his 'unfinished' contest against the Agong 
and the state rulers. As Milne and Mauzy correctly noted, in the process of Mahathir's 
assertion of executive power from 1981 -1990, the struggle to define 'magic powers of 
monarchy' in a stricter and more predictable way 'did not end in a complete victory for 
116 For the average numbers of the state voters in 1990, see NSTP, 1994, pp. 69 -107. The figures after the 
redelineation of 1993, see The Star, 26 April 1995. 
117. The Star, 26 April 1995. 
Us The constitution was amended 34 times between 1957 and 1993 and it is argued that 13 of the 34 
amendments affect directly 'fundamental liberties, the judiciary and federal -state rights'. See Rais Yatim, 
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Mahathir'.119 Since then, a tense relationship existed between Mahathir and the 
Rulers.120 Towards the end of the 1980s, the Mahathir government and the Rulers often 
came to loggerheads over the palace's alleged interference in administrative and 
political matters in the states. The situation was made worse by UMNO's disastrous 
electoral results in Kelantan during the 1990 elections.121 It is therefore not surprising 
that the years after 1990 saw unprecedented public outbursts by Mahathir and UMNO 
leaders over the palace's involvement in political affairs, and its role in a constitutional 
monarchy. 
First, the cue to attack the Rulers came from Mahathir soon after the 1990 
general election. Mahathir emboldened UMNO leaders and members to such an extent 
that they were now prepared to question the Malay Rulers, who had until recently been 
regarded as beyond question.122 Next, UMNO adopted a resolution in the 1990 general 
assembly advising the palace to adhere strictly to its role as a constitutional monarchy. 
The 1991 general assembly was to then scrutinize whether the resolution had been 
implemented or not. Meanwhile, from the end of 1992, Mahathir and UMNO leaders 
increasingly used the media to expose the Rulers' scandalous misbehavior and 
1995, p. 89. 
119 R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Malaysian Politics under Mahathir (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1999), p. 29. The Malaysian Constitution stipulated that, by the time Mahathir took over 
power in 1981, all bills passed by parliament must receive the royal assent before they could be gazetted 
as laws. The royal assent, in other words, was necessary to complete the legislative process, providing the 
monarchy with certain powers beyond ceremonial duties and symbolic privileges. Mahathir therefore 
tried to redefine the role of the constitutional monarchy by proposing amendments to the Constitution 
which sought to make Bills passed by parliament automatically law without receiving the royal assent. 
This sparked a constitutional crisis in 1983. The Rulers and almost half of the UMNO leaders came out 
flatly against Mahathir's move to strip the monarchy of its powers. Eventually, after intense negotiations 
between UMNO and the Rulers, a compromise was reached: the Rulers accepted the amendment on the 
condition that the royal assent was retained, although a Bill, which is not a money Bill, presented to the 
Agong for his assent shall be assented by him for a period not exceeding 30 days. According to the 
Constitution (Amendment) Act 1984, even if the Agong refuses to give his consent, a Bill shall become 
law by the votes of not less than two -thirds majority in parliament. In practice, the amendments simply 
empowered the Agong to delay the royal assent for a longer period with no actual power to veto a Bill. 
Nonetheless, it must be noted that the Rulers still retained their power to participate directly in the 
drafting of laws and their role could be enhanced when the government failed to obtain a two -thirds 
majority in parliament. For more details of the constitutional crisis of 1983 and its implication, see H. P. 
Lee, Constitutional Conflicts in Contemporary Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995), 
pp. 22 -42; Rais Yatim, 1995, pp. 97 -100; and Milne and Mauzy, 1999, pp. 30 -39. 
]zo For a background analysis of the relations between UMNO and the Rulers, see Hari Singh, "UMNO 
Leaders and Malay Rulers: The Erosion of a Special Relationship ", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 2 
(Summer 1995), pp. 187 -205. 
121 It was felt by some state UMNO leaders that UMNO's disastrous performance in Kelantan was partly 
because of the palace's involvement in a 'silent campaign' against the Mahathir government in favor of the 
Razaleigh -led opposition coalition. For example, see NST, 30 October 1990. 
122 The Sedition Act expressly prohibits public discussion, even in the legislatures, on the 'matter, right, 
status, position, privilege, sovereignty or prerogatives' of the Malay Rulers. However, Mahathir made it 
clear that 'it is not seditious to criticize the behavior of any Ruler who misbehaves'. Then, he mentioned 
that 'the Sedition Act only made it seditious if a person advocated the abolition of the monarchy' and he 
stressed that 'UMNO would continue to speak out against any Ruler deemed to have overstepped his role 
as a constitutional monarchy'. See The Star, 22 December 1990. 
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extravagant life -styles to the Malaysian public.123 Finally, in 1993, the Federal 
Constitution was amended to accommodate the policy of removing certain powers and 
the royal immunity of the Rulers.124 
As expected, the Rulers initially rejected the proposed constitutional 
amendments that sought to remove their personal immunity from criminal and civil 
prosecution. However, they had to accept the slightly modified amendments in 
circumstances where their rejection would have quickly raised public outbursts and 
apprehensions.125 As a result, firstly, the personal immunity of the Rulers was removed, 
except for the legal process relating to their performance of official duties. Secondly, to 
make the removal of the immunity of the Rulers effective, a Ruler was precluded from 
hearing an appeal on his own behalf and from pardoning himself, his wife and children. 
Thirdly, it was no longer seditious for parliament to question matters relating to the 
Rulers, although the freedom of elective representatives did not extend to the advocacy 
of the abolition of the constitutional monarchy,126 
Another amendment to the Constitution in May 1994 had far- reaching 
consequences in connection with the position of the Rulers. While the Agong had been 
permitted to withhold his assent and return a Bill to parliament for reconsideration, the 
constitutional amendment of 1994 did away completely with the Agong's assent to a 
Bill passed by parliament. The Agong now had to assent to a Bill within thirty days of 
123 For examples of the media exposure of the Rulers' involvement in commercial enterprise and personal 
affairs, see various issues of NST, The Star, Berita Harian, Utusan Malaysia, Nanyang Siang Pau, Sin 
Chew Jit Poh and Tamil Nesan on I4, 16, 19, 29 January 1993; 12, 14, 18, 19, 28 February 1993; and 2, 
3, 5, 7, 8, 11, 15 -21 and 23 March 1993. Quoted in Rais Yatim, 1995, p. 110, footnote 5. 
t24 Towards the end of 1992 in the midst of growing tension between UMNO and the Rulers, the alleged 
assault of hockey coach Douglas Gomez by the Johor Sultan unleashed a flood of public opinion against 
Royal excesses. The unfair treatment of the rakyat at the hands of the state ruler even united the ruling 
coalition and the opposition MPs to amend the Constitution withdrawing the royal immunity of the 
Rulers. On 10 December 1992, then Deputy Prime Minister Ghafar Baba tabled a substantive motion in 
parliament expressing the Dewan Rakyat's concern over the Gomez incident. The motion was 
unanimously passed by 96 BN and opposition MPs. This was immediately followed by the UMNO 
supreme council's resolution for a constitutional amendment to remove the Ruler's immunity. 
125 Just a few hours after the Conference of the Rulers' rejection, Mahathir tabled a constitutional 
amendment bill at a special sitting of the Dewan Rakyat. Within three days, the Bill passed through both 
Houses. When the voting took place in parliament, all the opposition members, except four Independents, 
abstained or walked out just before the vote. In particular, Razaleigh, an uncle of the Sultan of Kelantan, 
questioned the legality of the parliament sitting. His reason was that Article 38(4) of the Constitution 
stipulates that any constitutional amendment touching on the position of the Rulers must receive the 
consent of the Rulers. In relation to this matter, Mahathir pointed out that 'if the King refuses to give his 
assent, the Bill goes back to Parliament and once approved by both Houses will become law with or 
without the royal assent.... If the process is disputed, then a decision can be made by the courts. As a 
government which strongly upholds the rule of law, we will abide by the court's decision' (NST 19 
January 1993). In a situation in which the judiciary had already subordinated to the government, there is 
little doubt that the court's decision would be in favor of the Mahathir government. For more detail of the 
political developments in the 1993 constitutional conflicts, see Aliran Monthly, 1993 :13(1), pp. 2 -5 (Anil 
Netto, "No one is above the law "). 
126 For detail on the constitutional amendments in 1993, see H. P. Lee,1995, pp. 89 -93. 
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its being presented to him. If he did not do so, the Bill automatically became a law upon 
the expiration of that period as if he had assented to it.127 By this amendment, the royal 
assent was no longer necessary to complete the legislative process. Considering this 
royal assent in the legislative process was the main issue of the constitutional crisis of 
1983 between Mahathir and the Rulers, the constitutional amendment of 1994 can be 
perceived as a move to finalize the 'unfinished' contest between them. In this context, 
Rais Yatim observes that the Constitution (Amendment) Act 1994 was nothing but the 
final "seal" of the Rulers' fate' by Mahathir's executive power.128 Although it is a moot 
point to argue whether the removal of the royal assent in the legislative process 
undermines an important means of check and balance on the executive or not, there is 
little doubt that the dominant executive in total control of all significant political 
institutions can be perceived as the essence of the authoritarian trend in Malaysian 
politics in the years after 1990.129 
Further centralization of executive power in Mahathir can also be found in the 
1994 constitutional amendment. In connection with the position of the judiciary, the 
Constitution was amended to provide a broader ground for removing a judge by adding 
a new provision of 'any breach of any provisions of the code of ethics' into Article 125 
which stipulate tenure of office and remuneration of judges of the Federal Court.13° 
Further, the newly inserted code of ethics would be prescribed by the government, 
especially the Prime Minister, rather than the judiciary.131 This implies that the judges 
must abide by a government- drafted code of conduct and thus 'remove any separation 
between the judiciary and the executive'.132 In this regard, a senior judge summarizes 
the amendment as 'repugnant to the basic concept of democracy' and marked 'the end of 
127 See Legal Research Board, Federal Constitution, 1995, pp. 81 -82, Clause (4) and (4A) of Article 66. 
120 Rais Yatim, 1995, p. 113. 
129 In his letter from Sungai Buloh prison on 8 November 1998, Anwar wrote that: 
We supported him [Mahathirl in the constitutional amendment issue [in 1993], thinking rather 
naively that the powers taken from the Rulers would revert to the people and not go to him alone. 
How blind we were then not to see through his vile plan to eventually overthrow the traditional 
Malay Rulers and install himself as the supreme feudal lord of the Malays. 
'3° The existing provisions of Clause (3) of Article 125 of the Federal Constitution stipulated that a judge 
of the Supreme Court (now Federal Court) ought only to be removed on the grounds of 'misbehavior or of 
inability, from infirmity of body or mind or any other cause, properly to discharge the functions of his 
office'. See Legal Research Board, Federal Constitution, 1995, p. 90. 
131 Clause (3A) of the amended Article 125 states that: 'The Yang di- Pertuan Agong on the 
recommendation of the Chief Justice, the President of the Court of Appeal and the Chief Judges of the 
High Court, may, after consulting the Prime Minister, prescribe in writing a code of ethics which shall be 
observed by every judge of the Federal Court.' See Legal Research Board, Federal Constitution, I995, p. 
151, Italics added. 
132 FEER, 19 May 1994 (Michael Vatikiotis, "King and Country: Government further clips rulers' 
wings "). 
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the independence of the Judiciary' in Malaysia.133 
Other pieces of legislation have also significantly reinforced the coercive powers 
of the executive and curtailed democratic rights. In particular, apart from the direct 
ownership of the media, various measures were taken by the government to ensure its 
full control over the press through coercive legislation, discontinuance of critical 
publications, harassment of journalists, and even promotion of self -censorship among 
joumalists.134 Following Operasi Lalang and the suspension of two daily newspapers 
and a Malay magazine in October 1987, the Printing Presses and Publication Act was 
amended in 1988 to disallow judicial review of the Home Minister's decision in 
revoking or suspending a publishing permit. Then in late 1991, the government imposed 
a new ruling on the publishing permit of the opposition parties' organs, especially the 
DAP's The Rocket and PAS's The Harakah, restricting their circulation to party 
members only. Just a few weeks later, the printing permit of Mingguan Waktu, a Malay 
political weekly, was revoked on the grounds that the weekly had in its inaugural issue 
published a critical article describing Mahathir's first ten years as Prime Minister as a 
failure.135 
The scope and frequency of politically motivated detentions were maintained at 
relatively Iow Ievels in the years after 1990. Nonetheless, it must be noted that the threat 
of using repressive laws continued and served well to constrain participation in political 
activities among various social and political activists during this period. In particular, 
incremental amendments to the ISA extended authoritarian executive powers of the 
Mahathir government by removing the power of judicial review in the ISA cases from 
the courts.136 The rationale for the amendments was that the amended ISA enabled the 
133 Atiran Monthly, 1994:14(5), p. 11 (Zainur Zakaria, "The 1994 Constitutional Amendment: End of 
Judicial Independence"). 
134 For a more detailed explanation of how the ruling elites in Malaysia appropriated control of the media 
through these various steps, see John Lent, "Restructuring of Mass Media in Malaysia and Singapore" in 
Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol. 16, No. 4, 1984, pp. 26 -35; Chandra Muzaffar, Freedom in 
Fetters: An Analysis of the State of Democracy in Malaysia (Penang: Aliran, 1986), especially pp. 1 -5; 
Kua Kia Soong (ed.), Media Watch: The Use and Abuse of the Malaysian Press (Kuala Lumpur: The 
Resource & Research Center, Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall, 1990); Gomez, 1994; and Francis Loh 
Kok Wah and Mustafa K. Anuar, "The Press in Malaysia in the Early 1990s: Corporatisation, 
Technological Innovation and the Middle Class" in Muhammad Ikmal Said and Zahid Emby (eds.), 
Malaysia Critical Perspectives (Petaling Jaya: Persatuan Sains Sosial Malaysia, 1996), especially pp. 
100 -107. 
133 See FEER, 9 January 1992 (Michael Vatikiotis, "A tabloid tamed "); Miran Monthly, I992 :12(1), pp. 
2 -3 ( Mustafa K. Anuar and Francis Loh, "Color, Puzzles, Feng Shui and the Malaysian Press "). 
136 The ISA allows the police to arrest and detain any person suspected of threatening national security for 
up to 60 days of investigation, after which the Minister of Home Affairs can order detention without 
charge or trial for renewable periods of two years. On 26 June 1989, the Mahathir government amended 
the ISA, stripping away the judicial safeguards designed to protect against its abuse. For more details of 
the ISA amendments, see FEER, 6 July 1989 (Suhaini Aznam, "ISA amendments abolish judicial review: 
Appeal no more "). 
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government to act more swiftly for the protection of national security, whereas matters 
went through a time- consuming judicial review in the past. The amended ISA, however, 
made executive decisions on detentions without trial final with no effective recourse to 
legal protection for the ISA detainee. By this amendment, the ISA gives the executive 
extraordinary and exceptional power, with almost no check and balance. 
Among the selective and politically motivated political detentions in the 1990s 
were the ISA arrest of Sabah Chief Minister Pairin Kitingan's brother, Jeffrey Kitingan, 
and six other PBS members soon after the 1990 general election, for their alleged 
involvement in a plot to withdraw Sabah from the Malaysian Federation; the ISA arrest 
of the leaders and members of the Muslim Al -Arqam group in late 1994 for their alleged 
deviationist Islamic activities; and the arrest of Lim Guan Eng, a DAP parliamentary 
member, under the Sedition Act and Printing Presses and Publication Act in 1994, for 
'exciting public disaffection with the administrations of justice' and 'maliciously 
publishing false information', in relation to the alleged statutory rape case of the former 
Chief Minister of Melaka, Rahim Tamby Chik.137 
The banning of Al -Arqam and the subsequent ISA arrests in particular provide a 
clear example of political maneuvers by the UMNO -led government, not only in 
curtailing democratic rights in Malaysia's limited democracy, but also in preempting a 
possible challenge against its political dominance. Various explanations were given for 
the banning of Al- Argam, one of the long- standing dakwah (missionary) movements in 
Malaysia. According to Milne and Mauzy, the two most plausible explanations were 
that the Al Argam group increasingly emerged as a significant political threat to the 
hegemonic UMNO regime; and that Al-Arqam constituted a challenge to the 
government's rural development programs with its own apparently successful approach 
to rural development.138 Of course there are some political observers who claim that Al- 
Arqam's 'deviation teachings' provided the rationale behind the banning of the 
movement. It seems, however, that none of these explanations reveals any satisfactory 
reason for the Mahathir government's motives, and especially timing, in taking such 
137 Background information on Lim Guan Eng's case, see Amnesty International, The Trial of Opposition 
Parliamentarian Lim Guan Eng: An Update, 28 March 1997. For other details of political arrests in the 
1990s, see Amnesty International, Malaysia: Human Rights Undermined - Restrictive Laws in a 
Parliamentary Democracy, 1 September 1999. Also see SUARAM, Malaysian Human Rights Report 
(Petaling Jaya: Suaram Komunikasi, 1998), pp. 213 -258. 
138 Milne and Mauzy, 1999, pp. 87 -88. Some useful background analysis on the motivation behind the 
banning of Al -Argam can be found in D. Camroux, "State Responses to Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia: 
Accommodation, Co- option and Confrontation ", Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 9, 1996, especially pp. 863- 
865; Abdul Fauzi Abdul Hamid, "Political Dimensions of Religious Conflict in Malaysia: State Response 
to an Islamic Movement ", Indonesian and the Malay World, Vol. 28, No. 80, 2000, pp. 32 -65; and Aliran 
Monthly, 1997:17(1), p. 38. 
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excessive and decisive actions against Al- Argam.t39 
There is no doubt that over the years the Al-Arqam movement had grown among 
both the urban Muslim middle class and in rural areas.140 Nonetheless, it seems to be an 
overstatement that Al -Arqam was a significant political threat to the UMNO -led 
government, although rumors of the emergence of a new political party led by Al-Arqam 
had been floated since the early 1990s. In relation to Al- Arqam's successful 
developmental approach and its threat to the ruling government, it must be noted that, in 
fact, the movement has acted as an effective tool to reduce, or check, influence of the 
Islamic opposition PAS in rural Malay areas especially since the mid -1980s.141 
Moreover, considering the country's rapid economic growth in the early 1990s, it is not 
satisfactory to assume that the At-Arqam way proposed serious worries at this juncture. 
Then why was Al -Arqam outlawed especially when the next general election was just 
around the comer? 
It is worth noting that Mahathir and UMNO's weakest point in the early 1990s 
was always related to the issue of Islam, especially since PAS took over the Kelantan 
state in 1990. Furthermore, sensitive Islamic matters were perceived as the only 
threatening element remaining to undermine or at least bother UMNO's political 
dominance, since all other significant political forces had been considerably debilitated 
by the mid- 1990s. And it was widely expected that the Islamic PAS would incite 
139 By November 1994, at least 12 Al-Arqam leaders and several hundred members were arrested, 
including its leader Ashaari. On 26 October 1994, Ashaari and seven other followers made confessions of 
their deviation from the Islamic true teachings at the national fatwa committee which were telecast. On 31 
October, the Al-Arqam supreme council publicly announced that the movement no longer existed in the 
country. Meanwhile, almost all Al-Arqam facilities in the country were closed down within a few months 
of the banning of Al-Arqam, 
140 Since its inauguration in 1968 by Ustaz Ashaari Muhammad, Al-Arqam, or Darul Arqam, has long 
been acknowledged as one of the major Islamic forces in Malaysia, along with ABIM (Malaysian Islamic 
Youth Movement) and the Islamic opposition PAS. The AI-Arqam movement has expanded remarkably 
especially since the mid- 1980s. Its membership doubled from about 5,000 -6,000 to nearly 10,000 after 
1987. Starting with a single village in 1973, its self -contained villages, with all necessary facilities, 
increased to 32 in 1988 and 48 in 1993. The movement also ran 257 kindergartens, primary and 
secondary schools with a total of almost 10,000 students and nearly 700 teachers, many of whom are self - 
trained. Apart from this, Al-Arqam was also actively involved in businesses and economic activities in 
domestic and overseas. By 1993 the movement was operating 417 economic projects in Malaysia alone, 
including industrial factories, mini markets, grocery shops, bookstores, tailor shops, workshops, 
restaurants and transport. In particular, Al -Arqam launched the Al-Arqam Group of Companies (AGC) in 
Chiang Mai, Thailand, to coordinate its business activities in Malaysia and overseas. The AGC's 20 -odd 
subsidiary companies own assets totaling some RM300 million. For more detail of Al- Argam's growth 
since the mid- 1980s, see Aliran Monthly, 1994:14(8), pp. 26 -27. A study of Al- Argam's origin, growth 
and its developmental approach can be found in Muhammad Syukri Salleh, An Islamic Approach to Rural 
Development: The Arqam Way (London: Asoib International, 1992). Also see Jomo K. S. and Ahmad 
Shabery Chik, "Malaysia's Islamic Movements" in J. S. Kahn and Francis Loh (eds.), Fragmented Vision: 
Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1992), especially pp. 81 -85. 
'41 This led to a mutual co- existence and patronage between the Mahathir government and the Al-Arqam 
group. There were many reports and photographs showing top UMNO leaders' support at Al-Arqam 
functions. Mahathir himself often applauded Al-Arqam as a genuine and successful Islamic movement. 
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Islamic sentiment in the forthcoming general election. It was at this juncture, with the 
general election on the horizon in late 1994, that Al -Argam was outlawed as a 'deviant' 
movement and its leaders and members were arrested under the ISA. Certainly, the 
timing of Al- Arqam's banning was in the political interests of the UMNO -led 
government. As Razaleigh stressed, the Al -Argam case was quite successful especially 
for UMNO to overcome its seeming weakness over Islamic issues when another general 
election was widely anticipated. L42 The Al -Arqam warning was largely directed at the 
Islamic opposition PAS, but also penetrated the rest of Malaysias political and civil 
societies at this juncture. The successful disbanding of one of the country's major 
Islamic forces highlighted Mahathir's hegemonic control over the political processes in 
public. 
In sum, after the leadership crisis in the late 1980s, Mahathir successfully dealt 
with political rivalries within UMNO circles. This was then followed by triumphant 
maneuverings in dealing with other political opponents outside the ruling party, 
including Semangat 46, PAS and other non -Malay opposition parties. All other 
significant political institutions, that is, the judiciary, the press, the Rulers and even 
Islam, were systematically enervated by the centralization of executive power. It 
therefore eventuated that there was scarcely any element remaining to check the 
growing authoritarian rule of the Mahathir government towards the mid- 1990s. 
6 -5. Minor Liberalization in Ethnic Politics without Consociational Bargaining 
For the two decades after the communal upheaval in 1969, the UMNO -led government 
was involved in a range of preferential approaches through the NEP, designed to 
improve or consolidate the economic and political position of Malays. At its broadest 
level, the NEP was directed to redistribute material imbalances between the Malay and 
non -Malay communities. However, as described above, the NEP was not only confined 
to economic re- allotment, but also extended to re- negotiate social equilibrium of multi- 
ethnic Malaysian society, towards unambiguous Malay dominance in the sensitive 
spheres of language, education, religion and national culture. 
Indeed, prior to 1970, Malaysia had already adopted a system of preference or 
discrimination. It must also be noted that non -Malay communities continued to live 
their lives in accustomed ways during the NEP period, despite the UMNO -led 
government's primary concern to create 'one -language and one -culture' in Malaysian 
See Jomo K. S. and Ahmad Shabery Chik, 1992, p. 84. 
142 Interview with Razaleigh Hamzah, Kuala Lumpur, 23 February 1998. 
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society. Communal tensions, however, were regularly exacerbated as the UMNO -led 
government systematically instituted a series of affirmative programs in the areas of 
language, education and national culture policy during the 1970s and 1980s.143 This did 
not mean that socio- political stability was severely undermined in these periods, but the 
inter -ethnic co- operation, even within the ruling coalition, often came under pressure 
from the strong communal demands of various races. In this sense, Crouch is quite 
correct to say that: 
The roots of communal conflict in Malaysia do not lie in economic imbalances or political rivalries 
alone but also involve the struggle to preserve and project ethnic identity - the aspirations of 
Malays as the indigenous community to project their culture and values onto the state and the 
determination of non -Malays to preserve their distinctive cultural identities.144 
A Shift in the Politics of Ethnicism 
The years after 1990, however, illustrated that inter -ethnic tolerance had been 
dramatically increased in Malaysian society. In particular, Mahathir -led UMNO showed 
enhanced flexibility toward the non -Malay communities, in respect of their language, 
education, religion and cultural heritage. A clear indication of the Mahathir 
government's changing attitude towards a more liberal approach was revealed in 
Mahathir's Vision 2020 speech, which he delivered at the inauguration of the Malaysian 
Business Council in February 1991. As one of the nine central strategic challenges to be 
overcome for Malaysia to become a fully developed country by the year 2020, Mahathir 
stressed that the nation had to encounter: 
the challenge of establishing a matured, liberal and tolerant society in which Malaysians of all 
colors and creeds are free to practice and profess their customs, cultures and religious beliefs and 
yet feeling that they belong to one nation.14p5 
The ideas of multi- ethnic nation -building were then articulated in Mahathir's Vision 
2020 speech as 'one Bangsa Malaysia with political loyalty and dedication to the 
nation'.146 And the multi- ethnic connotation of 'Bangsa Malaysia' gradually evolved as a 
new national identity by the mid- 1990s, in some degree superseding the concept of 
Bangsa Melayu' that had connoted the potent symbol of mono -ethnic Malay communal 
143 Jomo, K. S., "Whither Malaysia's New Economic Policy ? ", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 4 (Winter 
1990 -91), 469 -501. 
'44 Crouch, 1996, p. 156. 
145 Mahathir Mohamad, "Malaysia: The Way Forward ", in Ahmad Sarji Abdul Hamid (ed.), Malaysia's 
Vision 2020: Understanding the Concept. Implications and Challenges (Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk 
Publications, 1993), p. 405. An excellent overview of the concept and implications of Mahathir's Vision 
2020 is provided in this edited book by Ahmad Sarji Abdul Hamid, Chief Secretary to the Government of 
Malaysia. 
146 Ahmad Sarji Abdul Hamid (ed.), 1993, p. 404. 
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solidarity for the past several decades.147 A few months after BN's victory in the 1995 
general election, Mahathir further clarified that: 
Bangsa Malaysia means people who are able to identify themselves with the country, speak 
Bahasa Malaysia and accept the Constitution. To realize the goal of Bangsa Malaysia, the people 
should start accepting each other as they are, regardless of race and religion.148 
In the same way, Mahathir stressed the spirit of multi -culturalism by discrediting the 
previous assimilative approach in Malaysia. He said in an interview with Time 
magazine that: 
The idea [of assimilation] before was that people should become 100% Malay in order to be 
Malaysian. We now accept that this is a multi -racial country. We should build bridges instead of 
trying to remove completely the barriers separating us. We do not intend to convert all the Chinese 
to Islam, and we tell our people, the Muslims, you will not try to force people to convert'.149 
Meanwhile, the Mahathir government announced its National Development 
Policy (NDP), with a ten -year Second Outline Perspective Plan (OPP2) for 1991 -2000, 
to replace the NEP in mid -1991. The objectives of the NDP are not fundamentally 
different from those of the NEP. The NDP, however, shows the clear shift in emphasis 
and priority from NEP's emphasis on inter -ethnic wealth redistribution, to economic 
growth and privatization with an envisaged decline in the role of the public sector.150 
Some argue that Mahathir's Vision 2020 and the NDP reveal a mere 'reformulation and 
'reiteration' of the objectives already embodied in the Rukunnegara, or National 
Ideology, and the NEP, both announced in 1970.151 However, it must be noted that 
cultural and economic liberalization has been continually encouraged by the 
147 For an analysis of the concept of Bangsa Melayu and its arguments, see Ariffin Omar, Bangsa Melayu: 
Malay Concepts of Democracy and Community 1945 -1950 (Kuala Lumpur and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), especially pp. 191 -216. 
148 The Star, 11 September 1995. 
149 Time, 9 December 1996. 
150 The original objective of achieving 30 per cent of Bumiputera ownership continues -although it is not 
stated explicitly - but greater attention is given to the qualitative aspects of Bumiputera participation. In 
announcing the NDP, Mahathir makes it clear that: 
.._ while we would like to see more Bumiputera- non -Bumiputera partnerships, the "Ali Baba" type 
of arrangement in which Ali is not only passive but risks no capital of his own must be regarded as 
a form of undermining the NDP. Non -Bumiputera partners must find genuine Bumiputera partners 
willing to risk their capital and involve themselves in the day -to -day running of the business.... For 
their part... the Bumiputeras cannot expect economic policies to always favor them.... It is time the 
Bumiputeras cease to expect to do business only with the government. They must go fully into the 
marketplace to compete. 
See Mahathir Mohamad, "The Second Outline Perspective Plan, 1991 -2000" in Ahmad Sarji Abdul 
Hamid (ed.), 1993, pp. 435 -437. 
151 For a critical analysis of Mahathir's Vision 2020 and the NDP, see Jomo K. S., U -Turn? Malaysian 
Economic Development Policies After 1990 (Townsville: Center for East and Southeast Asian Studies, 
James Cook University of North Queensland, 1994). 
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government throughout the 1990s, in line with the long -term objectives of Vision 2020 
and the NDP. There is no doubt that non -Malay communities reacted favorably to the 
idea of Bangsa Malaysia as the concept is widely perceived as a 'complete retraction' of 
the UMNO -led government's provocative assimilation policy in the 1970s and early 
1980s.152 
First of all, the government appears to have recognized the private sector as a 
co- provider of tertiary education in the 1990s. In fact, the early 1980s already witnessed 
the significant changes in the role of private colleges as providers for tertiary education 
in pursuing a certificate, diploma or professional course leading to foreign 
qualifications. It was, however, not until the early 1990s that private higher educational 
institutions gained considerable recognition as an alternative means of access to 
university education for those unable to gain entry into Iocal universities, due to a quota 
system which enrolled students based on ethnicity.153 In encouraging the private tertiary 
education system, the government had approved approximately 335 private higher 
educational institutions throughout the country by mid- 1997.154 Meanwhile, the 
government allowed private colleges to adopt various types of inter -institutional 
arrangements with foreign universities, such as twinning programs, credit transfers and 
distance learning arrangements.155 This enabled local students to acquire a foreign 
degree with a substantial saving on living expenses and tuition fees. To a large extent, 
the increasing alternative opportunities for tertiary education and inter -institutional 
arrangements with foreign universities seemed to relieve one of the Chinese 
community's major grievances. A survey by the author of the ethnic distribution of the 
35 major private colleges shows that non -Malay students, mostly Chinese, constitute 
about 80 to 95 per cent of the total enrolment with a few exceptions.156 
152 See Democratic Action Party, DAP Policies For Malaysia: Full Liberalization, released on 3 October 
1994 as the basis of the 1995 general election campaign, available on < http : / /www.malaysia.netldap /poll- 
1.htm>. 
153 The quota system for the public tertiary education was based on the June 28, 1979 resolution, which 
applies the 55:45 racial ratio between Bumiputera and non -Bumiputera. 35 per cent of the total enrolment 
is allocated to Chinese students. The government, however, had not released the actual racial ratio since 
the introduction of the quota system because of the sensitivity of the issue. 
154 Interview with Anuwar Ali, the Director of the Department of Higher Education in the Ministry of 
Education, Kuala Lumpur, 6 February 1998. 
155 The twinning or split -degree concept of studies conferring a foreign bachelor degree was first 
introduced in the early 1980s. It involves a formal agreement between a local private higher educational 
institution (PHEI) and one or a consortium of foreign universities to run a split -site program in the local 
PREI and then proceed to the overseas university for the final part of the degree program. Twinning can 
be on a '1+2 arrangement' (one year in local PHEI and two years overseas), '2 +2' (two years local and two 
years overseas) or '2 +1' (two years local and one year overseas). Since the mid- 1990s, some of the PHEI 
have even been granted '3+0' status meaning that students are no longer required to go overseas to 
complete their university education. 
156 The survey was conducted in late 1996 with a graduate student of UPM (Universiti Pertanian 
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Meanwhile, one of the approaches adopted by the government to promote the 
private sector's involvement in education is the introduction of new legislation aimed at 
liberalizing the government's education policy. For example, the new Private Higher 
Educational Institution Act 1996 led to the establishment of private universities and 
branch campuses of foreign universities in the country.157 Consequently, Malaysia 
witnessed in 1997 the birth of the first private university, Telekom University, followed 
by Tenaga National University and the Petronas University of Technology. After that, 
three more private universities, Multimedia University, International and 
Commonwealth University and Malaysia University of Science and Technology, were 
approved by the government. The ethnic quota system is not applied to the private 
higher educational institutions. 
In relation to Chinese education, further liberalizing steps were taken by the 
government in the post -1990 period. In particular, UMNO leaders became more 
supportive of national -type Chinese primary schools, whereas in the 1970s and 1980s 
these institutions were regarded caustically as counter -productive to the fostering of 
national unity.158 The government even encouraged Malay and Indian families to send 
their children to Chinese language primary schools and the number of non -Chinese 
enrollments increased dramatically in the 1990s. The mid -1995 statistics show that there 
were over 35,000 non -Chinese students, including 25,000 Malays, enrolled in 1,281 
national -type Chinese primary schools in the country. The figure represents an increase 
of more than 400 per cent over 1985 when there were fewer than 8,000 non -Chinese 
pupils nationwide.159 In addition, in the mid -1990s more state funds were allocated to 
promote Chinese educational institutions at primary, secondary and tertiary Ievels. The 
government's growing support for Chinese education is well reflected in the increased 
allocation for education under the Sixth Malaysia Plan 1991 -95. In the case of the 
MCA -sponsored Tunku Abdul Rahman College, the government allocation has 
increased ten -fold from RM2 million under the Fifth Malaysia Plan to RM20 million 
under the Sixth Malaysia Plan. The TAR College further expanded its main campus in 
Malaysia). The survey shows that most major private colleges are concentrated in Klang Valley. The 
average number of student enrolments are around 2,500- 4,000. 
157 Four acts related to education gazetted in the mid -1990s were: the Education Act 1996; the National 
Council on Higher Education Act 1996; the National Accreditation Board Act 1996; and the Universities 
and University Colleges (Amendment) Act 1996. Prior to the introduction of the new laws, the 
educational activities were regulated by the Education Act 1961; the Essential (Higher Education 
Institution) Regulation 1969; and the Universities and University Colleges Act 1971. 
158 National -type school is a government or government -aided primary school using the Chinese or Tamil 
language as the main medium of instruction. Both the national language (Bahasa Melayu) and English are 
compulsory subjects in the national -type primary schools. 
159 See NST, 7 April 1995 ( "35,000 Malay and Indian pupils in Chinese schools "). 
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Kuala Lumpur and established new branch campuses in Johor and Penang in the mid - 
1990s.16° The MCA's various fund -raising campaigns for independent Chinese 
secondary schools also gained much support from the Chinese community.161 
There was also less politicization of sensitive issues such as the national culture 
and the national language by UMNO leaders. In spite of reaffirming the status of Malay 
language as the national language, Mahathir and other UMNO leaders had increasingly 
stressed the importance of English since the early 1990s.162 In the mid- 1990s, the 
government finally allowed the use of English as the medium of instruction in local 
universities for subjects such as science, technology, mathematics and medicine. The 
Malay language was not used as the sole medium of instruction in many other subjects. 
English was gaining more popularity in local university education and more local 
lecturers used a mixture of English and Malay in their classes. This was a complete 
retraction of the UMNO -led government's one -language policy introduced in 1971. 
In relation to cultural policy, non -Malay culture is now quite liberally accepted 
as part and parcel of the national culture by most Malay intellectuals and cultural 
organizations. In particular, the increased flexibility towards Chinese cultural activities 
is a noticeable sign of greater communal tolerance than existed in the 1970s and 1980s. 
There are still criticisms from some Malay intellectuals as to the status of Malay 
language and national culture.1fi3 But such criticisms no longer receive the considerable 
attention they did in the 1970s and early 1980s, when the non -Malay communities were 
often referred to as 'pendatang asing (foreign immigrant)'. Anwar Ibrahim, then the 
Deputy Prime Minister, with his own Mandarin calligraphy '1-A (We are 
one happy family)' has often been portrayed as a well -known symbolic example of 
amicable Malay- Chinese relationships: The decades -long restrictions on Chinese lion 
166 See Sixth Malaysia Plan 1991 -1995, p. 183 (Table 5 -5). The TAR College was established in 1969 by 
the MCA to pursue higher education for the Chinese community. For the development of the TAR 
College, see Ling Liong Sik, The Malaysian Chinese: Towards Vision 2020 (Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk 
Publication, 1995), pp. 103 -105. Another the MCA -sponsored Langkawi Project, launched in 1993 to 
help school children especially in the Chinese new villages, had also raised some RM25 million by mid - 
1994 supplemented by a RM5 million donation from the government. See Nanyang Siang Pau, 20 May 
1994. 
161 In the mid -1990s the decade -long acrimonious relationship between the MCA and Dongjiaozong, a 
national grouping of Chinese educationalists, increasingly recovered for the first time since the 1950s. For 
the continuous conflicts between the MCA and Dongjiaozong over almost four decades, see Tan Link Ee, 
"Dongjiaozong and the Challenge to Cultural Hegemony 1951- 1987" in Joel S. Kahn and Francis Loh 
Kok Wah, 1992, pp. 181 -198. 
162 For instance, see FEER, 12 December 1991 (Michael Vatikiotis, "A question of priorities "); 8 October 
1992 (Michael Vatikiotis, 'The language lobby "); and 11 November 1993 (Michael Vatikiotis, "Back to 
English "). 
163 For example, see Rustam A. Sani, Politik dan Polemik Bahasa Melayu (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan 
Publication and Distributors, 1993), pp. 105 -150. 
164 See the picture in Ling Liong Sik, 1995, between p. 56 and p. 57. For other examples, see FEER, 10 
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dances were not only lifted but they were often witnessed by Mahathir and other 
UMNO Ieaders. Furthermore, following the lifting of restrictions on travel to China, 
bilateral trade between Malaysia and China substantially increased in the years after 
1990.165 It was also during this period that the government increasingly emphasized 
inter -civilization dialogues between Islam and other Asian civilizations, including 
Confucianism, Buddhism and Hinduism.166 
The Rules of the Game: Change or Continuity? 
To what extent, then, does this cultural and economic liberalization stem from the 
Mahathir government's growing commitment towards the necessity of nation -building 
from a multi- ethnic perspective? Is UMNO's willingness to move towards what the non- 
Malay communities regard as a minor liberalization, attributable to consocíational 
bargaining to reassess the socio- political power equilibrium in a multi -ethnic Malaysian 
politics? In other words, what factors have enabled or motivated the UMNO-led 
government to introduce the so- called minor liberalization in the years after 1990? 
It is commonly believed that the political role of minority communities becomes 
preeminent when there is a severe breakdown in the dominant political group.167 It 
might be expected, therefore, that the non -Malay communities would gain a more 
significant political presence following the UMNO leadership split in mid -1987. A 
series of parliamentary or state by- elections in the years after 1987 had proven how 
decisive the non -Malay - especially Chinese - voters were for the competing Malay 
political parties. In this regard, some argue that the Mahathir government had to make a 
more accommodative gesture to the non -Malay demands even before the 1990 general 
February 1994 (Michael Vatikiotis, "Value Judgements "); FEER, 6 April 1995 (Jayasankaran, "Young 
Minds, Old Tool "). 
165 The number of Sino- Malaysia joint ventures rapidly increased in the 1990s. And the number of high - 
level visits between Malaysia and China also noticeably increased during this period. Mahathir visited 
China three times between I993 and 1996, while Anwar also made one visit in 1994. In return, similar 
high -level visits were made from China to Malaysia. For more detailed analysis of the development of 
Malaysia -China relations, see Stephen Leong, "Malaysia and the People's Republic of China in the 1980s: 
Political Vigilance and Economic Pragmatism ", Asian Survey, Vol. 27, No. 10, 1987, pp. 1109 -1126; Lee 
Kam Hing, "Malaysian Chinese: Seeking Identity in Wawasan 2020" in Leo Suryadinata (ed.), Ethnic 
Chinese as Southeast Asians (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997), esp. pp. 77 -79; and 
Joseph Chin Yong Liow, "Malaysia -China Relations in the 1990s ", Asian Survey, Vol. XL, No. 4, 2000, 
pp. 672 -691. 
6 In an effort to illustrate the modernization in the implementation of Islamization, a series of 
government -sponsored conferences on inter -civilizational dialogues were held at the University of 
Malaya in the mid- 1990s. The first conference was about inter -civilizational dialogue between Islam and 
Confucianism in March 1995; this was followed by an inter -civilizational dialogue between Islam, Japan 
and the West in September 1996. The two conferences eventually led to the establishment of the Center 
for Civilizational Dialogue at the University of Malaya when the third inter -civilizational dialogue was 
held in September 1997. 
167 Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic 
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election.168 As an example, the government approved an application to set up a private 
Chinese college, Southern College, just before the Johor Baru by- election in August 
1988.169 Similarly, a new Education Act was proposed by Anwar Ibrahim, then 
Education Minister, as a way of abolishing the racially sensitive Section 21(2) of the 
Education Act 1961, which enabled the Education Minister to convert Chinese and 
Tamil language primary schools to Malay- medium schools.170 It was also around this 
time that the government officially recognized the diplomas and degrees obtained 
through the MCA -sponsored TAR College, for employment in the public service. 
Indeed, the UMNO -led government's dilemma at this time was how to attract the non - 
Malay voters without alienating the Malays in an increasingly insecure environment 
after the leadership splits. 
As the 1990 general election results illustrated, UMNO appeared to fully recover 
its dominant political position in Malaysian politics. Nonetheless, it must also be noted 
that the consecutive support given by Chinese voters to the opposition in the two 
general elections in 1986 and 1990 sustained the pre -election conditions which 
pressured the Mahathir government to embark on a more accommodative approach to 
Chinese demands. A clear example is shown in the appointment of the Penang Chief 
Minister after the 1990 elections. In normal circumstance, UMNO would have taken 
over the Penang state leadership with its 12 state assembly seats compared to Gerakan's 
seven. UMNO, however, had to concede the chief minister position to the Gerakan in an 
increasingly unpredictable post -election political atmosphere. With its poor 
performance in the 1990 elections, Gerakan announced that the party would not join the 
state executive council in Penang. Then, the opposition DAP, with its 14 state assembly 
seats, offered its 'unconditional co- operation' with the Gerakan to form an opposition - 
led state government in Penang to prevent UMNO's political dominance.171 Although 
the co- operation between DAP and Gerakan was unlikely to happen, even some Chinese 
leaders in the Barisan government felt that the Gerakan should have worked with the 
DAP so that, by having one Chinese dominant party within the ruling coalition, the 
Instability (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1972), p. 89. 
168 Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 
1991), pp. 248 -250. 
169 FEER, 8 September 1988. It took more than two years to approve the Southern College after the 
original application had been made in June 1986. The Southern College became the first Chinese -medium 
private college, although English and Bahasa Melayu were used as the medium of instruction as well. 
170 NST, 14 November 1989. For more detailed explanation on the seeming concessions to non -Malay 
communities before the 1990 general election, see Khong Kim Hoong, 1991, pp. 31 -32. 
171 The Star, 24 October 1990. 
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Chinese would have greater bargaining power.172 At this time, any move on UMNO's 
part to further erode the Chinese leadership in Penang could entice Gerakan, which after 
all had once been an opposition party before the formation of the BN, into the 
opposition camp again. This would have resulted in the emergence of the third 
opposition -led state government in Malaysia, following Sabah and Kelantan. In this 
regard, some political observers claimed that the post -election atmosphere in the 
Chinese community appeared to be an indirect pressure on the Mahathir government, 
and this created the conditions for the liberalization in ethnic politics to 'recoup a loss in 
Chinese votes' since 1990.173 
There is no doubt that a series of concessions to the non -Malay communities in 
the 1990s reduced communal and cultural sensitivity in Malaysian society to a very 
large extent. However, as a senior MCA official stressed, this change in ethnic policies 
was not promoted by a society -driven pressure to assert its communal rights, but largely 
initiated by state -driven motives. Although the political role of minority communities 
became more critical at this time, he believes that Malaysia's ethnic politics was, and 
still is, conditioned by the rules on what is politically permissible for inter- ethnic 
contestation imposed by the dominant UNLNO.174 It must also be noted that Malaysian 
politics since independence has long been guided by one main principle: that any 
political and/or communal contestation operates only within the framework of an 
unambiguous Malay - to be exact UMNO - supremacy in power. When this political 
dominance is under threat or perceived to be under threat, the rules of the political and 
communal contestation are easily modified with greater restrictions, if not totally 
removed, as occurred in the aftermath of the 1969 general election and the 1987 UMNO 
leadership crisis. 
In this regard, Musa Hitam argues that the shift of ethnic politics in the 1990s 
was not a concession to the Chinese but a result of the high level of tolerance' displayed 
by Mahathir and UMNO leaders. He believes that the willingness of the Mahathir 
government to adopt a more flexible approach in ethnic policies, even if these appeared 
to initialIy benefit the non -Malays, stems from a decisive power shift favoring Mahathir 
and his new loyalist party UMNO (Baru) since the 1990 general election.175 
Even in the case of the Penang Chief Minister, there was little likelihood that the 
appointment of a Chief Minister from Gerakan was made at the expense of UMNO's 
172 Interview with Lee Kim Sai, then Deputy President of the MCA, Kajang, 25 February 1998. 
173 Milne and Mauzy, 1999, p. 96. 
176 Interview with Ong Tee Keat, a Member of Parliament for Ampang Jaya and MCA Youth president, 
Kuala Lumpur, 5 February 1998. 
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political dominance in the state. Although greater pressure from the Chinese continued 
in the aftermath of the 1990 elections, the Chinese parties in the BN were by no means 
in a position to bargain for the Chinese state leadership after their miserable defeat in 
the elections.t76 It was therefore public knowledge that the state leadership would be 
dominated by UMNO with the real power being held by the re- introduced Deputy Chief 
Minister, even though Koh Tsu Koon of the Gerakan took over the chief ministership.177 
As expected, in addition to the deputy chief ministership, UMNO occupied four state 
executive councilor seats in Penang; the other three were given to the Gerakan. In an 
interview, Ibrahim Saad of UMNO, who had been appointed as Penang's Deputy Chief 
Minister, makes it clear that: 
The reason why UMNO gave the CM position to the Chinese was not because there was strong 
pressure from the Chinese, but because UMNO's position became much more solid by that time. 
There was a Chinese sentiment that somehow UMNO should know, but the bargaining power of 
the Chinese was not there after the 1990 elections. The Deputy Chief Minister position was newly 
introduced as a political consideration not only to control the Penang state leadership but also to 
satisfy the Malay community. At that time, Koh Tsu Koon was only a puppet and UMNO was the 
one who controlled the whole family with full confidence.178 
It is clear that a more tolerant climate evolved in the 1990s in dealing with some 
of the traditional non -Malay concerns involving culture, language and education. 
Nevertheless, it also must be noted that the tolerant climate had only been allowed to 
evolve within certain boundaries set by the Malay ruling group. Although greater 
liberalization in ethnic politics was initiated by the UMNO leaders in the 1990s, the 
change in policy was hardly motivated by their growing commitment to address the 
misgivings of minority communities in Malaysian society. 
In all likelihood, a better explanation for the shift of ethnic politics can be found 
in the increasing confidence of the UMNO leaders in their dominant political and 
economic positions. The country's persistently growing economy, averaging over 8 per 
cent annually since 1988, benefited both the Malay and non -Malay communities and, 
thus, the liberalization in ethnic policies at this time did not come at the expense of 
other races. In particular, the strategic shift in the NDP focusing on deregulation and 
privatization of the economy mostly benefited the Malay corporate elite and served as 
an essential tool for the consolidation of Mahathir and UMNO's political patronage 
175 Interview with Musa Hitam, Kuala Lumpur, 13 February 1998. 
176 Interview with Lee Kim Sai, then Deputy President of the MCA, Kajang, 25 February 1998. 
177 There was a case that a deputy chief minister was appointed in Penang in 1969 but the constitutional 
basis for the appointment was openly challenged. Then, no deputy chief minister had been appointed 
since the 1974 general election. 
178 Interview with Ibrahim Saad, Kuala Lumpur, 19 February 1998. 
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networks in the 1990s.'79 
The government's recognition of the private sector as a co- provider of tertiary 
education, notably the proliferation of private educational institutions, provided an 
alternative for tertiary education, especially for Chinese students. Nonetheless, this did 
not necessarily show that the education policy in Malaysia had been liberalized. The 
country already faced a significant challenge for more educated and skilled personnel 
with the rapid economic growth since the end of 1980s, and the existing public 
universities could no longer provide the necessary workforce. As the essential rationale 
to promote the private sector as an alternative source of tertiary education was to meet 
the rapidly growing student enrolment in public universities, the private higher 
educational institutions are not dominated by the non -Malay students.18° In this context, 
a senior government official emphasized that the primary reasoning of the government's 
liberal approach toward private education was based purely on administrative 
consideration to meet the imperative of economic competitiveness rather than a political 
decision to accommodate non -Malay communities' concerns from a multi- ethnic 
perspective. He, thus, believed that there could always be a retraction of the 
government's liberal educational policy toward private tertiary educational institutions if 
the country's economic pie were shrinking in a prolonged economic recessìon.lsl 
Nevertheless, whatever the motives for the new policy, the result in fact was an opening 
of educational opportunities for non -Malay students. 
At this juncture, it is worth noting that newly introduced educational legislation 
in the mid -1990s was actually double -edged in nature. On the one hand, the new 
legislation, in particular the Private Higher Educational Institutions (PHEI) Act 1996, 
apparently promoted a more active involvement of the private sector in tertiary 
education. The new legislation, however, substantially paved the way for a further 
consolidation of the government's jurisdiction over educational activities in private 
education as well as in public education, whereas previously there were not as many 
restrictions on private higher education. In particular, the National Council on Higher 
179 See Edmund Terence Gomez and Somo K. S., Malaysia's Political Economy: Politics, Patronage and 
Profits (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 75 -165. 
1â° As shown in Seventh Malaysia Plan 1996 -2000, the overall enrolment at the various levels of tertiary 
education, including certificate, diploma and degree course, increased by 52.7 per cent from 100,590 in 
1990 to 153,610 in 1995. However, it must also be noted that opportunities for Bumiputera to pursue the 
tertiary education were largely expanded in the same period. For instance, Institute Teknologi MARA 
(ITM) increased its enrolment from 27,000 to 32,480 in the period 1991 -1995. Furthermore, it was 
expected that the enrolment of ITM would further increase by 61.6 per cent from 32,480 in 1995 to 
52,500 in 2000. See Seventh Malaysia Plan 1996 -2000, p. 312 and p. 331. For more details of expansion 
of intake and enrolment in local public and private education institutions in the 1990s, see Sixth Malaysia 
Plan 1991 -1996, pp. 157 -183 and Seventh Malaysia Plan 1996 -2000, pp. 303 -339. 
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Education Act 1996 clearly reflects the government's intention to place a single 
administrative body in charge of both the public and private educational sectors.182 The 
PHEI Act 1996 also categorically outlines the government's regulatory control over 
educational activities of the private higher educational institutions by granting extensive 
discretionary power to the Education Minister. More importantly, the PHEI Act 1996 
empowered the Education Minister to direct that the national language be used to 
conduct all courses at all times. In addition, the PHEI Act 1996 stipulates that all private 
higher educational institutions must teach Islamic religion for Muslim students and 
moral education for non -Muslim students.183 In short, despite the seeming liberal 
approach in private education, the government effectively expand its control in terms of 
legal framework. 
In addition, the Education Act 1996 has also assigned the Education Minister 
inordinate powers, to the extent of denying judicial review. Under the Education Act 
1996, the Minister's decision, such as on deregistration of educational institutions and 
teachers, dissolution of boards of governors and intervention in links between 
educational institutions, cannot be appealed in court. Besides, while the Education Act 
1961 merely stipulated fines in hundreds of ringgit for contravention of the regulations 
imposed by the Minister, the new Education Act makes offenders liable to fines of up to 
RM300,000 and jail sentences are of up to five years. In this context, many Chinese 
educationists aired their misgivings that: 
Whereas previously, there were not as many prohibitions, in the new Bill [now the Education Act 
1996] there is almost a blanket prohibition on the educational activities that we are involved in 
unless we apply for exemption from the Minister. '84 
In relation to mother tongue education, Chinese and Indian communities still 
feel strongly that their fundamental rights are not recognized, or are becoming even Iess 
respected, despite a more liberal educational policy in the 1990s. Although the 
controversial Section 21(2) of the Education Act 1961 no longer exists, Chinese and 
Tamil educationists believe that the same risks of the survival of mother tongue 
181 Confidential interview, Kuala Lumpur, February 1998. 
182 For an analysis of the government's approach to private education in Malaysia, see Molly N. N. Lee, 
"Public Policies toward Private Education in Malaysia ", paper presented at the First International 
Malaysian Studies Conference, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 11 -13 August 1997. 
183 See Legal Research Board, Private Higher Educational Institutions Act 1996 (Kuala Lumpur: 
International Law Book Services, 1996), clauses 42 and 43. 
184 United Chinese School Committees Association of Malaysia et al., Memorandum on the Education 
Bill 1995, submitted by the seven major Chinese Associations to the Education Minister, 15 December 
1995, p. 1. For more detail of inordinate powers given to the Education Minister, see Legal Research 
Board, Education Act 1996 (Kuala Lumpur: International Law Book Services, 1996), especially clauses 
58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 67, 68, 69, 75, 76, 77, 85 and 126. 
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education in Malaysia remain under the new Education Act 1996, as the newly 
introduced Section 17(1) stipulates that: 
The national language shall be the main medium of instruction in all educational institutions in the 
National Education System except a national -type school established under section 28 or any 
other educational institution exempted by the Minister from this subsection.185 
The legal implication of Section 17(1) is that all existing national -type Chinese and 
Tamil schools must use the Malay language as the main medium of instruction unless 
the Education Minister's exemption is obtained, as they were not established under 
Section 28 of the Education Act 1996. By qualifying autonomy of the national -type 
schools in this manner, it is claimed that the conversion of mother tongue education has 
already taken place with the introduction of the Education Act 1996, whereas the old 
Education Act 1961 did not make any provision for the use of Malay as the main 
medium of instruction in the Chinese and Tamil primary schools.186 Although the forced 
conversion of existing national -type primary schools into Malay- medium schools is 
unlikely to happen due to its sensitivity, many Chinese educationists worry that the 
position of mother tongue education is becoming more vulnerable as its future depends 
entirely on the 'benevolence' of the Education Minister.187 
Currently, there are 1,281 Chinese -medium primary schools and 534 Tamil - 
medium primary schools in the country. Some of these schools are fully subsidized by 
the government; the rest are partially subsidized or not subsidized at all. Compared to 
the other national schools, the allocation of development funds for these national -type 
schools are seriously disproportionate, as shown in Table 6-4, 
185 Italics added. Section 28 states: 'Subject to the provision of this Act, the Minister may establish 
national schools and national -type schools and shall maintain such schools.' 
'86 See United Chinese School Committees Association of Malaysia et al., Memorandum on the 
Education Bill 1995, submitted by the Seven Major Chinese Associations to the Education Minister, 15 
December 1995, pp. 2 -3. 
187 Interview with Kua Kia Soong, Academic Director of Dongjiaozong Higher Learning Center, Kajang, 
20 January 1998. The several rejections and the extraordinary length of time for the approval of New Era 
College proposed by the Chinese education movement Dongjiaozong clearly showed the government's 
reluctance to approve mother -tongue tertiary education and the arbitrary exercise of power of the 
Education Minister. The New Era College, aiming at eventual conversion into a Chinese university, 
finally received the official approval of the Ministry of Education in May 1997, almost three years after 
its first application and several revised applications. The approved main medium of instruction was 
Bahasa Malaysia, even though the college was allowed to use English and Mandarin in some 
departments. 
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Table 6 -4. Development Funds Allocation and Student Numbers (Primary Schools, 1996) 
Funds Allocation (RM million) Student Numbers 
National Primary Schools 1,027.167 i 96.6% 2,128,227 I 75.3% 
National -Type Primary Schools (Chinese) 25.970 2.4% 595,451: 21.1% 
National -Type Primary Schools (Tamil) 10.902: 1.0% 102,679 3.6% 
Total 1,064.039 I 100.0% 2,826,357 1 100.0% 
Source: Reply by the Education Minister to the question raised by the MP of Kota Melaka in Parliament, 
5 November 1996, quoted in SUARAM, Malaysian Human Rights Repon (Petaling Jaya: Suaram 
Komunikasi, 1998), p. 211. 
Apart from the national -type primary schools, there are 60 Chinese -medium 
Independent secondary schools, which are not recognized by the government. Indeed, it 
is a remarkable change that the government even provided funds for the Independent 
Chinese secondary schools in the 1990s. However, it is worth noting that such financial 
assistance was insufficient and, more importantly, such funds were concentrated in the 
mid -1990s as one -off cases, with another general election on the horizon.188 What is 
worse, the Education Act 1996 prohibits individuals from making any form of monetary 
contribution, including gifts or donations, for the purpose of establishing higher 
educational institutions.789 Considering most mother -tongue private schools are largely 
sustained by the community's monetary contribution, the new Education Act will further 
undermine the status of mother -tongue education. Moreover, the prohibition on 
monetary contributions will affect any possible establishment of community- subsidized 
mother -tongue tertiary institutions in the country. 
The series of liberal measures in cultural policy appeared to be a multi- ethnic 
move away from mono -ethnic Malay concerns. It is nonetheless doubtful whether this 
shift in ethnic politics was driven by a need to address the misgivings of the non -Malay 
communities. Some traditional non -Malay concerns have been seemingly accepted as 
part of the country's national culture. However, it is also often found that there have 
been recurrent retractions by the UMNO leaders over the implementation of cultural 
activities held by the non -Malay communities.14p Although a series of accommodative 
measures in ethnic politics occurred, not all of these changes were considered by the 
UMNO leaders as a concession to the non -Malay communities based on the principle of 
iss For selective examples of the government's support for the independent Chinese secondary schools, 
see Berita Harían, 16 February 1994 ( "RM10 juta untuk sekolah Cina'); NST, 8 May 1994 ( "Anwar: 
Chinese schools to still get aid "); and The Star, 26 May 1994 ("Ling" Fund- raiser to make schools 
popular "). 
B9 See Legal Research Board, Education Act 1996, clause 71. Clause 72 specifies that the penalty for 
contravention of Clause 71 will be fined up to RM50,000 or imprisonment of up to five years. 
190 For example, in September I995, when Metro Vision, a private cable television station intended to air 
a famous Chinese mini series 'Justice Pao', propagating healthy family values and loyalty to the country, it 
was initially stopped by the Information Ministry whose rationale was that 'costume dramas' cannot be 
screened over television. Although the decision was subsequently overturned following widespread 
objection by the Chinese community, the 'Justice Pao' case is an example of the recurring controversies 
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equality. They believed that such concessions did not constitute any threat to Malay 
political pre -eminence even in the process of an apparent concession to the Chinese.191 
In this context, a former senior UMNO Youth official summarizes the ethnic 
liberalization in the 1990s: 
I don't think that UMNO is implementing greater liberalization as a way of giving away 
everything. The Barisan government's flexible move in Chinese culture, language and education 
only shows that we are enjoying the higher level of tolerance. And the tolerance level is purely 
based on the level of confidence in terms of political and economic position of the Malays. We 
share the political power with the Chinese. When the Chinese component parties need to increase 
their political support from their community it is very important for them to serve the main 
concerns of the Chinese. So, why shouldn't we allow that? We can show a very high level of 
tolerance in so far as we can achieve a win -win situation. This is a purely political move.... 
Similarly, we fUMNO Youth] have to be often seen as a very racialist political group fighting for 
the Malay interests. In politics, we can not be simply static but have to be flexible. However, those 
finished agendas that we have done, such as Islam, Bahasa Melayu and the special status of the 
Malays, should not be questioned in any circumstance because these are very sensitive issues. I 
hope I don't miss this fundamental rule of the game in Malaysia's ethnicpolitics.t92 
Indeed, the more conducive climate to greater tolerance in Malaysia's ethnic 
politics depends on the Malay community's sense of physical and psychological security 
and comfort in the political and economic domination of Malay ruling elites.193 In other 
words, the shift in the politics of ethnicism in the 1990s was not driven by any 
consociational bargaining or a society- initiated struggle to assert minority communities' 
fundamental rights, but was initiated by Mahathir and UMNO leaders with full 
confidence in their own power. It is, therefore, presumed that a U -turn involving the 
retraction of the so- called minor liberalization would be quite likely if Mahathir and 
UMNO leaders were to face an increasingly insecure situation that threatened their 
over the cultural policy by the government. See The Star, 4 October 1995. 
191 A good example of practicing affirmative action for the assurance of Malay preference can be found in 
the public- funded tertiary educational institutions. The racial quota system, which provides 55 per cent 
for the Bumiputera and 45 per cent for the non -Bumiputera of which 35 per cent is for the Chinese, is one 
of many affirmative programs. Interestingly it is reported that the quota of non -Bumiputera even further 
favored the dominant Malays. A survey showed that in the new intakes in seven public universities in the 
academic year of 1994 -1995 and 1995 -1996, Chinese students comprised 28.78 per cent and 28.86 per 
cent respectively. See Nanyang Siang Pau, 4 February 1996. For a study of various affirmative programs 
in the public and private sectors in Malaysia, see Boo Cheng Hau, Quotas versus Affirmative Action: A 
Malaysian Perspective (Kuala Lumpur: Oriengroup, 1998). 
192 Interview with Saifuddin Nasution Ismail, then UMNO Youth secretary, Kuala Lumpur, 22 January 
1998. 
193 A significant demographic change has also contributed to the growing confidence of the Malay ruling 
elites. While Chinese and Indians comprised almost half of the total population in the early 1970s, the 
figures has gradually dipped to 44 per cent in 1980. On the basis of the 1991 Census, 61.7 per cent of 
Malaysian citizens were Bumiputera, while Chinese were 27.3 per cent and Indians were 7.7 per cent. 
Moreover, it is widely expected that the Chinese will form less than 20 per cent of the total population 
within the next two decades. For the UMNO leaders, the steady but substantial demographic change 
meant that the scale of the non -Malay population became much less of a threat to undermine the Malay - 
centered balance of power both in electoral and psychological terms. The ethnic composition of the 
Malaysian population in 1980 and 1990 can be found in Mid -Term Review of the Fourth Malaysian Plan 
1981 -1985, p. 116 and Seventh Malaysian Plan 1996 -2000, pp. 104 -107. 
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political and economic hegemony in the near future.194 
6 -6. The 1995 General Election and Its Implications 
As another general election approached in the mid- 1990s, another victory for the BN 
seemed inevitable. Mahathir's supremacy became more unassailable and no possible 
rival for power could emerge. In short, all the pre -election conditions appeared to enable 
the UMNO -led ruling coalition to easily win with its traditional two -thirds majority in 
parliament.195 
Firstly, the performance of the Malaysian economy was one of the most 
favorable factors for the ruling coalition. The country's 8 per cent -plus economic growth 
rates over the last seven years created a general public sentiment of satisfaction with the 
government, in particular within business and the middle class in urban areas. Secondly, 
it was unavoidable for the Chinese opposition to accept the UMNO- initiated 
liberalization in language, cultural and educational policies in the years since 1990. 
Besides, the Malay opposition faced difficulties in mobilizing its support as the 
country's rapid economic growth accommodated the material demands of the Malay 
community. In short, the remarkable economic growth and subsequent liberalization 
process were accompanied by the depoliticization of traditionally controversial issues in 
Malaysian society.196 Therefore, with the next general election on the horizon, the 
opposition parties seemed to lack issues on which to campaign while the Mahathir 
government effectively promoted the discourse of 'developmentalísm', including Vision 
2020 and cultural liberalization 197 Thirdly, apart from the BN's ever -ready electoral 
assets, '3Ms' (money, media, and government machinery), Mahathir's increased personal 
popularity was another credible 'M' factor for the ruling coalition.198 Mahathir's 
popularity was even apparent among many ethnic Chinese who had traditionally voted 
194 During the economic recession in 1998, there was a case illustrating this on a mini- scale. Anwar had 
urged the MCA to review the proposal to build a branch of the TARC in Bentong as this had generated 
concern among local Malay residents. Though UMNO had no intention of impeding the progress of 
TARC, such development projects should take into consideration the sensitivities of locals. Bentong 
division chief Adnan Yaakob had voiced concern over the setting up of the branch campus of TARC, 
saying it would alter the area's racial composition. The proposal involved the development of 920ha to 
build 4,000 houses. It would create a new population, mainly Chinese, of 20,000. See The Star, 22 March 
1998, 23 March 1998 and 25 March 1998. 
195 Between the 1990 general election and May 1994, there were 17 by- elections. The BN was successful 
in 13 by- elections. Out of the 13 seats, 9 were retained by BN candidates and 4 were new seats obtained 
from the opposition, including PAS and DAP. Semangat 46 was successful in maintaining 2 state seats in 
Kelantan, but with a reduced majority. PAS and PBS also maintained a seat each in Kelantan and Sabah 
respectively. The winning majority, however, was slightly reduced. See NSTP, 1994, pp. 61 -67. 
196 Francis Loh, 1998, pp. 10 -12. 
197 Francis Loh, 1998, pp. 14 -17. 
19a Gomez, 1996, p. 45. 
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for the opposition. 
These external factors, however, were not the only impediments to the 
opposition parties. Another element foreshadowing the coming debacle could be found 
in internal factors for which they themselves were largely responsible. Soon after the 
1990 general election, there were efforts within the opposition circles to keep their 
electoral alliances alive by focusing on reformulating the loose election packages, 
Gagasan and APU, as a more unified opposition coalition. For example in early 1991, 
the reorganization of Gagasan was initiated by Razaleigh to include PAS, DAP, PBS 
and Semangat 46 under a single opposition coalition with common symbol and 
manifesto. Such an effort to form a BN -type multi- ethnic coalition, however, could not 
succeed mainly due to conflicting ideologies and political interests among the 
opposition parties. In particular, PAS refused to join given that the party considered the 
other opposition parties, DAP and PBS, as anti- Islamic.199 It is also noteworthy that 
Semangat 46 increasingly adopted the agenda of 'Malayness' to claim Malay supporters. 
DAP's relation with Semangat 46, thus, deteriorated towards the mid- 1990s, leading to 
the virtual breakup of the Gagasan arrangement between Semangat 46 and DAP just 
before the 1995 general election.200 In the end, the opposition parties could not present 
themselves as viable alternatives, despite the next general election being just around 
corner. 
As expected, BN was returned to power in the general election in April 1995. 
The winning margin of the BN, however, was quite remarkable, securing more than a 
five -sixths parliamentary majority. The BN captured 162 parliamentary seats (84.4 per 
cent of the total of 192 seats) and 338 state assembly seats (85.8 per cent of the total of 
394 seats). In sharp contrast to the 1990 general election, these figures show an increase 
of 13.8 per cent in parliamentary seats and 13.7 per cent in state assembly seats 
respectively (see Table 6 -5 and 6 -6). This was the largest victory of the ruling coalition 
for the last three decades.201 The BN also notably increased its popular vote from 53.4 
per cent in 1990 to almost 65.1 per cent in 1995. In all states except Kelantan, the BN 
wrested almost total control of both parliamentary and state seats. 
199 See NST, 5 February 1991; Asiaweek, 22 February 1991 ( "After Defeat, a Time to Regroup "); and 
Asiaweek, 11 April 1991 (Suhaini Aznam, "Crossover season "). A good example to illustrate the mutually 
incompatible differences can be found in the issue of Hudud law in 1992, see Aliran Monthly, 1992:12(4), 
pp. 2 -8 ( "The Hudud Laws: Debate has brought about tension "). 
t00 For political development towards the disintegration of Gagasan, see Kua Kia Soong, Inside the DAP 
1990 -1995 (Kuala Lumpur: Potensi Serentak, 1996), pp. 29 -33. 
201 In the I964 general election, the Alliance party had won 89 out of the total 104 seats (85.6 per cent). 
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Table 6 -5. Comparison of the 1990 and 1995 General Elections (Parliamentary) 
Barisan Nasional Opposition Parties and Independents 
1990 1995 1990 1995 
UMNO 71 (86) 89 (102) DAP 20 (57) 9 (50) 
MCA 18 (32) 30 (35) PAS 7 (30) 7 (46) 
MIC 6 (6) 7 (7) Semangat 46 8 (61) 6 (66) 
Gerakan 5 (9) 7 (I0) PBS 14 (14) 8 (28) 
USNOtt) 6 (6) - PRM 0 (3) 0 (3) 
PBB 10 (10) 10 (10) AKIM - 0 (2) 
SNAP 3 (5) 3 (4) AKAR(3) 0 (4) - 
SUPP 4 (8) 7 (7) AMIPF(4) 0 (5) - 
PBDS 4 (4) 5 (5) Independent 4 (64) 0 (43) 
Others(2) - 4 (12) 
Totahs) 127 (180) 162 (192) Total 53 (180) 30 (192) 
Source: NST, 23 October 1990; Khong Kim Hoong, 1991; NST, 27 April 1995; and Gomez, 1996. 
Note: Figures in parentheses are numbers of seats contested. 
(1) USNO was deregistered in August 1993 after being expelled from BN. 
(2) SAPP won 3 seats and LDP 1 seats. 
(3) AKAR joined BN in 1991 but did not contest in 1995. 
(4) AMIPF did not contest in 1995 after declaring its support for BN. 
(5) Figures in parentheses are total numbers of parliamentary seats. 
Table 6 -6. Comparison of the 1990 and 1995 General EIections (State, Peninsular Malaysia) 
Barisan Nasional Opposition Parties 
1990 1995 1990 1995 
UMNO 196 (246) 230 (275) DAP 45 (87) 11 (93) 
MCA 34 (64) 71 (77) PAS 33 (114) 33 (177) 
MIC 12 (13) 15 (15) Semangat 46 19 (152) 12 (I31) 
Gerakan 11 (21) 22 (26) Berjasa 1 (1) 0 (1) 
Totalo) 253 (351) 338 (394) Total 98 (351) 56 (394) 
Source: NST, 23 October 1990; Khong Kim Hoong, 1991; NST, 27 April 1995; and Gomez, 1996. 
Note: Figures in parentheses are numbers of seats contested. 
(1) Figures in parentheses are total numbers of state seats. 
The most distinctive result of the 1995 elections was the considerable shift in 
Chinese votes in favor of the BN. The Chinese -dominated DAP retained only nine 
parliamentary seats, compared to 20 in 1990. In terms of total votes, the party suffered a 
serious setback, from 17.7 per cent in 1990 to 12.1 per cent this time. The DAP's losses 
were even more obvious at the state level. While the DAP had won 45 of 87 contested 
state seats (51.7 per cent) in 1990, this time it could only take 11 of 93 contested seats 
(11.8 per cent). The total votes at the state level also dropped to 11.7 per cent from 14.9 
per cent. Especially in Penang where the DAP had made a great effort to take over the 
state government, the party could only win one of the 33 state seats, compared to 14 
seats in 1990.202 The DAP's heavy losses led to a large increase for the Chinese BN 
parties. The MCA, in particular, won 12 new parliamentary seats, bringing its total to 30 
in 1995. At the state level, the MCA more than doubled its seats, from 34 in 1990 to 71 
2 °2 See Gomez, 1996, pp. 26 -27, Table 6 and 7. The winning majority of Batu Lancang, the only state seat 
232 
in 1995. Another Chinese party Gerakan also doubled its state seats from I1 to 22. It is 
worth noting that the BN secured average support of 64.5 per cent of the total votes in 
58 constituencies where the Chinese were more than one -third of the total electorate. 
The average increase of the majority votes in 51 of those 58 constituencies was 12.2 per 
cent, compared to the 1990 elections.2 °3 
Nonetheless, in all likelihood, this considerable swing in Chinese votes to the 
government did not seem to increase the bargaining power of the Chinese component 
parties within the ruling coalition. First of all, UM.1TO notably enhanced its grip on 
power in the election. Although the ruling coalition lost again in Kelantan, UMNO 
secured two parliamentary seats and seven state seats in that state at this time, compared 
to the complete defeat in 1990. In addition, UMNO recovered its traditional support in 
most Malay- dominant constituencies at the expense of the splinter party Semangat 46. 
Following incessant disputes with its counterpart PAS in the aftermath of the 1995 
elections, Semangat 46 dissolved itself and returned to the UMNO fold in mid -1996 in 
the name of Malay unity.204 The former UMNO members' return increased UMNO's 
dominance in parliamentary seats to 95, only one seat short of what would be needed to 
form an UMNO government without its BN partners. Adding on the ten Bumiputera 
parliamentary seats won by the Sarawak -based PBB, it appeared that the political 
position of the Chinese BN parties had become more vulnerable at this juncture. 
Moreover, as Francis Loh implies, a shift in the discourse of Malaysian politics 
from 'ethnicism' to 'developmentalism' in the 1990s also considerably undermined the 
MCA and Gerakan's political role within the ruling coalition. The LTMNO- initiated 
cultural and economic liberalization removed a key issue for non -Malay politicians, 
regardless of whether they belonged to government or opposition parties, from 
controversial political debate and thus the decades -Iong issues of ethnicity were no 
longer perceived as primary means to enhance the Chinese BN parties' bargaining 
position. In addition, the seemingly illiberal political processes of the 1990s were hardly 
questioned as the country's fast -growing economy was able to accommodate the 
material demands of the growing business and middle classes in urban areas.205 In this 
context, a former MCA leader stresses that: 
that DAP won in Penang, was just 62 votes. See NST, 27 April 1995. 
203 Figures compiled from Gomez, 1996, pp. 32 -33, Table 8. The other seven constituencies were newly 
introduced in the 1995 general election. 
204 For a review of the uneasy relationships between Semangat 46 and PAS in the aftermath of the 1995 
general election, see Aliran Monthly, 1996:16(3), pp. 2 -6 (Anil Netto, "Death of a Spirit "). 
205 Francis Loh, 1998, especially pp. 10 -12 and 14 -17. 
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MCA's bargaining power is very much dependent on what kind of issues MCA can bring up. On 
the one hand, we have to work together with UMNO. But, on the other, what is important is we 
need to provide the political issues. During my time [in the I980s], MCA, as a political party 
representing Chinese interests, had faced a lot of controversial issues so we had to fight it out. But, 
now no more issues are left and MCA can live happily under UMNO's big umbrella.... Even DAP 
is supporting the PM's approach. Now you can see the way DAP leaders talk is seen as if they are 
already a component part of the BN. Initially, MCA had been the only bargaining partner of 
UMNO. But, later on, UMNO had one more option - Gerakan within the BN. Now UMNO has 
another possible option - DAP since the 1995 general election. This is a totally new 
development.206 
As implied in the above remarks, it is ironic that the diminishing role of the 
DAP as an opposition party was accompanied by a considerable setback in the 
bargaining position of Chinese parties within the ruling coalition. Nonetheless, the more 
important factor undermining the Chinese BN parties' political negotiation with their 
Malay counterpart UMNO was, and still is, their own confined style of leadership. In 
theory, the MCA and Gerakan's bargaining power had to be enhanced as the Chinese 
voters gave them a strong mandate in the elections. However, it must also be noted that 
the increasing popularity of the MCA and Gerakan at this time had largely been 
dependent on UMNO's willingness to accommodate Chinese demands, and Mahathir's 
personal popularity in particular.207 In fact, there is little doubt that the MCA and 
Gerakan leaderships adopted a soft approach in dealing with their counterpart in the BN 
and became increasingly accustomed to the politics of margínalization since the 1995 
general election. It was during this period that, in many cases, the so- called 
controversial issues have been avoided even in the Chinese parties' internal debates.08 
A clear example of self -restrained leadership style can be found in the MCA president 
Ling Liong Sik's comment as follows: 
I often tell my party leaders if you are a minority, you have to learn to behave like a minority race. 
Don't start behaving like a majority race or else you are asking for trouble.209 
6 -7. Summary 
The discussion on the sustainability of democratic systems has long been influenced by 
modernization theories of a close relationship between economic development and 
democratization. Several decades of evidence from comparative political studies also 
confirms Lipset's classic hypothesis that 'democracy is related to the state of economic 
206 Interview with Lee Kim Sai, Kajang, 25 February 1998. 
207 Gomez, 1996, p. 53. 
208 Confidential interview with a senior MCA official, Kuala Lumpur, January 1998. 
209 Ling Liong Sik at the National Press Club in February 1999 for a talk on The Malaysian Chinese: 
Crisis and Choice ", quoted in Lim Kit Siang's press statement, 31 May 1999. 
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development.'210 This evidence led Diamond to adapt Lipset's argument in the 1990s as: 
'the more well -to -do the people of a country, on average, the more likely they will favor, 
achieve, and maintain a democratic system for their country.'211 
In Malaysia, However, increasing economic benefits during the 1990s did not 
produce a momentum toward political democratization. In other words, the country's 
economic growth and the emergence of a large middle class did not engender a greater 
degree of democracy as modernization theories would have predicted. Rather, it became 
clear that the rhetoric of 'developmentalism' was used as the principal justification for 
authoritarianism and thus Ied the Mahathir regime to impose greater state controls in the 
years after 1990. During this period, Mahathir -led UMNO exhibited an enhanced 
flexibility toward non -Malay communities, pertaining to their language, education, 
religion and cultural heritage. Greater liberalization in ethnic politics, however, was not 
motivated by a growing commitment to address the misgivings of the minority 
communities in Malaysian society. Nor did the state -driven cultural liberalization 
accompany greater political liberalization. 
With UMNO's dominant control over the political process and Mahathir's 
overwhelming popularity among both Malay and non -Malay communities, it was 
unlikely that the Mahathir regime would be challenged in the near future. Factional 
conflicts were still found in UMNO politics in the early 1990s, but they were no longer 
seen as a significant means of restraining the oligarchic tendencies. of party leaders. If 
factional alignments were allowed during this period, it was only when Mahathir needed 
to check and balance the second -echelon leaders of the party, without the risk of a direct 
leadership challenge against him. Any attempt to restrain Mahathir's personal influence, 
by an individual or a faction, has always been followed by a tightening of authoritarian 
control inside and outside of the ruling party, and hence a further consolidation of his 
personal grip on power. In short, no one in UMNO seemed to effectively check and 
balance Mahathir's power, but rather everybody else was being checked and balanced 
by Mahathir towards the mid- 1990s. 
Nonetheless, this did not mean that Mahathir, who was then seventy, would be 
free from the pressure of leadership succession. Although there was no sign of 
Mahathir's early retirement at this juncture, his age made it obvious that the leadership 
succession would not be far off. And, it was widely believed that political interest in 
21° Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1981), p. 31. 
211 Larry Diamond, "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered" in G. Marks and Larry 
Diamond (eds.), Reexamining Democracy (Newbury Park, California: Sage, 1992), p. 109. 
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succession would revive after the 1995 general election. Indeed, it was around this time 
that political commentators were openly discussing a rift between Mahathir and his 
deputy Anwar Ibrahim. Rumors of a possible challenge by Anwar to Mahathir's party 
presidency had also been speculated upon frequently in journalistic circles.212 Mahathir, 
much sooner than expected, encountered rapidly growing pressure from the new 
factional forces, led by Anwar, for a generational change of the national leadership. This 
was Mahathir's new political dilemma after the 1995 general election, and the following 
chapter revisits the nexus between growing factional conflicts in the ruling bloc and 
democratic transformation of authoritarian regime in this period. 
212 The very first story of an alleged rift between Mahathir and Anwar can be found in FEER, 21 April 
1994 (Michael Vitikiotis, The Waiting Game: Is Anwar Impatient for the Top Job ? "). It must be noted 
that Anwar's control over the political processes had been steadily and systematically enhanced since the 
early 1990s. In particular, the vast control of UMNO over the mainstream medía gradually shifted to 
Anwar in the years after 1990 to strengthen his power within and outside UMNO. For example, see 
Aliran Monthly, 1993:3(3), pp. 2 -6 (Edmund Terence Gomez, "Anwar's Men Gain Media Control ?"). 
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CHAPTER 7 
The Anwar Saga: Revisiting the Nexus between UMNO Factionalism and the 
Transition from Authoritarian Rule 
If any ruler puts a single one of his subjects to shame [memberi' aib], that shall be a sign that his 
kingdom will be destroyed by Almighty God. Similarly it has been granted by Almighty God to 
Malay subjects that they shall never be disloyal or treacherous to their rulers, even if their rulers 
behave evilly or inflict injustice upon them.' 
During my entire political career, when I visited every corner of the country, at any gathering, I 
felt confident of the support of the Malay society for UMNO. On the other hand, it was difficult to 
be certain of Chinese support or even be sure of their stand. Now the situation has changed.... My 
experience was extremely peculiar, one that I had never experienced in my entire life. In Malay - 
majority areas, BN leaders and workers looked weary and exhausted as well as pressured. This 
was because in a very open, fearless and unhesitant manner, so many Malays - young, old, 
laborers, the learned, the rich, the poor - worked hard and earnestly for the opposition parties, no 
matter whether it was PAS, DAP, Parti Rakyat or KeADILan. Only in Chinese -majority areas 
were the BN and UMNO leaders and workers relaxed? 
7 -1. Introduction 
The year 1998 marks a significant change in Malaysian political history. After several 
years of rumors of leadership conflict within UMNO, Anwar Ibrahim was abruptly 
dismissed from office, expelled from the party, imprisoned under the ISA, beaten while 
in custody and eventually charged in court on five counts of sodomy and five counts of 
corruption. These events happened with Machiavellian ruthlessness in September 1998. 
Anwar sensed his time as Mahathir's deputy was about to end, but even he did not 
anticipate Mahathir acting in 'such a despicable and shameless manner'.3 Interestingly, 
Mahathir claimed in an interview that he had not read Machiavelli's prescription on how 
to be a successful politician.4 Anwar's abrupt dismissal and its aftermath, nonetheless, 
recall Machiavelli's famous dictum about cruelty, that a successful leader should not 
care about the infamy of cruelty in order to maintain power.5 
Anwar's sacking shocked the nation because such treatment of a Deputy Prime 
Sejarah Melayu (Malay Annals), quoted in Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya, A History 
of Malaysia (London: The Macmillan Press, 1982), pp. 44 -45. 
2 Musa Hitam at the annual general meeting of UMNO branches in the Johor Baru division on 19 
February 2000. Quoted in Aliran Monthly, 2000:20(2), p. 8. 
3 Anwar Ibrahim, "From the Halls of Power to the Labyrinths of Incarceration', a letter from Sungai 
Buloh prison on 3 November 1998. 
4 The Star, 7 August 1996. 
5 See Harvey C. Mansfield (trans.), The Prince (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 
1998), pp. 65 -68. 
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Minister had never happened before. Even resignation was not part of Malaysian 
political culture until Mahathir came to power in 1981. During Tunku Abdul Rahman's 
era, Tun Abdul Razak was his deputy for the duration of his reign. It was only because 
of the death of his first deputy Ismail bin Abdul Rahman that two deputies served under 
Razak.6 Mahathir was Hussein Onn's deputy during his administration. To a much 
greater extent than in most other countries, leadership succession had been 
institutionalized as an important factor contributing to political stability in Malaysia. 
But up to now, Mahathir has had four deputies and three of them resigned or were 
sacked. It is still uncertain whether the fourth deputy will succeed Mahathir as 
president. As Funston notes, it was under Mahathir's leadership that conflict within top 
levels of UMNO has become institutionalized to a certain extent .7 
The Mahathir -Anwar leadership tussle is certainly not the first in Malaysian 
political history since there has been a series of serious leadership struggles within 
UMNO circles.8 But unlike previous tussles, the Mahathir -Anwar conflict was 
something 'unprecedented in Malaysian politics. Its political, social and even cultural 
consequences were not bounded by 'Malay issues' or 'UMNO affairs'. In short, the 
Anwar episode has acted as a catalyst for a new political configuration, not just in 
Malay politics but in Malaysian politics as a whole. 
Malaysia witnessed its most intense street protests since the 1960s, after the 
sacking of Anwar Ibrahim. At each public rally, Anwar attracted tens of thousands of 
Malaysians from all ethnic groups, though mainly Malays. Within a few weeks of 
Anwar's sacking, Mahathir's national image was tarnished and the expression of anti - 
Mahathir sentiment by Malays became commonplace. The harshness of the police in 
dispersing unarmed protesters shocked Malaysians, especially the young middle class 
Malays, who had accepted the political myth that only UMNO could provide protection 
for them. Anwar's widely publicized appearance in court with a black eye reinforced the 
perception that this was not merely an internal Malay or UMNO affair but one of 
national significance. Thereafter, co- operation among non -government organizations 
6 See Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 
1991), p. 22. 
N. J. Funston, "Malaysia: A Fateful September ", Southeast Asian Affairs 1999, p. 169. 
s In fact, the internal life of UMNO has shown a series of struggles for the top leadership and the presence 
of factional alliances since its establishment as a political party in 1946. For instance, there was the Onn 
Jaafar -Abdul Rahman conflict in the late 1940s over the party leadership. During the 1960s and 1970s, 
there was a number of continuing leadership conflicts and they frequently spilled into the open in the 
1980s and 1990s, as evidenced in the Mahathir- Musa -Razaleigh tussles and Anwar -Ghafar Baba conflict 
respectively. An excellent overview of the UMNO leadership crisis in the 1970s is provided by Harold 
Crouch, "The UMNO Crisis: 1975 -77" in Harold Crouch, Lee Kam Hing and Michael Ong (eds.) 
Malaysian Politics and the 1978 Election (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 11 -36. 
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and opposition parties, rallying on a variety of public issues, was enhanced. These 
developments culminated in the formation of an unprecedented united multi -ethnic 
opposition coalition, the Barisan Alternatif, which included PAS, DAP, PRM and the 
newly formed KeADILan led by Anwar's wife Wan Azizah Wan Ismail, in anticipation 
of the 1999 general election. 
To some extent, the circumstances and political maneuverings that surround the 
Mahathir -Anwar tussle resembled those of the previous leadership conflict, especially 
the situation preceding the split of the Mahathir -Musa leadership in 1986 and 
subsequent breakaway of UMNO in 1988. Musa believes that Anwar's problem was 
similar to his own problem with Mahathir, even though Mahathir's political 
maneuvering in handling Anwar was much more refined, having learnt from experience 
in the mid- 1980s.9 Thus, the changing conflict configurations after September 1998 
offer another opportunity to reexamine some of the same questions which were raised in 
the wake of the UMNO Ieadership crisis in 1987, in particular the relationship between 
UMNO factionalism and the transition of authoritarian regimes. Specifically, to what 
extent, does severe factional strife within the ruling UMNO circle transform the 
political system into a more open and responsive one in an ethnically fragmented 
society? In the new circumstances where UMNO has lost much of its traditional support 
from the Malay community, is Malaysia's single- party -dominant political landscape 
being realigned as a new multi- racial two -coalition party system? 
This chapter aims to analyze the development and consequences of Anwar's 
downfall. It examines the context in which the leadership conflict took place and how 
Mahathir responded to a second crisis within the UMNO leadership. It asks the 
question: what are the consequences of Anwar's downfall for both Malaysian politics as 
a whole and Mahathir's political destiny in particular? In dealing with these issues, this 
chapter focuses, though indirectly, on a comparison of the two most recent UMNO 
factional splits: that of 1987 and of 1998 and their consequences for the transition of the 
Malaysian political system. 
7 -2. What Went Wrong ?: Allegations and Counter -allegations 
What went wrong with the relationship between Mahathir and Anwar? Did it sour 
because Anwar was 'morally unfit' to be a Prime Minister, as claimed by Mahathir? Or, 
was Anwar the victim of 'a political conspiracy at the highest level', as alleged by 
Anwar? Was the leadership split the product of increasing differences in approach 
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between Mahathir and Anwar in their handling of the economic crisis since mid -1997, 
as the foreign media assert? Or, was it another political crisis that had to happen after 
rumors of a power struggle between the two top leaders? Now, several years after the 
Mahathir -Anwar leadership split, there is still speculation about the real reasons behind 
Anwar's abrupt downfaII in September 1998. 
Initially, Mahathir's official announcement was that Anwar's dismissal was 
because of his involvement in sexual impropriety, including affairs with prostitutes, and 
sodomy. Rumors had also been circulated that Anwar was the father of a child born to 
his private secretary's wife. In claiming this, Mahathir reiterated that he had 
'incontrovertible proof of Anwar's indulgence in improper sexual activities.10 Mahathir 
also claimed that Anwar's sacking and expulsion had nothing to do with differences 
over economic policies or a possible leadership challenge from his deputy. t l 
It is still a moot point whether Anwar committed acts of sodomy or not while 
tests proved that it was his private secretary, not Anwar, who had fathered the child.'2 
The unorthodox conduct of Anwar's trial cast doubt on its credibility and raised big 
questions about the impartiality of the court. Mahathir's accusations against Anwar then 
shifted into the political and economic realm as the public remained unconvinced about 
the sexual charges. In the middle of the trial, the original charges against him were 
amended. The revised charges shifted the focus to Anwar's interference in police 
investigations rather than the sexual allegations themselves.13 This gave rise to a public 
perception that the issue of morality was not the real reason for Anwar's downfall. It 
was also argued that Mahathir, in fact, made the 'incontrovertible' sexual allegations to 
kill Anwar politically. As Mahathir's former deputy, Musa, put it, Mahathir's opponents 
had to fight against 'the awesome power of incumbency'. Musa mentioned that 'if I 
resisted in leaving and if I were fighting against Mahathir, he might have produced 10 
men that I had sexual relations with'.t4 
Meanwhile, the foreign media gave prominence to the differences in approach 
9 Interview with Musa Hitam, former Deputy Prime Minister, Kuala Lumpur, 23 August I999. 
l° The Straits Times, 23 September 1998. 
11 The Straits Times, 9 September 1998. 
12 For the basics of the Anwar trial, see Asiaweek, 13 November 1998 (Arjuna Ranawana, "Facts and 
Figures "). More details of background, milestones and reports on the Anwar trial can be traced at: 
<http ://straitstimes.asia I.com/anwar /anwarindex.html> 
13 For more details of the revised charges, see The Straits Times, 14 January 1999. 
14 Interview with Musa Hitam, Kuala Lumpur, 23 August 1999. It was reported that Mahathir offered 
Anwar the option of resigning several times to avoid the humiliation of having allegations of sexual 
indiscretion being brought out into the open. But, Anwar refused to take the option. See The Straits 
Times, 9 September 1999. 
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between Mahathir and Anwar in their handling of the economic crisis.15 To put it 
simply, Mahathir, by blaming external factors for Malaysia's economic downturn, 
favored the loosening of monetary and fiscal policies aimed at stimulating growth and 
preventing the economy from sinking into recession.16 To the contrary, Anwar, by 
focusing on internal problems, took the more conventional view of tightening monetary 
policies and austerity measures prescribed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Anwar and his allies' criticism of 'mega projects' and 'the lack of transparency of 
privatized state patronage' was, of course, not pleasing to Mahathir.17 According to 
foreign media, the underlying differences in economic policies between the two top 
leaders, especially since mid -1997, eventually led to Anwar's downfall in September 
1998. 
It was, indeed, well known that Mahathir and Anwar were at odds in certain 
areas of government policy even before the country faced economic recession. Perhaps 
what exacerbated the situation was Anwar's initial reluctance to bail out certain 
individuals or companies associated with Mahathir during the economic crisis. These 
differences, however, did not necessarily indicate that Anwar's approach to handling the 
economic crisis was in opposition to the wishes of Mahathir. According to Funston, 
' Mahathir's and Anwar's views on the international and domestic aspects of the crisis 
were not as far apart as has generally been argued'. He argues that if there were any 
differences on certain policies, they received at least Mahathir's acquiescence.'$ Anwar 
15 Towards the middle of 1997, after almost a decade of high economic growth averaging more than eight 
per cent annually, the Malaysian economic miracle had turned into a mirage, together with its ASEAN 
counterparts. Following the devaluation of the Thai Baht on 2 July 1997, the Malaysian Ringgit, the 
Philippine Peso and the Indonesian Rupiah - together with the South Korean Won, were in free fall. By 
the end of 1997, the Malaysian Ringgit had depreciated by nearly 50 per cent to a value of about RM4.80 
per US dollar from around RM2.5 per US dollar at the beginning of 1997. During the same period, the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Composite Index (KLCI) also collapsed to just over 500 points from a 
high of 1272 points on 25 February 1997, an astonishing 60 per cent drop in the average value of the 
shares listed on the main board of the KLSE in just 10 months. Combined with the collapse of the 
currency and the stock market, real estate prices also sharply dropped from the middle of 1997. This triple 
disaster of ringgit, stock market and real estate collapse left many Malaysians, especially those in the 
younger generation of middle -class Malaysians, in a state of confusion, shock and frustration. For more 
detailed analysis of the economic crisis in Malaysia and the Southeast Asian countries, see Manuel F. 
Montes, The Currency Crisis in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1998); 
Ross H. McLeod and Ross Garnaut (eds.), East Asia in Crisis: From Being a Miracle to Needing One? 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1998); and H. W. Arndt & Hal Hill (eds.), Southeast Asia's 
Economic Crisis: Origins, Lessons, and the Way Forward (Singapore; Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 1999). 
c Mahathir's view, that currency traders sparked the region's financial crisis, are well expounded in a 
book of Mahathir's speeches and articles. See Mahathir Mohamad, In the Face of Attack: Currency 
Turmoil (Petaling Jaya: Limkokwing Integrated, 1998). 
See Aliran Monthly, 1997:17(11), pp. 10 -14 (Ram, "Corporate Rape ") and Asiaweek, 19 June 1998 (Jim 
Erickson, "Little Room at the Top "). 
15 See Funston, 1999, especially pp. 167 -168. According to a close associate of Daim, who asked not to 
be named, Daim also believes that the breakaway of the top two leaders had nothing to do with the 
economic situation (confidential interview on 21 August 1999, Kuala Lumpur). 
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also pointed out that the seemingly different attitudes to managing the economic crisis 
nevertheless arose from a team approach.19 A senior UMNO leader, who was viewed as 
neither Mahathir's nor Anwar's ally, also stated that over the last 10 to 15 years 
Mahathir schooled Anwar into his mode of thinking and Anwar subscribed, to a 
considerable degree, to Mahathirism after he joined UMNO_20 And, it should be noted 
that especially with the advent of UMNO (Baru), factional disputes themselves were 
largely limited to struggles for spoils rather than differences over policy or ideology.21 
In this regard, it would be an oversimplification to view the leadership split as directly 
caused by inherent differences in policies or leadership style between the two leaders. 
What, then, went wrong with Anwar? Anwar believes that he was the victim of a 
high -level political conspiracy designed to finish his political future, a conspiracy that 
began more than one year before his downfall. Anwar's allies strongly believe that 
Mahathir's cronies, especially Daim, initiated the whole process of Anwar's destruction 
to protect or prolong their own political and economic interests because Anwar's 
ascendancy had increasingly threatened them and the country faced economic turmoi1.22 
These people allegedly kept telling Mahathir that Anwar was planning to challenge for 
the party presidency in the forthcoming party election of 1999 using the economic crisis 
as a spur. These allegations of leadership challenge made Mahathir paranoid. To kill 
Anwar politically, a close associate of Anwar says, Mahathir used the issue of 
immorality to cover the power struggle. This placed Anwar's supporters in a very 
defensive position 23 
There is no doubt that the Mahathir faction conspired to remove Anwar from 
office.24 However, such factional rivalry is common in the conduct of party politics. In 
the case of Anwar, he was definitely seen by Mahathir's close associates as more and 
19 The detailed analysis of contradictory, but mutually supportive, approaches towards the country's 
economic crisis between Mahathir and Anwar can be found in Ranjit Gill, Asia Under Siege: How the 
Asian Miracle Went Wrong (Singapore: Epic Management Services, 1998). 
20 Interview with Rais Yátim, Minister in Prime Minister's Department, Kuala Lumpur, 11 August 1999. 
21 For details of UMNO factionalism and money politics, see Aliran Monthly, 1995:15(7), pp. 2 -9 
( "Political Rivalry and Privatized Patronage'). Also see Edmund Terence Gomez and Jomo K. S., 
Malaysia's Political Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), especially pp. 124 -130. 
22 See Anwar's letter to Mahathir dated 25 August 1998 in Aliran Monthly, 1998:18(8), p. 12. As a clear 
example of high -level political conspiracy, Anwar and his allies indicate the defamatory book, 50 
Reasons Why Anwar Can't Be a Prime Minister. They believe that the book was funded by very high - 
level people in the government. In particular, the very fact that the party secretary had been used to 
distribute the book during the general assembly in June 1998 was a vivid example of the involvement of 
the highest levels in the party. Interview with Saifuddin Nasution Ismail, then UMNO Youth Secretary, 
Kuala Lumpur, 25 August 1999. 
23 Interview with Kamarudin Jaffar, Member of Parliament for Tumpat (PAS), Petaling Jaya, 25 August 
1999. 
24 Musa says: 'I do know that there are individuals involved who were planning and who in fact told me 
what will be done against Anwar to make sure that he will be toppled. So in that sense, yes there was a 
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more dangerous as he was rapidly promoted as Finance Minister, Deputy Prime 
Minister and then Acting Prime Minister. Anwar himself, like it or not, had to step on 
their toes to expand his power base. The more ground he gained, the more enemies he 
made within the government and the ruling party. Given this, there were plenty of 
reasons for conspiring to destroy Anwar and ensure Mahathir' s cronies' continued hold 
on their political and economic interests. What, then, made Anwar's adversaries decide 
to topple Anwar toward the end of 1990s? Musa comments on this question: 
What is splitting our party is the political culture in UMNO now - both the winning and losing side 
realize that there will be attempts to finish off the loser's political career. The loser will be cursed, 
condemned and obstructed not only in their political activities but also to the extent of threatening 
their rice -bowl. This fate is not limited to those who contest, but also extends to their supporters. 
His job is jeopardized; his business, his loans, his children's scholarships are also threatened. Not 
surprisingly, the contests are so intense and finally divisive, Hatred continues, animosity continues 
and purging continues. Under such conditions, contest within UMNO has truly become a matter of 
life and death.25 
7 -3. Prelude to the Deepening of the Mahathir -Anwar Leadership Tussle 
With the advent of UMNO (Baru) in 1988, new guiding principles of behavior appeared 
within the ruling party: 'de-politicization' and/or 'no- contest' for the party's top posts. 
Promotion of these 'new traditions' was intended to protect Mahathir from a repeat of 
his experience in 1987. Consequently, the increasing competitiveness within UMNO 
during Mahathir's early leadership (1981 -87) was gradually, but systematically, 
restricted with the creation of UMNO (Banc). Factional rivalries in the 1990s were 
always confined to competition between second -echelon leaders of the party. 
However, immediately after the 1995 general election, these second -echelon 
rivalries were being transformed into proxy battles between Mahathir and his deputy, 
Anwar.26 More unpleasant for Mahathir, these factional struggles were largely won by 
Anwar and his supporters. Since 1995, whenever Mahathir initiated political maneuvers 
to assert his political authority, there were immediate and clear counter -attacks by 
Anwar and his followers which showed Mahathir's weakening grip on the party. 
Although Anwar did not mount a grand challenge against Mahathir, the way in which 
the likely successor and his allies were seemingly planning an eventual take -over of 
power was not welcomed by Mahathir and his people. Indeed, party unity toward the 
end of the 1990s had already exhibited cracks, it was just waiting for something to break 
it apart. 
political conspiracy definitely.' Interview with Musa Hitam, Kuala Lumpur 23 August 1999. 
5 Musa Hitam's speech at the annual general meeting of UMNO branches in the Johor Baru division on 
19 February 2000. Quoted in Aliran Monthly, 2000: 20(2), p. 10. 
26 See Aliran Monthly, 1995:15(9), pp. 2- 11(Edmund Terence Gomez, "Anwar vs Mahathir') 
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There were numerous indications of the deepening factional antagonism 
between Mahathir and Anwar after the 1995 general election. To begin with, Mahathir 
checked Anwar's growing influence by asserting the Prime Minister's prerogative to 
determine government posts. In the cabinet appointments of May 1995, Anwar's 
political allies were restricted to less influential ministries or to positions where 
Mahathir could monitor their activities, while Anwar's rivals or opponents were 
promoted to senior portfolios. Anwar saw the 1995 cabinet reshuffle as a case of 
Mahathir blocking any chance he had of establishing a power base in the government, 
despite his increasing popularity in the party.22 Many of Anwar's allies also believed 
that Mahathir had learnt how dangerous it was to allow a repeat of the Musa case in 
which Musa was able to control almost half of the top positions in the government 
before the leadership tussle in the mid- 1980s. 
A few months later, however, UMNO's divisional elections in September 1995 
brought a strong reaction from Anwar. Overall, the election results showed only 34 new 
faces, or about 22 per cent of the total, and not all of those were Anwar proteges. 
However, leaders who were personally identified with Mahathir faced difficulties in 
retaining their divisional chairmanships. Despite Mahathir's open support, some of his 
main allies failed to be re- elected as divisional heads, including Daim Zainuddin, Sanusi 
Junid, Ghafar Baba and Rahim Tamby Chik.28 One of Anwar's closest allies states that 
the 1995 divisional election was a straight fight between Mahathir's and Anwar's 
factions. Although Anwar did not directly reveal his political ambitions at this time, his 
clear intention was to demonstrate his own influence and perhaps show Mahathir's 
declining influence in the party. The informant believed that Anwar's machinery was 
z° Interview with Kamarudin Jaffar, Bangsar, 25 August I999. Incidentally, the 1995 cabinet 
appointments were reminiscent of an earlier cabinet reshuffle after the 1986 general election to undermine 
Musa s influence in the government. After the 1986 general election, Musa's strong supporter, Ajib 
Ahmad, then Menteri Besar of Johor, was named Deputy Minister in the Prime Minister's Department 
where Mahathir could keep his eye on him. Najib, then a Musa ally, was appointed to the relatively minor 
portfolio of Culture, Youth and Sports. In 1995, Muyhiddin Yassin, the former Menteri Besar of Johor 
and an Anwar loyalist who had obtained the highest number of votes among the three vice -presidents in 
the 1993 party elections, was named as the relatively minor Minister of Culture, Youth and Sports. 
Meanwhile, two other strong political confidants of Anwar, Nazri Aziz, then Acting Youth Chief, and 
Ibrahim Saad, the former Deputy Chief Minister of Penang, were made deputy ministers in the Prime 
Minister's Department. For more details of the cabinet appointments in 1995, see FEER, 18 May 1995 
(Jayasankaran, "Change and Continuity"). 
as In particular, Sanusi was defeated in Kedah, Mahathir's home state, despite Mahathir's open support for 
Sanusi. In Kedah, six of the 15 divisional heads were replaced. This was a high ratio of replacement 
compared to the other states (see Table in The Star, 5 October 1995, "Polls see eclipse of some big 
guns "). Meanwhile, Daim decided not to contest when he was challenged as divisional head, Earlier, 
Daim announced that he would stay as Merbok UMNO division head only if he were not challenged (The 
Star, 31 August 1995). For more detailed analysis of the divisional elections in 1995, see FEER, 28 
September 1995 (Jayasankaran, "Scramble for power "). 
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working very hard during the campaign period.29 Indeed, the election results were a 
subtle message that Mahathir was losing his grip on the party. It was in this context that 
people saw Anwar as a possible challenger to Mahathir at the triennial party elections 
scheduled in 1996. 
After that, 'rumors of crisis' and 'denial syndrome' characterized UMNO's 
internal life as both leaders repeatedly attempted to deny rumors of conflict.30 This 
recalls the on -off rumors of a rift between Mahathir and Musa prior to the 2Ms 
leadership breach in 1986. Although Musa and Anwar repeatedly professed their loyalty 
to Mahathir, speculation of a leadership tussle and a possible leadership split had been 
ceaselessly spread inside and outside the ruling party. The more they denied the 
leadership problem, the more others believed that a leadership battle was imminent. 
Open pledges of loyalty were viewed as nothing more than a show of political wayang 
kulit (shadow play). 
In these circumstances, a 'no- contest' resolution for the top two posts was 
adopted in the party assembly which was held a few months after the 1995 divisional 
elections.31 This move was widely viewed as Mahathir's way of pre -empting a possible 
challenge for the party presidency at the party election scheduled in October 1996.32 
Mahathir's presidency, therefore, was successfully entrenched for another four years, 
until 1999, and Mahathir's grip on the party seemed to be consolidated.i3 The 'no- 
contest' resolution, in theory, was expected to bury the speculation of a purported rift 
between Mahathir and Anwar in the run -up to the 1996 party elections. However, 
ironically, the 'proxy battles' between Mahathir and Anwar became increasingly furious 
after the 'no- contest' decision. There was a further move by Mahathir's faction to expand 
the 'no- contest' decision to other party posts but it was limited to the party president and 
its deputy.34 
29 Interview with Saifuddin Nasution Ismail, Kuala Lumpur, 23 August 1999. Saifuddin was one of the 
leading figures who represented pro -Anwar Youth circles during the 1995 divisional elections. 
39 For the very first story of the rumors of conflict between Mahathir and Anwar, see FEER, 21 April 
1994 (Michael Vatikiotis, "The Waiting Game: Is Anwar Impatient for the Top Job ? "). 
31 The Star, 26 November 1995. 
32 It was reported that the 'no- contest' resolution followed Anwar's open declaration on 'no intention of 
challenging the Mahathir presidency' a few days earlier at the party's Youth meeting. See The Star, 24 
November 1995 ( "Anwar: Don't Nominate Me "). However, Anwar's tutelage argues that the original idea 
came directly from Mahathir and was endorsed at the supreme council meeting. In a very odd situation 
where he could not go against the so- called collective decision, Anwar had to openly support the 'no- 
contest' idea. Interview with Saifuddin Nasution Ismail, Kuala Lumpur, 23 August 1999. 
33 See FEER, 7 December 1995 (Jayasankaran, "Still the boss "). 
34 For example, Rafidah Aziz, then incumbent Wanita chief, said after a Wanita exco meeting in 
September 1995 that the exco members unanimously agreed with the 'no- contest' resolution for the top 
two posts. See The Star, 30 September 1995 ( "No- contest for top Wanita UMNO posts "). However, Siti 
Zaharah Sulaiman, who later became Wanita chief after defeating Rafidah Aziz, denied that Wanita 
UMNO had never adopted such a resolution for the 'no- contest' for the top two posts. See The Star, 19 
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A few months later, Mahathir's authority was again seriously undermined by a 
strong move initiated by Anwar's supporters. In March 1996, 22 of the 25 Kedah 
UMNO assemblymen signed a memorandum declaring that they would oppose any 
move by Mahathir to replace Osman Aroff, the state's Menteri Besar and alleged Anwar 
ally, with Sanusi, a Mahathir loyalist and long -time rival of Anwar. The memorandum 
was described as 'an act of defiance' against Mahathir's authority. Eventually, the '22 
Kedah rebels' were forced to make a public apology to Mahathir, but did not back down 
from their demands.35 Later, in May 1996, Osman resigned after intense pressure from 
Mahathir who then named Sanusi as Kedah Menteri Besar. However, this happened 
only after Mahathir's grip on the party was already seriously undermined. Anwar, of 
course, openly expressed his regret over the act of defiance by the 22 Kedah 
assemblymen. Nonetheless, he never forgot to stress the right of the party members to 
air their views on the position of Menteri Besar by emphasizing that their views in the 
memorandum 'should not be taken lightly or ignored'.36 It was widely believed that the 
fight between Osman Aroff and Sanusi was a shadow power play between Anwar and 
Mahathir, though some of the Kedah assemblymen may have had their own reasons for 
rejecting Sanusi.37 
With the party elections only a few months away, speculation on the number two 
taking on the number one had not subsided despite Mahathir's 'no- contest' resolution.33 
This was why the Mahathir -chaired UMNO supreme council introduced a new party 
rule that further restricted the right to challenge incumbents, including the party 
president. According to the new rule, aspirants for the top party posts must personally 
declare their intention by registering with UMNO headquarters by 7 May 1996. Only 
those who did so could be nominated by the divisions and those who failed to register 
March 1996 ( "Zaharah: No Resolution Against Contest "). Siti Zaharah finally announced her willingness 
to contest the top Wanita post. See The Star, 24 April 1996 ( "Siti Zaharah: Contest will not cause split "). 
35 For more details of the 22 Kedah assemblymen case, see FEER, 11 April 1996 (Jayasankaran, "Back 
off'); FEER, 16 May 1996 (Jayasankaran, "Showing who's boss "). 
36 The Star, 27 March 1996. 
37 According to a close confident of Anwar, Anwar revealed his strong displeasure with Mahathir's move 
to replace Osman Aroff with Sanusi at that time. Interview with Ibrahim Saad, former Deputy Chief 
Minister of Penang, 16 August 1999, Petaling Jaya. Meanwhile, it was also reported that Mahathir asked 
the Kedah assemblymen whether their action was instigated by Anwar. This means that Mahathir was 
already very suspicious and uneasy with Anwar at that time. 
38 Despite Anwar's open defense of the 'no- contest' resolution, party delegates had obviously been aware 
of what had happened during the 1993 party elections when Anwar challenged Ghafar's deputy 
presidency. At that time, Anwar also publicly announced, at least three times, that he had no intention of 
challenging Ghafar. In this regard, Mahathir's uneasiness was clear in his wind -up speech at the 1995 
UMNO general assembly. Mahathir said that 'if there is a contest either I win or lose. If I win, it is okay 
and it is okay too if I lose as I have had my share of being UMNO president and Prime Minister for 14 
years which is something I am proud of. But if Anwar loses, that will be the end of him. It will not be 
easy to find a replacement and will give rise to turmoil and unrest'. See The Star, 27 November 1995. 
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would not be allowed to contest even if they had been nominated as candidates.39 In 
July 1996, the supreme council even pushed through an unprecedented rule that banned 
all campaigning in its triennial party election in October 1996.° Without a doubt, the 
new rules limiting challenges to incumbents favored those closely associated with 
Mahathir. Several party leaders were barred from standing as candidates for the 
supreme council for violating the no campaign' rule. It cannot be coincidental that most 
of them were in the Anwar faction. 
However, again, Anwar's supporters sent a clear signal to Mahathir that his time 
was running out during the triennial party elections in October 1996. On the first day of 
the elections, the two 'endorsed candidates' of Anwar, Zahid Hamidi and Siti Zaharah 
Sulaiman, won the leadership of the Youth and Wanita wings respectively against the 
incumbents Rahim Tamby Chik and Rafidah Aziz who were strongly backed by 
Mahathir. It was, then, just before another vote commenced on the second day of the 
elections that Mahathir 'had to' produce an emotional speech in which he wept in front 
of the party delegates while criticizing money politics. Largely owing to the tearful 
speech by Mahathir, it seemed that the second -round battle for the three vice -presidents 
and 25 members of the supreme council favored Mahathir.41 Indeed, as Milne and 
Mauzy point out, Mahathir might even have faced greater pressure for an early 
leadership succession if Anwar's first -round victories had continued.42 Mahathir later 
admitted that his 'unusual display of emotion' might have affected the results of the 
vice -presidency and supreme council on the second day. 
At this juncture, it was difficult to tell if there was a serious leadership split 
between Mahathir and Anwar. There was no grand challenge by Anwar's faction to 
Mahathir's national leadership though he had ample opportunity in 1996. Nonetheless, it 
39 Although this new rule was introduced in the name of reducing excessive politicking, it was widely 
believed that one of the key motives behind the new rule was to stop a possible divisional nomination for 
Anwar as a candidate of the party president during the divisional meetings scheduled just before the 
UNINO elections of I996, as had happened when Anwar took over the deputy presidency from Ghafar 
Baba in 1993. For more details of the new rule, see The Star, 7 April I996. 
4° The Star, 7 July 1996 ( "Dr M: Ban to ensure fairness "). See also FEER, 25 July 1996 (Jayasankaran, 
"Equal opportunity "). In fact, a few months before the ban on all campaigning, Mahathir had introduced a 
fixed campaigning period of three months beginning July in a move to curb excessive politicking and 
money politics. According to the fixed campaign rule, only incumbent ministers and deputy ministers 
were allowed to visit other divisions or branches as part of official government business. See The Star, 7 
April 1996 ( "Dr M: Stop it "). 
41 For the details of the election results, see FEER, 24 October 1996 (Kulkarni, Murray Hiebert and 
Jayasankaran, "Succession saga ") and Asiaweek, 25 October 1996, pp. 27 -28. Later in November 1996, 
Mahathir announced 10 appointed supreme council members. Eight, including Rafidah Aziz, Sanusi 
Junid, Mohamed Rahman and Hussein Ahmad, were among his supporters who had been defeated in the 
election. On the other hand, Muhyiddin Yassin, a defeated vice -president who was backed by Anwar, was 
excluded from the appointed supreme council members. See The Star, 29 November 1996. 
42 R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Malaysian Politics under Mahathir (London and New York: 
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was quite clear that Anwar and his political allies tried to create a perception that 
Mahathir's end was approaching. Anwar has often been perceived as impatient for 
Mahathir's retirement, while Mahathir repeatedly reminded him that he would set the 
terms of his own retirement. Anwar's supporters, in particular, became more impatient 
about his ascendancy when Mahathir did not show any sign of voluntary retirement. 
This made Mahathir and his followers suspect Anwar of disloyal intention, despite 
Anwar's repeated description of Mahathir as his 'mentor' and 'political father'. 
For the ten years after the leadership struggle of the mid- 1980s, Mahathir had 
made great efforts to avoid a recurrence of the situation where the number two was seen 
as equal to number one. By pre -empting every possible challenge from his political 
rivals or opponents, Mahathir was able to consolidate his political grip on the party as 
well as the government. Nonetheless, towards the end of the 1990s, Mahathir seemed to 
be confronted with a similar political dilemma to the one he had faced with Musa 
preceding the UMNO leadership crisis of 1987, 
From the very beginning of Mahathir's administration, Musa had been part of the 
'2M' leadership rather than merely the Deputy Prime Minister. Although the term 
connoted an ideal combination of the 'Mahathir -Musa' leadership, this made Musa 
virtually Mahathir's equal.43 Towards the mid- 1980s, Mahathir's uneasiness became 
more obvious as Musa's influence and popularity grew in and outside of UMNO. Musa 
was widely viewed in public as Malaysia's prime- minister -in- waiting although Mahathir 
did not show any intention of early retirement. What was even worse, Musa's liberal and 
flexible attitudes had often been contrasted with Mahathir's authoritarian and 
intransigent leadership style. 
Mahathir thought Anwar, being only in his 40s during the mid- 1990s, would not 
be in such a hurry to take over from him. However, Anwar's rise within UMNO, and 
nation -wide popularity, went far beyond Mahathir's expectations.44 To all public 
appearances, it was just a matter of time until Anwar took over the national leadership. 
In this regard, Mahathir, much sooner than he expected, encountered a rapidly growing 
pressure for generational change. Then again, Mahathir's leadership style was 
Routledge, 1999), p. 155. 
43 Musa believes that it was a big mistake that his supporters and the press continuously labeled his 
combination with Mahathir as the 2M leadership without consideration of Mahathir's uneasiness about the 
term. For Mahathir, number one is only one and number two still has to be second. Interview with Musa 
Hitam, Kuala Lumpur, 23 August 1999. Indeed, Mahathir's sensitivities toward the connotation of the 
term '2M were revealed in his claim that '2M' stood for 'Mahathir Mohamad' rather than 'Mahathir-Musa'. 
See Milne and Mauzy, 1999, p. 40. See also, Aziz Zariza Ahmad, Mahathir's Paradigm Shift: The Man 
Behind the Vision (Taiping: Firma Malaysia Publishing, 1997), pp. 163 -181. 
44 See Aliran Monthly, 1993:I3 (9), pp. 2 -6 ( "Anwar Ibrahim: Prime Minister- To -Be ") 
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increasingly compared to that of Anwar, often less than favorably, bearing comparison 
with Musa s case in the mid- 1980s. Especially after the 1995 general election, Anwar's 
ascendancy posed a direct political threat to Mahathir's supremacy. 
7 -4. The Mid -1997 Economic Crisis: Whose Blessing in Disguise? 
Meanwhile, mid -1997 marked a point of change in the to -ing and fro -ing of the UMNO 
leadership tussle. Firstly, it was at this time that Anwar's adversaries started an 
organized campaign to defame Anwar's high moral character which had assisted his 
meteoric rise in the party. A surat layang (literally: flying letter), alleging Anwar's 
philandering and homosexuality, was circulated widely among party members.45 Even 
though it was not the first time that poison -pen letters had been written about Anwar, in 
his own words, this time it was a 'most concerted, well- organized and well -orchestrated' 
effort to bring him down politically 46 Incidentally, the incident of the poison -pen letters 
against Anwar reminds us of an earlier defamatory book, Challenger: Siapa Lawan 
Siapa, that aimed to injure Musa's character just a month prior to the UMNO elections 
of 198747 
Secondly, the relationship between Mahathir and Anwar also shifted into a new 
phase as the country faced the mid -1997 economic recession. In short, occasional 
differences between Mahathir and Anwar were getting more and more irreconcilable. A 
serious schism between the top two leaders fueled renewed speculation that Anwar 
would resign as Mahathir's deputy as well as Finance Minister.48 Toward the middle of 
1998, Mahathir's counter -attack on Anwar and his followers seemed to intensify. 
Similarly to the 1987 UMNO leadership crisis, the economic crisis which struck 
Malaysia from mid -1997 highlighted the lines of fracture and deepened the power 
struggle between Mahathir and Anwar. However, as implied earlier, the regional 
economic crisis was only one contributing factor, and came about at the end of the 
underlying political struggle or imagined split between Mahathir and Anwar. 
Mahathir's support for an Anwar succession was still plausible at least until mid- 
0.5 The flying letters, or poison -pen letters, were circulated with the name 'Surat Dari Kota' and it was 
widely believed that the writer was closely associated with Mahathir and Daim. According to the flying 
letters, Anwar had not only an adulterous relationship with the wife of his confidential secretary but also a 
homosexual relationship with his wife's former driver. More details of the flying letters, see FEER, 11 
September 1997 (Jayasankaran, "Poison pen "). 
46 Business Times, 26 August 1997. 
47 For more details of the defamatory book against Musa, see The Star, 17 April 1987 ( "Musa gets order 
to stop sale of book"). 
48 On the last day of the UMNO General Assembly in September 1997, Anwar said that he had been 
rumored to have quit as Finance Minister at least eight times in the last two months. See Business Times, 
8 September 1997. 
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1997, as shown in the appointment of Anwar as Acting Prime Minster before Mahathir's 
two -month overseas leave in May 1997. Since Musa s acting premiership in September 
1985, no Mahathir deputy has been designated Acting Prime Minister, despite 
Mahathir's frequent absences from the country.49 It is still not clear whether Anwar's 
acting premiership was a major endorsement of Anwar by Mahathir or a probationary 
test to gauge Anwar's loyalty and capability as Mahathir's successor.50 Whatever the 
motives, Anwar's two -month tenure as Acting Prime Minister proved him a capable 
leader and seemed to confirm his position as Malaysia's prime -minister -in- waiting. This 
worried Anwar's adversaries in the party and a group of politically well- connected 
corporate figures who had become fabulously wealthy with Mahathir's blessing. For 
them, Anwar's drive on corruption, by proposing the Anti -Corruption Bill 1997 in 
particular, was viewed as a real threat to their futures.51 This was why anti -Anwar forces 
were more determined than ever to undermine his ascendancy by circulating the 
allegations of sexual impropriety against him soon after Mahathir's return from leave. 
The poison -pen letters were later 'upgraded' to a defamatory book, 50 Dalil: Mengapa 
Anwar Tidak Boleh Jadi PM (50 Reasons: Why Anwar Cannot Be Prime Minister) and 
widely distributed among party delegates during the annual meeting of UNLNO in June 
1998. 
69 It can be claimed that Mahathir needed to appoint an Acting Prime Minister due to his prolonged and 
unprecedented absence from the post. However, it should be noted that Mahathir did not give the same 
power to Ghafar Baba when he was off for 75 days after his heart attack in 1989. In the case of Anwar, 
Mahathir relinquished the Home Affairs Ministry and even the UMNO presidency to Anwar, along with 
the acting premiership. 
59 Soon after Anwar's abrupt dismissal in September 1998, Mahathir stated that he had planned to step 
down in 1998 and that was why he had appointed Anwar as Acting Prime Minister in mid -1997. See NST, 
9 September 1998. For various reactions about Anwar's acting premiership, see Asiaweek, 23 May 1997 
(Roger Mitton, "Dr. M Takes a Holiday "). Also see FEER, 31 July 1997 (Jayasankaran, "Hot -seat 
experience "). 
51 During Anwar's acting premiership in mid -1997, one of the honest issues on the national agenda was 
'the all -out war against corruption' launched by the Acting Prime Minister Anwar. In doing so, Anwar 
proposed the Anti -Corruption Bill 1997 to increase the powers of the Anti Corruption Agency as well as 
enhanced penalties for corruption offences. Even though the new Anti- Corruption Bill 1997 was endorsed 
by the Cabinet, it was alleged that some ministers had strong reservations. Among other reasons for his 
downfall, Anwar mentioned the tougher anti -corruption drive specifically when he was asked what made 
many UMNO politicians, the police and media so willing to collude in the political conspiracy at the 
highest level. In his letter from Sungai Buloh prison, Anwar emphasized that: 
... in the two months that I served as Acting PM, I had the opportunity to effectively assert some of 
my beliefs. I presided over the drafting of a new and tougher anti -corruption law in the face of 
objections by some Cabinet colleagues, particularly over provisions allowing prosecution even 
after a public official leaves office. Mohtar [Abdullah] the AG [Attorney -General] had strong 
reservations for reasons best known to himself, but the then Director -General of the Anti - 
Corruption Agency (ACA) Shafee Yahya was with me and we prevailed. This episode probably 
confirmed to some of Mahathir's close associates their suspicion that I could not be relied upon to 
protect their interest if ever I took over as Prime Minister. 
For more details of the anti- corruption drive during Anwar's acting premiership, see various newspaper 
reports in mid -1997 and FEER, 19 June 1997 ( Jayasankaran, "Credible Clean -up "). 
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At an early stage, rumors of Anwar's philandering and homosexuality were 
confined to UMNO circles. It seems that Mahathir did not orchestrate the sexual 
conspiracy against Anwar. Indeed, it was Mahathir who got the police to carry out an 
investigation of the earlier allegations that showed the rumors were baseless in early 
August 1997.52 Perhaps, the sex allegations against Anwar would have ended there. The 
mid -1997 economic crisis, however, triggered a series of developments that impacted 
adversely upon the Mahathir -Anwar relationship. Interestingly, it was none other than 
Mahathir's open statements on Anwar's sex scandal that publicized Anwar's sexual 
misconduct nationwide 53 Regarding this, many of Anwar's allies thought that 
Mahathir's intermittent reminders of the sex allegations against Anwar were a very 
tactful way of keeping the issue of Anwar's alleged immorality alive, in order to put him 
in a vulnerable position if Mahathir's national leadership was weakened by the 
economic crisis.54 They believe that the distribution of the book, 50 Reasons, during the 
UMNO general assembly of 1998 was a clear example of diabolical methods used by 
Mahathir. Without Mahathir's endorsement, the book could not have been distributed 
among the delegates, especially by the party secretariat, despite Anwar having obtained 
a court injunction preventing its distribution, said Wan Azízah 55 Hence, it was not 
surprising that the police began to investigate, according to Mahathir's directive, the 
contents of the book immediately after the party general assembly. 
There is little evidence of any organized, or systematic, effort by Anwar and his 
followers to oust Mahathir after the mid -1997 economic recession. But it was quite clear 
that Anwar tried to create a perception inside and outside UMNO that Mahathir's style 
in running the country was not appropriate. Even though there was no grand challenge 
to Mahathir's leadership, there was no doubt that Anwar, or at least his associates, saw 
the worsening economic situation as a circumstantial advantage, if not a much awaited 
opportunity, to promote the idea of an early leadership succession, especially in 
circumstances where Anwar's adversaries had initiated a scurrilous character 
assassination on him by circulating the sex allegations. 
Moreover, it was around this time that the foreign media began to highlight 
Mahathir's conspiratorial analysis as unproductive, incorrect and even reckless as he 
frequently denounced foreign speculators as the main culprits behind the regional 
52 NST, 3 September 1997. 
53 For the first open statement by Mahathir, see The Star, 25 August 1997. 
54 Interview with Kamarudin Jaffar, Kuala Lumpur, 25 August 1999. 
55 Interview with Wan Azizah Wan Ismail, President of KeADILan, Petaling Jaya, 26 August 1999. 
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financial crisis and vowed to ban foreign currency trading in the country.56 The more he 
censured outside forces for the economic downturn, the more he became the target of 
criticism by the foreign media. During this period, some observers and the foreign 
media even suggested Mahathir step down in favor of his deputy.57 Towards the end of 
the year, the general public also became more and more critical of Mahathir's 
controversial leadership as the country's economic situation further deteriorated. 
Subsequently, Mahathir's national leadership seemed to be very vulnerable at least for 
the first few months after the beginning of the mid -1997 economic downturn. 
More unpleasantly for Mahathir, Anwar was thrust into the international 
spotlight as one of the leading younger generation of leaders in Asia. In particular, 
Anwar's more liberal and flexible approaches to the regional financial crisis were 
increasingly highlighted by foreign media at Mahathir's expense. What was even worse, 
Anwar, on his part, seemed to try and cultivate a image as a modern and liberal leader 
by stressing all the big issues, such as democracy, human rights, civil society and so on, 
that are popular in the Western countries but not with Mahathir.58 Anwar's skillful use 
of image making alienated Mahathir as shown in his letter: 
As a high -ranking member of the administration, I often had to articulate and implement key 
policies [mega projects]. And when these were policies that I was personally unhappy with, I did 
so with great reluctance. But I took every opportunity to emphasize poverty eradication, low -cost 
housing, rural development, and small and medium -scale industries instead of mega projects. And 
whenever the opportunity to be bold presented itself, I criticized bailouts and the avarice of big 
tycoons and I called for greater commitment to democratic practices and the development of civil 
society.59 
Towards the end of 1997 in particular, with economic confidence sinking fast, Anwar 
seemed to reveal his reluctance to support Mahathir's unprofitable 'mega projects' and 
certain bailouts associated with Mahathir, including Mahathir's eldest son Mirzan's 
KPB, the Bakun Dam project and UEM's bailout of Renong.60 It was also around this 
56 In a keynote address at the IMF -World Bank meeting in Hong Kong, on 20 September 1997, Mahathir 
denounced currency speculators and called for a ban on currency trading by saying that '...currency 
trading is unnecessary, unproductive and immoral. It should be made illegal.' (NST, 21 September 1997). 
Since then, Mahathir's frequent attacks upon foreign speculators continued and the foreign media's 
counter -attacks on Mahathir intensified as well. For more details of continuous reactions and responses 
between Mahathir and the foreign media, see Mahathir's selected speeches and articles in Mahathir 
Mohamad, 1998; Ranjit Gill, 1998, pp. 95 -160. 
57 See Time, 6 October 1997 (Anthony Spaeth, "Man in the Middle"). 
58 See Anwar's interview with Time magazine on 6 October 1997 ( "What is Success without Freedom ?). 
Also see Anwar Ibrahim, The Asian Renaissance (Singapore: Times Books International, 1996). 
59 Anwar's letter from Sungai Buloh prison on 3 November 1998. 
6° A clear example was seen in the case of UEM's takeover Renong in November 1997. For more details, 
see Aliran Monthly, 1997:17(11), pp. 10 -14 (Ram, "Corporate Rape"). In fact, Anwar's apparent 
reluctance to support Mahathir- initiated mega projects is shown, on several occasions, even before the 
mid -1997 economic crisis. Then, as the country faced economic downturn, Anwar increasingly showed 
his unhappiness with a number of mega projects, in particular the RM15 billion Bakun hydro -electric dam 
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time that Anwar's allies increasingly claimed that a small circle of Mahathir's cronies 
had benefited most from lucrative state patronage through privatization over many 
years, though they did not criticize Mahathir directly.» 
For Mahathir's part, a series of developments from July 1997, such as 
differences in approach towards the economic crisis, the foreign media's growing 
criticism of him and Anwar's Iukewarm attitude to the bailouts of his son and close 
allies, was clear indication of a well- considered move to undermine his national 
leadership and eventually to force him out of office.ó2 Mahathir was certainly not too 
pleased with various things Anwar had done in the wake of the economic crisis. It was 
in this light that Musa warned that the period towards the end of 1997 was a very risky 
time for Anwar's relationship with Mahathir as he was perceived as getting more 
impatient and preparing to take over power eventually. Musa pointed out in a recent 
interview: 
By the end of 1997, the political leadership was already in a crisis mood. He [Anwar] was already 
touching on all the issues which I thought he should not with the PM, like what I did actually. It 
was basically based on my own experience. I knew what are the things that you need not and 
should not do when you are the DPM. And Anwar was repeating [what I did], but worse.... He has 
always been against the way Mahathir conducted himself and it showed the weakness of 
Mahathir's style.... I felt that Anwar should be more supportive rather than going off at a tangent 
and going somewhere else.... So, the line was so similar to my problem except it was more 
highlighted because of the high profile stand of Anwar.63 
project in Sarawak. Despite Mahathir's strong attachment to the mega projects even in the wake of the 
economic downturn, Anwar initiated the delay and the shelving of some of them, including Bakun Dam, 
the Northern Airport and the KL Linear City (NST, 5 September 1997). Again, Anwar made it clear that 
there would be no selective rescue nor bailout of an ailing private company by the government when he 
announced additional austerity measures on 5 December 1997. It should be noted that several of 
Mahathir's close associates were already facing serious financial problems at this time. In particular, in 
Mirzan Mahathir's case, it was reported that he had lost more than RM2 billion in his shipping company, 
Konsortium Perkapalan Berhad (KPB) (Singapore Business Times, 8 September 1997). Despite Anwar's 
'no- bailout' announcement in December 1997, Petronas, wholly owned by the Malaysian government, 
eventually paid RM1.7 billion for Mirzan's KPB (Aliran Monthly, 1998:18(3), pp. 2 -5). It should be noted 
that there was severe disagreement between Anwar and Mahathir over the amount in the bailout of 
Mirzan's KPB. According to Anwar, Mahathir was very displeased that Mirzan could not receive the 
RM2.2 billion he wanted, instead of the RM1.7 billion he received (see Anwar's letter from Sungai Buloh 
on 3 November 1998). 
61 There had. been Iong- lasting disputes over mega projects between Mahathir and Anwar since as early as 
1994. These included: Bank Bumiputera Bhd, Malaysia Airlines Bhd (MAS), the Second Link Highway, 
and the Bakun Dam project. For more details of political rivalry over these mega projects between 
Mahathir's and Anwar's factions, see Miran Monthly, 1995:15(7), pp. 2 -10 ( "Political Rivalry and 
Privatized Patronage "); Malaysian Business, 16 March 1994; Gomez and Jomo, 1997, pp. 75 -116. 
62 It was said that Mahathir was unhappy not only when Anwar tried to argue against certain policies but 
also believed that Anwar deliberately instigated the foreign media's antagonism towards him. According 
to a close associate of Daim who declined to be named, Anwar had a regular weekly briefing with the 
foreign media at his Finance Ministry for many years. And, especially since the mid -1997 economic 
crisis, the meeting was largely Mahathir bashing to differentiate his leadership style from that of 
Mahathir. In this regard, he claimed that Mahathir further believed that Anwar was an accomplice in an 
international conspiracy against him. Confidential interview, Kuala Lumpur, August 1999. 
63 Interview with Musa Hitam, Kuala Lumpur, 23 August 1999. During the same interview, Musa said 
that: 
I had personally been talking to Anwar saying that "you will be in trouble ". But he always said that 
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In particular, Anwar's unwillingness to save Mirzan's KPB was enough to convince 
Mahathir that Anwar was not prepared to protect his family and cronies' interests after 
his prime ministership. In this context, a senior journalist asserted that Anwar had 
already exceeded Mahathir's own level of tolerance, by the end of 1997, by touching on 
the issues of cronyism and nepotism in particular. Similarly, Musa made it clear that: 
To put it in a very simple term, this is all about the search for the next leader who could ensure that 
the past leader and his cronies will not be in trouble... The more successors took action against 
predecessors, the more Mahathir [and his cronies] worried about their potential successor.... So he 
has to look for somebody whom he can absolutely trust. Musa was no, Ghafar was just temporary 
and Anwar became no.65 
At least for the first few months after the mid -1997 economic crisis, Mahathir's 
strategy for political survival was not well- coordinated. As mentioned earlier, 
Mahathir's initial response to the economic crisis was to blame foreign speculators, one 
of the conventional ways of consolidating national leadership by the Malay ruling elites. 
This time, however, such a strategy did not appear to be effective. On the contrary, 
though the economic crisis was largely due to external factors, Mahathir's frequent 
attacks upon foreign speculators bounced back not only in terms of the worsening 
economic situation but also as growing Iack of confidence in his political leadership. 
Mahathir's shrewdness as a political manipulator, however, should not be 
underestimated. At this point of his increasing unpopularity as leader, Mahathir raised 
an ethnic issue by singling out 'the Jews' as the main culprits behind the economic crisis. 
Up to that point, even though he frequently blamed the economic downturn on the work 
of foreign speculators, his remarks were largely in code. However, on 10 October 1997, 
addressing a rally of about 10,000 Muslim villagers in Kuala Terengganu, Mahathir 
directly criticized the Jews, like George Soros, for having a hidden agenda to block the 
progress of Muslims. Mahathir was quoted by the local press as well as the national 
news agency, Bernama, and his comments were then given extensive coverage in the 
"no, I have talked to the PM, I told him everything, I don't keep him out of touch with my 
thinking ". That was more reason that I was worried because that was exactly what I said when I 
was a DPM. 
Indeed, Anwar's naive attitude towards Mahathir came out in his interview with Time magazine in 
October 1997 when he said that he was allowed to disagree with Mahathir. Anwar said: 
[Mahathir] has given me enough leeway and freedom to express myself and to decide on some 
issues that he is not necessarily totally comfortable with. Often he jokes I'm too conciliatory... 
but... he is quite tolerant. We work as a team (Time, 6 October 1997). 
" Interview with Shamsul Akmar Musakamal, then Journalist of The Star and currently at NST, Petaling 
Jaya, 6 August 1999. 
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international media, as saying: 
We may suspect that they, the Jews, have an agenda, but we do not want to accuse... incidentally, 
we are Muslims and the Jews are not happy to see the Muslims progress... the Jews robbed the 
Palestinians of everything, but in Malaysia they could not do so, hence they do this, depress the 
ringgit.66 
A day later, Mahathir clarified that he merely stated that incidentally George Soros was 
a Jew and Malaysia is a Muslim -dominated country. Nonetheless, it was widely 
believed that Mahathir's anti -Semitic remarks were part of an elaborate attempt to divert 
the issue into a racial one and to consolidate his leadership. As Musa mentioned, such a 
racial tactic was nothing new in multi- ethnic Malaysian politics and, once again, 
Mahathir proved that his political career had been built on similar episodes of 'scape- 
goating', such as those demonstrated in the aftermath of the 1987 leadership crisis.67 In 
1987, the escalation of racial tension and subsequent ISA arrests, as a series of 
diversionary exercises in the midst of leadership crisis, gave Mahathir a circumstantial 
advantage to consolidate his position against internal challenges in the ruling party.68 
Whereas the Chinese were the main targets in 1987, this time 'the Jews' were used as a 
diversionary tactic to get people to rally around him 
Mahathir's anti -Semitic remarks immediately escalated the foreign media's 
antagonism towards him.69 In particular, 34 United States congressmen drafted a 
resolution and sent a letter, dated on October 27, to demand Mahathir openly apologize 
or to resign as the Prime Minister of Malaysia. Perhaps more favorable to Mahathir, at 
this time tension had built up between Malaysia and the Untied States as the Clinton 
administration attempted to apply a US domestic law, the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act 
1996, to Malaysia because of Petronas's investment in the Iranian gas industry.70 
Subsequently, external pressures prompted Malaysian politicians, including opposition 
parties, and editorial writers of all stripes to denounce foreign interference in domestic 
65 Interview with Musa Hitam, Kuala Lumpur, 23 August 1999. 
Bernama, 11 October 1997. 
67 Interview with Musa Hitam, Kuala Lumpur, 13 February 1998. 
69 For more details, see Chapter 5. 
69 For examples, see Sydney Morning Herald, 13 October 1997 ('Dr Mahathir's racist slur "); New York 
Times, 16 October I997 ( "Malaysia Premier Sees Jews Behind Nation's Money Crisis "); and The Nation, 
16 October 1997 ( "Mahathir has to learn the lesson - he has to take the good and the bad"). 
70 In early October, it was reported that Total, a French energy company, and its consortium partners, 
Malaysia's national oil company Petronas and Russia's Gazprom, planned to invest US$2 billion to 
develop the Iranian gas industry, which the United State said defied US sanctions legislation (NST, 1 
October 1997). And, following Mahathir's anti- Semitic remarks and a US congressman's draft resolution, 
the issue of possible US sanctions on Malaysia was highlighted by the local Malaysian newspapers as the 
US sanctions were viewed as an interference with the sovereign rights of Malaysians. 
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political affairs and express full support for Mahathir.71 Public rallies, placards, car 
stickers and badges expressing support for Mahathir were also widespread. Then, 
Anwar finally announced that he would move an unprecedented parliamentary vote of 
confidence in Mahathir following all nine Menteris Besar and four Chief Ministers' 
vowing to support Mahathir's leadership.72 The state leaders pledged their unconditional 
support by announcing that they support 'all actions that had been or would be taken by 
Dr Mahathir in handling the country's economic problems'.73 As Mahathir himself 
believes, the well -coordinated upsurge in nationalistic sentiment after mid- October 
provided him with advantageous conditions to recapture a lot of the ground that he had 
lost in the wake of economic crisis.74 
Not surprisingly, it was just one day after the passing of the motion of 
confidence in parliament that Mahathir took the political initiative by proposing the 
setting up of a National Economic Action Council (NEAC) to oversee the country's 
economic recovery. In recommending the council's formation, Mahathir implied that the 
proposed council could be compared to the National Operations Council (NOC), which 
suspended Malaysia's constitution and ruled the country after the May 13 racial riots in 
1969, by saying that 'we will adopt a similar approach as we did during the Emergency 
even though we have not declared a state of emergency .75 At this time, it was a moot 
point whether the proposed NEAC was to have executive powers or was merely 
advisory in nature. Nonetheless, some analysts argued that the formation of a trouble- 
shooting economic council was a clear move to protect, and/or bailout, a small group of 
corporate figures closely linked to the ruling party, and Mahathir in particular. It was 
also widely believed that the NEAC, as an ad hoc crisis council chaired by Mahathir, 
aimed to infringe Anwar's authority as Finance Minister in circumstances where Anwar 
showed differences in approach to handle the economic problems. 
11 For examples of opposition parties' support for Mahathir, see NST, 15 November 1997 ( "Congressmen's 
act 'arrogant, undemocratic "'); NST, 17 November 1997 ( "Support Dr M, says Nik Aziz "); and Lim Kit 
Siang's October 20 speech on the 1998 Budget. It is argued that, in a situation where the issue became 
foreign interference in domestic political affairs, the opposition had no alternative but to express its 
support, though it was not unconditional support, for Mahathir. Opposition parties' criticism, or even 
silence, on Mahathir's leadership at that time would have been regarded as a complicity in infringement of 
sovereignty by the foreign forces. Interview with Lim Kit Siang, former Secretary -General and currently 
Chairman of DAP, Canberra, 19 April 2000. 
72 The motion of confidence in Mahathir passed in parliament on 19 November 1997. For the full text of 
the motion, see NST, 20 November 1997. 
7; See NST, 14 November 1997 ( "State leaders denounce US Congressmen's move "), italics added. 
74 Mahathir mentioned that foreign interference after his remarks on the Jewish conspiracy made his 
position stronger. See NST, 12 November 1997 ( "PM: Quit suggestion made me stronger instead "). For 
more details of political effect of external pressure towards Mahathir's leadership, see FEER, 27 
November 1997 (Jayasankaran, "Two -Edged Sword: Anti -American mood angers U.S. but helps 
Mahathir "). 
NST, 21 November 1997 ( "Economic Action Council proposed "). 
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Meanwhile, Anwar also appeared to preempt the situation before the NEAC was 
fully established. On 5 December 1997, Anwar, as Finance Minister, announced a series 
of belt- tightening measures which were described as a 'homegrown IMF program 
without the IMF'.76 The major austerity measures included: further cutbacks in 1998 
government expenditure by 18 per cent, on top of the 3 per cent announced in 1998 
Budget on October 17; revising 1998 growth to 4 -5 per cent from 7 per cent previously; 
and reducing salaries of government ministers by 10 per cent. In addition, a number of 
mega projects were deferred. Anwar also announced that there would be no government 
bailout of politically well -connected companies and corporate figures.77 Anwar's 
announcement came after the December 3 Cabinet meeting held on the Langkawi 
island, chaired by Mahathir who approved the new economic measures. However, 
according to a story circulating in Kuala Lumpur, Anwar had already persuaded Cabinet 
members to accept his package before Mahathir's attendance at the meeting and 
reluctantly Mahathir had to endorse ' the -Anwar- initiated -austerity- package'. Some 
analysts believed that the December 3 Cabinet meeting was the turning point of the 
Mahathir -Anwar relationship which was now on a collision course.78 
A clear sign of Mahathir's effort to curb Anwar's capacity as Finance Minister 
was the appointment of former Finance Minister Daim Zainuddin, Mahathir's most 
trusted lieutenant, as executive director of the NEAC on December 20, 1997. Anwar 
was named as the council's deputy chairman with Mahathir as chairman. Mahathir made 
it clear that Daim would exercise full power to carry out the council's directives.79 
Though it was reported that Anwar viewed Daim as the right man for the NEAC 
executive director, Anwar was very upset about Daim's installation and confided in his 
close allies that 'Mahathir is squeezing me'.S0 Later, Anwar wrote in a letter that he 
76 FEER, 18 December 1997 (Jayasankaran, "Hit the Brakes "). 
77 For the full text of Anwar's announcement on new economic measures, see NST, 6 December 1997. 
78 Indeed, a series of developments after the December 3 Cabinet meeting demonstrated the widening 
disagreement between Mahathir and Anwar. For example, on the day after the Cabinet meeting, Mahathir 
openly affirmed that 'the government will proceed with its plan for the RMIO billion land bridge project 
linking northern peninsular Malaysia and southern Thailand despite the ringgit's depreciation' (NST, 5 
December 1997, "Land bridge project will proceed, says Dr Mahathir "). One day later, however, Anwar 
reversed Mahathir's stand by announcing that 'neither Malaysia nor Thailand was in a position to start on 
the RMIO billion land bridge' when he unveiled the December 3 Cabinet decision of the austerity package 
(NST, 6 December 1997, "Land bridge project is deferred, says Anwar "). It took two days for Mahathir to 
break his silence and reluctantly endorse the -Anwar- initiated- austerity- measures as 'necessary to restore 
confidence in the economy' (NST, 8 December 1997, "PM: Tough measures necessary"). For more details 
of the December 3 Cabinet decision and its consequence, see FEER, 18 December 1997 (Jayasankaran, 
"Hit the Brakes "); Asiaweek, 19 December 1997 (Assif Shameen, "Mahathir Shifts into Reverse "). 
79 NST, 21 December 1997 ( "Daim appointed NEAC executive director "). Also see, FEER, 19 February 
1998 ( Jayasankaran and Murray Hiebert, "Calling Doctor Daim "). 
8° Interview with Saifuddin Nasution Ismail, Kuala Lumpur, 23 August 1999. 
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suspected Mahathir wished to remove him by December 1997.81 Perhaps, Mahathir was 
signaling Anwar at this time to resign, in a similar way to his former deputy Musa who 
resigned in 1986. However, the signal in the mid -1980s was one -sided from Mahathir 
whereas in the Mahathir -Anwar case it was double -sided. Therefore, it was not entirely 
surprising that the year 1998 saw the final rupture of the growing leadership conflict 
between Mahathir and Anwar. 
7 -5. The Final Stages of the Mahathir -Anwar Leadership Tussle 
The UMNO Supreme Council elections were scheduled for mid -1999, and in March 
1998 UMNO was to conduct elections in its 165 divisions. Given that each division 
elects 11 delegates to the general assembly that elects Supreme Council, the March 
divisional elections, though local by nature, were regarded as a litmus test of the balance 
of power between Mahathir and Anwar. It was then widely anticipated that Anwar 
would receive very solid support at the upcoming divisional elections. According to one 
of Anwar's close allies, he had strong support in about 75 to 80 divisions out of 165 and 
substantial support in more. Moreover, once the election campaign had begun, Anwar 
would be in an advantageous position because of the great turbulence and political 
change in neighboring Asian countries at the time of the economic crisis. For these 
reasons, Anwar's camp expected to get a majority of votes. In particular, the Youth and 
Wanita wings were viewed as very solid Anwar strongholds.82 
At the beginning of 1998, in these circumstances, Mahathir's attempt to pre -empt 
a possible challenge to his presidency began. In his efforts to minimize so- called 
'internal politicking', Mahathir advised would -be challengers not to contest against the 
incumbent divisional heads who were supreme council members during the divisional 
elections scheduled on March 12 to 29. In the same way, supreme council members who 
were not divisional heads were also warned against contesting for the divisional head 
posts.ß3 And, ten days later, the 'no- contest advice' was followed by a 'no- contest 
directive, banning contest for incumbent divisional heads in Kelantan from the 
Mahathir -chaired Kelantan UMNO liaison committee. Though the 'no- contest directive' 
supposedly only applied to Kelantan, Mahathir did not forget to 'advise' other UMNO 
divisions to avoid disruptive contests through internal compromise in the run -up to the 
Si See Anwar's letter from Sungai Buloh prison, 3 November 1998. 
52 E -mail correspondence with Saifuddin Nasution Ismail on 25 April 2000. 
83 NST, 16 January 1998 ( "Let Supreme Council members retain division posts "). Mahathir's no- contest 
'advice' became a 'directive by the decision of the supreme council about a week before the divisional 
elections. See Business Times, 3 March 1998 (" Ümno bars contests for top post of divisions "). 
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divisional elections.$4 As expected, the 'no- contest directive' in Kelantan was followed 
by similar moves in several other states, such as Selangor, Perlis, Terengganu, Pahang 
and Sabah.85 
Without doubt, Mahathir's 'advice' and the subsequent 'directive' on 'no- contest' 
were strategies for retaining the status quo by discouraging Anwar's supporters from 
challenging the incumbent divisional chiefs who presumably accepted the continuation 
of Mahathir's leadership. As for supreme council members who were mostly divisional 
chiefs, Mahathir was unwilling to see any changes in the council's composition in 
Anwar's favor. Owing to the 'no- contest directive', a number of supreme council 
members who were facing possible challenges by Anwar's allies were able to retain 
their divisional head posts.86 Interestingly, it was alleged that the majority of supreme 
council members who were not divisional heads at this time were made up of close 
associates of Anwar. Their electoral eligibility was usurped by the 'no- contest directive' 
although most of them were well -prepared to stand against pro -Mahathir incumbent 
divisional chiefs.87 
The outcome of the divisional elections, in general terms, showed that the status 
quo had been maintained, especially for the posts of divisional chief. There were only 
24 new divisional chiefs in the 165 divisions. In other words, more than 80 per cent of 
the incumbent Ieaders were retained during the elections. In particular, Perlis, Perak, 
Pahang and Terengganu saw a 100 per cent success rate for the incumbent divisional 
chiefs, as shown in Table 7 -1. Nonetheless, it was still arguable whether Mahathir's 
advice on no- contest had worked effectively in the run -up to the divisional elections, 
especially if one scrutinized the result of the other key divisional posts - the deputy and 
vice -chairmen, and the youth and waníta chiefs. For instance, 35 per cent of divisional 
deputies and 52 per cent of divisional vice -chairmen had changed. Especially for the 
Youth chiefs post, nearly 60 per cent were new. In fact, considering about 40 per cent 
of the incumbent chiefs had exceeded the 40 -year age limit, a great number of the 
84 See NST, 27 January 1998 ( "No contest for top Kelantan Umno posts ") and NST, 7 February 1998 ( "Dr 
M's advice seen as a directive "). The Gua Musang division was exempted from the no- contest directive as 
the then Gua Musang chief decided not to contest and handed over the post to former Gua Musang 
division chief Razaleigh Hamzah. 
85 For example, see Business Times, 10 February 1998 ( "No contest for posts in Sabah Umno divisions "). 
86 For example, Zaleha Ismail, a supreme council member and divisional chief of Gombak, faced a 
challenge from an Anwar loyalist, Fuad Hassan, the then deputy chief, but was returned unopposed. At 
that time, it was an open secret that Fuad Hassan would win if the post were contested. 
87 E -mail correspondence with Saifuddin Nasution Ismail on 25 April 2000. According to Saifuddin, 
among Anwar's close allies who were not divisional heads were Khalid Yunus, Nazri Aziz, Shahrizat Jalil 
and Zainal Abidin Abdul Kadir. At that time, Khalil Yunus was ready to contest against Lilah Yasin, a 
Mahathir man, in Jempol division in Negeri Sembilan. And, Zainal Abidin Abdul Kadir was also ready to 
stand against Annuar Musa, a Cabinet minister and Mahathir loyalist, in Peringat division in Kelantan. 
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the incumbent leaders were retained during the elections. In particular, Perlis, Perak, 
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Youth chiefs post, nearly 60 per cent were new. In fact, considering about 40 per cent 
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84 See NST, 27 January 1998 ( "No contest for top Kelantan Umno posts ") and NST, 7 February 1998 ( "Dr 
Ms advice seen as a directive "). The Gua Musang division was exempted from the no- contest directive as 
the then Gua Musang chief decided not to contest and handed over the post to former Gua Musang 
division chief Razaleigh Hamzah. 
85 For example, see Business Times, 10 February 1998 ( "No contest for posts in Sabah Umno divisions "). 
ss For example, Zaleha Ismail, a supreme council member and divisional chief of Gombak, faced a 
challenge from an Anwar loyalist, Fuad Hassan, the then deputy chief, but was returned unopposed. At 
that time, it was an open secret that Fuad Hassan would win if the post were contested. 
87 E -mail correspondence with Saifuddin Nasution Ismail on 25 April 2000. According to Saifuddin, 
among Anwar's close allies who were not divisional heads were Khalid Yunus, Nazri Aziz, Shahrizat Jalil 
and Zainal Abidin Abdul Kadir. At that time, Khalil Yunus was ready to contest against Lilah Yasin, a 
Mahathir man, in Jempol division in Negeri Sembilan. And, ZainaI Abidin Abdul Kadir was also ready to 
stand against Annuar Musa, a Cabinet minister and Mahathir loyalist, in Peringat division in Kelantan. 
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changes had been widely expected before the elections. Nevertheless, the drastic 
turnover of almost 60 per cent of new youth leadership was enough to suggest that 
Mahathir's advice of no- contest had been disregarded. In fact, before the elections, 
Anwar and his close allies indicated that Mahathir's advice should be confined to 
divisions held by supreme council members and not extended to all division chiefs or 
other division posts.88 It was, then, an open secret that Anwar's electoral machinery 
worked very hard in the mn -up to and during the divisional elections. Indeed, the 
divisional election results were only to confirm the growing discrepancy between the 
top two leaders. The outcome of the divisional elections pointed to possible 
maneuvering for the party presidency in the following year's UMNO supreme council 
elections. 
Table 7 -1: The Numbers of New Faces in the 1998 UMNO Divisional Elections 
Divisions Chief Deputy Vice -chief Youth chief Wanita chief 
Perlis 3 - 2 2 2 
Kedah 15 2 3 8 7 1 
Penang 11 2 4 8 5 3 
Perak 23 - 1 8 13 4 
Kelantan 14 3 7 8 7 2 
Terengganu 8 - - 3 5 2 
Pahang 11 - 5 7 3 6 
Selangor 17 2 2 8 13 2 
N. Sembilan 7 2 3 2 4 2 
Melaka 5 3 4 4 2 1 
Johor 20 5 10 13 14 8 
Sabah 20 1 8 7 11 2 
FT, Labuan 11 4 8 7 7 4 
Total 165 24 (14.5 %) 57 (34.5%) 85 (51.5 %) 95 (57.6%) 37 (22.4 %) 
Source: The Star, 18 April 1998, p. 20. 
It was therefore not surprising that soon after the divisional elections further 
steps were taken to insulate the Mahathir presidency from challenges. To begin, as 
happened in the mn -up to the 1995 UNLNO annual assembly, yet another 'no- contest' 
resolution for the top two posts - the party presidency and deputy presidency - was 
proposed by Mahathir's supporters.89 If the resolution were passed during the June 1998 
UMNO annual assembly, Mahathir's presidency would be successfully entrenched for 
another four years up to 2002. In addition, several amendments to the UMNO 
constitution were proposed by Mahathir's allies. The proposed amendments included the 
Zainal Abidin Abdul Kadir became new deputy divisional chief through an internal compromise. 
88 Anwar and his close allies' unhappiness with Mahathir's 'no- contest advice had been intermittently, but 
openly, revealed in public. For example, see NST, 17 February 1998 ( "Stay neutral or face action, Anwar 
warns party leaders "); NST, 10 February I998 ( "Ahmad Zahid: Allow contests where changes are 
needed "). 
89 Initially, the 'no- contest' resolution was raised in mid -April by the UMNO liaison committee of 
Kelantan and followed by the support of the other states. See NST, 6 May I998 ( "No- contest move for top 
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tightening of qualifications for potential challengers running for division and high -level 
posts, by requiring a minimum 25 per cent of the total number of nominations cast, 
different from the existing constitution whereby one only needs two nominations from 
the divisions to make a challenge for any post.90 Some even proposed the deferment of 
the scheduled 1999 supreme council elections until after the general election in 2000.91 
There is no doubt that these amendments were all aimed at consolidating Mahathir's 
presidency by preserving the incumbent party leadership. Interestingly, it was around 
this time that Mahathir resumed his verbal attacks on foreign currency speculators after 
several months of relative silence.92 
This time, however, party delegates were unlikely to endorse the 'no- contest' 
resolution. To the contrary, there was already pressure on Mahathir to allow challengers 
from Anwar's camp. In particular, the UMNO Youth chief Zahid Hamidi, an Anwar 
backer, urged the Youth exco members not to table any proposal calling for 'no- contest' 
for the movement's top two posts with a view 'to ensure democracy remains fertile in 
UMNO'.93 Immediately after this, Anwar pointedly welcomed Zahid's willingness to 
face possible challenges in the 1999 UMNO supreme council elections as a way of 
preserving 'the spirit of the constitution as well as the democracy and the healthy culture 
in the party' 94 Then again, Zahid's remarks and Anwar's positive response fuelled 
renewed speculation on the possibility of Anwar challenging Mahathir in the 1999 
UMNO supreme council elections. 
As the rift between Mahathir and Anwar widened, yet another external factor 
began to impact upon their relationship. This was the explosive political situation in 
Indonesia which came to a head in May 1998. In the wake of the mid -1997 economic 
crisis, Suharto became the main target of public fury over his involvement of korupsi 
(corruption), kronisme (cronyism) and nepotisme (nepotism). The Indonesian reformasi 
movement finally forced the once mighty Suharto to step down on May 21, 1998 after 
32 years and six consecutive terms in office.95 Around May and early June, Mahathir 
became more paranoid as various political groups in and outside of Malaysia began to 
draw parallels between him and Suharto. Some of them openly suggested that the time 
Rosts "); NST, 7 June 1998 ( "Kedah: No contest for two posts"). 
See Asiaweek, 24 April 1998 (Sangwon Suh and Santha Oorjitham, "A Matter of Rejuvenation "). 
91 NST, 4 May I998 ( "Selangor Umno wants party polls postponed "). 
92 For more details, see FEER, 21 May 1998 (Murray Hiebert and Jayasankaran, "Mixed Signals "). 
93 See NST, 9 May 1998 ( "Umno Youth posts should be contested "); NST, 20 May 1998 ( "Ahmad Zahid 
reiterates his stand "). 
94 See The Star, 11 May 1998 ( "Anwar backs Zahid's call on contests for top posts "). 
95 An excellent overview of the Indonesian reformasi movement and Suharto 's downfall is provided by 
Geoff Forrester & R. J. May (eds.), The Fall of Soeharto (NSW: Crawford House Publishing, 1998). 
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had come for Mahathir, having been in power for 17 years by July 1998, to step down 
and make way for a new generation of leaders. The general public, already critical of 
Mahathir's controversial leadership in handling the country's economic crisis, showed 
increasing support for an early Anwar succession.96 
More unpleasantly for Mahathir, it was around this time that Anwar himself 
increasingly stressed in public the need to 'reform' the Malaysian version of 'corruption, 
cronyism and nepotism' in order to avoid an Indonesian -style crisis. Anwar even talked 
about the positive elements of the economic crisis by emphasizing 'creative destruction' 
to cleanse society of corruption, cronyism and nepotism.97 In particular, at a Johor 
UMNO convention on June 8, Anwar warned of the dangers of Malaysia facing a 
similar crisis to that of Indonesia where people demanded changes, if reformasi were 
not undertaken. Though Anwar's call for reform did not necessarily mean an early 
leadership succession, for Mahathir the reformasi slogan in Indonesia meant nothing 
more than the ousting of the Suharto presidency. For Mahathir, the adoption of the same 
reformasi rhetoric and the anti -KKN (korupsi, kronisme, nepotisme) campaign by 
Anwar and his supporters was aimed at achieving the same result as in Indonesia. The 
timing of Anwar's call for reformasi in particular, unveiled about a week before the 
upcoming UMNO general assembly, was transparently mischievous. Soon after Anwar's 
call for reform, a lot of noise was made about the question of cronyism and nepotism by 
Zahid and other like- minded members. Rumors of plans to 'boo' at Mahathir's opening 
speech and a subsequent 'plot' by 30 -odd MPs planning to demand Mahathir's 
resignation during the party's general assembly were circulated widely at this time. All 
this was enough to convince Mahathir that there was an organized endeavor to force 
him out of office in the wake of Suharto's downfall in Indonesia.98 
96 An informal survey over the Internet in mid -1998 showed that only 16.7 per cent of the respondents 
showed their confidence in Mahathir's handling of the economic crisis, whereas 64.6 per cent of them felt 
Anwar was the best leader to lead Malaysia out of the crisis. The opinion poll also showed extravagant 
spending on unimportant projects, corruption and nepotism were the most serious problems under the 
Mahathir government. In this regard, 65 per cent of the respondents felt the necessity of political reform if 
Malaysia were to emerge stronger from the crisis. See Asiaweek, 3 July 1998 (Sangwon Suh, "Speaking 
One's Mind "). 
97 In a confidential interview, a government official close to Daim claimed that Mahathir and his 
associates, Daim in particular, were even suspicious that Anwar and his allies might engage in economic 
sabotage in the wake of the Indonesian reformasi movement, by allowing the country's economy to 
deteriorate further for the purpose of ousting Mahathir. According to the official, around fune and July 
1998, Anwar's close allies met the Indonesian opposition leader, Amein Rais, to consult on how Malaysia 
might follow Indonesia's example. Mahathir was reportedly quite furious with Anwar and his allies' close 
contacts with the Indonesian opposition. 
98 Mahathir's attitude is well demonstrated in an interview with Mainichi Daily News. Mahathir pointed 
out that: 
To get me to step down [Anwar] and his supporters in the party condemned alleged cronyism, 
nepotism and lack of transparency in the Government [in the run -up to the party's annual assembly 
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Having sensed the imminence of Anwar's attack upon his leadership, Mahathir 
took systematic steps to emasculate Anwar in the run -up to, and during, the UMNO 
general assembly. First of all, Mahathir gave a series of public warnings not to make 
'unsubstantiated' claims about nepotism and cronyism a few days before the assembly.99 
Meanwhile, Daim called Zahid and advised him to step backward from his strong 
criticism on nepotism and cronyism for the sake of his own political future. This 
happened just eight hours before Zahid was supposed to deliver his speech. Then, Zahid 
asked Saifuddin, then the Youth secretary, not to distribute the already- printed text of 
his speech because of some amendments to the context of the speech.100 Defying a pre - 
assembly warning by Mahathir, Zahid brought up the issue of cronyism and nepotism as 
a top agenda item, but in a slightly more moderate manner. Immediately after Zahid's 
speech, Mahathir retaliated against accusations of nepotism and cronyism by releasing a 
list of names which showed that Anwar's relatives and close associates, including Zahid 
himself, had also benefited substantially from privatized state contracts and special 
share allocations.107 At the same time, 2,000 copies of the defamatory book, 50 
Reasons: Why Anwar Cannot Be Prime Minister, were distributed widely to UMNO 
delegates by the party secretariat, despite Anwar having obtained an interim injunction 
preventing its distribution on 17 June.102 It was then no surprise that Mahathir ordered 
the police to re- investigate the 'contents' of the book, although an earlier police 
investigation had revealed that the sexual allegations against Anwar were baseless. 
of June 1998]. He expected the attack to be supported so widely by the grassroots leaders of the 
party, especially at the 1998 UMNO general assembly, that I would have to step down and he 
would take over as the appointed successor (Quoted in NST, 15 December 1999). 
99 Two days before the annual assembly, the draft of Zahid's speech had been already presented during the 
special UMNO Youth executive meeting. For examples of Mahathir's pre -assembly warnings, see NST, 
14 June 1998 ( "PM: Accusers are themselves cronies "); NST, 18 June 1998 ( "Be responsible, UMNO 
delegates told "). 
100 Interview with Saifuddin Nasution Ismail, Kuala Lumpur, 23 August 1999. Another close ally of 
Anwar, who declined to be named, claims that the original text of Zahid's speech contained a direct 
challenge to Mahathir. But it was, in fact, Anwar himself who asked Zahid to delete all the strong words 
against Mahathir from his speech. Anwar, however, gave his blessing for Zahid to raise the issue of 
nepotism and cronyism in a way that indirectly challenged Mahathir's leadership. 
1°1 See The Star, 17 June 1998 ( "Cronies all "); The Star, 22 June 1998 ( "List on show "). The full lists of 
the names can be found at ( http : / /cnn.com/asianow /asiaweek/98 /0703 /nat_3_list.html). Interestingly, this 
counter -attack again recalls an earlier move by Mahathir against his rivals just ten days prior to the 1987 
party election. At that time, given the circumstances where anti -Mahathir factions increasingly accused 
Mahathir of ruining the country with expensive and luxury 'mammoth projects', Mahathir surprisingly de- 
classified minutes of cabinet meetings to show that his rivals were, in fact, part of the decision -making 
process of the alleged 'mammoth projects', including the Penang Bridge, the Dayabumi Complex, 
HICOM's heavy industrialization and Proton Saga. See The Star, 14 April 1987 ( "No longer a secret: 
documents on three projects declassified "). 
102 Soon after a High Court judge granted Anwar the injunction to restrain the dissemination of the book, 
he was transferred to the Shah Alam High Court from his position as head of the Civil Division of the 
High Court in Kuala Lumpur. Based on his seniority, the transfer was viewed as another case of 
interference by the executive in the independence of the judiciary. See Ali ran Monthly, 1998:18(9), p. 13. 
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There is no doubt that Anwar, who was neither author nor publisher, would become the 
primary target of investigation at this time.1°3 
No formal resolution prohibiting contests for the top two posts in the next year's 
supreme council elections was proposed during the party assembly. After successfully 
outmaneuvering critics at the crucial assembly, however, Mahathir accelerated his 
counter -attack with the aim of wiping out Anwar. Despite Anwar's repeated pledge of 
loyalty during and after the party assembly, Mahathir's distrust of his protege became 
irreversible. On June 24, three days after the assembly, Daim was named Special 
Functions Minister and given executive powers for coordinating efforts to oversee 
economic development. The appointment of Daim, as virtual finance minister, 
deliberately undermined Anwar's political future as Finance Minister and as heir 
apparent.104 Soon after Daim's return, the tight -fisted monetary and fiscal policies of 
Anwar were replaced by the more expansionary polices favored by Mahathir.105 Then, 
within a few weeks, two of Anwar's strongest allies, Johan Jaaffar and Ahmad Nazri 
Abdullah, were forced to resign as the chief editors of the two major Malay newspapers, 
Utusan Melayu and Berita Harían, respectively. This was followed by the resignation of 
the director general of TV3, the country's largest private television network. All three 
positions were filled by pro -Mahathir figures. This was viewed as a pre -emptive move 
to limit the possibility of an Anwar counter- attack.106 
In the meantime, soon after the assembly, Mahathir shrewdly linked the issue of 
nepotism and cronyism with that of foreign machination to instigate Malaysians and 
eventually topple the government. It was not surprising, then, that Zahid changed his 
stance on the allegations of nepotism and cronyism by being forced to say that such 
practices did not exist in Malaysia.107 Incidentally, it was around this time that 
Malaysia's relations with Singapore were troubled by the issue of the relocation of 
Malaysia's immigration checkpoint in Singapore. The bitter dispute with Singapore gave 
Mahathir an opportunity to mobilize nationalist emotion around his leadership. 108 It was 
103 See NST, 9 September 1997 ( "IGP: Allegations against Anwar baseless... "); NST, 21 June 1999 (Dr M: 
Umno will investigate contents of book on Anwar "). 
104 For more details, see Asiaweek, 10 July 1998 ( "The Return of Daim "). 
1°5 Business Times, 2 July 1998 ( "DPM: RM5bn to revive infrastructure projects "). 
106 See NST, 15 July 1998 ( "Johan resigns as Utusan Melayu editor -in- chief'); NST, 19 July 1998 
( "MRCB announces latest NSTP appointments "). Since the mid -1997 economic turmoil, Johan and Nazri 
openly called for political and economic reform. Moreover, Mahathir appeared to be ill- tempered about 
their extensive coverage of the controversial bail -out of a shipping company controlled by Mahathir's 
eldest son Mirzan. For more details of their resignations, see FEER, 30 July 1998 (Jayasankaran, "Press 
pressure'). 
107 For example, see The Star, 27 June 1998 ( "Foreign Ploy, Mahathir: Nepotism made an issue to topple 
govt. "); NST, 10 July 1998 ( "Umno Youth changes stance on allegation of nepotism, cronyism "). 
108 The relocation of Malaysia's Customs, Immigration and Quarantine (CIQ) operation in Singapore had 
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even argued that the issue would not have reached such an intense level if there were no 
serious internal politicking within UMNO. Throughout August, Mahathir made a series 
of official visits to all states in the name of 'meet- the -people'. Officially, those tours 
were to explain to people the country's economic problems. It was, however, clear that 
the nationwide trips were well -planned to reinforce Mahathir's popularity in the country 
by increasingly appealing to national solidarity.1°9 
In the midst of growing nationalistic sentiment, Mahathir appeared to 
consolidate his grip on power within UMNO circles. In early August, a special 
committee was set up under the instruction of the supreme council. The special 
committee, chaired by then UMNO secretary- general Sabaruddin Chik, was designed to 
propose several amendments to the UMNO constitution. The principle agenda of the 
committee was to review the '10- bonus -votes' system which allows a candidate for the 
president or deputy president's post to gain 10 votes automatically upon securing a 
divisional nomination. Anwar had used the 10- bonus -votes system to oust then UMNO 
deputy president Ghafar Baba in the run -up to the 1993 party elections. Other main 
agenda items of the special committee were a series of limitations preventing new party 
members from contesting senior party posts."° Without doubt, these proposed 
amendments were to further institutionalize the incumbent's advantage in favor of 
Mahathir and his allies. Interestingly, a series of public pledges by state leaders around 
this time gave support only to Mahathir's leadership, unlike the simultaneous support for 
Anwar's leadership in the previous years. 
Being well aware of impending political disaster, Anwar openly declared in 
been a controversial issue as early as 1992. The issue, however, became a bitter one after early July 1998 
as the scheduled date (1 August 1998) of relocation of Singapore's CIQ to the new Woodlands Train 
Checkpoint (WTCP) from Tanjong Pagar was approaching. There were totally different versions of the 
CIQ dispute between Malaysia and Singapore. According to Singapore, the Mahathir government had 
earlier agreed to move its immigration checkpoint to Woodlands when Singapore started to build a new 
Woodlands Checkpoint Complex. But the Mahathir government decided not to move its immigration 
checkpoint to the new place after internally reviewing the issue during mid -1997. Then, Malaysia's stand 
on the CIQ issue became tougher as a number of Singapore banks decided to raise interest rates for 
Malaysian ringgit deposits to attract the Malaysian money to Singapore during the regional economic 
crisis. It was alleged that the amount involved several billion ringgits. For details of Malaysia's version on 
the CIQ dispute, see NST, 1 August 1998 ( "Press statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the 
issue of the Malaysian CIQ in Singapore "). 
109 From mid -July 1998, Mahathir launched a series of nationwide programs, such as the Buy Malaysian 
campaign and the Love Malaysia Exposition. In mid -July, all UMNO MPs, except Anwar who was then 
on official visit to US, pledged their loyalty to Mahathir. See N. J. Funston, "Malaysia: A Fateful 
September" in Southeast Asian Affairs 1999, p. 170. 
115 Along with the review of the 10- bonus -votes system, the agendas of the special committee included: 
(1) the new members have to wait 5 years before they can contest for the divisional level and the national 
Ievel; (2) the new party members have to wait 3 years to be nominated as a delegate for the UMNO 
general assembly; and (3) the one who wants to contest for the senior party posts should obtain 25 per 
cent of the total number of nominations cast in order to qualify. Interview with Saifuddin Nasution Ismail, 
Kuala Lumpur, 25 August 1999. 
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Penang, where he was the UMNO liaison committee chairman, that he would ensure all 
11 UIVINO divisions to nominate Mahathir for the party president. At this time, Anwar 
vowed that he would never challenge the party presidency and described himself as a 
student, whereas Mahathir was his teacher and someone who was more Iike a father to 
him. Anwar, however, did not forget to remind, in jest, UMNO members that they 
should make sure to nominate him for the number two post." As an Anwar associate 
pointed out, this was a telling gesture of Anwar under siege attempting to secure 
Mahathir's assurance for his position as heir apparent in a reciprocal way.112 Mahathir, 
however, paid but little attention to Anwar's request by sarcastically replying to Penang 
UMNO members not to forget to nominate 'someone who wants to be deputy' in next 
year's party elections.113 
Meanwhile on 31 July Nallakaruppan, Anwar's occasional tennis partner, had 
been taken into police custody for questioning in connection with the defamatory book, 
50 Reasons. Though Anwar obtained an interlocutory court injunction against the author 
and publisher on the same day, NalIakaruppan's arrest was aimed at Anwar and his 
allies. On 13 August, Nallakaruppan was charged under the ISA with unlawful 
possession of live ammunition, an offence carrying a mandatory death sentence upon 
conviction_114 It seemed that Nallakaruppan was detained in order to increase the 
pressure on Anwar. Then, the Attorney -General foreshadowed the possibility of further 
arrests in relation to the book, 50 Reasons.115 After that, Bank Negara Governor and his 
deputy, Ahmad Mohd Don and Fong Weng Phak who were closely aligned with Anwar, 
were removed from their posts due to their differences with the government over the 
management of the economy.116 Their resignations, soon followed by currency control, 
were viewed as Anwar's final setback."? Mahathir's maneuverings finally led to 
Ill NST, 12 August 1998. 
112 Interview with Ibrahim Saad, Deputy Minister in Prime Minister's Department, Petaling Jaya, 16 
August 1999. 
113 NST, 12 August 1998. 
114 NST, 14 August 1998. On 7 August, a rumor of riots spread throughout Kuala Lumpur saying that 
illegal Indonesian workers will use parang to kill Malaysians, presumably Chinese, at Jalan Chow Kit 
before their planned deportation to Indonesia on 15 August. The rumor was spread through internet, 
telephone calls and even the major newspapers. Chow Kit was the place where one of the worst killings 
had happened in May I969. And this was the place where a Malay soldier killed a few people just a few 
days before the 1987 Operasi Lalang. In this regard, it was even speculated that the rumor was 
intentionally created by the authorities. The rumor was spread on the same day Anwar denied his 
resignation. On August 8, a Chinese newspaper reported this rumor as a main story while the side story 
on the front page was Anwar's denial of resignation (Sin Chew Jit Poh). In short, the rumor was enough to 
remind the public of the 1969 racial riots and the 1987 Operasi Lalang. 
115 NST, 23 August 1998. 
16 NST, 30 August 1998. In On 1 September 1998, a day before Anwar's sacking as Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister, 
Mahathir imposed capital controls and fixed the currency at RM3.80 to the U.S. dollar. 
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Anwar's abrupt dismissal from office, expulsion from the party, ISA arrest and trial in 
September 1998. 
One day after Anwar's dismissal from government, a special UMNO supreme 
council was called to discuss the matter of Anwar's expulsion from UMNO. It is alleged 
that a few supreme council members suggested suspending Anwar from the party and 
waiting for the court's decision over Anwar's charges. However, as a supreme council 
member claimed, the meeting was already prepared for Anwar's expulsion. It was 
alleged that there was nothing the supreme council members could do to change 
Anwar's political destiny as the meeting had started with Mahathir's directive that he 
wanted Anwar expelled from UNNO. The supreme council member believed that if 
anyone were to object to Mahathir's directive during the supreme council meeting he or 
she would have shared the same fate as Anwar. "s 
Kamarudin Jaffar, Anwar's close confident, believes that Anwar should have 
fought it out with Mahathir by raising the issue of nepotism and cronyism himself, not 
just through Zahid as he had done during the party assembly in June 1998. He argues 
that a direct challenge by Anwar would not have given Mahathir enough time or 
opportunity to plot to destroy Anwar politically by raising the question of Anwar's 
moral misconduct. Even if Mahathir had brought up the issue, it would not have been 
effective in his move to oust his deputy because the conflict would already be seen as a 
political challenge.119 In addition, by launching an 'all- out -war' at the June 1998 party 
assembly, the floating party delegates, or fence -sitters, would have been forced to side 
with Mahathir or Anwar. At least, Anwar's followers may have taken their chance to 
make their stand clear much earlier when they were still in a relatively strong position. 
Other close allies of Anwar said that they were willing to go for the 'all- out -war' against 
Mahathir if an instruction had been given by Anwar at that time. And they believe that, 
if there had been an open challenge, Mahathir's position would have been far more 
vulnerable, considering the leadership changes in neighboring countries in the wake of 
the regional economic crisis.'2° 
Yet, by re- affirming his loyalty to Mahathir during and after the party assembly, 
"s Interview with Ibrahim Saad, then UMNO supreme council member, Petaling Jaya, 16 August 1999. 
"9 Interview with Kamarudin Jaffar, Kuala Lumpur, 25 August 1999. 
120 Interview with Saifuddin Nasution Ismail, Kuala Lumpur, 25 August 1999. According to Jomo K. 
Sundaram, an UM academic who was invited to a closed -door meeting of the Anwar camp in May 1998, 
Anwar's followers strongly demanded Anwar to give a clear indication to challenge Mahathir by saying 
'lead us out of this darkness'. Anwar, however, did not respond positively to their request. Rather, Anwar 
was even trying to explain Mahathir's concerns and persuaded his allies by saying that he could still 
manage the situation. Interview with Jomo Kwame Sundaram, then President of Malaysian Social Science 
Association, Kuala Lumpur, 26 August 1999. 
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the Anwar camp was left completely bewildered. Furthermore, by distancing himself 
from Zahid, Anwar even lost a degree of loyalty from his own supporters. Again, as 
Kamarudin Jaffar points out, 'Anwar was over -confident until it was too late and until 
power was taken away from him. It was because of his hesitation that Mahathir took an 
opportunity to go on the offensive to remove Anwar's power base'_121 
The nature of Anwar's sacking suggests that Mahathir had learnt from his past 
experience with Razaleigh, who had allowed the opportunity to continue to challenge 
him from within mainstream Malaysian politics. In the case of Anwar, Mahathir 
effectively pre -empted any possible challenge from him by sacking him from the ruling 
party as well as the government. Furthermore, the subsequent imprisonment of Anwar 
significantly eroded his supporters' hope of his making a political comeback. By doing 
this, Mahathir not only eliminated any prospect of Anwar's challenge to his national 
leadership but also demonstrated that he could guarantee the protection of his cronies. 
Consequently, the ousting of Anwar from the government and UMNO enabled Mahathir 
and his cronies to consolidate their political and economic revenues without the threat 
of Anwar and his followers. 
7 -6. Changing Conflict Configurations and the Rise of the New Politics of Multi - 
Ethnic Awareness 
Anwar was dismissed as Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister on 2 September 
1998, the day following Mahathir's controversial decision on currency controls.122 The 
very next day Anwar was expelled from UMNO. No sooner had he been ejected from 
the ruling party than Anwar launched a reformasi movement, highlighting the abuse of 
power and corruption by Mahathir's government, and called for Mahathir's resignation 
as wel1.123 After initiating a series of nationwide public rallies, Anwar was finally 
121 Interview with Kamarudin Jaffar, Kuala Lumpur, 25 August 1999. 
122 It was reported that Mahathir offered Anwar the options of resignation from his government posts or 
criminal charges. Anwar refused to resign. Some suggested that Anwar should have accepted Mahathir's 
demand and wait for a future opportunity for a political comeback. Then they remembered Musa s 
voluntary resignation after his years of uneasy cohabitation with Mahathir. Many of Anwar's allies, 
however, believe that Anwar's only option then was to take his political struggle to the people and rally 
public support by highlighting the issues of reformation in the country. According to Kamarudin Jaffar, a 
close confident to Anwar, Musa's resignation was viewed as a tactical withdrawal of 'one step backward 
to move two steps forward' as there was the possibility of a political comeback through majority support 
of the supreme council members. In Musa s case, it was Musa who was on the offensive move. But, in 
Anwar's case, it was Mahathir who was on the offensive. Kamarudin argues that Anwar's resignation 
would have been regarded as a desperate political setback not only to the public but also within UMNO 
circles (Interview with Kamarudin Jaffar, Kuala Lumpur, 25 August 1999). Musa, in answering the 
question of Anwar's possible political comeback after his voluntary resignation, stressed that 'I don't 
believe in [Anwar's political comeback], though the possibility is better than the way Anwar did' 
(Interview with Musa Hitam, Kuala Lumpur, 23 August 1999). 
123 For eye -witness accounts of a series of public rallies in the run -up to the arrest of Anwar, see Aliran 
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detained without trial under the ISA on 20 September until charged in court at a 
preliminary hearing on 29 September when he appeared with signs of beating while in 
police custody.124 Many political observers within and outside the country saw Anwar's 
sacking, expulsion and the subsequent detention as the denouement of a long political 
battle between Mahathir and his chosen successor. Nonetheless, such drastic measures 
failed to bring an end to the political confrontation. 
A Return to 'Normalcy'? 
For a while after Anwar's dismissal, very serious elite divisions within UMNO circles, 
between Anwar's supporters and detractors, were widely expected, as had occurred in 
the wake of the UMNO split of 1987 when Razaleigh secured defections of a significant 
section of the ruling political elites. This time, however, similar fractures did not 
happen. On the contrary, Mahathir actually consolidated his grip on power within 
UMNO by keeping the ruling political elite, including seasoned political figures and 
even many of Anwar's allies, collectively on his side. In so doing, as mentioned earlier, 
Mahathir ruthlessly eliminated Anwar from the ruling party through a well -designed 
special UMNO supreme council meeting.125 By removing any possibility of Anwar's 
political comeback into UNLNO politics, Mahathir could secure almost unanimous 
support of UMNO leaders. Within a few day of the expulsion of Anwar, all UMNO 
MPs, Menteris Besar, cabinet ministers and deputy ministers, parliamentary secretaries 
and UMNO division leaders came out in full support of Mahathir's decision.126 Indeed, 
UMNO leaders, remembering a decade ago and the consequences of siding with the 
wrong leaders, did not want to put themselves in a difficult situation. They tended to 
choose the easier and safer way. 
Monthly, 1998:18(9), pp. 19 -30. A more comprehensive account and interpretation of the Anwar episode 
can be found at Fan Yew Teng, Anwar Saga: Malaysia on Trial (Selangor: Genting Raya Sdn Bhd, 
1999). 
124 Anwar told the court that he had been beaten unconscious by police immediately after his arrest on 20 
September. But, on 24 September at a press conference, the Inspector - General of Police, Rahim Noor, 
had stated that Anwar was 'safe and sound' in custody. Immediately after Anwar's appearance with a 
black eye and bruised arm, Mahathir made a public statement that Anwar's injuries may have been 'self - 
inflicted'. Later on 2 March 1999, Rahim Noor admitted that he had beaten Anwar in a fit of anger. See 
Asian Wall Street Journal, 1 October 1998 ( "Review & Outlook: Malaysia's Black Eye ") and The Straits 
Times, 3 March 1999 (Douglas Wong, "I act along, says ex- police chief'). 
125 On the day after Anwar's expulsion, Mahathir reasserted his grip by taking over the position of Acting 
Finance Minister, besides being the Prime Minister and Home Minister. Meanwhile, he indicated that the 
deputy presidency of UMNO and deputy premiership would remain vacant until the following year's 
party election. See The Straits Times, 5 September 1998 (Brendan Pereira, "Senior minister -type post 
likely "). 
126 For examples of Najib, Abdullah Badawi and Razaleigh's open support for Mahathir's action, see The 
Straits Times, 5 September 1998 ( "Anwar 'improper to attack system"). See also The Straits Times, 6 
September 1998 ( "Umno MPs back Mahathir's actions "). 
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Unlike the aftermath of the UMNO leadership crisis of 1987, there were no 
serious political purges against Anwar's allies, especially at senior levels of the UMNO 
leadership. Nonetheless, this did not necessarily mean that Mahathir's adversaries within 
UMNO were free of political oppression.127 To some extent, this was because what 
happened after Anwar's dismissal was quite different from what Mahathir had forecast. 
In the wake of Anwar's dismissal, anti -Mahathir feelings continued to run high in the 
country, though Mahathir and his close allies had thought that the Anwar episode would 
die down within a few weeks. Given the sensitivity of the issue and popularity of 
Anwar, the removal of more of his supporters from UMNO may have further 
undermined Mahathir's image and weakened the ruling party. The experience of the 
leadership crisis of 1987, during which a significant number of UMNO leaders 
challenged Mahathir's leadership after a series of political purges, made Mahathir 
reluctant to remove senior associates of Anwar within the ruling party. As another 
general election was approaching, those who were to be ousted might turn against 
Mahathir's leadership as such a situation would give them a chance to stand against 
UMNO candidates at the election.128 
Meanwhile, as a way of keeping Anwar's allies on side, Mahathir used the 
impending general election card very effectively. A well -known aide of Anwar, who 
sided with Mahathir after Anwar's expulsion, privately admitted that the forthcoming 
general election was one of the reasons why Anwar's allies, especially MPs and division 
leaders, seemed to distance themselves from Anwar and his refornnasi movement prior 
to and after Anwar's detention. Specifically, those who allegedly associated with Anwar 
feared that even irresolute attitudes would be subject to censure by Mahathir and, thus, 
their names would be left out of the list of candidates for the impending general 
election.t29 Indeed, it is worth noting that Mahathir's government had hinted of the 
127 It was alleged that the UMNO supreme council used various types of action against Anwar's 
supporters especially at the divisional level. These included expulsions, show -cause letters, warnings and 
suspension of membership. A UKM social scientist claimed that over the year since Anwar's dismissal, an 
average of 4 out of 11 UMNO divisional delegates had been sacked or subjected to other pressures for 
supporting Anwar and his reformasi movement. He argues that the political purge after the 'Battle Royal' 
of 1987 was top -down but after Anwar's dismissal it was more from the bottom -up. In other words, 
Mahathir removed Anwar's Colonels and Captains rather then his Generals in the post -Anwar purge. 
Interview with Shamsul A. B., Professor of Social Anthropology at Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 
Bangi, 12 August 1999. For examples of other types of actions, see The Star, 10 October 1998 
( "Sabbaruddin: 20 members issued letters ") and The Star, 5 November 1998 ( "25 to face disciplinary 
action "). 
128 Under Malaysia's constitution, the next general election had to be held before mid -2000. 
129 Confidential interview, Kuala Lumpur, August 1999. In an interview held a few months before the 
general election, the same interviewee predicted a cleanup of Anwar's allies in the run -up to and soon 
after the general election. He believed that only a few of Anwar's former aides would be included in the 
candidacy list for the next election. Even those who were selected as UMNO candidates would be given 
relatively vulnerable seats where they would face very strong challenges from Anwar supporters. For 
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possibility of an early general election immediately after Anwar's dismissal. For those 
of the 'rice bowl' mindset in UMNO, siding with Anwar was political suicide at this 
time. 
Outside UNLVO, there were no immediate or widespread arrests after Anwar's 
dismissal, unlike Operation Lalang in the aftermath of the UMNO leadership crisis of 
1987. However, this did not mean that after the Anwar episode Malaysian civil society 
enjoyed a more open political arena without fear. The authorities reiterated the 
possibility of arrests practically every day following the launch of reformasi by 
Anwar.13° Well before the detention of Anwar on September 20, a series of arrests of 
Anwar's friends and associates was made.131 Then, following his arrest, 16 political 
associates were also detained under the ISA. The detainees included leaders of Muslim 
youth organizations, including Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM, Malaysian 
Islamic Youth Movement), who were perceived as having wide political influence in the 
Islamic student movement.132 In addition, on several occasions Mahathir implied that 
Anwar's wife Wan Azizah would be arrested.133 The selective ISA arrests continued in 
October and November, but expanded from the original core of Anwar supporters to 
those who organized and participated in the reformasi movement. Though there were no 
those whose names were not included on the list, their political future was vulnerable anyway. This was 
either because they would lose the opportunity to stand as opposition candidates as the selection of 
UMNO candidates would be made at the very last moment before nomination, or because they would not 
be accepted among people even though they stood as independent candidates, due to their opportunistic 
attitudes. According to the interviewee, this was the political dilemma that supporters of Anwar still in 
UMNO faced as the general election approached. 
130 Well before Anwar was charged in the High Court on October 5, 1998, there was an unprecedented 
trial by media, where maximum coverage was given to statements made by Mahathir, cabinet ministers 
and UMNO leaders that Anwar was immoral and corrupt. For more details of the trial by media, see 
Aliran Monthly, 1998:18(9), pp. 11 -15 ( "The Rule of Law Under Threat"). 
131 First, Sukma Darmawan, Anwar's adopted brother, was arrested on September 6 for his alleged 
involvement in acts of sodomy with Anwar. Next, Munawar Anees, Anwar's speechwriter, was detained 
under the ISA with similar charges on September 14. Then, on the same day, Anwar's former private 
secretary in the Finance Ministry, Mohamad Ahmad, was arrested under section 117 of the Penal Code. 
After that, on September 15, another of Anwar's former private secretaries, Mohamed Azmin Ali, was 
detained under section 117 of the Penal Code. Mohamad Ahmad and Mohamed Azmin Ali were released 
on September 23 and September 22 respectively, whereas Sukma Darmawan and Munawar Anees were 
sentenced to six months in prison. See "Chronology of the Case against Anwar Ibrahim ", 
http: / /www.hrw.orglhrw/ campaigns /malaysia98 /anwar -chronology.html [Posted November I998]. 
132 The ISA detainees included Zahid Hamidi, the UMNO Youth chief; Ruslan Kassim, Negri Sembilan 
state UMNO Youth chief; Kamarudin Jaffar, the head of the Institute for Policy Research (IKD), a think - 
tank closely linked to Anwar; Ahmad Azam Abdul Rahman, the president of AB IM; Mukhtar Redhuan, 
the deputy president of ABIM; Siddiq Baba, Student Affairs Rector at the International Islamic 
University; and Zulkifli Nordin, a member of Anwar's legal defense team. 
133 Meanwhile, the UMNO supreme council sacked ten vocal Anwar supporters from the party. They 
included Saifuddin Nasution Ismail, UMNO Youth secretary; Abdul Rahim Ghouse, Penang state UMNO 
Youth chief; Ezam Mohd. Noor, a political secretary to Anwar; and Ruslan Kassim, Negri Sembilan state 
UMNO Youth chief. See The Star, 7 October 1998 ( "10 Uomo members sacked "). Soon after their 
sacking, Saifuddin Nasution Ismail, Abdul Rahim Ghouse and Ezam Mohd Noor continued their anti - 
Mahathir campaign in Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines respectively. See The Star, 9 October 1998 
( "Saifuddin vows to continue fighting "). 
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widespread ISA arrests, a culture of fear had already spread. An opposition leader 
commented that 'we, in fact, expect another Operation Lalang will strike the nation if 
Mahathir cannot control the current political situation' 134 As the wet season began 
towards mid- November and the Muslim fasting month approached in December, street 
protests eventually subsided. 
At the end of 1998, having dealt with Anwar's closest allies, Mahathir 
maneuvered to consolidate his power again within UMNO. About one month after 
Anwar's sacking, 17 amendments to the UMNO constitution were proposed by the 
constitutional amendment committee chaired by the UMNO secretary- genera1.135 Most 
of the proposed amendments were passed at the UMNO extraordinary general assembly 
held on 13 December 1998. The amendments included: the removal of the 10 bonus 
votes system; the requirement of a minimum of 30 and 20 per cent of divisional 
nominations respectively for candidates for the party president and deputy president; 
and the empowerment of the supreme council to postpone the triennial supreme council 
elections. The provision of expulsion for life of any party member who contests the 
elections as an independent or opposition candidate was also a new inclusion in the 
UMNO constitution.136 These changes showed Mahathir's determination not to allow 
any possible comeback for Anwar or his supporters into UMNO politics. On 8 January 
1999, Mahathir announced the postponement of the triennial supreme council elections, 
scheduled to take place in June 1999, for up to 18 months.137 This prevented Anwar's 
remaining supporters or Mahathir's potential adversaries from mounting a leadership 
challenge at least until the end of 2000. 
On the same day, Mahathir named Abdullah Badawi as Deputy Prime Minister 
as well as Home Minister. Mahathir's other loyalist Daim was appointed as Finance 
Minister. Among the senior UMNO leaders, Abdullah Badawi and Daim were the most 
anti -Anwar political figures. AIthough Mahathir relinquished two key posts, there was 
no doubt that he would continue to dominate the cabinet. As FEER reported, '[ Abdullah 
Badawi's] government will be predictable, there will be no change in policy, no change 
in the vision. So when Abdullah [ Badawi] takes over, the Mahathir legacy will be 
134 E -mail correspondence with Teresa Kok, then a Central Committee member and currently a Member 
of Parliament from the DAP, 5 October 1998. 
135 See Business Times, 8 October 1998 ( "Supreme council agrees to amend Umno constitution "). 
136 For more details of the amendments to the UMNO constitution, see NST, 14 December 1998 C'15 
constitutional amendments passed "). 
137 See The Star, 9 January 1999 ( "Umno polls put off to next year "). According to the newly amended 
party constitution, The Supreme Council has the right to postpone elections at the Supreme Council, 
division and branch levels. This postponement cannot be more than 18 months from the date on which the 
elections should have been held'. 
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preserved'.138 
In the aftermath of Anwar's dismissal these changes to the political and 
constitutional configuration of UMNO allowed Mahathir to reassert his power and 
patronage within the ruling party. In this context, Case saw that politics beyond Anwar 
in Malaysia would remain almost unchanged as Mahathir appeared to have effectively 
managed the crisis. In his recent study of UMNO factionalism and its effects on the 
system, Case concludes that: 
...while on first blush the struggle between Mahathir and Anwar evokes serious divisions in elite - 
level relations, this break has neither been complete nor without precedent. Specifically, by 
isolating Anwar, Mahathir has regained the loyalties - or at least ensured the passivity - of the rest 
of the elite collectivity.... Thus, if one believes that elite -level relations forge the most critical 
arena in which any meaningful political change must take place, Mahathir's regime would appear 
less threatened today than it was during the Iate 1980s, with the UMNO then splitting evenly into 
rival elite "teams ".139 
From 'De politicization' to 'Re- politicization' and the Decline of Ethnicity in 
Malaysian Politics 
However, what distinguishes the Mahathir -Anwar tussle from the 1987 UMNO 
leadership crisis was that the former was not simply an intra -elite schism- In the wake of 
the 1987 UMNO leadership crisis, the conflicts were all within the UMNO context and 
were perceived as fairly typical, but rather intense, internal UMNO rivalry. The Anwar 
episode, however, drew people's attention from very different levels in Malaysian 
society, especially from the new generation of Malays. Together with the growing 
generalized grievances against Mahathir's cronyism and nepotism during the economic 
crisis, the excessive handling of the Anwar case acted as a catalyst for an unprecedented 
political awakening in the Malay community at large. In short, what happened after 
Anwar's downfall can be seen as a transition from 'de- politicization' to 're-politicization' 
not only in the Malay community but also in Malaysian society as a whole. 
Many political observers believe that if Anwar had been sacked only for his 
disloyalty, the Anwar episode would have been perceived as no more than a normal 
power struggle within UMNO, regardless of how unfair and unjust Mahathir was in 
removing Anwar. However, Mahathir's humiliating treatment of Anwar in public was 
perceived by many Malays as cruel, vindictive, and even un- Islamic. It has been argued 
that Malay culture expects that rulers should not impose their authority by shaming their 
i38 See FEER, 21 January 1999 (Jayasankaran, "Tactical Retreat "). For further explanation of Mahathir's 
consolidation of power through the cabinet reshuffle, see Asiaweek, 22 January 1999, pp. 16 -22. 
139 William Case, "Politics Beyond Anwar: What's New ? ", Asian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 7, No. 
1 (June 1999), p. 15. 
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subjects.14o As Chandra Muzaffar observes, many Malays believe that since the colonial 
period UMNO has performed the role of 'protector' of the Malays. For the last half 
century, this belief in a 'protector -protected relationship' has been behind unstinting 
Malay support to UMNO.141 However, the manner in which Anwar was humiliated and 
the way in which the state apparatus, the supposed -protector of the Malays, was used 
against unarmed demonstrators, mostly Malays, awakened the new generation of 
Malays from 'political hibernation' or 'false consciousness'. 
What may be more significant is the extent to which the political awakening has 
penetrated the rural Malay heartland, UMNO's political power base. Musa believes that 
the issue of Anwar's humiliation was very emotional among the Malays and that this 
emotion cut across social, class and regional boundaries in the Malay community. The 
question of Anwar's innocence or guilt was virtually irrelevant and the two Malay 
words, 'kezaliman (cruelty)' and 'kasihan (pity)', were at the very heart of anti -Mahathir 
sentiment. At this point, it was still arguable whether the widespread anti -Mahathir 
mood would translate into the erosion of Malay support for UMNO. Musa, however, 
made it clear that there were enough signs that for the first time ever Malays were 
starting to distance themselves from UMNO after Anwar's humiliating treatment. He 
saw that this was a clear indication that 'dislike for Mahathir was transforming into 
dislike for UNLNO'.142 A survey, indeed, showed that about 70 per cent of Malays were 
unhappy with the way that the 'old man' treated his chosen successor in a desperate 
situation.t43 Even within UMNO and government circles, quite a few party members 
and civil servants privately revealed their dissatisfaction with Mahathii s persecution of 
Anwar while significant numbers of UMNO members defected to opposition parties)" 
In this regard, an opposition leader stressed that 'never before in the political history of 
the nation has the legitimacy of UMNO as the undisputed representative of the Malays 
140 Andaya and Andaya, 1982, pp. 44 -50. Also see Aliran Monthly, 1999:19(1), pp. 2 -7 (Mazanah 
Mohamad, Can Umno Survive?"). 
141 Chandra Muzaffar, Protector? An Analysis of the Concept and Practice of Loyalty in Leader -led 
Relationships within Malay Society (Penang: Aliran, 1979), especially see pp. 50 -71 and 114 -154. 
142 Interview with Musa Hitam, Kuala Lumpur, 23 August 1999. Musa's distinctive viewpoint on the 
erosion of the Malay support for UMNO can be also found in his speech at the annual general meeting of 
UMNO branches in the Johor Baru division on 19 February 2000. For the details of Musa's speech, see 
Aliran Monthly, 2000:20(2), pp. 7 -10 (Musa Hitam, "What Has Happened To UMNO?). 
143 See FEER, 29 October 1998 (Murray Hiebert, "A Single Spark "). 
1A4 A senior PAS official said that PAS membership increased by at least 8,000 per month. Thus PAS 
membership jumped by 20 per cent in the ten months after Anwar's dismissal. He argued that these new 
members were mostly from UMNO and, more importantly, covered various sections of the Malays, old, 
young, rich, poor, learned and non -educated, whereas the party usually attracted only young Malays 
before the Anwar issue. Interview with Subky Latiff, PAS Central Committee Member, Kuala Lumpur, 9 
August 1999. It was also reported that KeADILan registered 150,000 members within three months of its 
inauguration. See FEER, 1 July 1999 (Murray Hiebert, "Signs of the Times "). 
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been so seriously questioned and challenged'.145 
In sum, the anti -Mahathir mood in the aftermath of Anwar's dismissal was not 
limited to UNLNO leadership circles, as was to some extent the case of the 1987 UMNO 
leadership crisis. This time anti -Mahathir sentiment was widespread among the Malay 
grassroots. UMNO, therefore, can no longer take Malay support for granted. A series of 
political upheavals that developed since Anwar's dismissal reminds us of Przeworski's 
conditions that lead to the breakdown of authoritarian regimes. In particular, he 
emphasizes that 'one would expect to observe mass unrest or at least mass uncompliance 
before any liberalization occurs'.146 As Francis Loh argues: 
The hegemony or ideological control of the government over the public has been broken and 
fragmented. Fissures have occurred. Sycophants aside, the previous unquestioning loyalty among 
the public to the executive or party leaders has all but disappeared.... As never before a wide 
spectrum of Malaysian society has lost faith in many of the institutions of our parliamentary 
system [including the police, the judiciary and the mass medial."' 
In this context, political commentator Rustam Sani argues that: 
What happened to him [Anwar] is a blessing in disguise. If there had been a smooth transition of 
power from Mahathir to Anwar, only the personalities would have changed and the old system 
would have continued.'48 
When Anwar launched the reformasi movement, the objectives of his reform 
movement were somewhat unclear and even self -contradictory. Many of Anwar's critics 
claimed that if Anwar succeeded Mahathir he would lead the country with the same 
system of corruption, cronyism and nepotism as Mahathir has relied on to expand his 
patronage. The argument commonly used was that Anwar started to promote reformasi 
only after his sudden political marginalization and the reformasi movement itself was in 
fact manipulated for his own political ends. Only a few people took seriously the so- 
called reformasi demonstrations, despite increased mass -gatherings around Anwar. 
Others believed that this was mainly a matter of curiosity and, indeed, these activities 
were largely localized around Kuala Lumpur. 
Indeed, as Farish Noor acknowledges, it cannot be denied that the so- called 
reformers, including Anwar supporters, opposition politicians and NGO activists, were 
145 Lim Kit Siang, "The Impact of the Anwar Ibrahim Case on Politics in Malaysia ", Speech at Griffith 
University, Brisbane, 4 May 2000. 
146 Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy ", in Guillermo 
O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (eds.), Transition from Authoritarian Rule: 
Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 50. 
Italics original. 
147 Francis Loh, "A Nation On Trial ", Aliran Monthly, I998: 18(9), p. 7, italics added. 
'4s Interview with Rustam Sani, Quoted in Australian, 28 December 1998, p. 6, italics added. 
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articulating a vague and ambiguous concept of reformasi without setting forth concrete 
programs for reform.149 Nevertheless, it should also be noted that the discourse of 
reformasi became deeply entrenched in part of the 'everyday social and political reality' 
of Malaysia and appeared as a very effective tool for 'political and ideological 
confrontation' in Malaysian politics after Anwar.150 What was perhaps more noticeable 
about the Anwar issue and the momentum of the reformasi movement was its catalytic 
role in 'political institutionalization' of a multi- ethnic consciousness which took a 
common stand against the political hegemony of the ruling BN coalition. 
To begin with, two major multi -racial coalitions were launched while Anwar 
was in police custody on 27 September 1998. First, NGOs, headed by Suara Rakyat 
Malaysian (Malaysian People's Voice, SUARAM), initiated the formation of a multi- 
racial coalition calling for political, economic and social reform in the wake of Anwar's 
downfall.11 This was called Gagasan Demokrasi Rakyat (Coalition for People's 
Democracy, GAGASAN), comprising main opposition parties, including PAS, DAP 
and PRM, and 14 NGOs, mostly human-rights organizations. As a NGO -led coalition, 
GAGASAN was designed to provide a forum for disparate opposition parties and NGOs 
to seek alternative ideas and programs to those of the ruling BN coalition. According to 
Tian Chua, GAGASAN pro tem chairman, the idea of forming GAGASAN as a social 
movement was mooted even a year before Anwar's dismissal when the country 
encountered the economic crisis of mid -1997, though the Anwar issue acted as a 
catalyst for materialization of the idea.152 
Secondly, PAS reacted quickly to take advantage of the Anwar episode. The 
same day GAGASAN was formed, PAS Iaunched another coalition, called Majlis 
Gerakan Keadilan Rakyat Malaysia (Council of Malaysian People's Justice Movement, 
GERAK), whose membership was similar to that of GAGASAN - PAS, DAP, PRM, 
and a dozen mostly Islamic NGOs including ABIM. The PAS -led GERAK, however, 
had a rather distinct Malay- Muslim flavor in its activities in the rural Malay areas. 
While GAGASAN focused on much longer -term objectives, GERAK's agenda was 
directly centered on the abolition of the ISA. Despite similar membership components, 
tag For a distinctive analysis of how the concept of reformasi has been introduced, developed and utilized 
within the Malaysian political arena, see Farish A. Noor, "Looking for Reformasi: The Discursive 
Dynamics of the Reformasi Movement and Its Prospects as a Political Project ", Indonesia and the Malay 
World, Vol. 27, No. 77 (1999), pp. 5 -18. 
15° Farish A. Noor, 1999, pp. 5 -6. 
151 SUARAM is a non -governmental organization committed to upholding human rights. It began as a 
campaign body for the abolition of the Internal Security Act (ISA) in 1989 in the aftermath of Operation 
laLang of 1987. 
'52 Interview with Tian Chua, currently Vice -President of KeADILan, Kuala Selangor, 24 August 1999. 
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the main activities of the two coalitions were distinctive and mutually supportive. 
According to Tian Chua, GAGASAN attracted the urban- based, multi -racial middle 
classes through closed -door meetings, and through its programs and seminars. 
Meanwhile, GERAK, with its strong grassroots networks, aimed at mobilizing lower - 
income peoples, especially in rural Malay communities.153 Neither coalition 
acknowledged formal links with Anwar, though in general terms the formation of both 
stemmed from the Anwar case.154 
Apart from these two coalitions, an amorphous but broad mass -based reformasi 
(reform) movement emerged in support of Anwar. As Farish Noor observes, this 
movement was actively involved in most public rallies in the aftermath of Anwar's 
expulsion from UMNO.155 Unlike GAGASAN and GERAK, it tended to focus sharply 
on the issue of Anwar's imprisonment and sought his restoration and Mahathir's 
resignation. This broadly based movement was led by Anwar's family and his strong 
supporters. For ten weeks after Anwar's arrest, the reformasi group continued as a large 
mass movement, mobilizing grassroots support for Anwar and promoting anti -Mahathir 
sentiment, especially among the urban -based Malay middle class. 
It was only after the public rallies subsided in early December 1998 that the 
Anwar -led reformasi movement was transformed as a formal multi -racial organization. 
This was called ADIL (Pergerakan Keadilan Sosial or Movement for Social Justice) 
and was led by Wan Azizah Wan Ismail, Anwar's wife. The formation of ADIL was the 
first official step by Anwar and his supporters to transform the reformasi agenda from a 
narrowly pro -Anwar one to a broader one of political, economic and social reform. As 
Wan Azizah stressed, the issue was no longer only about Anwar's political fate but had 
snowballed into something bigger that promotes the reformation of the whole system of 
authoritarianism under Mahathir's leadership.156 For a while, ADIL remained a multi- 
racial social coalition. This was because ADIL wanted to attract the support of the 
disparate political and social groups representing different racial and religious 
backgrounds. 
Along with the political institutionalization of social mobilization, the most 
distinctive characteristic of Malaysian politics after Anwar was the changing attitude of 
153 Interview with Tian Chua, Kuala Lumpur, 10 August 1999. 
154 A senior PAS official Subky Latiff pointed out that GERAK had no formal link with Anwar -led 
reformasi movement, though it had sympathy with Anwar and his family. Interview with Subky Latiff, 
Kuala Lumpur, 9 August 1999. Tian Chua also mentioned that the idea of GAGASAN was not restricted 
to campaigning for Anwar, even though members actively participated in the public protests held in the 
wake of Anwar's dismissal. Interview with Tian Chua, Kuala Lumpur, 10 August 1999. 
155 Farish A. Noor, 1999, p. 11. 
156 Interview with Wan Azizah Wan Ismail, Petaling Jaya, 26 August 1999. 
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the Malay middle class. Bell and his co- authors generalize that the middle classes in 
Asian countries are actually beneficiaries, not adversaries, of authoritarianism and 
therefore less willing to promote liberal democratic values.157 Gomez and Jomo also 
described the expanding Malaysian middle classes in the 1990s as highly 'materialistic' 
and unlikely to take the avoidable risks of seeking reforms' of authoritarian forms of 
governance.158 Similarly, in his earlier study of the middle class in the 198Os, Crouch 
assumes that the relatively prosperous Malaysian middle class provided a solid base of 
support and principal justification for an authoritarian style of politics.159 Most 
interestingly, Saravanamuttu's survey of the Malaysian middle classes' attitudes shows 
not only that a remarkably high proportion of the Malays were satisfied with Malaysian 
political system which they considered as just' and 'fair', but that a large proportion of 
non -Malays - although less than that of the Malays - also agreed that the system was 
'fair'.t6o 
The Malay middle classes' attitudes, however, have changed drastically since the 
removal of Anwar. The middle classes were not the main forces of popular upsurge in 
the aftermath of Anwar's dismissal. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that for the first 
time unprecedented numbers of the Malay middle class were deeply involved in the 
reformasi movement. As Francis Loh points out, it was because of changing attitudes in 
this previously pro -government Malay middle class that 'expectations ran high for a 
change of government' in the run -up to the 1999 general election, although for reasons 
discussed later the change did not occur.161 Shabery Chik, special assistant to RazaIeigh 
Hamzah, stresses that the change in attitude among the Malay middle class is not just a 
cyclic occurrence. Middle -class Malays have also influenced attitudes among lower- 
157 Daniel A. Bell, David Brown, Kanishka Jayasuriya and David Martin Jones (eds.), Towards Illiberal 
Democracy in Pacific Asia (Oxford: St. Martin's Press, 1995). 
158 For the analysis of why the middle class did not play a reforming role in Malaysia during the 1990s, 
see Edmund Terence Gomez & Jomo K. S., "Authoritarianism, Elections and Political Change in 
Malaysia ", Public Policy, Vol. 2, No. 3 (July- September 1998), pp. 113 -144. 
159 Harold Crouch, Domestic Political Structures and Regional Economic Cooperation (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984), especially pp. 5, 25 -26. Crouch's observation on the close 
relation between the middle class and regime stability has been evidenced in a series of by- elections and 
general elections in the 1990s, as the growing middle classes became the prime sources of popular 
support for the Mahathir government, despite its growing tendency towards authoritarian forms of 
governance. For the detailed results of the by- elections, see NSTP Research and Information Services, 
Elections in Malaysia: A Handbook of Facts and Figures on the Elections 1955 -1990 (Kuala Lumpur: 
The New Straits Times Press (Malaysia) Berhad, 1994), pp. 61 -107. 
16° In particular, 91 per cent of the Malay middle class 'agree' or 'very much agree' that the Malaysian 
electoral system is fair, whereas 59 per cent of the Chinese and 62 per cent of the Indians replied 
positively about the same question. For more details, see Johan Saravanamuttu, "The State, Ethnicity and 
the Middle Class Factor: Addressing Nonviolent, Democratic Change in Malaysia" in Kumar Rupesinghe 
(ed.), Internal Conflict and Governance (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1992), p. 56. 
161 Francis Loh Kok Wah, "Post -NEP Politics in Malaysia: Ferment and Fragmentation ", paper presented 
at the Second Australia- Malaysia Conference, ANU, Canberra, 24 -26 May 2000, p. 4. 
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income peoples in rural Malay communities through personal contacts and 
organizations, like ABIM and JIM, during the reformasi period and up to the general 
election. Shabery believes that, unless UMNO gives serious consideration of the Malay 
middle classes' change in attitude and role, UMNO's loss of legitimacy among them will 
spill over into the whole of Malay society.162 
Furthermore, a significant number of middle class non -Malays were involved in 
the reformasi movement. Although their participation in street demonstrations was 
Iacking, their voices were heard in promoting the issues of justice, human rights and 
democratic values. Their involvement was more issue -based and multi -racial in 
character.163 In short, a significant section of the non -Malay middle classes, many of 
whom had been quite apathetic and indifferent to politics, followed political 
developments more closely and critically than before Anwar's expulsion, even if they 
have yet to translate their views into action. An obvious example of the increase in 
political participation among young or previously apathetic groups was the registration 
of 680,000 new voters during the 1999 registration period, held about six months after 
the detention of Anwar. This was almost half a million more than the usual 200,000 new 
voters registered per annum. Many believe that the increased number of new registrants 
was motivated by the Anwar issue and they probably would have voted for the 
opposition coalition, if given the chance.164 
What further distinguishes the post -Anwar political situation from the post -1987 
UMNO leadership crisis is that there was no serious racial tension. Obviously, fear of 
racial riots was widespread in the country as Malaysians witnessed the bloody racial 
killings in Indonesia. The possibility of racial rioting in Malaysia was also suggested by 
the mainstream medía, especially during reformasi demonstrations. However, unlike the 
dangerous racial disputes which occurred after the 1987 UMNO leadership crisis, the 
post -Anwar situation showed little sign of growing racial tension. On the contrary, the 
reformasi demonstrations seemed to lower racial barriers between the Malay and non - 
Malay communities. Musa also observes that there has been a considerable decrease in 
162 Interview with Ahmad Shabery Chik, Special Assistant to former Semangat 46 President Razaleigh 
Hamzah, Canberra, 24 May 2000. 
163 For more details of their activities, see Francis Loh, 2000, pp. 3-4. Farish Noor argues that reformasi 
demonstrations were multi- racial to some extent. According to him, those who were arrested and detained 
during street demonstrations came from very wide -ranging groups of people, including students, 
professionals, the unemployed, civil servants and even members of the armed forces. All these people 
came from very different social, ethnic and religious backgrounds grouped under the common banner of 
reformasi. See Farish A. Noor, 1999, p. 11. 
164 The 680,000 new registrants were not allowed to vote in the 1999 general election as the Election 
Commission (EC) claimed that their registration as eligible voters could not be processed until February 
2000, due to the enormous increase in number of the new registrants. 
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racial politics during the reformasi phase. In the past, he said: 
...any demonstration of any nature in Kuala Lumpur or Penang would always turn racial. Even if 
they were against the government, they would burn the Chinese shops. If the reformasi movement 
and demonstrations could be given any significance in terms of Malaysian politics - if there is 
anything that I could unhesitatingly come to [consider] a positive conclusion - it never turns racial. 
It's amazing. In the old days, people would be afraid of it turning racial. To me the reformasi 
movement is significant. It is more issue -based than racial. I'm fascinated.165 
What then made Malaysian politics after Anwar less racial in character? First, it 
should be noted that the general Malay perception toward the Chinese community in the 
1990s was not as antagonistic as it had been in the 1970s and 1980s. This was largely 
because of the impact of the New Economic Policy (NEP) over the past two decades 
and the country's high economic growth during the 1990s. This resulted in the creation 
of a large multi -racial middle class in Malaysian society, especially a large, well - 
educated, young urban Malay middle class, and considerably diluted economic barriers 
between Malays and Chinese. It is significant that young urban middle class Malays 
were at the forefront of most of the reformasi demonstrations after Anwar's dismissal. 
Besides, the non -Malay communities did not perceive the UMNO leadership 
crisis as an opportunity to pursue their own political and social rights, as they did in the 
aftermath of the UMMO leadership crisis of 1987. On the contrary, around this time the 
non -Malay communities were concerned with possible reversion to the politics of 
racialism from what is called the politics of 'developmentalism' and 'cultural 
liberalization'.I66 This was also one of the main reasons why the Chinese communities 
and DAP leaders noticeably separated themselves from the reformasi movement. They 
viewed Anwar's sacking and expulsion as an internal UMNO affair, at least at the initial 
stages of the reformasi movement and, thus, did not become deeply involved in Anwar - 
led reformasi demonstrations. The possibility of collision between Malays and Chinese 
in 1998, therefore, was much less than in 1987. In this context, the recent crisis 
provided little opportunity for Mahathir and his followers to revert to traditional racial 
politics, even though they may have been inclined to.167 Furthermore, the main issues 
following the 1987 UMNO leadership crisis were largely racially sensitive matters, 
165 Musa nitwit, < http:// www. malaysiakini .com/archives_news/2000 /may /may6- 7 /news2.htm>. Weekend 
edition May 6 -7, 2000. 
166 See Francis Loh, 2000. 
167 A Chinese student who participated in most of the reformasi demonstrations mentioned that one of the 
main reasons the reformasi group moved the venue of demonstrations to Kampung Baru, a Malay district 
in Kuala Lumpur, was to avoid any possibility of racial conflict between Malays and Chinese. Reformasi 
people were afraid that government provocateurs might try to burn Chinese houses or shops to turn the 
reformasi demonstrations into racial riots. So they shifted the venue to a Malay district. Interview with 
Liew Chin Tong, currently Political Secretary to the Member of Parliament for Seputeh (DAP), Petaling 
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whereas after the more recent crisis the key issues were non -racial ones, such as the 
abuse of power, corruption and transparency. 
Several other particular factors also contributed to the decrease in racial politics 
at the time of the 1998 crisis. First, the case of Lim Guan Eng attracted wide sympathy 
not only among Chinese but also among many Malays because he had been imprisoned 
for defending the rights of a Malay girl who was an alleged victim of statutory -rape by 
then Melaka Chief Minister Rahim Tamby Chik.168 As a way of promoting his 
multiracial stance, Anwar often showed solidarity with Lim Guan Eng by recalling his 
concern and sympathy for the Lim Guan Eng case well before his own dismissal from 
the government.169 As a symbolic gesture, Anwar signed a DAP petition seeking a royal 
pardon for Lim Guan Eng on a visit to a DAP branch in Kajang during the reformasi 
movement.170 The reduced significance of race was suggested when Malays joined 
Chinese and Indians to welcome Lim as he emerged from the prison on his release on 
25 August 1999. Also, Tian Chua drew enormous Malay support for his active 
involvement in the Malay -dominated reformasi movement. During reformasi 
demonstrations, he was arrested at least four times and emerged as a hero among many 
MaIays.171 Despite the individual nature of these cases, they contributed to the bridging 
of the racial divide before and during the reformasi movement. 
After the removal of Anwar, one of the main factors contributing to the decrease 
in racial politics was the changed attitude of Malaysians toward the mainstream media. 
Until recently, a majority of the Malaysian public depended heavily on mainstream 
media for general information and their understanding of political developments. 
Reporting in the mainstream media, however, was often grossly biased in favor of the 
government and, thus, reinforced and legitimized the established power structure. 
Moreover, the effects of media partisanship were even more serious given the relative 
Jaya, 16 August 1999. 
168 Lim Guan Eng, MP for Kota Melaka and deputy secretary- general of the DAP, went on trial in January 
1996 and was sentenced in April 1998 to two concurrent 18 -month jail terms for printing a political 
pamphlet, 'Mangsa Dipenjarkan, Penjenayah Bebas' (Victim Imprisoned, Criminal Free), criticizing the 
government for not pressing statutory -rape charges against Rahim Tamby Chik. Lim Guan Eng's appeal 
against the court's decision was finally dismissed on 25 August 1998. For the details of the Lim Guan Eng 
case, see Aliran Monthly, 1998:18(6), p. 8 ( "Uphold Cause of Justice "); Aliran Monthly, 1998:18(8), pp. 
32 -37 and p. 40 ('A Shameful Episode "); FEER, 18 June 1998 (Murray Hiebert, "Missed Opportunity "); 
and The Rocket, June 1999, pp. 43-47 ( "Sedition is a serious offence.... "). 
169 In fact, Anwar had expressed his concern and sympathy for the injustice of the Lim Guan Eng case 
during a discussion with Malaysian students in London on 30 May 1998. For the details of Anwaí s 
remarks on the Lim Guan Eng case and his multiracial approach after September 2, see Fan Yew Teng, 
1999, pp. 46 -57. 
1'8 For more correspondence between Anwar and Lim while in prison, see Aliran Monthly, 1999:19(2), 
pp. 4 -7 ( "Anwar writes to Guan Eng" and "Guan Eng replies to Anwar "). 
71 See Aliran Monthly, 1998:18(11/12), pp. 24 -25 ( "Chua Detained... Again "). 
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weakness of, and restriction on, alternative mass inedia; that is, the organs of opposition 
parties and NGOs, weeklies and monthlies. All these alternative sources were both 
financially weak and very Iimited in their circulation.172 The 1990 general election 
offered a good example of how far the government -controlled media would go to foster 
racial fear in the interests of the ruling political elites within the short period of three or 
four days before polling.173 
This time around, however, public antagonism towards the mainstream media 
increased noticeably over the unfair coverage of the Anwar issue.174 The mainstream 
media's lack of credibility resulted in a dramatic increase in alternative media's 
popularity. In particular, Harakah, the biweekly organ of PAS, increased its circulation 
extraordinarily, from approximately 60,000 to 300,000 per issue, in the wake of 
Anwar's dismissal. The total sales of Harakah reached around RM700,000 per week. 
Considering the estimated 200,000 circulation of the two main English newspapers, 
NST and The Star, it could be said that Harakah became a de facto mainstream 
newspaper after Anwar's downfal1.175 Aliran Monthly, a more middle class oriented 
critical publication, also more than doubled subscriptions and street sales during late 
1998 and early 1999.176 Besides these, several new political magazines, such as Detik 
and Eksklusif, were launched and circulated widely around this time. Other political 
material, like videos, cassette tapes and even VCDs were in high demand. Moreover, a 
significant number of internet websites became very popular among Malaysians and 
played a crucial role in promoting pro -Anwar and pro- reformasi materia1.177 These 
alternative sources provided serious competition to the pro -government mainstream 
media since the Malaysian public was very anxious to receive credible news and critical 
analyses of the political upheaval of the country. 
In short, as mentioned earlier, UMNO leadership conflicts are nothing new in 
Malaysian politics; the removal of Anwar, however, acted as a catalyst in the 
172 For a discussion of the alternative media in Malaysia, see Francis Loh Kok Wah and Mustafa K. 
Anuar, The Press in Malaysia in the Early 1990s: Corporatisation, Technological Innovation and the 
Middle Class" in Muhammad Ikmal Said and Zahid Emby (eds.), Malaysia Critical Perspectives 
(Petaling Jaya: Persatuan Sains Sosial Malaysia, 1996), especially pp. I07 -111. 
t73 For details of the role of the media and the 1990 general election, see Mustafa K. Anuar, "The 
Malaysian 1990 General Election: The Role of the BN Mass Media" in Kajian Malaysia, I990, Vol. 8, 
No. 2, pp. 82 -102. 
174 About the growing anger towards mainstream media after the removal of Anwar, see Asiaweek, 13 
November 1998 (Peter Cordingley and Santha Oorjitham, "How the media have fared "). 
175 Interview with Zulkifli Sulong, Group Editor of Harakah, Kuala Lumpur, 27 August 1999. Harakah's 
sale price per issue was then RM 1.30. 
176 E -mail correspondence with Francis Loh Kok Wah, Aliran Exco member, 17 June 2000. 
177 For lists of pro -Anwar and pro- reformasi websites and analyses of the growing influence of the 
alternative media over the public after the Anwar episode, see Aliran Monthly, 1999:19(5), pp. 28 -31 
(Mustafa K. Anuar, "Turning Over ? "). 
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resurrection of Malaysian civil society. First of all, what makes Malaysian politics after 
Anwar different from the previous UMNO leadership crisis of 1987 and its aftermath is 
the Malay community's unprecedented disenchantment with UMNO leadership. The 
other significant change in Malaysia's political life after Anwar's dismissal is the 
emergence of a new politics of multi- ethnic awareness in Malaysian civil society, 
especially among the young Malaysian middle classes. As Francis Loh stresses, 
Whereas ethnicity previously dominated the discourse and practice of Malaysian politics, it no 
longer does so, or at least not to the same predictable extent. Recent developments especially those 
that occurred over the past two years suggest that a new discourse and practice of participatory 
democracy, not merely electoral and procedural democracy, has gained ground among 
Malaysians of all ethnic groups.178 
7 -7. The 1999 General Election and Its Implications 
On 4 April 1999, with Anwar's endorsement and in anticipation of an early general 
election, ADIL turned into a political party, KeADILan (Parti Keadilan Nasional or 
National Justice Party), led by Wan Azizah. KeADILan, as a multi- racial political party. 
Along with former UMNO members, key multi -racial reformers, like Chandra Muzaffar 
(JUST), Tian Chua (GAGASAN), Irene Fernandez (Tenaganita) and many ABIM 
Ieaders, were prominent within the KeADILan leadership. And it was widely expected 
that the multi- racial KeADILan would be situated as a middle group in the coming 
general election between the Malay -based PAS and the Chinese -dominated DAP, just as 
former UMNO- splinter party Semangat 46 was in 1990.179 
Until the 1990s, elections in Malaysia, as Crouch observes, had been perceived 
as just a routine ritual- casting of a vote every four or five years to provide 'a cloak of 
legitimacy for what is really authoritarian rule'.180 Certainly, the rules of electoral 
competition in Malaysia do not seem to be designed to allow the electorate to change 
the government, even though they allow an element of choice. Due partly to the 
delineation of electoral constituencies to favor rural Malays, opposition parties have 
never been able to prevent the ruling coalition from securing its two- thirds majority in 
parliament, except in 1969 when racial rioting led to the postponement of voting in East 
Malaysia. Even in 1969, the ruling coalition obtained 64.1 per cent of parliamentary 
seats in the peninsula with only 48.4 per cent of the total votes cast.181 In 1990, the 
178 Francis Loh, 2000, p.1. Italics added. 
179 See interview with the KeADILan president Wan Azizah Wan Ismail and her deputy Chandra 
Muzaffar in Asiaweek, 16 April 1999 ( "We Want to be a Bridge "). 
18° Harold Crouch, "Malaysia: Do elections make a difference ?" in R. H. Tayor (ed.), The Politics of 
Elections in Southeast Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 114. 
181 R. K. Vasil, The Malaysian General Election of 1969 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1972), 
pp. 85 -96. 
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ruling coalition gained over 70 per cent of parliamentary seats with only 52 per cent of 
the total vote.182 As long as elections in Malaysia are largely contests for ethnic support 
and opposition parties are divided along ethnic lines, the multi- ethnic ruling coalition's 
two -thirds majority in parliament seems to be impregnable. 
The 1999 general election, however, was not viewed as another ritualistic and 
orchestrated exercise legitimating the UMNO -led government's authoritarian rule.183 
Malaysia's four main opposition parties, PAS, DAP, PRM and KeADILan, formed an 
unprecedented and better -than -expected multi- ethnic opposition coalition under the 
common banner of the Barisan Alternatif (Alternative Front or BA). After much 
deliberation, the allied opposition parties nominated Anwar as their candidate for Prime 
Minister, seeking to provide a 'capable' and 'coIlectivé leadership as an alternative to the 
ruling BN government.184 Finally in October 1999, the BA announced a common 
election manifesto and even an alternative budget as the general election approached.185 
Indeed, it was not the first time that opposition parties had formed an electoral 
alliance, as the elections of 1969 and 1990 showed.186 For the first time in electoral 
history, however, PAS and DAP united as a multi- ethnic opposition coalition under one 
banner with a common election manifesto. In 1990, Razaleigh's Semangat 46 had to 
form two separate opposition coalitions; one with PAS and other Muslim -based parties 
(APU) and the other with DAP and other predominantly non -Malay parties (Gagasan), 
due to the mutual distrust between PAS and DAP.187 There was no common ground at 
all, especially between PAS and DAP, except the need to avoid contests with each other 
and they used their own banners in campaigns.188 Even Semangat 46 and PAS could not 
182 See Khong Kim Hoong, Malaysia's General Election 1990: Continuity, Change, and Ethnic Politics 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), p. 15. 
183 Mahathir dissolved parliament on 11 November 1999. The 1999 general election was held on 29 
November 1999 after on eight- day -campaign period following nominations on 20 November 1999. 
1s4 On 20 September 1999, the BA issued a statement regarding its nomination of Anwar as opposition 
candidate for Prime Minister. Given Anwar's six year jail sentence that began in April 1999, the BA 
announced that there would be an interim Prime Minister, if it came to power, and a fair judicial inquiry 
for Anwar regarding the alleged political conspiracy against him. The BA then proposed that it would 
allow Anwar to Iead the country once justice was delivered. For the full text of the BA statement, see 
http: // members. tripod .com /- mahazalimd/220999x4.html. Posted on 22 September 1999. 
i85 For the full text of the common election manifesto, see Kamarudin Jaffar, Pilihanraya 1999 Dan Masa 
Depan Politik Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: IKDAS, 2000), pp. 71 -94. 
186 There was an electoral alliance among the opposition parties in the west coast states of Peninsular 
Malaysia in the 1969 general election, involving DAP, PPP (People's Progressive Party) and the newly 
formed Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia. For more details, see Vasil, 1972, pp. 21 -24. 
187 The opposition coalition with PAS, including other small Malay political parties Hamín and Berjasa, 
was called Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah (Muslim Community Unity Movement, APU). The other 
opposition coalition with DAP, including PRM and a newly formed All -Malaysia Indian Progressive 
Front (IPP), was called Gagasan Rakyat Malaysia (Malaysian Peoples Front, Gagasan). 
188 There were straight fights in more than 90 per cent of the constituencies in the 1990 elections. It was, 
however, widely reported that the opposition parties, PAS and DAP in particular, carried out their 
internecine fight even after nomination day. The voters' confidence in the opposition therefore eroded to a 
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come up with a common election manifesto due to their ideological discrepancies over 
the setting up of an Islamic state. As Razaleigh himself admitted, the two separate 
opposition coalitions were formed in a hasty manner due to 'the need of accommodation' 
as the election was very near.189 It was even argued that the very reason why Razaleigh 
combined with PAS and DAP was the 'political convenience' of toppling Mahathir's 
government, without any long -term basis for accommodation within the opposition.19° 
The preparation for the 1999 general election, however, involved a much longer 
process of co- operation within the opposition, even before the removal of Anwar. 
Especially after Anwar's sacking and the subsequent upheaval, there was a greater 
commitment from the opposition to come up with a common platform based on their 
similarities. This was due to the strong pressure from the grassroots, especially among 
the young generation of Malays.191 Lim Kit Siang also admitted that the opposition 
groups faced much stronger pressure from the people to expand the limits of mere 
liberalization unleashed in September 1998.192 In this regard, unlike 1990, the 
emergence of the opposition coalition came about not only because of the chance of a 
win in electoral terms, but as a response to the new political atmosphere which 
produced a greater commitment to discourse of more open, accountable and democratic 
government, among leaders and members of the opposition parties. Especially given the 
growing mass grievance over Mahathir's ruling style and widespread perceptions of the 
ruling coalition's corruption, political observers viewed the emergence of the multi- 
ethnic opposition coalition as another, but much better, historic opportunity to bring 
about a paradigm shift in Malaysian politics from one of single -party dominance to a 
two -coalition party system after the failure of 1990. At least, the BA anticipated 
obstructing the Mahathir government's authoritarian rule by depriving it of its two - thirds 
great extent during the election campaign. Such deep discord in the opposition was clearly stated in a 
senior DAP leader's remark as follows: 
The 1990 opposition coalition was not a tripartite arrangement. DAP had something to do with 
Semangat 46 and PAS had something to do with Semangat 46. However, DAP had nothing to do 
with PAS for political reasons. So, that was a terrible disadvantage of DAP to be seen on the same 
platform with PAS (Interview with Tan Seng Giaw, Vice -Chairman of DAP, Petaling Jaya, 4 
February 1998). 
189 Interview with Razaleigh Hamzah, former Semangat 46 President and currently UMNO Supreme 
Council Member, Kuala Lumpur, 23 February 1998. 
19° Interview with Ibrahim Ali, former Semangat 46 Youth Chief, Kuala Lumpur, 23 February 1998. 
191 According to Husin Ali, there were a dozen meetings among the opposition parties before August 
1999. But not one meeting was boycotted by any political party and at the meetings the same 
representatives were always present, except twice. He believes that there was a more sincere commitment 
in the opposition's preparation for the 1999 general election, compared to the 'marriage of convenience 
among the opposition parties in 1990. Interview with Syed Husin Ali, President of PRM, Petaling Jaya, 
17 August 1999. 
192 Interview with Lim Kit Siang, Petaling Jaya, 17 August 1999. 
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majority in parliament. 
The 1999 election results, however, did not meet the earlier expectations of the 
BA. Although the BN's popular vote declined significantly from the historically high 
level of 65.1 per cent in 1995 to a more normal 56.5 per cent in 1999, the BN secured 
almost 77 per cent of parliamentary seats. On the surface at least, the convincing victory 
of the BN appeared to confirm yet again the hypothesis that electoral competition in 
Malaysia is little more than a ritual by which the UMNO -led government authenticates 
the legitimacy of its authoritarian rule. 
Nonetheless, the opposition did not entirely fail to undermine the Malaysian 
political order of single -party dominance. A close scrutiny of the results demonstrates 
that considerable change has occurred in Malaysian politics. The 1999 general election 
revealed that a large number of voters were disenchanted with the ruling coalition, 
especially UNLNO. First of all, the BN's majority in parliamentary seats was reduced 
markedly from 166 to 148 out of 193. The opposition coalition was also able to decrease 
the BN's state legislature seats from 350 to 281 out of 394, as shown in Table 7 -2. More 
significant was the major shift in voting patterns among the Malays. Despite all the pre- 
election speculation about how much anti-Mahathir sentiment would be translated into 
real votes, UMNO's apprehensions were realized as the UMNO -led ruling coalition 
suffered serious losses in most Malay- dominated states of the north. As a result, the BN 
lost another state, Terengganu, to the opposition, along with Kelantan. The BN was all 
but wiped out in both states. Moreover, Malay votes went noticeably against the ruling 
coalition in Kedah, Perlis and Pahang. This indicated a sharp erosion in Malay support 
for UMNO, which had been the main contributor to the ruling coalition's election 
victories for the Iast four decades. 
Table 7 -2. Parliamentary and State Assembly Seats Won by Mai or Political Parties, 1995 -1999(1) 
Parliament (1995) Parliament (1999) State (1995) State (1999) 
UMNO 89 (93) 72 230 (242) 176 
MCA 30 28 70 68 
MIC 7 7 15 15 
Gerakan 7 7 23 22 
Others(2) 29 34 - - 
Total (BN) 162 (166) 148 338 (350) 281 
DAP 9 (7) 10 11 (8) l 1 
PAS 7 (8) 27 33 98 
Semangat 46(3) 6 (0) - 12 (0) - 
KeADnan 
- (1) 5 - 4 
PBS 8 (6) 3 - - 
Others(4) - (4) - - (1) . 
Total (BA) 30 (26) 45 56 (42) 113 
Source: Compiled from Zakaria Haji Ahmad, The 1999 General Elections- APreliminary Overview" in Trends in Malaysia: 
Election Assessment, Working Paper in the Trends in Southeast Asia series (Singapore: ISEAS, 2000), pp. 9 -I0. 
Note: (1) Figures in parentheses refer the number of seats before the dissolution of the parliament. (2) Included the BN component 
parties in Sabah and Sarawak (PBB, SUPP. SNAP, PBDS, UPKO, SAPP and LDP). (3) Semangat 46 joined UMNO in 
1996. (4) Included MDP, STAR and Independent. 
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As shown in the above Table 7 -2, UMNO lost 21 of its 93 parliamentary seats 
and 66 of its 242 state assembly seats respectively. For the first time, UMNO took less 
than half (72) of the total parliamentary seats (148) won by the ruling coalition. What is 
more disconcerting for UMNO, its winning margins in all but one of the 59 
parliamentary seats retained by UMNO in peninsular Malaysia were greatly reduced, as 
shown in Table 7 -3. 
Table 7 -3. Winning Majorities in Parliamentary Seats Won by UMNO (1995 versus 1999) 
State Constituency()) Majority (1995) Majority (1999) 
Perlis Padang Besar (82.57 %) 10,070 4,519 
Kangar (78.05 %) 11,000 4,049 
Arau (87.24 %) 6,929 1,586 
Kedah Langkawi (90.63 %) 6,425 6,547 
Kubang Pasu (83.71%) Mahathir(2) 17,226 10,138 
Merbok (55.71 %) 22,201 15,376 
Sungai Petani (58.27 %) 26,221 12,133 
Kulim Bandar Baharu (65.01%) 14,302 8,067 
Kelantan Gua Musang (91.1%) Razaleigh(3) 8,980 2,925 
Penang Kepala Batas (73 %) Abdullah Badawi 17,834 11,175 
Tasek Gelugor (76.6 %) 12,651 4,236 
Batik Pulau (56 %) 30,046 9,434 
Perak Larut (83.25 %) (1990) 10,991 4,009 
Bagan Serai (68.33 %) 6,250 1,584 
Bukit Gantang (63.4 %) 15,154 5,101 
Cenderoh (73.29 %) 11,793 3990 
Tambun (58.62 %) 26,639 7,084 
Kuala Kangsar (64.69 %) Rafidah 10,649 2,774 
Pasir Salak (78.29 %) 17,115 5,045 
Bagan Datoh (56.29 %) 14,830 4,617 
Pahang Lipis (53.91%) 10,113 6,356 
Jerantut (78.77 %) 7,194 1,463 
Kuantan (54.5 %) 23,096 7,361 
Paya Besar (81.93 %) 16,759 3,563 
Pekan (90.88 %) Najib 10,793 241 
Marah (9031 %) 14,046 3,748 
Temerluh (61.3 %) 7,852 213 
Rompin (87.16 70 12,825 6,028 
Selangor Sabak Bemam (74.91 %) 14,452 901 
Tanjung Karang (80.33 %) 15,818 2,075 
Kuala Selangor (56.76 %) 18,342 9,920 
Gombak (75.20 %) 30,878 803 
Hulu Langat (59.45 %) 30,812 3,866 
Shah Alam (60.54 %) 40,715 1,440 
Kuala Langat (53.02 %) 9,211 8,020 
Sepang (55.34 %) 15,669 7,162 
Kuala Lumpur Wangsa Maju (54.2 %) 27,894 5,618 
Titiwangsa (60.4 %) 18,966 1,513 
Lembah Pantai (54.1%) 13,389 1,454 
Negeri Sembilan Jelebu (62.15 %) 2,940 7,119 
Jempol (56.46 %) 15,704 11,919 
Tampin (62.99 %) 23,452 9,979 
Kuala Pilah (75.47 %) 20,600 2,818 
Melaka Alor Gajah (80.59 %) 25,096 12,332 
Baru Berendam (53.61%) 22,325 7,288 
Jasin (67.09 %) 22,128 10,691 
labor Ledang (53.85 %) 23,361 13,507 
Pagoh (60.05 %) 17,599 12,857 
Mersíng (68.49 %) 13,525 10,861 
Pant Sulong (62.94 %) 25,354 17,657 
Muar (6346 %) 9,483 7,182 
Sri Gading (67.71 %) 26,350 17,558 
Baru Pabst (54.91 %) 24,993 17,448 
Tenggara(56.61 %) 24,518 20,817 
Sungai Benut (65.35%) 21,142 20,692 
Kota Tinggi (81.43 %) 33,769 32.161 
Tebrau (50.82 %) 39,140 35,485 
Johor Bam (47.8 %) 34,118 24,558 
Pistai (57.75 %) 29,403 24,568 
Source: Kamarudin Jaffar, 2000, pp. 24-25 and pp. 97 -108. 
Note: (1) Percentage in constituency means the majority ratio of the Malays. (2) The winning majority of Mahathir in 1990 was 
22,062. (3) Razaleigh won as a Semangat 46 candidate in 1995. 
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UMNO's top leaders, including Mahathir, Abdullah Badawi, Razaleigh, Rafidah and 
Najib, showed declines in their winning majorities (see Table 7 -3). Also, UMNO lost 
four ministers, six deputy ministers, one Menteri Besar, several state executive 
councilors and parliamentary secretaries.193 According to Francis Loh, UMNO's popular 
vote in constituencies where two -thirds of voters were Malays dropped significantly, 
from 62 per cent in 1995 to 49 per cent in 1999. Compared to the 1995 elections, 
UMNO's losses in its total vote in selected states were: Kelantan, -6 %; Terengganu, - 
14%; Perlis, -12 %; Kedah, -9 %; Selangor, -31 %; Negeri Sembilan, -32 %; Penang, - 
25%; and Melaka, -21 %. The losses in those last four states were even more serious 
than those of the states in the so- called Malay heartland in the north, though they did not 
result in seat losses for UMNO (see Table 7- 6).144 
The Muslim -based PAS registered major gains, though the election results were 
not favorable for other BA component parties, as shown in Table 7 -2.195 This was 
largely because non -Malay voters largely supported BN candidates in contrast to the 
erosion of support among the Malays for UMNO and the BN. The BN's performance 
was outstanding in most multi -ethnic constituencies where no single ethnic group 
composed a majority. The BN won all but one of the 61 multi -ethnic constituencies 
where Malays comprised less than a two- thirds majority and the Chinese constituted 
less than half of voters in a constituency.196 Indeed, the rally of non -Malay voters 
behind the ruling coalition did much to prolong Mahathir's eighteen -year rule. 
The newly -formed KeADILan obtained only a handful of seats in Parliament 
and the State Assemblies. Yet, KeADILan candidates lost very narrowly in most multi- 
ethnic constituencies and the party's share of the popular vote was similar to the DAP's, 
as shown in Table 7 -4. It was clear that KeADILan's multi- ethnic approach was well 
recognized in Malaysian politics, especially as no political space had been given for 
multi- ethnic parties in the past. DAP's performance in 1999 was no worse than in 1995, 
despite the losses of several of its prominent leaders. Indeed, what happened was that 
the party maintained its traditional stronghold but was unable to attract new support 
from the growing multi -racial Malaysian middle classes. 
193 For detailed election results, see ht tp:// www.spr.gov.my /election95.html. For further analysis of the 
erosion of UMNO in the 1999 elections and its impact, see Aliran Monthly, 1999:19(10), pp. 2 -7 (Maznah 
Mohamad, "UMNO And Its Partners In The New Malaysia'). 
194 See Francis Loh, 2000, p. 6. 
195 Many prominent opposition leaders of other BA component parties lost their seats or failed to win in 
the 1999 elections. These included: Lim Kit Siang, Karpal Singh and Chen Man Hin (DAP); Chandra 
Muzaffar, Irene Fernandez, Tian Chua and Marina Yusoff (KeADILan); and Syed Husin Ali (PRM). 
196 See Francis Loh, 2000, p. 8. 
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Table 7 -4. Percentage of Votes and Number of Seats Won by BA Component Parties 
(Parliamentary Election in Peninsular Malaysia, 1999) 
PAS DAP KeADILan PRM 
17.4 (27) 13.5 (10) 12.3 (5) 1.2 (0) 
Source: N. J. Funston, "Malaysia's Tenth Elections: Status Quo, Reformasi or Islamization ? ", 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2000, p. 50. 
As Francis Loh observes, the figures demonstrated that the support among the 
Chinese for the BN and the BA was quite evenly distributed. For instance, in the 24 
urban constituencies in the peninsula where Chinese comprised 50 per cent or more of 
the voters, the BN secured only about 51 per cent of the popular votes cast, as shown in 
Table 7 -5. And similar figures were found in the multi- ethnic constituencies in 
peninsular Malaysia where no single ethnic group composed a majority.197 Thus, it is a 
moot point whether the BN regained its two -thirds parliamentary majority because the 
Chinese deserted the opposition, though more Chinese did rally behind the ruling 
coalition. The BA's share of the popular parliamentary vote was 42.5 per cent in 
1999.198 Of this, only 23.3 per cent of the popular vote was reflected in parliament (45 
of 193 parliamentary seats) due to the first -past- the -post electoral system. It is worth 
noting that almost 35 per cent of parliamentary seats (50 out of 144) in the peninsula 
were won with majorities of Iess than 10 per cent of the popular votes. The BN won 29 
of these seats. What is more important, the 680,000 new registrants in 1999 who were 
not able to vote for dubious reasons constituted about 7.1 per cent of the 9,564,071 total 
registrants for the 1999 general election or 9.7 per cent of the 7,009,507 voters who 
actually voted in the parliamentary election.'99 As Francis Loh notes, the ratio of BN to 
BA parliamentary seats in peninsular Malaysia would be 73 to 71, if the BA had taken 
all the marginal seats through a 5 to 6 per cent swing in votes in favor of the 
opposition 200 
197 For a detailed case study of vote distribution in a multi -ethnic constituency, see Aliran Monthly, 
1999:19(11/12), pp. 24 -26 (Jeyakumar Devaraj, "What next for the Barisan Alternatif? "). Meanwhile, 
Francis Loh argues that the BN polled only 45 per cent of the average popular vote and won only one of 
the nine Chinese -dominated constituencies where the Chinese comprised more than 80 per cent of total 
votes. See Francis Loh, 2000, p. 7. 
198 N. J. Funston, "Malaysia's Tenth Elections: Status Quo, Reformasi or Islamization ? ", Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2000, p. 50, Table 2. 
199 Figures from the Public Relations office of Malaysian Election Commission, via e -mail from Liew 
Chin Tong, Political Secretary to the Member of Parliament for Seputeh, on 12 July 2000. 
200 Francis Loh, 2000, p. I I. Indeed, the BN's support was noticeably concentrated in several states, 
especially Johor, Sabah and Sarawak. The 66 seats gained from these three states account for almost 45 
per cent of the total parliamentary seats won by the BN in the 1999 elections. See Table 7 -6. 
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Table 7 -5. BNs Average Percentage Vote Polled in Malay Majority([) and Chinese Majority(2) 
Constituency in 1986, 1990, 1995, 1999 Elections 
1986 1990 1995 1999 
Malay 
Chinese 
61.18 
41.09 
54.86 
41.55 
59.25 
53.19 
48.80 
5I.36 
Source: Francis Loh 2000. 
Note: (1) Malay compose more than or equal to 2/3 majority of voters in a constituency. 
(2) Chinese compose more than or equal to 50% majority of voters in a constituency. 
Table 7 -6. Percentage of Votes in the 1999 Parliamentary Election (by State) 
Barisan Nasional(i) Barisan Alternatif 
Kelantan 38.9 (1/14) 61.1 
Terengganu 4I.2 (0/8) 58.8 
Kuala Lumpur 50.2 (6/10) 49.8 
Penang 51.4 (6/I1) 48.6 
Selangor 54.8 (17/17) 44.8 
Perak 55.5 (20/23) 44.5 
Kedah 55.8 (7/15) 44.2 
Perlis 56.2 (3/3) 43.8 
Melaka 56.6 (4/5) 43.4 
Pahang 57.4 (11 /11) 42.6 
Negeri Sembilan 59.2 (7/7) 40.8 
Johor 72.9 (20/20) 27.1 
Peninsular Total 55.4 (102/144) 44.4 
Sabah 59.4 (17/20) 4.9 (37.3)(2) 
Sarawak 65.9 (28/28) 25.0 
Labuan 71.3 (1 /1) 10.8 (28.6)(2) 
Grand Total 56.5 (148/193) 40.3 (415)(2) 
Source: Funston, 2000, p. 50. 
Note: (1) Figures in parentheses refer the number of seats won by the BN out of the total constituencies. 
(2) Figures in parentheses included PBS. 
7 -8. Summary 
The survival of an authoritarian or semi- authoritarian regime may be threatened by 
conflicts within the ruling group. In Malaysia, therefore, a more responsive political 
system could be expected from factional splits in Malaysia's dominant political party, 
UMNO. There is, however, little evidence that the UMNO -Ied authoritarian regime 
became more democratic after the severe factional rivalries in 1987. Factional disputes 
within the ruling bloc, especially after Anwar's downfall in 1998, offer another 
opportunity to revisit the nexus between UMNO factionalism and the transition from 
authoritarian rule under Mahathir's leadership. 
Superficially at least, learning from the experience of 1987, Mahathir made sure 
that Anwar was completely isolated from the mainstream of Malaysian politics. Anwar's 
legacies within UMNO appear to have petered out only a few weeks after his expulsion. 
The UMNO -led ruling coalition was then returned to power in the 1999 general election 
and retained its traditional two- thirds majority in parliament. The BN's victory, 
however, was won at a heavy price, especially for many in UNLNO. The election results 
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demonstrate a significant diminution of UMNO's domination of the popular Malay vote. 
UMNO could no longer take its traditional Malay allegiance and loyalty for granted. 
Indeed, the loss, or at Ieast erosion, of support for UMNO from its traditional power 
base is really something new to Malaysian politics and goes beyond the similar crisis 
situation of 1987. 
More importantly, the Anwar episode and its social, cultural and political 
consequences disclosed a possible erosion of the politics of racialism. What 
distinguishes Malaysian politics after Anwar's dismissal from the previous UMNO 
leadership crisis of 1987 is the emergence of multi- ethnic awareness in Malaysian civil 
society, especially among the young Malaysian middle class. Unlike the previous 
elections, this time voting behavior hinged upon the question of leadership to a great 
extent rather than ethnicity as the central issue; who could run the country with more 
accountable, more workable and less corrupt processes 201 The 1999 election results also 
showed that the BA, as a viable electoral proposition, has a reasonable chance of 
winning in a substantial number of multi -ethnic seats with only small swings in popular 
votes. It would be premature to conclude that Malay voters have abandoned UMNO and 
that cracks have begun to appear in the UMNO -led authoritarian regime. However, as 
Francis Loh argues, the ferment and fragmentation of Malaysian politics after Anwar 
makes a change of government a real possibility with only a small swing in voting 
behavior - a far cry from the situation of the last few decades, when BN victory was 
ensured by the ritual casting of votes202 Shamsul also sees Malaysian politics beyond 
Anwar as the beginning of 'new politics' of 'resistance', concluding that: 
Whatever the future holds, sooner or later Malaysia has to move on without Mahathir, even if 
Anwar is not at the helm. But nobody could deny that the 'Anwar factor' has been critical in the 
making and consolidation of the 'new' Malaysian politics, especially in building a democracy of 
which Malaysians can be proud of.2°3 
It is, nonetheless, worth noting that UMNO has experienced several periods of 
severe factional strife but each time the party has retained its internal cohesion and re- 
emerged as strong as ever. Crouch also emphasizes that the dynamics of political 
202 Despite an earlier anti -establishment mood in the wake of the 1987 UMNO leadership split, the 1990 
general election eventually became a fight over who or which party could better represent the Malay's 
political master. That was why Razaleigh's Semangat 46, after its miserable defeat in the election, became 
a more Malay- centric party by claiming its mission to be defending the issue of Malayness. This finally 
led to the dissolution of the multi -ethnic coalition of Semangat 46 and DAP before the next general 
election in 1995. 
2°2 Francis Loh, 2000, p. 13. 
203 Shamsul A. B., "The Redefinition of Politics and the Transformation of Malaysian Pluralism ", paper 
presented to conference on Southeast Asian Pluralism, ISEC -Ford Project, Kuala Lumpur, 5 -6 August 
1999, p. 17. 
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competition can sometimes lead to a strengthening of authoritarian characteristics in the 
system, as the ruling elites are 'not essentially [responding] to social and economic 
pressures', but 'often motivated primarily by the quest for political power'.204 
Meanwhile, a survey among UKM students, conducted by KeADILan before the 1999 
election, showed that 80 per cent of the respondents were willing to vote for the 
opposition coalition, but only 11 per cent of this 80 per cent had confidence in the BA's 
capacity to head the government.205 As the survey implied, one of the key reasons the 
opposition parties were unable to turn their general support into real votes during the 
1999 elections was due not only to external factors, but also to their own internal 
political weaknesses. In this regard, a question still remains to be answered: will 
authoritarianism survive or will a stronger civil society force change the system? 
264 See Harold Crouch, "Malaysia: Neither Authoritarian nor Democratic" in Kevin Hewison, Richard 
Robison and Garry Rodan (eds.), Southeast Asia in the I990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy and 
Capitalism (NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1993), pp. 135 -157. 
2°5 Confidential interview with a senior KeADILan official, Kuala Lumpur, August 1999. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Conclusion 
This thesis has been concerned with the nexus between a dynamic conflict structure and 
regime maintenance strategies in Malaysia. The central question is how the ruling 
political elite, especially UMNO and Mahathir, has been able to maintain its own 
political hegemony while at the same time maintaining a fairly high degree of regime 
stability. The study assumes that the conflict structure challenging or undermining the 
maintenance of the regime in Malaysia has been changing since independence in 1957. 
And, the period of changing conflict configurations provides opportunities for a fresh 
look at the nature of the ruling elite's regime maintenance strategies in accommodating 
new social and political challenges. An assumption throughout lies in the nature of 
power politics that those who enjoy positions of power in the apparatus of the state are 
unlikely to give up their power willingly. Although the UMNO -led ruling elite has 
adapted to changing expectations of Malaysian society to meet new social and political 
conflict circumstances, the single most important motive for regime change and regime 
maintenance is to sustain its own political power. The study has shown in detail what 
made the UMNO -led ruling elite transform its regime maintenance approaches (from 
consociational bargaining to authoritarian UMNO dominance then to Mahathir's 
personal dominance) and what were the essential elements of these changing regime 
maintenance strategies. 
During the years after independence when ethnic conflict was perceived as the 
main threat to regime stability, inter -ethnic elite cooperation was the most crucial 
element in the maintenance of the dominant Malay ruling elite's power. Accordingly, 
the UMNO -led Malay ruling elite opted for political compromise with other communal 
leaders in coalition government to maintain its legitimate influence over the political 
processes. Although the Malaysian political system did not fully conform to all features 
of consociationalism mentioned by Lijphart, it nonetheless involved the articulation of 
the key ones for the first twelve years of independence (1957- 1969). In particular, the 
presence of inter -ethnic elite cooperation in the Alliance government and sufficient 
rank -and -file support made Malaysian politics consociational during the earlier period 
of independence. Given the intense ethnic and societal cleavages in Malaysia, much 
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writing on consociationalism has been oriented towards exploring how the various 
ethnic leaders were able to reach some measure of consensus to preserve their political 
legitimacy. 
Towards the end of the 1960s, the Alliance -type of consociational compromise, 
however, became increasingly unfeasible for maintaining regime stability as Malaysian 
ethnic society became more and more politicized. In particular, the Alliance's disastrous 
outcome in the 1969 general election which triggered the subsequent May 13 racial riots 
demonstrated that consociational inter -ethnic compromises were less effective for the 
Malay ruling elite as a means of maintaining its own political power. This was one of 
the most crucial reasons for the Malay ruling elite seeking an alternative mode of 
regime maintenance and shifting towards more hegemonic control, which led to the 
unambiguous UNLNO -led Malay dominance during the 1970s and 1980s. During this 
period, changes took place in almost every field of Malaysian society, the political, 
social, economic, legal, and even ideological spheres. The major anti -crisis strategies - 
the Rukunegara as a behavior code for daily life, the amendment and enactment of 
repressive laws, a new development plan (NEP), and the realignment of a ruling scheme 
(BN) - necessarily led to the consolidation of UMNO's authoritarian rule within and 
outside the ruling coalition. To some extent, the rule of consociational bargaining 
continued to be utilized. It must, however, be noted that, during the 1970s and 1980s, 
the political configuration in Malaysia was more and more inclined to shift towards the 
control end of a control- consensus spectrum from near the consensus end. 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the nature of the conflict undermining the power 
and position of the dominant ruling elite changed again as UMNO, the dominant group 
in the government, underwent severe factional conflicts. Factionalism is a common 
feature of party organization, although political parties are often perceived as unitary 
actors in political theories. UMNO's recent experience of factionalism was, and still is, 
not all that distinctive because it had been common enough in the party since its 
formation in 1946. The internal life of UMNO underwent a series of quiet, but constant, 
struggles for the strengthening of factional allies during the 1960s and 1970s. The 
character of UMNO's factionalism, however, changed in the 1980s and even developed 
to the point where the essential unity of the party itself was at stake. Especially after the 
UMNO leadership crisis in 1987, factional rivalries within UMNO circles took an 
increasingly life -or -death quality and thus appeared to constitute a crucial threat to the 
Mahathir -led ruling elite's power. It was therefore a natural step for Mahathir to engage 
in a greater degree of conflict resolution to maintain his own grip on UMNO in a 
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situation of deepening factional conflicts. 
Regime change in authoritarian or semi -authoritarian states has often been 
attributed to divisions within the ruling bloc, especially in countries with a strong 
tradition of single party dominance. Given the closeness and bitterness of the intra -elite 
schism within the ruling Malay elite in 1987, Malaysian politics was expected to be 
much more responsive and competitive. There might even have been a transition from 
'semi' to 'full' democracy. There is, however, little evidence that the severe factionalism 
promoted political liberalization in Malaysia under Mahathir's new political party, 
UMNO (Baru), especially during the period of 1987 -90. 
Indeed, what Mahathir actually did was destroy the existing ruling party and 
rebuild it around his dominant personality. First, Mahathir reduced the political space of 
civil society by using 'self- created' racial tensions followed by massive Internal Security 
Act (ISA) arrests in Operation Lalang in October 1987. Mahathir then drove out all of 
his rivals within the new political configuration. With the advent of UMNO (Baru) in 
1988, new guiding principles of behavior appeared within the ruling party: 'de- 
politicization' and/or 'no- contest' for the party's top post to create UMNO (Baru) as a 
loyalist party. Promotion of these new traditions' was in response to Mahathir's bitter 
experience of serious challenge to his leadership by well- organized factional alliances 
led by Razaleigh and Musa in 1987. The increasing electoral competitiveness during 
Mahathir's early leadership (1981 -87) was gradually, but systematically, restricted when 
he rebuilt UIvLNO as UNINO (Baru). It was only after Mahathir successfully drove out 
all of his enemies and effectively quashed opposition within the new political 
configuration that he reverted to a traditional checks -and -balances approach, but 
without the risk of a leadership challenge against him. After 1990, with his rivals gone, 
Mahathir was able to further consolidate his grip on power within and outside the new 
ruling party. 
The years after 1990 saw an intermittent replay of the key features of the period 
1987 -1990, especially in the political sphere. Throughout the 1990s, Mahathir's main 
concern has been to centralize the processes of power within his personal domain. 
Mahathir seemed to be much less tolerant than pre -1987 in managing potential 
opponents in the ruling party. To a certain extent factional rivalries among the second - 
echelon leaders were permitted to counter the growing pressure of a generational shift in 
the party leadership. Nonetheless, whenever new factional forces attempted to increase 
their influence and thus undermine Mahathir's supremacy, tighter authoritarian rules 
were applied to further consolidate Mahathir's political grip in a more centralized way. 
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The pace of constitutional amendments, including the UMNO (Baru) constitution, 
quickened and the reasons for the amendments increasingly reflected the Prime 
Minister's self aggrandizing motives. The notion of strong executive authority has long 
been enshrined in the Malaysian political system, especially after Mahathir took over in 
1981. It was, however, in the years after 1990 that the key democratic features of 
Malaysian politics were further eroded due to the growing concentration of power in 
Mahathir's hands at the expense of the legislature, the monarchy and the judiciary. 
Towards the mid- 1990s, there was scarcely any element remaining to check the growing 
authoritarian rule of the Mahathir government. 
Perhaps paradoxically, the years after 1990 also demonstrated that inter -ethnic 
tolerance had increased dramatically in Malaysian society. This was largely because of 
the Mahathir government's introducing a series of accommodative policies aimed at the 
non -Malay communities through so- called 'cultural liberalization'. Given the country's 
persistently growing economy from the end of the 1980s, UMNO leaders and members 
demonstrated more flexibility towards the non -Malay communities' demands 
concerning language, education, religion and cultural heritage. The state -driven cultural 
liberalization, however, seemed not to stem from the Mahathir -led ruling elite's growing 
commitment to multi- ethnic nation -building. In all likelihood, a better explanation for 
the shift of ethnic politics in the 1990s can be found in Mahathir's and UMNO leaders' 
increasing confidence in their dominant political and economic positions. It is, 
therefore, presumed that a U -turn involving the retraction of the so- called cultural 
liberalization would be quite likely if Mahathir and UMNO leaders were to face an 
increasingly insecure situation that threatened their political and economic hegemony in 
the near future. 
Moreover, the climate of greater tolerance in Malaysias ethnic politics was not 
necessarily accompanied by greater political liberalization. As mentioned above, the 
tolerance level for political expression in the years after 1990 was increasingly limited. 
The Mahathir regime's ambivalence towards political and cultural expression 
characterized the post -1990 Malaysian political system as 'repressive- responsive' along 
a continuum between liberal democracy and authoritarianism. These 'repressive- 
responsive' elements in the Malaysian political system, however, were not necessarily 
contradictory but mutually supportive for regime maintenance throughout the 1990s. 
The recent factional conflict within UMNO and subsequent downfall of Anwar 
in 1998 offer another opportunity to revisit the nexus between factionalism in the ruling 
bloc and political liberalization in authoritarian or semi -authoritarian regimes. The 
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circumstances and political maneuverings that surround the Mahathir -Anwar tussle 
resembled, to a very large extent, those of the earlier factional disputes in UMMO 
during the mid -1980s and subsequent breakaway of UMNO in 1988. But unlike the 
previous factional conflicts, the Mahathir -Anwar tussle and its socio- political and 
cultural consequences were something 'unprecedented' in Malaysian politics, because 
the Anwar episode was not simply circumscribed as intra -Malay or UMNO's internal 
affairs. 
Unlike the situation in the wake of the 1987 leadership crisis, when very serious 
elite divisions occurred within UMNO circles, Anwar's Iegacies appeared to have 
petered out relatively quickly. Learning from the experience of 1987, Mahathir swiftly 
pre -empted any possible challenge from Anwar by sacking and ousting him from the 
ruling party. Anwar's subsequent imprisonment effectively eroded his followers' hopes 
of his political comeback into the mainstream of Malaysian politics. By doing this, 
Mahathir was able to keep the ruling political elite, including seasoned political figures 
and many of Anwar's allies, collectively on his side. Again, Mahathir retained his grip 
on power and the authoritarian political landscape of Malaysia remained almost the 
same. 
The Anwar episode, however, affected Malaysians from very different levels of 
society. One of the most significant impacts of the Anwar upheaval was its catalytic role 
in the resurrection of Malaysian civil society from 'de- politicization' to 're- 
politicization'. Mahathir's public humiliation of Anwar caused a political awakening 
especially among young -generation Malays. Unlike the previous power struggle in 
1987, anti -Mahathir sentiment was widespread not only within UMNO circles, but also 
among the whole Malay community. Indeed, the most distinctive characteristic of 
Malaysian politics after Anwar was the Malay community's unprecedented 
disenchantment with UMNO leadership. The 1999 general election demonstrated the 
extent to which a major shift in voting patterns within the rural Malay heartland had 
occurred. There was intense pre -election pessimism about how much anti -Mahathir 
sentiment would be translated into real votes. UMNO's apprehensions, however, were 
realized as it suffered serious losses in most Malay- dominated constituencies. 
The other significant change in Malaysia's political life after Anwar was the 
emergence of a new politics of multi -ethnic awareness in Malaysian civil society which 
took a common stand against the political hegemony of the ruling BN coalition. For the 
first time in Malaysia's political history, unprecedented numbers of the multi- ethnic 
middle class, especially among the Malay middle class, were deeply involved in a 
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reform movement seeking more open, accountable and democratic governance. What 
further distinguishes Malaysia's political configurations post 1998 from the post -1987 
UMNO leadership crisis was a considerable decline of ethnicity as the central issue in 
Malaysian politics. The decrease in racial politics, then, enabled the main opposition 
parties, PAS, DAP, PRM and KeADILan, to come together for the first time under the 
opposition coalition, Barisan Alternatif, in 1999. The opposition coalition could not 
entirely satisfy the newly emerging multi- ethnic civil society's aspirations for a 
breakdown of the single -party dominant ruling coalition's political hegemony. The 
emergence of the multi- ethnic opposition coalition and its strong electoral performances 
in 1999, however, prompted a reconsideration of the decades -old hypothesis about the 
ritual exercise of elections in Malaysia, as electoral competition in post -1999 was no 
longer simply perceived as a ceremonial procedure for legitimizing the UMNO -led 
government's authoritarian rule. 
The question then arises. How will UMNO react to this situation to restore its 
predominant political position in Malaysian politics? Will the UMNO -led BN 
government be more responsive to a more politicized public and expand the limits of 
liberalization? In other words, will Mahathir's UMNO be more adaptive to the changing 
expectations of the Malay community and prioritize issues such as the abuse of 
centralized power, the reform of the ruling party, and the change of leadership? 
Some have argued that the ruling elite sometimes concede 'functional needs' to 
transform, or at least modify, certain forms of authoritarian rule into more responsive 
modes, not because of a change in their primary concerns toward openness and/or good 
governance but for their own political survival. In this regard, many political analysts, 
and even some UMNO leaders, suggested that the UMNO -led government and UMNO 
itself needed to be more responsive, if not be reinvented, to meet the challenge of the 
1999 general election. 
Post -election developments, however, suggest that Mahathir is not prepared to 
respond positively to the changing expectations of Malaysian civil society. Mahathir 
continues to rely on the same harsh methods of authoritarian control in handling his 
political opponents and critics. A series of crackdowns on the opposition came within a 
few weeks of the 1999 elections. Following the Home Ministry's letters threatening to 
ban five alternative publications, Harakah, Detik, Eksklusif, Wasilah and Tamadun, 
several leaders from the three main opposition parties were arrested for sedition under 
the Official Secrets Act. They included Karpal Singh, Deputy Chairman of the DAP and 
Anwar's lawyer; Marina Yusoff, Vice President of KeADILan; Mohamed Ezam Mohd. 
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Noor, KeADILan Youth Chief; Zulkifli Sulong, Group Editor of Harakah; and Chea 
Lim Thye, the owner of the firm that prints Harakah.t A few weeks later, Harakah, the 
political organ of PAS, was allowed to print only twice monthly instead of twice 
weekly.2 In addition, the annual permits of Detik and Eksklusif were not renewed by the 
Home Ministry.3 Far from introducing political and democratic adaptations, Mahathir 
appears to be banking on the same iron -fist control he has used in the past. 
This continuing authoritarian trend is not only directed against the opposition 
but also operates within UMNO circles. Mahathir seems to refuse to recognize the need 
to rejuvenate the ruling party and heed his critics. During the UMNO supreme council 
elections in May 2000, Mahathir consolidated his power even further by effectively 
sidelining Razaleigh, his only remaining serious challenger, not only for the top two 
posts but even for the vice -presidency. As for the top two posts, any room for challenge 
was contracted as contests were prevented through Mahathir's no- contest 'advice and a 
subsequent no- contest 'resolution' of the supreme council, despite the party 
constitution's provision for contests. Razaleigh was even put out of the race for the vice - 
presidency as his eligibility to stand as a candidate was rejected by the supreme 
council!' It is believed that the disqualification of Razaleigh's candidacy was a reflection 
of Mahathir's wish not to allow any room for individual threats to the incumbent party 
leadership. 
Many UMNO officials worry in private that, if UMNO does not change and 
respond positively to the changing circumstances of the Malay community, the party 
will lose the strength and values which have enabled it to remain the dominant political 
Karpal Singh was arrested for sedition in connection with his defense of Anwar in court. Marina Yusoff 
was also charged for sedition for comments in a speech about UMNO's initiating role in the May 13 racial 
riots of 1969. Mohamed Ezam was charged under the Official Secrets Act for disclosing classified 
government documents involving anti -corruption investigations on top UMNO leaders. Zulkifli Sulong 
and Chea Lim Thye were arrested for sedition for publishing an article which suggested there was a 
government conspiracy to frame Anwar. For more details, see Aliran Monthly, I999:19(11/12), pp. 2 -6 
(Anil Netto, "A Y2K Crackdown ") and A WSJ, 17 January 2000 (Chandra Muzaffar, "Mahathir's 
Clampdown "). 
For more details of the warning to and subsequent publication limitation of Harakah, see FEER, 13 
January 2000 (Simon Elegant, "Press Alarm"); FEER, 16 March 2000 (Simon Elegant, "Net Gains "); and 
Aliran Monthly, 2000:20(2), pp. 13 -14 (Mustafa K. Anuar, "The Forbidden Fruit Called: Harakah "). 
3 See The Star, 26 April 2000 ( "Publication of weekly tabloid suspended "). 
° Under the newly amended UMNO constitution, an aspiring candidate for the vice -presidency must 
secure 10 per cent of nominations from the 165 divisions, that is, at least 17 nominations, to be eligible to 
stand as a candidate. Razaleigh had received the required 17 nominations to contest the vice -presidency 
but his candidacy was rejected by the supreme council as the nomination from Gua Musang division was 
declared invalid. Gua Musang nominated Razaleigh as a vice -presidential candidate at the division's 
committee with the endorsement of the divisional delegates' meeting rather than directly by the divisional 
delegates' meeting, resulting in a controversial debate over the interpretation of the UMNO constitution. 
For more on the Gua Musang nomination issue, see The Star, I4 April 2000 ( "Ku Li gets ticket for vice 
presidency race "); 14 April 2000 ( "Ku Li poser still a hot topic "); 18 April 2000 ( "Gua Musang 
nominations declared invalid "); and 19 April 2000 ( "Ku Li: It's a game where players are also referees "). 
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force in the country. A senior official stressed that UMNO's problems have become 
much more serious than outsiders have observed, especially after the party's supreme 
council elections in May 2000. He believes that there is no 'will' within the current 
Mahathir -led UMNO leadership to reform the party. But, what is even worse, the newly 
elected UMNO leadership shows neither 'credibility' nor 'will' to reform the party after 
the leadership succession. Abdullah Badawi's unopposed ascendancy to the deputy 
presidency has yet to be endorsed by the party delegates while the election of the three 
vice- presidents was not the result of the delegates' confidence in them, but rather a 
'protest vote' against Mahathir's leadership.5 Indeed, Najib's victory with the highest 
number of votes in TJMNO elections, compared with his narrow margin of victory in the 
1999 general election, suggests that UMNO supreme council elections did not reflect 
Malay grassroots sentiment. 
Will the new multi -racial political configuration and the resurrection of 
Malaysian civil society continue and eventually lead to a transition from UMNO -led 
authoritarian rule to democracy? Many political observers were doubtful about the 
sustainability of the BA before and during the 1999 elections. They doubted that the 
DAP and PAS would co- operate with one another on a long -term basis or that 
KeADILan would remain a multi- ethnic party (without following Semangat 46 by 
returning to the UNINO fold) after modifying its policies in a Malay nationalist 
direction. On the surface, however, the BA appears to be holding together and 
institutionalizing co- operative mechanisms among component parties. KeADILan's 
political future appears to be different from Semangat 46 as it is seeking to merge with 
PRM, another multi- ethnic BA component party.6 It is fair to say that mutual relations 
within the BA have become more stable compared to the period before the 1999 general 
elections. 
For instance, the institution in which the BA component parties discussed their 
common election manifesto and seat allocation before the 1999 elections continues. 
This body, called the 'BA Secretariat', is chaired by Chandra Muzaffar, and has met 
almost weekly, or at least fortnightly, to consolidate the relationships among the BA 
opposition parties. The BA's top leaders also continue their irregular meetings, as the 
'Presidents Council'. There is always a 'pre -council meeting', or at least communication, 
5 Interview with Rais Yatim, Canberra, 26 May 2000. The three elected vice -presidents are Najib, 
Muhammad Taib and Muhyiddin Yassin. Interestingly they were in the wawasan team that Anwar had 
forged in the 1993 UMNO elections, though the current election results did not necessarily reflect support 
for Anwar. It is claimed that Mahathir wanted Ghani Othman, Menten Besar of Johor, and Osu Sukam, 
Chief Minister of Sabah, to be elected but both failed to win. 
6 See NST, 22 March 2000 ( "Keadilan and Parti Rakyat agree to merge "). 
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among the BA MPs before parliament sits, too. Moreover, about 20 policy bureaus, 
called 'Barisan Alternatif Bureaus', have been formed to assist the BA MPs. The BA 
Bureaus are perceived as de facto shadow cabinets drawn from BA's component 
members. Similar local BA committees, called 'Shadow Local Authorities', have 
subsequently been formed in some constituencies. A series of 'inter -civilization 
dialogues' has also been organized by PAS and DAP to foster mutual understanding at 
the grassroots level. Obviously, these post -election developments are quite different 
from the relationships maintained among the opposition parties in Gagasan and APU in 
the aftermath of the 1990 general election. 
Nonetheless, the extent to which the BA component parties have overcome their 
perceived credibility problem remains to be seen. It is also too early to use the 1999 
election result to indicate the direction in which Malay voters are swinging. PAS's 
defeat in the Sanggang by- election in April 2000 when UMNO almost doubled its 
winning margin makes observers cautious about assuming that the Malay swing away 
from UMNO in 1999 would be continued in the next general electìon.7 On the other 
hand, the Teluk Kemang by- election which followed Sanggang proved that the BA 
component parties could still mobilize a considerable vote for each other. For 
KeADILan particularly, the by- election result was regarded as 'a victory in defeat' as it 
sharply reduced the BN's winning margin from 9,942 in the 1999 general election to 
5,972 in the typical multi- ethnic parliamentary seat of Teluk Kemang.8 The serious rift 
between DAP and KeADILan over the right to contest the Teluk Kemang seat, 
however, illustrated that considerable pre -election credibility problems and mutual 
distrust among the opposition parties still exist.9 
It is well known that there was a lack of confidence, and even mutual suspicion, 
within the opposition coalition. In particular, neither DAP nor PAS had much 
In the Sanggang state assembly by- election held on 1 April 2000, UMNO retained the seat with an 
increased majority from 1,038 to 1,963, despite a slight increase in Chinese votes for PAS in this Malay - 
dominated seat. The results showed that, to some extent, Malays had moved back to UMNO. 
8 The Teluk Kemang parliamentary constituency consists of 45.4 per cent Malays, 33.2 per cent Chinese 
and 20.6 per cent Indians. For details on the by- election results, see The Star, 12 June 2000 (A. 
Letchumanan, "Bittersweet result for both sides "). 
9 Teluk Kemang has been a traditional DAP seat and it was reported that the KeADILan candidate who 
had contested the 1999 election had used the DAP banner during the campaign - an indirect 
acknowledgement of the DAP's influence in the area. In the process of selecting the opposition candidate 
for the Teluk Kemang by- election, DAP wanted the seat back as it originally belonged to the party. 
Meanwhile, KeADILan insisted the seat now belonged to KeADILan according to the new arrangement 
made by leaders of the BA's four component parties before the 1999 general election. It was speculated 
that KeADILan had threatened to withdraw from BA if it failed to be nominated to contest the Teluk 
Kemang by- election, though the KeADILan leadership had denied this speculation. For more details, see 
Ng Boon Hooi, "KeADILan, not DAP, to contest Teluk Kemang ", 16 May 2000, Malaysiakini.com. 
<http: / /www. malaysiakíní. com/archive_ne ws /2000 /may /may 16 /news3. httn>. 
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confidence in the sustainability of KeADILan beyond the 1999 elections. More 
importantly, the two main opposition parties were reluctant to see the emergence of the 
multi- ethnic KeADILan as a viable alternative opposition force. Previously, Malays had 
only PAS as an alternative to UMNO, whereas the Chinese had to accept DAP when 
they supported the opposition. In 1990 Razaleigh's Semangat 46 was regarded as an 
alternative for the Malays but not the Chinese. However, the formation of KeADILan 
with its strong multi- ethnic character seemed to provide both Malays and Chinese with 
an alternative. Especially for young urban -based Chinese, KeADILan was viewed as a 
viable alternative force. Given that the DAP is facing problems attracting support from 
the younger generation, the emergence of KeADILan as a third opposition party posed a 
long -term threat to the DAP. The situation was more or less the same with the PAS. In 
fact, PAS was not really pleased with the formation of KeADILan from the very 
beginning. This was why both DAP and PAS were so reluctant to give any promising 
seat to KeADILan when the BA negotiated seat allocations in the run -up to the 1999 
general election. In this regard, it can be argued that the two existing parties perceive 
KeADILan as a bigger enemy than the ruling coalition in the Ionger term if KeADILan 
survives with its multi -ethnic character. Some even believe that the two parties, or at 
Ieast their top leaders, were more interested in consolidating their power bases within 
the current system of racial politics than changing the structure of the Malaysian 
political system itself toward a new politics of multi -racialism. 
The Anwar episode and its social, cultural and political consequences helped to 
create a more promising climate for the emergence of a third force in Malay politics as 
well as for non -Malays. However, especially in opposition politics, whether PAS and 
DAP would allow KeADILan to extend its influence as a third political force remains to 
be seen. There is no doubt that KeADILan has to overcome its internal weaknesses of 
membership and leadership. The new party has to prove its own strength. Nevertheless, 
it is also worth noting that PAS and DAP have tended to sideline or ignore KeADILan 
in various ways.10 Interestingly, it is well known that DAP and PAS enjoy a better 
relationship with each other compared to their relationships with KeADILan and PRM 
since the 1999 general election. 
It became clear that the social, political and circumstantial conditions induced by 
the Anwar episode have put the sustainability of authoritarian forms of governance in 
i° For example, it is claimed that DAP sometimes bypassed the BA structure and sent its officials to meet 
the Terengganu and Kelantan state government leaders to discuss the latters' policies on non -Muslims. 
And the two main inter -civilization dialogues were organized in January and March 2000 only between 
DAP and PAS, excluding KeADILan. 
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Malaysia in doubt. Case notes that the 'resurrection of civil society, a promise of 
popular upsurge, and the enhanced prospects for democracy will constitute the most 
important changes in Malaysia's political Iife after the removal of Anwar'.1t However, 
as O'Donnell and Schmitter emphasize, enhanced favorable circumstances for a new 
political order are 'by no means a constant'. The euphoria of a transition can easily 
subside when a majority of the people become more keen on a 'new social order'.12 
Furthermore, the discourse of a new social or political order has often become a 
principal justification for imposition of a new authoritarian form of governance in many 
previously authoritarian or semi -authoritarian countries. 
Until recently, Mahathir has challenged the discourse of political liberalization 
by arguing that Western -style democratic values are inappropriate in the socio -politicaI 
cultures of Asian countries that stress conformity, consensus and communal loyalty 
over confrontational forms of politics. Such arguments about 'Asian values' place 
Malaysia's politicaI system as a form of 'semi-democracy', 'quasi- democracy, 'coercive - 
consociationalism', 'soft -authoritarianism' or 'state -led democracy'. However, the 
Mahathir government is now facing increasing challenges to expand the boundaries of 
liberalization and limited democracy. There is no denying that the sharp erosion of 
Malay support for ÜNL O creates high expectations of a shift away from Mahathir's 
style of authoritarian rule. Many political observers inside and outside UMNO caution 
that UMNO should take the resurrection of civil society and its pressures for reformasi 
seriously. Failing that, the possibility of breakdown of the ruling bloc could become a 
reality. 
The Anwar episode and subsequent political upheaval, indeed, gave rise to a 
momentum and some of the favorable conditions for a transition from authoritarian to 
democratic rule in Malaysia. However, successful democratic transition in any society 
cannot be explained merely by a context favorable to democratization. Furthermore, the 
breakdown of an authoritarian regime does not necessarily lead to the establishment of 
certain democratic forms of governance. Rather, the regime can often be transformed 
into an 'uncertain something else'. Transitions can possibly develop into 'the instauration 
of a political democracy', but can also give way to 'the restoration of a new, and 
possibly more severe, form of authoritarian rule'.13 In Malaysia, the ruling political elite 
11 William Case, "Politics Beyonds Anwar: What's New ? ", Asian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 7, 
No. 1, 1999, p. 7. 
12 Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative 
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Balimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1986), p. 54. 
13 O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p. 3. 
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has shown considerable capacity to make effective political adaptations, through both 
coercive and co- optive means, in order to safeguard their own political survival despite 
desperate crisis situations - as shown in the wake of the Ieadership crisis of 1987. It is 
also worth noting that UMNO has successfully adapted to a series of internal and 
external crisis circumstances and continues to re- emerge as strong as ever at the national 
and state levels. The crucial questions faced by the BA parties, individually and 
collectively, are how to overcome their 'defensive mentalities' and develop convincing 
alternative political programs to promote voters' confidence in the opposition in the 
foreseeable future. 
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